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This book began with a puzzle. Asked to speak at a 2007 memorial conference in James W. Carey’s honor, I wrestled for months with his oddly shaped reputation. Unquestionably prominent within the American field of communication research, he was virtually unknown beyond its borders. For communication scholars Carey remained, in C. Wright Mills’ sense, a name that needs no explanation. For everyone else—even researchers in allied fields like film studies or the sociology of culture—his writing barely registered.

For me the puzzle was direct and personal. I was one of Carey’s graduate students—his last, in fact. He chaired my dissertation defense the month before he died. Because he was ailing in his final years, I rarely saw him, but felt his presence in the gauzier sense I evoke in the book. As for so many others, I have a hard time accounting for the particulars of his influence. Surely his career-long preoccupation with the history of the field left an imprint, though even here my interest centered on his disciplinary story-telling, rather than his historian’s craft as such.

In a way, then, this book is an attempt to understand the unusual if also undeniable significance that Carey holds for so many communication scholars, myself included. Another way of saying this is that the book—which traces Carey’s thought from his graduate school days through to the 1989 publication
of his reputation-sealing collection *Communication as Culture*—is an extended tribute to his legacy.

The book is not a full-fledged intellectual biography. Carey certainly deserves such a study, but space constraints and the limited scope of the project—in both chronological and thematic terms—dictated a more modest approach. Carey’s papers and other archival materials are only sparingly cited, and interviews with colleagues and graduate students were mainly used to supplement an otherwise publication-dependent narrative. His teaching, administration and public speaking do surface in these chapters, but receive nowhere near the focused attention they deserve. And his intellectual friendships with figures like the economist Julian Simon are merely flagged—an especially costly omission, since Carey conceived of, and enacted, intellectual life as a conversation. Perhaps this book’s narrow focus—on the dynamics of reputation and relative field prestige, as illustrated by *Communication as Culture*’s backstory—excuses these deficiencies.

David W. Park’s invitation got the project started, though it was his thoughtful editing, unwavering patience, and treasured friendship that ensured its completion. I am grateful to Sue Curry Jansen, Steve Jones, David Paul Nord, Joli Jensen, Andie Tucher, Deb Lubken, and Norman Sims for reading and commenting on chapters. Special thanks to Norman Sims, David Thorburn, Larry Grossberg, John Nerone, Steve Jones, and Lisa Freeman for their interviews. Deserving of thanks, too, are Barbie Zelizer and the Annenberg Scholars program at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, where I delivered an early version of the book’s argument. Brooke Duffy, the world’s best scholar-friend, helped prop up my morale and keep me laughing. My Muhlenberg College colleagues, especially Sue Curry Jansen, Amy Corbin, Elizabeth Nathanson, and John Sullivan, read bits of the manuscript along the way, and supplied helpful feedback.

The deepest thanks to my wife, Karen Beck Pooley. There would be no book without her support and sacrifices.
James W. Carey, born in 1934 to a working-class family, was by the time of his 2006 death a towering figure in U.S. communication research. His intellectual contributions came from the outside: He made his career as a critic of the discipline’s scientific pretensions, in a series of impossibly eloquent essays published in the 1970s and 1980s. As collected in his 1989 *Communication as Culture*, these essays opened up intellectual space for a different kind of scholarship.¹

Yet Carey conducted almost no empirical research, nor was he a systematic theorist. He did not groom a school of devoted followers, and he left behind nothing like a blueprint for overhauling the discipline. He never published a book-length study.

He was, instead, preoccupied by a handful of more-or-less stable themes: an extended plea for a verstehen-style reconstruction of the meanings humans make through communication; a related concern with expressive culture and social order; meditations on public life and journalism’s proper place within it; and the linked claim that Western societies are biased toward extensions in space.

A major aim of this book is to elucidate these themes in Carey’s work. And yet their substance, as argument and scholarship, only go so far in ac-
counting for his enormous stature within U.S. communication research. It’s true that his prominent posts at Illinois and Columbia helped to transmit his ideas, but that’s not nearly enough to explain his superlative fame. Carey had become, by the 1990s, a fixture on the field’s introductory syllabi, a one-man paradigm called on to orient students. Nearly every mass communication textbook published since 1990 at least glosses his thinking.

Consider, too, the dozens of memorials published in the years following his death, many written by former students. No other figure in the history of communication research has been honored in memory like Carey. A number of these short essays openly grapple with a paradox: Carey was deeply important to me, the former student writes, but I have a hard time pinpointing the stuff of influence itself. Many of these tributes cite, instead, Carey’s mesmerizing lecture style, or broader traits like his intellectual curiosity.

So it’s not Carey as thinker, nor Carey as dean—nor even Carey as teacher, at least in the conventional sense of passed-along knowledge—that makes sense of his place in the field’s consciousness. To get the full picture, we need to grasp Carey as talisman—as a walking symbol for the life of the mind. His example as an intellectual resonated with graduate students and young scholars making their way in a discipline with few such models.

The contrast with the discipline was crucial: Carey’s qualities, attractive on their own, acquired their special appeal when set in relief against the normal-science desiccation of most communication research. And his was not a dissent from nowhere. He issued his critique-by-example from an intellectual space—the humanities and humanistic social sciences, and even little-magazine literary culture—with its own form of authority and gravitas.

For communication scholars, Carey enacted an alternative ideal of academic identity. In place of regression analysis and CV-padding, he substituted the Kenyon Review and the old saw. He was a craftsman-essayist, joyfully indifferent to the conventions of APA citation norms. His writing—urbane but unpretentious—was an implied rebuke to the leaden prose that filled the discipline’s journals. In person, and especially on the conference stage, he was a captivating presence—noteless erudition crossed with gesticulating eccentricity. On the page, in the classroom, even at the bar, he mixed a storyteller’s wit with a commitment to intellectual life as a genuine conversation. He modeled, in short, a tweedy, high-minded alternative to the professional social scientist’s cross-tabulated careerism.

It is telling that the negative side of his project—the critique of the discipline’s scientism—proved far more influential than his positive program for
an interpretivist cultural studies. Carey identified, then named, then lanced that fraction of communication studies tethered to a self-image modeled on the natural sciences. The authority of his brief against scientism can be read in identity terms: here was a dressing-down of “behaviorism”, “positivism”, and the “effects tradition”, narrated in sweeping, binary terms and backed by the quoted wisdom of humanities-oriented eminences like Clifford Geertz and Richard Rorty. Even those who never adopted the positive side of his thinking came to embrace (or reject) him as a totem of anti-positivism.

As Carey himself often observed, though not in this context, identity normally coheres in opposition to some “other”. In academic life—especially in the last 40 years, as tied to wider cultural trends—many scholars have come to define themselves against a “mainstream” other. Because Carey modeled academic life as a (humanistic) vocation, and because he told such good stories about the bankruptcy of positive science, he resonated with generations of younger scholars and graduate students who were, with his help, fashioning their own intellectual self-concepts.

**Disciplinary Prestige**

So Carey was a giant figure within communication research, and his name is still getting regularly invoked. Perhaps more surprising is his invisibility outside the field. Even scholars working in cognate areas like film studies or the sociology of culture are ignorant of Carey and his work. Bring him up, and you are likely to get blank stares or puzzled allusions to comedic acting. This book is a sustained attempt to account for Carey’s lopsided stature.

One obvious explanation I considered was disciplinary chauvinism. Siloed in sub-fields, most scholars fail to notice the vast majority of their own discipline’s research, let alone work from adjacent fields. But the sheer size of Carey’s recognition gap—blinding in-field renown, total obscurity without—was one hint that inter-disciplinary indifference was not the main story.

Another clue was that Carey built his reputation not in the U.S. discipline’s center—such as it was—but instead along its periphery. He was known for, and known by, his broad reading outside communication research. He spoke in the language of sociology, philosophy and literature, and positioned his thought as part of that broader conversation. Yet sociologists and philosophers weren’t the ones listening. Communication scholars were—and with rapt attention. Carey’s position on the field’s margins, in other words, seemed...
enhance his appeal. He was, in effect, rewarded for his distance from the discipline’s center—but still invisible to his would-be conversants outside the field. Something else was going on.

The key to understanding Carey’s case, I came to believe, was communication’s status problem—its place in what I began to think of as the topography of disciplinary prestige. Youthful, polyglot in origin, and exiled to the university’s professional-school margins, U.S. communication research is routinely dismissed as a lightweight latecomer with a vocational handicap. Even departments, like sociology, that suffer in the university’s prestige hierarchy are comparatively advantaged over their colleagues across campus in the speech department or journalism school.

Communication’s lowly perch has provoked regular cycles of soul-searching and pleas for disciplinary self-assertion. But the reasons for the field’s weak standing in the university’s prestige economy cut deep. “Communication”, as an organized academic enterprise, was jerrybuilt atop a motley cluster of barely compatible, legitimacy-starved skills-training traditions.

In topographic terms, then, communication studies sits in a depression, surrounded—if not by peaks—then by the foothills of the social sciences and humanities. The metaphor, overwrought as it is, helps to vivify the effects of prestige on the circulation of ideas. If the prestige disparities are big enough, intellectual currents tend to run in just one direction. In the case of communication research, concepts and tools flow in from sociology, political science and other surrounding fields. Only rarely do communication scholars’ ideas win the upstream struggle back to the source.

These prestige dynamics, I argue, help to make sense of Carey’s reputation. He was a border-dwelling importer, a skilled exegete and creative synthesizer who translated ideas from surrounding, higher-status fields. His eloquent, field-specific critique of scientism, for example, was a re-narration of the arguments of high-profile dissenters like Rorty and Geertz.

It was Carey’s position upstream from the field that, more than anything, helps to explain his recognition gap. On the one hand he benefitted from his location, accruing intellectual capital from the high-prestige fields of origin. The poorly defined and weakly policed disciplinary center was itself a product, to some degree at least, of the same centrifugal pull. On the other hand, his one-way brokerage—his identity as a communication scholar addressing the field—meant that he suffered the same fate as his colleagues. In the balance of intellectual trade, communication studies is not merely a net importer, but something closer to the Hotel California: ideas flow in, but they can never leave.
Carey’s prominence, in short, depended on his location on the borderlands of higher-status fields. The particular contours of U.S. communication research—as shaped, in part, by relative prestige—made for an especially propitious reception.

The Field

The legitimacy problems of U.S. communication research derive, in a fundamental sense, from the discipline’s double mission as an academic field whose teaching, student enrollments, and raison d’être are grounded in vocational skills training. As British scholar Jeremy Tunstall observed over 30 years ago, in an essay titled “The Trouble with U.S. Communication Research”, the “fact that a single individual can teach courses in, say, magazine editing and research techniques in social psychology is a tribute to human adaptability, not to a well-conceived academic discipline”. The fateful marriage of skills and analysis was consummated in the discipline’s formative years, and exacted a reputational price from the beginning. An array of attendant and follow-on traits of the field—along with self-feeding dynamics—have secured the discipline’s place on the professional-school margins of the U.S. university system.

Beginning in the late 1940s through the 1960s, a loose, interdisciplinary field of social scientists working on “communication” topics was largely replaced by newly established programs in professional schools of journalism and speech departments. Both fields converged on the “communication” label as a response to their insecure place in the rapidly changing, post-World War II research university.

On both tracks—journalism schools and speech departments—traditional instruction in applied skills was awkwardly merged with scholarship. Both the journalism- and speech-derived ends of the “communication” discipline prospered in the balance of the 20th century, at least as measured by faculty hiring and student enrollments. But the discipline’s relative prosperity—a product, in truth, of the demand for vocational training—could not dispel the mission incoherence institutionalized by the field’s founders.

A number of factors, set in motion by the discipline’s institutional history, have contributed to U.S. communication research’s sustained and intractable legitimacy crisis. Taken together, these factors have opened up a yawning prestige gap between communication and adjacent disciplines.
1. Professional/academic double mission: Most communication departments are in the business of skills training, with academic analysis as a significant but secondary focus. The curricula of these programs reflect their roots in applied journalism and speech courses. Journalism-derived programs train journalists and related trades like advertising and public relations, while speech-oriented departments provide instruction in public speaking (and, often, acting and broadcasting). These units were established with this skills provision in mind, and ongoing and intense student demand merely reinforces that original charge. Especially in the case of journalism-derived departments, media-analysis coursework and faculty subsist as a kind of academic appendage on these programs’ core, history- and enrollment-driven mission to train media workers. The resulting schizophrenia—academic research and coursework in awkward co-habitation with vocational training—contributed to a pervasive sense of incoherency, which other scholars in the university, and even the educated public, detect.

2. Suspect professional status: All professional-academic disciplines arguably incur a reputational cost for their applied components. But unlike, say, law or medicine—professions with well-established scholarly traditions, histories of aggressive boundary work, and legal licensure—journalism’s professional status is questionable at best. The claims for advertising and public relations are weaker still. And very few indeed would assert that public speaking constitutes a bona fide profession. The promise of communication education is vocational training and gainful employment, not professional status. In that respect, communication programs resemble business schools—but without the economists and plush carpeting. One byproduct is lower esteem for communication programs within the academy.

3. Late-arriving: Academic units carrying the “communication” label arrived relatively late, with the first doctoral programs appearing in the late 1940s. Communication research has a long past, but a short history: scholarship in speech, rhetoric, journalism and other media topics predated the establishment of formal degree programs. But this work was produced under the sponsorship of fledgling speech and journalism programs, or else within the established social sciences and humanities. As an organized discipline with a recognized identity, communication research is a relative newcomer. Even though the other social sciences were differentiated, in the U.S. case, a mere 50 years earlier, the relative youth of communication has compounded the discipline’s legitimacy challenges.
4. Nomenclature: A related problem for the new discipline was the word “communication” itself—its novelty but also its nebulousness. References in English to “communication research” only begin to appear in the late 1930s, in the run-up to U.S. involvement in World War II.\(^3\) The term was in relatively wide circulation during and especially after the war, on through the 1950s—but as a label for an interdisciplinary field of psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists. Once claimed by journalism schools and, slightly later, speech programs, the term’s referent became increasingly vague. Especially in the hands of disciplinary entrepreneurs like Wilbur Schramm, the label’s sheer capaciousness—its seeming claim to all of human interaction—opened up a gap between the organized field’s scholarship, on the one hand, and the term’s undefined but expansive reach, on the other. In this light John Durham Peters has referred to U.S. communication research an academic Taiwan, claiming all of China while confined to a small island.\(^4\)

5. Two (or more) tracks: As we have seen, the U.S. communication discipline was erected upon two major pre-existing traditions, speech and journalism—both of which converged on “communication” for somewhat opportunistic reasons. In practice this has meant that many large U.S. universities have at least two schools or departments—and often many more—that carry “communication” in their name. The subsequent emergence of “indigenous” programs without professional ancestry as well as humanities-oriented film studies programs have contributed to the confusion. That motley appearance has only worsened over time, given name changes, administrative realignments, and the sometimes fierce enmity between rival units on a single campus. One result is that the U.S. discipline supports four large professional associations that claim jurisdiction over the field as a whole. For outsiders this madcap scene provokes understandable head-scratching.

6. On the campus periphery: Though some speech-oriented communication departments are housed within their universities’ arts and sciences faculties, most U.S. communication programs exist as stand-alone schools or colleges. In practice this means that most programs are segregated from the other social science and humanities disciplines in both administrative and physical terms. The arts and sciences faculties, especially for their constituent scholars, remain the symbolic (and often geographic) center of the U.S. university, committed (in theory at least) to the academy’s traditional truth-seeking mission. By contrast, professional units like communication—but also education, business, and architecture—are often viewed as questionably academic impostors that threaten to
corrode the university tradition. Stand-alone communication programs, housed in their own buildings on the edge of campus, act as a brick-and-mortar drag on the discipline’s legitimacy.

7. Midwestern state universities: For some of the same reasons, most early programs were established in large Midwestern land-grant universities, like Illinois, Iowa and Michigan State. Land-grant institutions, by design, were more receptive to applied education, and remain host to many of the country’s leading departments and schools today. With only a pair of exceptions, the elite private universities on the Eastern seaboard have shunned the discipline altogether. The absence of organized communication programs at Harvard, Yale, and the like is doubtless a product, at least in part, of the prestige dynamics already addressed, but communication’s exclusion from these elite institutions also doubles back on the field’s perceived legitimacy.

8. Enrollments: At many U.S. universities, the undergraduate communication major enrolls more students than any other program. These high enrollments in turn finance the discipline, so much so that some institutions apparently treat communication as a “cash cow” for other priorities. All those packed lecture halls, ironically, contribute to the discipline’s prestige problem. The sheer popularity of communication study, in concert with the field’s quasi-vocational curricula, has fostered suspicion among arts and sciences faculty. By reputation at least, communication undergraduates tend to be weaker—populated by “refugees” from other, more rigorous fields—and unduly preoccupied with aspirations for career-linked media visibility. Arguably unfair, this very real perception of communication majors as lightweight, would-be celebrities weighs on the discipline’s reputation.

9. Faculty job market: In large part due to surging enrollments, the job market for communication PhDs was for decades comparatively healthy—especially in contrast to low-enrollment fields like history, philosophy and even sociology. One result is that there is a closer alignment between the supply of, and demand for, well-qualified tenure-track faculty candidates, relative to “traditional” social science and humanities disciplines. These job market conditions suggest that, ceteris paribus, the communication job market is less competitive; the hired faculty pool, as a result, is presumably less impressive than the relative few who successfully navigate the other fields’ tougher markets. And communication’s low prestige may attract weaker graduate students in the first place. A related by-product of these job-market dynamics is that
communication research continues to employ “immigrants” with PhDs from other disciplines, like sociology and English—a pattern that is rarely reversed.  

These factors are causally intertwined and self-reinforcing. Communication research, as a consequence, is the quintessential “insecure science”, to borrow Ian Hacking’s phrase. My claim is that these dynamics do not merely generate repeated bouts of self-doubt and disciplinary soul-searching, but also give rise to persistent prestige gaps between communication studies and its neighbors. Hard data are hard to come by—ironically because communication research is typically excluded from reputation studies, and was only recently recognized as a doctoral field by the U.S. National Research Council. In the single study that has included communication, the U.S. academic deans surveyed judged communication to have the lowest prestige among the 25 disciplines named.

The argument of this book is that the humble status of U.S. communication research has had intellectual consequences. In Carey’s case, the field’s reputation problems helped boost, but also limited, his reputation. His position at the field’s edge qualified him to trade in the ideas of higher-status disciplines, but the same prestige imbalance ensured that his own thought would rarely if ever make the trip back. Brokers like Carey enjoy a double benefit: they take in some of the reputational lucre of higher-status thought, and secure a certain degree of hermeneutic license as they synopsize.

**Surrogates**

One way to tell Carey’s story is by way of the successive cast of surrogates he used to articulate his arguments. The book tracks these figures—Talcott Parsons, Harold Adams Innis, Clifford Geertz, and Richard Rorty—as each one assumed a central position for an interval.

Carey’s unlikely matriculation to the University of Illinois’ prominent doctoral program in the early 1960s is taken up in the first chapter. His little-known dissertation, in particular, is treated as an early example of scholarly ventriloquism—with the borrowed voice, in this case, of sociologist Talcott Parsons. The thesis articulates many of the themes that would preoccupy Carey for decades, but in the strange-sounding register of high-altitude sociological functionalism.

By the time of his 1963 defense, Carey was already walking back the dissertation’s Parsonsian framework. In its place, Carey—now on the Illinois faculty—gathered a handful of heterodox figures under the banner of what he began to call “cultural studies”. The second chapter treats this move as Carey’s attempt to define
a third-way alternative to the Illinois program’s Marxists and behavioralists. For the
next decade, the “cultural studies” label remained a local, and loosely outlined,
designation for outside-the-field scholars whom he admired. By the late 1960s, one
of those figures—Harold Adams Innis, the Canadian economist—had assumed a
prominent place in Carey’s thought. With Innis as touchstone, Carey published a
series of papers tracing the euphoric embrace of new communication technologies,
from the 19th century up through Marshall McLuhan. The articles savaged what
Carey, drawing on American studies scholarship, was calling the “rhetoric of the
technological sublime”. In this period, Carey’s own rhetoric shifted from a more-or-
less conventional social science prose-style to the allusive and melodic essay form
that would remain his trademark.

In the mid-1970s, Carey began to publish sweeping critiques of mainstream
communication research. Now openly partial to the humanist pole of the social
sciences, Carey, in effect, substituted the anthropologist Clifford Geertz for Innis.
As the book’s third chapter details, Geertz’s brief for an interpretive, meaning-
centered concept of culture provided the template for Carey’s own “cultural
approach” to communication research. By the end of the decade, Carey—now dean
of Illinois’ sprawling college of communication—had become the field’s main voice
for an interpretivist dissent that had swept through the social sciences.

The fourth chapter traces another, more subtle, but equally significant shift in
Carey’s thought. Beginning in the late 1970s, he turned his attention to journalism
and public life, drafting the Chicago School of sociology as a usable past. With debts
to Richard Rorty and the period’s revival of pragmatism, Carey narrated a declinist
account of public discourse that implicated the field’s own obsessions with science
and persuasion. In essays resonant with the era’s many communitarian assaults on
inward-looking American individualism, Carey positioned the philosopher John
Dewey—or at least the Dewey promoted by Rorty—as a democratic-humanist rival to
a program of scientific expertise exemplified by Walter Lippmann.

In the early to mid-1980s a wave of interest in cultural Marxism swept over the
U.S. discipline. Illinois was itself a focal point of engagement with European strands
of Marxist theory—including, notably, Stuart Hall’s British cultural studies project.
The book’s fifth and final chapter chronicles Carey’s response to the field’s leftist
ferment. He conceded, first, that power and domination had been unduly neglected,
but then resisted the resurgent left’s project to reduce culture to control. With
writerly finesse he developed a critique—respectful and indirect—of Hall and British
cultural studies. In essays from the period Carey marshaled Rorty and the pragmatist
tradition to stake off his American alternative.
In the late 1980s he began to assemble and edit his scattered writings into *Communication as Culture*. The collection was published in 1989 to wide acclaim and readership—at least within communication studies. The book’s essay-chapters had first appeared at different intellectual moments over three decades, but were revised and reordered to emphasize coherence. The result is a contrast between his publication pattern—essays scattered across decades in sometimes obscure journals—and the way the field actually reads him. The graceful flow of *Communication as Culture*’s first four chapters, for example, was accomplished through large and small edits, including artful blendings of select passages from an assortment of otherwise-excluded essays. As a result, we encounter Carey’s thought as always already coherent. My aim is to restore his writings’ historicity—to stretch out the accordion of his thought.
NOTES

1. THESIS DRIFT

By the time James W. Carey defended his University of Illinois dissertation in early 1963, the key features of his intellectual style were already taking observable shape. There’s something curious about this claim, because his thesis does not lean heavily on, say, John Dewey or Harold Adams Innis. Indeed, these and other profound influences on the published Carey are notably absent from the dissertation. As a result, in some ways the document reads like an impostor text, with jarring, even alien theoretical anchors. This is not the Carey we read and cite.

Still, some of his core ideas—arguments that would later establish his reputation—are lurking here. Also present are rhetorical devices that would go on to typify Carey’s approach to intellectual claim-making. Even the dissertation’s odd-seeming roster of cited theorists is consistent with his later work, in form at least: in 1963 as in the decades to come, Carey delivered his arguments through the voices of others.

A pair of concepts borrowed from historians of sociology help explain the intellectual style already detectable in Carey’s dissertation. The first is from Charles Camic, who has developed the idea of *strategic predecessor selection*.¹ Camic shows how Talcott Parsons, in his 1937 classic *The Structure of Social Action*, drafted a quartet of European thinkers, to make the case for his voluntaristic theory of
action. Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto and Alfred Marshall, whom Parsons depicted as converging on his theory, were chosen not especially for the intellectual fit but instead because they did other kinds of work for Parsons: *Structure of Social Action* was a discipline-building charter, and the Europeans were not only prestigious but unencumbered by the reputational blemishes of other, American scholarly traditions that Parsons considered, then discarded. Parsons had his theory, and only then chose the voices through which to build his argument.

The other idea that helps to understand Carey’s case is Patrick Baert’s distinction between two modes of scholarly presentation: the *enfant terrible* and the *synthesizer.* The *enfant terrible* presents his thought as a major rupture with the past. The synthesizer, by contrast, presents his work as continuous with, and indeed through the voice of, past thinkers. As Baert writes, “Synthesizers have sometimes remarkably little in common with their alleged inspirational sources, and they are often far more innovative than the label may lead us to think”.

Carey’s dissertation helps to tie these two ideas together. Fittingly, Carey speaks through Talcott Parsons himself, at least in the thesis proper. Even before his defense, however, he had shifted to other voices. The result is ventriloquism on the move.

**Rhode Island**

Carey was born in 1934, in an Irish Catholic, working-class neighborhood of Providence, Rhode Island. It was, Carey remembered, an “urban village, where generations of people in the same family lived in the same or adjacent houses”. Family members—if they had jobs at all during the Depression—worked at the nearby textile mills along the Woonasquatucket River.

Carey was the second of six children, and the only son among five sisters. The family struggled through the Depression, and even after the war his father’s employment was unsteady. The Carey children, after they were confirmed around age 12, were expected to earn money for their own expenses outside of room and board—“however you did it, you had to carry your own weight”. The household was mostly untouched by the middle-class consumer culture of the post-war years.

Carey’s family was politically active. His mother and aunts helped organize for the union in the mills, though even in the 1930s they kept their distance from the Communist Party. Looking back, Carey attributed that reticence to the
Party’s hostility to religion. More “ritual” than “theologic” Catholics, the family relied on the Church to answer questions like, “How do you bury the dead? How do you consecrate the ground? How do you retain memory of people?” The Party had “no answer for that”, Carey recalled. “They kind of recommended leaving the dead on the porch until they disintegrated”.10 Here, in Carey’s recollections of his Irish Catholic upbringing, are hints of his long, complicated quarrel with Marxism to come.

Carey’s parents, like many of their neighbors, had little or no education past middle school.11 For most of Carey’s childhood it appeared that their only son would have even less. In the first grade, a doctor diagnosed him with congenital heart disease during a routine school physical—at a time, Carey noted, “when the heart was a real dark continent of medicine”. With few known treatments, doctors ordered him to rest at home and avoid schools and other crowded places. Though he didn’t exactly “rest”, Carey would not return to school—and then just two hours a day—until the ninth grade.12

It’s a crucial irony that his heart problem, along with the long absence from formal schooling, were responsible for Carey’s academic career. Before returning to school, his state-supplied education consisted of a single hour of homeschooling a week. The rest of the time Carey benefitted from a kind of talking curriculum, through conversation with the neighborhood’s adults:

My childhood consisted largely of hanging around with otherwise unemployed adults. If you’re around adults all the time, functioning adults, you learn a lot. I’d make daily rounds to the church where I’d talk to the priests and sometimes accompany them when they delivered communion to the sick, visit the elderly and infirm, and run their errands, hang around the local coffee shop with the retired men and read the papers and talk politics. It was a wonderful life. I wasn’t educated in the technical sense so there were things I had to learn rather late. But in terms of understanding the immediacies of economics and history, of learning by direct experience how communities are put together, how people behave, what they’re interested in, learning the commonsense wisdom of people, it’s a tremendous way to learn.13

The profound significance that Carey assigned to conversation, across his academic interests and throughout his own professional life, has its roots in an unconventional education. He was schooled by his neighbors, through talk. In an earnest 1964 letter to an unnamed friend, he wrote that it is “from the Irish Catholics of New England, from the heritage of their own hates, loves and fears that I draw my own individual identity”.14 There are hazards in tracing mature intellectual beliefs back
to childhood experience, especially when those experiences are filtered through memory. In Carey’s case, however, it is clear that his life in Providence—remembered as a tight-knit, working-class community bound by talk, shared struggle, and a common religious-ethnic identity—formed something like a touchstone against which he would come to measure intellectual and public life.

The heart defect was fortuitous for a second reason. An able-bodied Carey would probably not have attended college. His eventual matriculation to the University of Rhode Island (URI) owed more to vexation than to careful grooming. No one in his family had ever attained any higher education, and Carey would be one of the first in his neighborhood. When Carey started high school, the state’s Department of Vocational Rehabilitation had ruled out a future of factory work or military service, and suggested secretarial training instead. Carey enrolled in bookkeeping, shorthand and typing—the only boy in those classes. He performed well in required courses like English and History, however, and by his junior year, as Carey recalled, the Department “started talking about [him] going to college as an alternative to secretarial work”. The office arranged for a full disability scholarship to the University of Rhode Island, despite his limited exposure to the traditional classroom. Carey would later call his scholarship an example of affirmative action, “before the process had a name”.

In the fall of 1952, Carey traveled the 35 miles from Providence to the URI campus in Kingston, “scared to death and completely unprepared”. He enrolled in the university’s College of Business, mainly because of its lenient prerequisite policy. A first-semester philosophy class convinced him to transfer to the College of Liberal Arts, but he was told that he needed more high school preparation first. Carey opted to stay in the business college, earning a BS in business administration in 1957. “I was all too anxious to get on with life”, he recalled.

In the summer of 1957, shortly after graduation, Carey was examined by a young doctor and re-diagnosed. A pair of surgeries quickly followed. His heart—which had given him an unconventional education and entrance to college—was no longer a mortal threat. He and his girlfriend, Elizabeth (Bette) Gilman, decided to get married. By fall the new couple was living in Illinois.
Illinois

When Carey applied to master’s programs during his last year at Rhode Island, he was looking for professional training in advertising or journalism. He had written for the school newspaper and yearbook at URI, and also freelanced at an advertising agency in Providence. He applied and gained admission to a few Midwestern land-grant universities, and settled on the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

That choice—by all accounts impulsive—ensured that Carey would be exposed to an eclectic, intellectually ambitious academic culture. Unknown to Carey, Illinois in 1958 was 11 years into an unprecedented campaign to establish communication research as a legitimate academic discipline. Upon his arrival at Illinois in 1947, Wilbur Schramm began to assemble a sprawling “Division of Communications” from an array of academic units. Among many other things, the Division housed a PhD program, a research institute, and faculty trained in at least a dozen social science and humanities disciplines. Carey arrived at Illinois a would-be copywriter; it wasn’t long before he became an aspiring scholar.

Over the next few years, Carey’s rudderless curiosity would lead him on a promiscuous romp through stacks of academic literature. It was almost as if he was making up for lost time. He was formally affiliated with the Division of Advertising, a semi-autonomous unit within what was then called the College of Journalism and Communications. But Carey took a number of courses in economics, philosophy, history of science, and sociology. He was already a voracious reader.

Carey was supervised by Charles H. Sandage, the director of the advertising program. Sandage, the author of an early and well-respected advertising textbook, had been recruited to the School of Journalism in 1946, in part to stave off a defection of advertising faculty to the university’s College of Commerce, which also offered advertising coursework. Under Sandage’s leadership, the school began offering a graduate degree in advertising the next year. Sandage’s program was among the first in the country, whose graduates would go on to prominence in the profession; still others would populate academic posts across the country. In the literature he is frequently called the “father of advertising education”.

Professional training was an important component of Sandage’s curriculum, but he placed special weight on academic study. He sought to justify the place of advertising in the university—and within the College—by arguing that the industry
plays a vital role in modern market economies. He conceived of advertising as an “institution of abundance”, and oriented the program’s academic sequence around the idea. In a modern, large-firm economy, Sandage argued, consumers could no longer glean the necessary information about products through direct experience. Advertising stepped into the breach. It was, he concluded, a “fundamental economic and social institution”—more than worthy of study, and deserving of a seat at the academic table. Sandage repeated this argument throughout his long career, and his “institutional approach” became a byword for his legacy in advertising education.

It must have been plain to Sandage that his new pupil was no ordinary student. In 1960 Sandage and a co-editor collected 48 previously-published essays into a reader, *The Role of Advertising*, with writings from John Kenneth Galbraith, Margaret Mead, Robert Merton, and other luminaries. Carey, a second-year graduate student and all of 25, was assigned the lead essay—the only one specially written for the volume. Sandage had decided to publish Carey’s paper as the collection’s de facto introduction. The essay’s surprising placement only makes sense given the senior scholar’s career-long quest to furnish advertising with an intellectual defense. The problem, for Sandage, was that he didn’t have the background to situate his claim within the broad sweep of Western intellectual history. Improbably, his graduate student did.

Carey’s chapter, his first published academic work, is faithful to his teacher’s project, and positions advertising as a functional necessity for liberal, market-oriented modernity. Already present are trademark features of Carey’s intellectual style: learned prose, cross-disciplinary citations, the confident march through centuries of Western thought. His sentences, though, are more crowded and polysyllabic, and lack the humble qualifiers that would mark his later style. The “modern controversy surrounding advertising”, Carey writes, “is meaningless unless the listener is aware of the implicit assumptions carried by the protagonists about the nature of man, of society, of the economic and political order”. These assumptions, he adds, are “not to be found in most modern writing on advertising; they are found in the intellectual history of society”. He cites E. H. Carr (historian), Robert Heilbroner (economist), Harold Laski (political scientist), David Riesman (sociologist) and John Herman Randall (philosopher) within the essay’s first three pages.

Carey supports his argument that advertising is a “logical corollary of a market system” with a condensed history of modernity’s slow emergence from the medieval period. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Protestant ethic, science, a
mechanistic conception of matter, individualism, liberalism, and market-based commerce—each appears in Carey’s all-embracing history. His narrative doesn’t stray far from his sources, but the account is striking for its breadth and gravitas in the service of the huckster’s art. Advertising comes off as a crucial prop for modernity—“the inexorable result”, he writes, “of certain fundamental assumptions on the nature of social life which leads to the organization of economic activity around a system of free markets”. Markets require information; in an age of large firms and national scale, the companies themselves serve this “informing function” through advertising.

Carey nods toward advertisers’ “social responsibility”, but his conclusions are notably quietist. Since advertising is the “logical analogue” to a free market system, efforts to “change or modify the character of advertising, new legislation governing it, or new social policy relative to it, must consider the functions which advertising can and does perform...” The essay, in line with Sandage’s own position, is a brief for the defense, in the late-1950s controversy over advertising. All of the essay’s erudition—its sheer ambition too—seem mismatched to its prosaic subject.

His uncommon curiosity and wide reading are harnessed here to the justification of advertising, but soon enough Carey would apply his talents to other questions—and without Sandage’s guidance. Even in this first publication, themes that Carey would develop as a mature scholar make brief appearances. “Man”, he writes, “is increasingly defined, using Ernst Cassirer’s terminology, not as animal rationale, but as animal symbolicum”. The reference to the philosopher Cassirer, and to the centrality of symbolism, prefigure the importance Carey would come to assign to shared meaning-making. By the time The Role of Advertising was published, Carey had already earned his master’s and moved over to Illinois’ Communications PhD program. There was a lot more reading ahead, and little of it involved advertising.

The Illinois Faculty

In this period, the University of Illinois’ communication-related academic universe was in institutional flux—and in that respect Illinois exemplified the unstable place of “communication” in the postwar university. Communication, as an organized discipline, did not exist before World War II. It was Wilbur Schramm, with an assist from the so-called “Bleyer children”, who transformed an interdisciplinary social-
science crossroads into an institutionalized field. Schramm’s field-building laboratory was Illinois, and though he departed for Stanford in 1955, he left behind a communication program that was widely regarded as the country’s leader. Schramm had worked to anchor the nascent field—and Illinois’ program—in the “behavioral sciences” ethos then prevailing in elite American social science. He only partly succeeded. By the time he left, the Illinois faculty remained strikingly eclectic, with Marxists and intellectual historians working alongside psycholinguists. Carey joined a doctoral program with a diverse array of potential mentors.

Schramm, a consummate academic entrepreneur originally trained in English, had been lured to Illinois in 1947 by its new president, George Stoddard, who handed Schramm an unusually broad portfolio. He joined the president’s inner circle as Assistant to the President, and established the PhD-granting Institute of Communications Research with generous funding. He was also named director of the university press and a full professor of journalism. In 1950, Stoddard convinced Illinois trustees to approve a new “Division of Communications”, with Schramm as dean. He was more czar than dean, with direct control over not just the Institute and university press, but also the School of Journalism and Communications, the university’s public relations and broadcasting initiatives, its conference center, the Library School, and even the Alumni and Athletic Associations. Schramm’s reign ended in 1954, the year after Illinois trustees ousted Stoddard. The trustees unceremoniously dismantled Schramm’s Division, and restored its constituent units to their old campus roles. Schramm soon left for Stanford, but the PhD-granting Institute, along with the School of Journalism and Communications, continued to thrive.

Research at Illinois was indeed marked by quantitative evangelism, government-funded team research, and other hallmarks of the mid-century behavioral sciences movement. In keeping with Schramm’s vision for the nascent discipline, psychologists dominated the Institute’s hiring over its first decade and a half. Schramm hired Yale-trained Charles Osgood in 1949, who would from the mid-1950s assemble a large team of Institute-affiliated psychologists focused on CIA and military-funded psycholinguistics research. In 1957, Osgood was named director of the Institute, a post he held until 1965. By then, psychologists—many of them working on Osgood-related projects—had come to fill out most of the Institute’s ranks.

Still, the Institute retained pockets of heterogeneity throughout the period. Schramm himself inadvertently ushered in one longstanding tradition of Illinois
heterodoxy by making Dallas Smythe, the critical political economist then serving at
the FCC, his first external hire in 1948. Schramm was somehow warned of
Smythe’s radical politics—the details remain murky—and tried unsuccessfully to have
the appointment rescinded. Then Smythe, a Marxist, successfully recruited
George Gerbner to the faculty in 1956; Smythe had been a visitor at the University
of Southern California, where the Hungarian-born Gerbner completed his PhD in
1955. Though no Marxist, Gerbner was openly hostile to the models of
communication embraced by behavioral scientists like Schramm. After a visiting
stint in 1961, Herbert Schiller—another Marxist political economist—replaced
Smythe, who left for Canada’s Simon Fraser University in 1963. One of Smythe’s
Illinois students, Thomas Guback, also joined the faculty after completing his

As I discuss in the next chapter, Carey was never drawn to any of the Institute’s
political economy faculty, and indeed would go on to establish his own “cultural
approach” with the Marxist and behavioral science models as explicit foils. Still, the
presence of Smythe and Gerbner, and later Schiller and Guback, provided a
counterweight to the Institute’s psycholinguists and information theorists.

And there were, in the 1950s and early 1960s, still other models of intellectual
work for Carey to emulate. When Schramm established the Institute back in 1947,
he had appointed three existing Illinois faculty to the Institute: Sandage and
Frederick Siebert from the School of Journalism and Communications, and J.W.
Albig from Sociology. Albig, the author of a major textbook on public opinion,
was a critic of the quantitative polling research that had come to dominate post-war
opinion study. In a 1957 survey of the field, Albig lamented the “disproportionate
influence of the methodological dogmatists”. A few other sociologists were
appointed over these years, though only Albig and one other—Bennett Berger—were
still affiliated with the Institute during Carey’s graduate training.

More important than Albig was the cluster of journalism historians and
theorists had gathered around Siebert, including Theodore Peterson and Jay Jensen.
Siebert, one of the “Bleyer children” trained by University of Wisconsin journalism
educator Willard Bleyer, specialized in legal history around freedom of the press
questions. His 1952 Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776 was unusual
for its philosophical and intellectual historical sophistication. Peterson, a Siebert
student, began teaching in the School in 1948, and was named Dean of what was, in
1957, renamed as the College of Journalism and Communications. Along with
Schramm and Siebert, Peterson co-authored the Cold-War-tinged classic Four
Theories of the Press (1956), and wrote the key chapter on “Social Responsibility Theory”.  

Jensen was another Siebert student, and though he published little, he would end up the single most important influence on Carey among his Illinois teachers. Jensen, a former journalist, started teaching in the School almost immediately after he earned his master’s in 1948. His remarkable dissertation, “Liberalism, Democracy, and Mass Media”, wasn’t officially defended until 1959, two years after he had assumed the chair of the College’s Department of Journalism. Jensen’s dissertation—meticulous, neologism-filled intellectual history of liberal thought from the 17th century onward—was never published. The thesis can be read, John Nerone notes, as “the more refined and scholarly version of Four Theories”, and was certainly the only work by any of Carey’s Illinois teachers that is meaningfully engaged in Carey’s own dissertation. 

Carey later identified the widely-read Jensen as the unnamed “wise man” who suggested that he read John Dewey. (The famous passage is the opening line of Carey’s most-cited work, “A Cultural Approach to Communication” (1975): “When I decided some years ago to read seriously the literature of communications, a wise man suggested I begin with John Dewey. It was advice I have never regretted accepting.”) Jensen was influential enough that Carey misremembered him, in a 2006 interview, as his doctoral advisor. (Sandage was, at least officially.) And Carey’s son Daniel, in a recent memoir, makes a passing claim that Jensen “was responsible, in effect, for poaching [Carey] from Charles Sandage and further work in advertising”. Both Jensen and Peterson would remain Carey’s close friends for the balance of his career.

The Institute’s inherent interdisciplinarity, which permitted doctoral students considerable leeway in course selection, also exposed Carey to a number of scholars outside the unit’s orbit—including Paul Wells and Dwight Flanders (both economists) and Frederick Will (a philosopher). There were, in short, plenty of dissenters from the behavioral sciences worldview available to Carey. Illinois’ eclecticism offered him a license to explore, far beyond the behavioral sciences domain. What’s striking, however, is that he didn’t model himself after one of the many examples of heterodoxy among the faculty, in the fashion of discipleship. Even Jensen, influential as he was on Carey’s wide-ranging intellectual literacy, in the end left little mark on his dissertation and subsequent career.
Instead, and from the beginning, Carey sought after something distinctive, an intellectual room of his own. The Illinois faculty had made plain that the behavioral sciences model could be defied. Carey took this as a nonspecific invitation to resist the mainstream approach, on his own terms.

The Dissertation

Certainly Carey went about his graduate-school explorations in an unconventional way. Already in his 1960 “Advertising: An Institutional Approach”, Carey had demonstrated a talent for absorbing an expansive literature, and then synopsizing it into clean prose. Even in graduate school, he was able to work sprawling, far-afield thought into lucid and elegant paragraphs. He was already a ventriloquist, and a very good one.

The other distinctive feature of Carey’s exploration was where he went looking. Invariably he was drawn to work outside the half-established canon of communication research. Humanities fields, along with as-yet untilled swaths of the social sciences, were especially attractive to Carey. For the newly institutionalized discipline of communication at least, these were virgin territories. If communication research was, in Schramm’s formulation, an interdisciplinary “crossroads”, there were plenty of social scientists (not to mention humanities scholars) who never made the trip. Carey was interested in them. And early on he developed a knack—already on display as a PhD student—for identifying, and then importing, propitious strands of otherwise-neglected thought.

He was becoming, in effect, an ambassador-at-large, with a special talent for translation. But he hadn’t, in his PhD-student years at any rate, fashioned a coherent worldview from all this cross-border work. There were early stirrings of what would become, in the 1970s, Carey’s distinctive “cultural approach” to the field. But in these early years Carey also adopted the language and high-altitude theorizing of sociologist Talcott Parsons. The Harvard-based Parsons was the leading U.S. theorist in the early postwar decades, known for his abstracted claims for the functional interdependence of the economy, culture and the individual. It was Parsons’ voice that animated Carey’s official, 1963 dissertation. Tellingly, that dissertation was actually his second. He had already written another draft thesis, this one on Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan—which would evolve into his celebrated 1967 Antioch Review essay on the Canadian pair. At the time, though, Carey deemed the first dissertation “unfinished”, and submitted the Parsonsian document instead. Its title alone strikes a strange note, given the very different

Reading the document with hindsight’s benefit is eerie, in part because the thesis is filled with off-key premonitions of future Carey themes. Famous lines from his later work—in some cases word-for-word—make appearances here. The oddness comes from the entirely transformed intellectual context: similar wine in very different bottles.

The dissertation is marked by a citational promiscuity, from field to field and back again, that’s hard to capture in a short summary. It is written in dense paragraphs of the highest abstraction, and plods along with much repetition. All the restating, though, has the effect of obscuring definite shifts in theoretical frame of reference; major touchstones in the first half get dropped in the second. And the preface, as I discuss below, seems to self-consciously undercut the whole project.

No dissertation is ever a polished work, and by any measure Carey’s is far more worldly and intelligent than most. For all of its madcap spread—indeed, in some respects, because of it—the thesis is an important document. Certain qualities of Carey’s intellectual style, in particular, are cast in sharp relief.

The dissertation’s first two chapters, for example, draw a contrast between two scholarly worldviews, one (“the atomistic-mechanistic faith”) sterile and the other (“the modern synthetic movement”) fecund. The contrast is made with unqualified, panoramic boldness, and with clear assignments to the respective parties of light and darkness. This mode of argument—the good-and-evil struggle narrated as intellectual history—would go on to become one of Carey’s principal claim-making device. The combatants would change over the course of his career, but he came to rely very often—and nearly always in the important work—on this kind of dichotomous historicizing.

Drawing on the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, Carey locates a mechanistic logic of science originating in the 17th century, with figures like Newton and Kepler. Its key assumption is that the world is made up of discrete bits of matter which interact with one another in cause-and-effect terms:

Most attempts at scientific explanation in the last two centuries have been efforts to reduce all entities to a number of independent, constituent parts. The only mode of relationship admissible to this type of analytic model is the strict point to point, causal relationship connecting up elements along a linear plane. Thus phenomena were reduced to an interplay of elementary units which could be investigated independent of one another.
Carey considers the framework to be a hobbling one, unable to account for process and dynamism. Even so, most academics, and certainly the main strands of communication research, remain in its thrall, he argued.  

Carey contrasts this “mentality of scientific materialism” with a more holistic approach that treats the whole as greater than the sum of its parts. This “synthetic movement”, as he calls it, insists on understanding social life in terms of organized complexity. It’s no use to look at a system or an event as a mere “collection of parts”. We need instead a “wider angle of vision” to see the “organic wholeness of the field”—to grasp properties that are “absent from its isolated parts”.

It is fascinating, considering Carey’s future intellectual commitments, that this two-chapter contrast is largely drawn from Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the Austrian-born biologist and founder of “general systems theory”, often abbreviated to GST. Bertalanffy developed his theory of systems in the late 1930s as a response to growing specialization in academic fields. He and his co-enthusiasts, many clustered at the University of Michigan in the 1950s, claimed that GST would come to unify all non-physical sciences, including the social sort. Their basic idea was that social and natural phenomena are the product of ever-changing, complex and cross-cutting interactions among constituent parts. Carey’s picture of dueling logics of science—the atomistic versus the synthetic—is directly borrowed from Bertalanffy, down to often-esoteric terms of art like “equifinality”.

The reason all this matters, writes Carey, is that a mechanistic mentality is what ails communication research. Citing a recent exchange between Bernard Berelson, Wilbur Schramm and others in the pages of Public Opinion Quarterly—in which Berelson had declared the field “withering away”—Carey points to a “great deal of bewilderment” over “just where twenty-five years of research on the communication process has brought us”. The main reason for the “sterility in the field”, he suggests, is its “atomistic-mechanistic bias”.

In issuing the charge, Carey divides communication research into two approaches, both of which commit the error of treating the communication act as a series of discrete elements. The first Carey calls the “Lasswellian model”, after the famous formula for the field put forward by political scientist Harold Lasswell: “Who says What to Whom and with what Effect”. The problem for Carey is the model’s assumption that the various facets of communication—like the sender (“Who”), the message (“What”), the receiver (“Whom”)—are separable and subject to individual analysis:
Lasswell starts with the “act” of communication and then by analysis breaks it down into constituent units thus suggesting that the best way to study communications is by the independent analysis of individualized aspects of the process. The only kind of relationship implied between the elements of the process is a linear, one-way, direct relationship between the individualized elements. Communications, as a social process, thus begins with a source, ends with an effect, and the two are joined by additional mediating elements strung out along a plane.  

What gets neglected, writes Carey, is the broader “social process” of communication, at the level of the act all the way up to larger communication “systems”. With his synthetic contrast in mind, he suggests that followers of the Lasswell model—and he means to include here the great bulk of empirical communication research since the early 1940s—miss altogether communication’s emergent properties. The “analytic, machine-summative school”, he concludes, is “one of the more debilitating inheritances bequeathed to communications by its parents among the social sciences”.

There is a second, more recent strand of research that holds more promise: information theory. But in its current deployment at least, it too succumbs to the mechanistic bias. Those commitments to atomism are “paradoxical”, because information theory is, “in its purest form, a revolt against mechanism”. But its “somewhat uncritical use” has produced “dire consequences for social science”. Here Carey, through implication and footnote references, is faulting Wilbur Schramm, the Illinois program’s founder, and psychologist Charles Osgood, a prominent member of the Illinois faculty. Their mistake was taking a theory of signal transmission and applying it to human communication. The resulting model of communication is nearly indistinguishable from the Laswellian model, with the “same atomistic, mechanistic bias”. Communication scholars who use information theory make “endless division” and “endless description” of the various elements of the communication act. “While this narrative subdividing is going on”, writes Carey, “the act of of communication itself, while constantly referred to, is largely ignored”.

The mechanistic-synthetic binary thus serves as Carey’s scene-setting device—grounds to disown most existing research in communication. “In sum, then”, he writes, “the analytic-summative mode of thought represents a kind of thinking which has structured much of the thought and research in communications and for which this thesis will attempt to present an alternative”. The dissertation, he writes, will address the field’s bountiful but under-theorized body of empirical findings. Researchers are “flustered by the wealth of data available for sifting and analysis” in
the absence of “basic conceptions” to make sense of the data. In order to progress, the field needs inquiries that “ascend ‘a ladder of abstraction generality [sic]’”. His thesis should be viewed as an “attempt to isolate the concepts which will facilitate such an ascension”.

Citing Bertalanffy, Carey places great theoretical stock in the concept of “system”, defined as a “set of relationships that bind objects into determinate and regular unity”. He observes that the word’s three appearances in the dissertation’s title are “not a fortuitous inclusion”, but instead used “quite purposely and with a rather rich meaning”. Systems theorists shift the focus from individuals to social organizations, and analyze individual behavior and experience in terms of how they contribute to the durability (or decay) of these larger units:

This represents a rather radical departure from the behaviorism that has dominated social science for half a century: it raises the system rather than the individualized entity to ontological primacy and makes any particular datum of knowledge secondarily relevant and then from the standpoint of the system in which it is found. Thus, the distinctiveness of systems theory as an approach to social science comes from its “stress of the causal priority of the whole over the part”.

This focus on the primacy of the social whole—in turn maintained by the interdependence of its parts—sounds a lot like sociological functionalism. Indeed, the quoted snippet (“stress of the causal priority of the whole over the part”) is drawn from a discussion of Talcott Parsons’ functionalist theory. Carey has, by the end of the second chapter, shifted his attention to the “maintenance of equilibrium” in social systems, said to result from the interplay of “differentiation” and “integration”. In the balance of the dissertation, Carey attempts to elaborate a role for communication in maintaining the social order. Sociologists, and Parsons in particular, are his primary referents.

Carey half-heartedly resists the “functionalist” label, though leans so heavily on Parsons’ variety (normally labeled “structural-functionalism”) as to render the protest too much. Parsons is more than twice-as-often cited as the next most-referenced figure, Whitehead. And every major step in the argument is in explicit debt to the sociological theorist.

In defining the “system” concept, Carey had written that the “first thing this definition should make clear is that ‘system’ is preeminently a name for order”.

Likewise, he noted that the “dominant usage of the term function will be as a reference to a system determined and system maintaining activity”. The problem that he has set up, in other words, is to account for the durability—the staying power
—of large social units. Throughout the discussion, Carey adopts Parsons’ abstraction from specific context in favor of a general, applicable-anywhere approach to theory. Parsons’ dense prose style is adopted too, with frequent and credited use of Parsonsian argot.

Like Parsons, and with reference to his 1951 *The Social System*, Carey points to systems-within-systems that can be distinguished for analysis but which are otherwise inseparable and mutually reinforcing. For Carey, the important sub-systems are the social system, the value (or myth) system and the technological system—though the latter is bracketed as “a given, a constant … whose effect is uniform and regular”, and quickly drops out of the dissertation. It’s the value system that occupies most of Carey’s discussion, which he then relates back to the social.

Citing Parsons and Jay Jensen (one of his Illinois advisors), Carey defines a “myth” as a “set of master, focal or dominant values”. A bundle of myths that permeate a whole population—that have sunk even into its institutions—Carey calls a “myth system”. The myth (or value) system, in turn, helps to maintain the wider social system of which it is part:

In more literary language, a myth system is a value-impregnated set of beliefs that men hold, that they live by and live for. Every society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating thought forms that sustains all its activities. The function of a myth system is the provision of a common set of value orientations that will facilitate social interaction.

The myth system, in short and in keeping with Parsons, supplies much of the sinew that bonds an otherwise complex and differentiated society. The patterned set of values welds the individual to the social order, infusing conventions, social rewards and punishments, and “role” definitions.

Carey’s idea is that the myth system gets shared and internalized in everyday communication. Through talking, reading, listening and the rest, members of a society absorb and reaffirm its dominant values. A face-to-face conversation, for example, requires a “common set of cultural orientations”, which are then reinforced in their performance. These cultural orientations aren’t merely a shared language, but also “a set of common symbols and values. As Parsons says, ‘communication always implies a common culture’. Drawing on his mechanistic-synthetic contrast, Carey concludes that communication is not “a particularized, discrete process”, but instead a “generalized affective process which inheres in culture”.

His next line is a stunner: “Culture, then, from one point of view, is communication”. The phrasing, of course, is nearly identical to the title (and main argument) of his 1989 essay collection, *Communication as Culture*. What’s especially interesting is that, for all of its foreshadowing, the 1963 claim is dressed in Parsonsian garb. Continues Carey:

To appreciate this point it must be seen and acknowledged that one of the functional imperatives of social life is that the value orientations of individuals in the same social system must be integrated in some measure to form a common system. The agent of this integration is the plurality of communication systems in which value orientations are institutionalized.

The sense of off-kilter deja vu only intensifies with a same-page reference to the shared linguistic roots of “communication” and “common”. “Many people”, he writes, “have noted that the word communication comes from the Latin *communis*, meaning common”. Carey would, in his famous 1975 essay “A Cultural Approach to Communication” (which would become the first chapter of *Communication as Culture*), use this same etymological fact to great rhetorical effect, by a way of Dewey quote: “There is more than a verbal tie between the words...” Dewey makes no appearance in the 1963 reference, but the lesson drawn is strikingly similar: “the major focus of communication—as a good deal of empirical work should have at last verified—is not persuasion but the establishment of consensus—which is another way of saying the stabilization and institutionalization of a common definition of the situation”. Communication is dependent on, but also helps to ratify, the shared values that ground social order. The “function” of communication, in short, is the achievement of consensus.

As the “main focus of the points where myth systems and social systems control behavior”, communication is the fundamental social process. Carey supports the claim with a quote from Parsons: social process “must be in large part grounded in the symbolic-value ordered elements of action, the fundamental input-output categories are always communicative”. Communication, concludes Carey, is the “most generalized mode of social interaction, the most generalized social process”. Any social unit, from face-to-face conversation all the way up to large-scale societies, “must be held together, must be integrated, by the generation of common facilities of communication”. In modern societies, the mass media in particular help to spread and affirm dominant values. Anticipating metaphors that he would employ with great vividness in the mid-1970s, Carey argues that most media content takes on the “form of a social
ceremony as it celebrates the values which the national community holds in common”. The media are “designed, in an objective sense”, to provide the “social occasions for the celebration of collective values”.  

Why do societies hang together? We have our answer, the same one he would give in the coming decades—though without Parsons and without the sociological jargon. The dissertation, however, closes with four pages of numbered propositions, complete with equations and phrases like “where $p$ represents subsystems bound by commitment to common values”. These pages, for readers familiar with Carey’s published work, are truly a sight to behold. We are a long way from advertising copy, and a long way too from the idiographic humanism he would embrace soon enough.

The Preface

The dissertation’s preface is Carey’s attempt at narrative closure, an apology for a thesis that had metastasized. It’s a fascinating eighteen pages: written last but appearing first, and asked to account for hundreds of pages to follow. Like the dissertation proper, it’s packed with shotgun-blast erudition, but written from a defensive posture. He has plainly recognized that his topic and material ranged well outside his committee’s frames of reference, and that an explanation was required. There is even a hint of panic in these lines of otherwise high-styled knowing.

Carey is also writing to himself. The preface walks back many of the dissertation’s core claims, in the direction of what he’s already calling Kulturwissenschaft. By the time he sat down to draft the preface, in other words, he seems to have lost faith or interest in the formal social theorizing that frames his dissertation.

All of this required explanatory juggling: a defense of the thesis and its topical drift, and at the same time a revision of its foundational tenets. Perhaps under the stress of these two tasks, the preface is unusually self-referential, focused on telling the story of its author’s consuming intellectual commitments. It’s also written in a literary, allusion-filled style that Carey would soon embrace—but largely absent from the rest of the dissertation.

“Among the many kinds of candor a writer owes his readers”, he opens, “is a statement of what his work is and is not. If possible, he should also give them a glimpse at the human impulses that have shaped his thesis”. Scholars often disguise these impulses through platitudes about topical importance or the
advance of science—neither of which deal with the “basic meaning and genesis of any serious intellectual production”. Look to the author’s life, Carey urges: “The basic meaning can only be revealed by a re-examination of some of the misplaced and forgotten biography that shaped it”. Even a thesis like his is a product of its creator’s background:

Although a doctoral dissertation occupies but a fragment of a man’s life, it is a product of the pleasures, traumas, dispositions and prejudices accumulated over a lifetime. A thesis is a very complicated thing, a whole set of personalities, one inside the other like a nest of Chinese boxes.120

His own biography-driven preoccupation is to help overcome the Babel-like din of academic specialization. “The basic human impulse behind this thesis”, he writes, “is the deeply felt desire to see some unity in the fragments of 20th century scientific specialization... an attempt to get a vision of the whole, a wider lens in the intellectual glasses that will help erase the myopic, the partial, the overspecialized vision of an age...”129 Why does the dissertation take on so much? “Because I share a possibly inordinate desire for the reintegration of social thought”.130

Since the thesis is ostensibly about economics, but in reality rarely touches on the subject, Carey is in the awkward position here of drawing connections where there aren’t many. “When this project was originally undertaken in 1960”, he explains, “my only goal was to make some limited integration between the data and concepts of economics and communications”131:

It has been felt for some time that there must be a systemic relationship between certain economic variables (gross national product, national income, gross capital formation) and certain communications variables (literacy, newspaper output, telecommunication facilities and the nature of press organization and control). This thesis was originally stated as an investigation into changes in certain communications variables and their relationship with certain classes of economic variables believing that all this was relevant, in some sense, to problems of economic development and social change. And there is strong evidence of a determinate co-variance among communications variables and economic variables.132

That initial focus made abundant sense, given Carey’s undergraduate business training, his advertising master’s, and his considerable economics coursework to that point.133 The fact that he had since moved on, however, needed to be explained to his committee, three members of which—Sandage, Dwight Flanders (an
economist), and H.W. Huegy (in marketing)—were in the orbit of economics and presumably selected on that basis.

Carey first gestures toward the importance of “information” in economic systems, in keeping with his 1960 advertising article. But that point hadn’t informed his thesis, so cannot do any heavy-lifting. He then turns to economists’ “methodological rigor”, a quality sorely lacking in communication studies. “An immediate catalyst of this thesis”, he writes, “is what might be termed the ‘mentality’ of economics”, by which he means the exactitude and analytic refinement of “that most dismal of sciences”.134

That’s a pretty thin reed to stand on, which Carey seemed to recognize. Instead he staked his claim on two core assumptions of economics—the “Two Economic Postulates” from the subtitle:

After watching the initial problem disintegrate, I decided to recruit some intellectual resources from economics and apply them to a theory of communications systems. Naturally, once economics was admitted, and the bar to eclecticism lowered, many other disciplines, particularly sociology, crept in strongly. But the fundamental logic of this work is economic, for its seminal impulse was the concordance of two powerful assumptions of economics.

The first postulate is economists’ claim that the economic process can be studied in a consistent way at any level of analysis, micro or macro. This assumption, Carey writes, is applicable to communication research, which likewise needs to stress the continuity—the fundamental sameness—of communication, from the “two-man system to the national communication system”.135 The second postulate is economists’ rationality assumption. Economists operate on the expectation that actors employ reason to decide among available alternatives. When applied to communication, the assumption will “hopefully remove the suffocating view that when people engage in communication they are ‘properly wired’ in terms of the invariant association of certain stimuli and responses”.136

Both postulates are curious, and only intelligible given Carey’s need to assert a connection to economics. The first, about analytic continuity, could be drawn from any number of other sources, including many of the sociologists the dissertation leans on. What’s more, the assumption did not, arguably, match the views of economists, since mainstream macro-economics informed by Keynes typically stressed certain practical discontinuities in the move from micro to macro.

The second postulate—the rationality assumption—is especially odd, since the dissertation does not, in fact, assume that actors are rational. So what is going on
here? By “rational” Carey means to signal “not behaviorist”; that is, because economists pay attention to motivation and reasoning, they provide a happy alternative to behaviorist psychology, with its stimulus-response, black-box theory of mind. Still, Carey might have drawn a critique of behaviorism from other sources closer to the dissertation’s argument—especially since he plainly rejects the rationality part of the rationality assumption. Notice the clever way he gets around the problem:

The student of communication frequently assumes that parties are wired to the communication transaction and that it has no meaning in terms of systems. This thesis introduces the assumption of rationality, or, as it shall be called of voluntarism, by assuming that individuals have alternative courses of action in communications transactions and that the irreducible property of a communication transaction is the value orientations which control it.\textsuperscript{137}

The passing substitution of “voluntarism” for “rationality” is a revealing switch. The language of “voluntarism” and “value orientations”, though without citation, is a clear reference to Parsons. In his 1936 \textit{The Structure of Social Action}, Parsons had developed his “voluntaristic theory of action”, which he put forward as a critique of behaviorist psychology, but also of economists’ rationality assumption.\textsuperscript{138} It is, therefore, a startling move to treat “voluntarism” and “rationality” as synonyms, but there is a certain logic: “voluntarism” is indeed important to Carey’s dissertation, while “rationality” signals the link to economics. He needed a plausible story to connect the work he had planned to the work he ended up writing. The two postulates served that need.

The preface also addresses the dissertation’s lack of empirical data, in ways that presage his 1970s arguments against the communication field’s blind devotion to quantitative data. Citing Ernst Cassirer, Carey notes that it became “increasingly apparent that the data themselves would yield no central organizing principles... for the basic questions cannot be answered by the data of covariance”.\textsuperscript{139} Communication studies in particular overemphasizes the “data themselves” at the expense of theory:

One gets the rather distressing feeling, in fact, that many communication researchers have deliberately set out to stand on its head Whitehead’s classic phrase, “It is characteristic of science in its earlier stages ... to be both ambitiously profound in its aims and trivial in its handling of details”. If science, at least in its earlier stages, must live with a dilemma it would seem preferable to escape through the horn that allows you to be profound and expansive in ultimate goals at the
expense of methodological rigor and close empirical confirmation rather than wallowing in a set of detail that lacks “all conceptual unity”.140

The big questions are the ones worth asking—especially, he suggests, if the alternative is slavish attention to method for its own sake. Carey’s references to Whitehead and Cassirer, together with the evocative prose-style (“... escape through the horn...”), work to justify his move away from what had been, in its original conception, an empirical project.141

The thesis became, of course, a theoretical project instead—and a muscular one at that. Here too Carey had some second thoughts, and used the preface to qualify the document’s formalizing ambition. In scaling back its claims, he drew upon a language much more familiar to readers of his better-known work, with citations to figures—like Kenneth Burke and Harold Adams Innis—who don’t otherwise appear in the dissertation. In that sense, the preface is a signal of a new set of intellectual allegiances, albeit a subtle one.

First, Carey admits that, in the “strictest sense” the thesis “does not constitute a theory”. Nor is the document a “seamless web’ with all parts dependent on all others”. Citing Andrew Hacker and then Whitehead, he declares that no “dogmatic assertions of truth will be made for the point of view embodied in this work”.142 Instead, the thesis aims to develop tentative generalizations, with the expectation that these will be refuted or improved upon. “[A] theory of this type is put up”, writes Carey, “with an eye to its own destruction”. He compares theories to scaffolding, to be removed once the “architecture has been outlined”.143

He seems to recognize a certain distance between the thesis proper and the preface’s modest claims for theory. He admits, for example, that there’s an apparent inconsistency between the dissertation’s high-theoretic, formalizing language and his claim in the preface that his theory is “sacrosanct only for heuristic purposes”. The document’s “extensive, elaborate, and idiosyncratic terminology might belie the conception of science advanced here”, he writes, after half-apologizing that “certain parts of the thesis will strike one as speculative and impressionistic”.144

Carey’s intimation of new allegiances appears in the preface’s closing pages. He observes that American social scientists limit “science” to the natural-scientific fields “or sciences explicitly modeled on them”. Not so the Germans, whose Wissenschaft (“science”) concept is more capacious, inclusive even of art or theology. Carey declares that he subscribes to the roomier German conception. More significantly, he asserts that his “thesis is quite close to what the Germans might call Kulturwissenschaft”: 
because it is not concerned with the factual descriptions and the exact lawful relations obtaining between natural events, but, instead, is designed to erect a structure of concepts that will allow for a more adequate and profound knowledge of what we already ‘know’ in the factual sense of our direct and daily encounter of the world and ourselves. This is not science in the sense of enabling us to predict behavior and events, but science in the sense of a more generalized and adequate rendering of that which we know from personal life.\textsuperscript{145}

The passage, though densely written and hard to unpack, is a striking rejection of the unity-of-science stance still prevailing in American social science. Carey is invoking the late 19th century German \textit{Methodenstreit} (‘debate over methods’), in which historians, philosophers, and economists disputed the question of whether social science methods are continuous with, or else distinctive from, those of natural science. Carey throws his lot in with the discontinuity camp, whose exponents pointed to historical specificity and the role of meaning in social life. The dissertation, he writes, does not aim to discover, in the mold of natural science, some timeless logic of communication (‘the exact lawful relations obtaining between natural events’). Instead, the thesis builds its arguments out of everyday interpretation (‘the factual sense of our direct and daily encounter of the world and ourselves’). Hence the embrace of \textit{Kulturwissenschaft} (‘cultural science’).

Carey’s argument here is plainly indebted to Max Weber, the great German sociologist who elaborated and popularized the \textit{Kulturwissenschaft} concept.\textsuperscript{146} Without using the explicit term, Carey is invoking Weber’s \textit{verstehen} sociology, in which the analyst interprets the meanings of his research subjects—‘that which we know from personal life’, in Carey’s language. In a 2006 interview, Carey confirmed the Weber influence, stating that he had read, “over the course of that [1962] summer (probably as part of dissertation work), \textit{The Logic of the Cultural Sciences} by Max Weber... my first introduction to that hermeneutical, \textit{verstehen} tradition, if you will, in its European form”.\textsuperscript{147} It’s a mere half-page in the preface, but the nod to “cultural science” and an interpretive ideal of social science—a stance for which he would become widely known in the 1970s—was his first. It’s also a sensibility that appears nowhere else in the thesis.

The preface closes with other signs that Carey had already moved on from Bertalanffy and systems theory. He turns to Kenneth Burke, the rhetorician, to concede the dissertation’s partiality:

I am not unmindful, however, that the logic presented here is, itself, a limited view of a very complex field. The admonitions of Kenneth Burke have not been lost on this thesis: “Any performance is discussible either from the standpoint of what it
attains or what it misses. Comprehensiveness can be discussed as superficiality, intensiveness as stricture, tolerance as uncertainty—and the poor pedestrian abilities of the fish are clearly explainable in terms of his excellence as a swimmer. A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing”.

Burke, of course, would become a charter member of Carey’s personal pantheon. Some of its other future members get mentioned here too, even though they appear rarely if at all in the dissertation proper. Indeed, he acknowledges the dissertation’s intellectual debts with two distinct lists of names. “For anyone familiar with their work”, he writes, “or who takes a cursory glance at the footnotes, the influence of Alfred North Whitehead, Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Clyde Kluckhohn will be obvious”. There is, he adds, a second grouping. “Not so obvious from the thesis, but of equal importance, is the effect of Harold Innis, Ernst Cassirer, and Erving Goffman had on the formulation of the mentality and categories of this work”. The first list is the visible one, the second unseen—and late-breaking.

Conclusion

Carey successfully defended the dissertation in January 1963, and in the fall he took up an appointment to the Illinois faculty. As discussed in the next chapter, he also tweaked Weber’s “cultural science” the same fall, settling on “cultural studies” as a makeshift label for a group of thinkers that he had come to admire. Notably, Parsons and Bertalanffy were not among the elect. As insinuated by the dissertation’s preface, Carey had already lost his nomothetic faith.

He turned down at least one offer to publish the thesis, and rarely mentioned it again. When asked about the document in 2006, he admitted that “no one could understand it, including me”. Certainly the “committee couldn’t understand it”, he continued, “and they figured I could, or at least they deferred to me”. He went on to say that some parts of the thesis were “interesting”, but others “didn’t make any sense at all, that still don’t make any sense”. At least one committee member openly challenged the thesis. At the defense, according to Carey, George Gerbner told him, “I disagree with everything you say, but I’m not going to fail you”. To Sandage, Carey’s nominal advisor, and the others in business and economics, it must have been startling to witness an advertising/economics talent mutate into a high sociological theorist.
Surely one reason Carey rejected the book publishing offer, and opted against pulling journal articles out of thesis chapters, is that he was dissatisfied with the work. Another, complementary way to understand the reticence is hypocrisy-avoidance: the brand of sociological functionalism he endorsed here became a standard target in his 1970s work. With new—and in some respects diametrically opposed—intellectual coordinates, the dissertation had become a self-refuted liability.

Why, then, dwell on a thesis that was, at the time of its defense, already half-abandoned? Because the dissertation, considered alongside his later work, offers a revealing mix of continuity and change. And key features of Carey’s intellectual style are given early expression, three of which stand out. 

Roving ventriloquism. The dissertation does not merely cite and repurpose Parsons’ arguments. What’s more striking is the way that Carey adopts Parsons’ language—his abstruse prose-style, signature jargon, and resolute abstraction. Carey displays an effortless facility, in other words, with exegesis of an especially immersive kind. There is, moreover, movement. In the early chapters, it’s Bertalanfly whose style is mimicked, and, as we’ve seen, the voice shifts again in the preface. Internal to the document, then, there is evidence of Carey’s role-playing ease. But what I am calling “roving ventriloquism” is most visible against the backdrop of Carey’s full career.

Consider the dissertation’s main argument, that communication acts as a social adhesive for modern societies. The thing to notice is how closely the argument tracks claims for which Carey would become widely known in the 1970s and after—that communication supplies the glue that holds society together. How do large, modern nation-states maintain order, despite their plurality and the loosened grip of tradition? Carey’s answer in 1963 is fundamentally the same one he gave, say, in 1975, or again in 1982: It’s communication that furnishes the relative solidity of vast societies like the United States. What’s distinct about 1964 is that he’s speaking through the voice of Parsons. In the mid-1970s anthropologist Clifford Geertz would serve as Carey’s theoretical surrogate. By the early 1980s he would register his claims through John Dewey and Chicago School sociologists.

This roving ventriloquism—from Parsons to Geertz to Dewey—is much more than the shuffling of names. It is “strategic predecessor selection” in Charles Camic’s terms, but with iterative swapping. And since the core argument stays more or less constant, what’s notable about each successive voice is its ancillary traits—its style of writing, methodological cues, and mode of reasoning. A figure like Parsons
or Dewey comes with a host of associations, including assumed allegiances and an implied tradition. There is, in other words, a bundle of meanings that gets invoked when Carey substitutes one predecessor for another. These are not so much choices of *what* to say, but *how* to say it—or, better yet, *who* to say it. And they are choices with major consequences, as Carey’s unfolding career attests.

**Intellectual importing.** Here in the dissertation Carey acts as a border-dwelling broker of sorts, linking currents of thought—systems theory and sociology—to the problems of communication research. He is, in other words, harvesting from adjacent fields, and then importing the fruits back to the institutionalized field of communication. Though the intellectual goods would change, Carey remained a border-dwelling importer throughout his career. No one in the history of communication research has staked out the disciplinary borderlands with more dexterity. And though the dissertation itself hardly circulated beyond his committee, the pattern was set: Carey would go on to repeatedly mine the promising veins of nearby disciplines, to be cut and polished for communication researchers.

It is not just that the dissertation is a first-run instance of a career-long pattern. What’s more interesting is that Carey devoted five of its pages to an extensive discussion of academic brokerage. The dissertation’s last substantive chapter develops the idea of specialized “symbolic brokers”, communication professionals who occupy an important niche in modern, media-saturated societies.\(^{155}\) To illustrate the idea, he points to those academics whose main contributions aren’t “scientific” but instead “communicative”. These brokers are “ostensibly members of the scientific community” but are actually “professional brokers in other people’s ideas”. Their status in the “social system of science”, he adds, is a result of their “status in the communication system of science”.\(^{156}\) He is not referring just to those brokers who sit between fields; he has in mind, too, communicators within fields, as well as popularizers. Still, the discussion is revealing, if only because Carey’s generic broker, with his “ability to process symbols”, so closely resembles the gifted exegete he became.

**Intellectual history as argument.** The dissertation is, finally, an early illustration of an approach to argument that would typify much of Carey’s subsequent work. That approach is to position competing claims as traceable strands of intellectual history. Diverse perspectives, in Carey’s practice, get swept up into two or three big-tent genealogies, which are then labeled or associated with an exemplary figure. Normally Carey would treat one of these narrative-cum-perspectives as regrettable neglected, and the other(s) as prevailing but impoverished. The classic case is

Carey’s use of intellectual history has had unusually durable consequences, owing to the specific conditions of his academic work. As we have seen, he speaks through others, and those others get imported from higher-prestige disciplines. As a result his intellectual historical claims have proven more robust—more resistant to doubt and aspersion from colleagues within communication studies. All that exported prestige, for one thing, helped to strengthen the authority of Carey’s intellectual histories. Most of his colleagues within communication, moreover, had insufficient knowledge of the exporting disciplines—sociology, say, or continental philosophy—to adequately police his claims. And just because of that prestige gap Carey was not often read outside the discipline, so his narratives and synopses were rarely scrutinized by scholars in the originating fields.

In the year after defending his dissertation in January 1963, Carey would go on to affix a new label, “cultural studies”, to a heterodox group of thinkers—among them, figures like Innis and Goffman who had surfaced in the dissertation’s preface. As outlined in the next chapter, Carey—newly appointed to the Illinois faculty—sought to carve out distinctive intellectual space, set off from his prominent colleagues at the university. His approach was to designate an alternative to the Marxist and behavioral-science currents then prevailing at Illinois. He drew on the dissertation’s scholarly tool-kit—ventriloquism, border-dwelling brokerage, and intellectual story-telling—but without recourse to Parsons. In effect, he invented a tradition, and called it “cultural studies”.

NOTES


3 Communication studies has its own examples of strategic predecessor selection: Consider Wilbur Schramm’s four-founders myth. First elaborated in 1963, Schramm’s genealogy credits the discipline’s plucky emergence to four pioneers—“founding fathers”, he labels them. Kurt Lewin, Carl Hovland, Harold Lasswell, and Lazarsfeld—two psychologists, a political scientist, and a sociologist, all eminent bearers of scholarly capital—were invoked as predisciplinary forerunners of the newly institutionalized field. See Pooley, “The New History of Mass Communication Research”, in *The History of Media and Communication Research: Contested Memories*, ed. David W. Park and Pooley (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 45-46.


5 Ibid., 141.


7 Grossberg, “From New England”, 11-12.
“It would be improper to describe my family as poor in the modern sense, but we were damaged very badly by the Depression and only started to recover during the war. I remember that my father was making eighty dollars a week working in the local shipyard during the war. The day after the war ended, he was laid off and was out of work for two years and finally got a job at twenty-five dollars a week, so it was that kind of up-and-down existence. You just never knew when the work was going to play out”. Ibid., 12.

Ibid. “It was by all the measures that I had a fine, interesting childhood. I have no great scars that come from all of this. But it was a premodern childhood. The first refrigerator that we had in the house was about 1946 or 1947. Before that there was Larry the iceman who provided the ice for the icebox. The refrigerator arrived one day from Sears with a coin box on it. You had to put a quarter a day in the refrigerator to keep the damn thing running. That was the installment plan! It was like having a pay telephone in the house. So we were late to the consumer goods culture, which had developed far beyond that. My family never owned an automobile nor held a driver’s license”.


Ibid., 12.


Quoted in Munson and Warren, “Introduction”, xii.


Ibid., 13-14. According to Daniel Carey, the scholarship was funded by the American Heart Association. “Life’s Work”, 170.

“As an affirmative action admit of another generation, before the process had a name, one admitted not on the basis of race but class and disability, I have a real investment in the legitimacy of this process and a real sympathy for those today being unfairly stigmatized and victimized by it”. Carey, “The Academy and its Discontents”, Gannett Center Journal (Spring-Summer 1991): 176.

“I’d fallen under the spell of a philosophy professor named Oliver Smith... He was a very inspirational teacher and was capable of opening a world that was completely foreign and unknown to me”. Grossberg, “From New England”, 14.


“When I decided to go to graduate school, I took the safe route. I had written for the student newspaper and the yearbook and had written a few successful things on a minor scale. And so I decided to go someplace where I could write journalistically or even do advertising”. Grossberg, “From New England”, 15. See also Daniel Carey, “Life’s Work”, 170.

In a 2006 interview, Carey mentions Michigan State and Illinois. Grossberg, “From New England”, 15. Daniel Carey refers to a “number” of applications, and mentions Ohio State. “I recall him saying that he applied to Ohio State which required candidates to take the Miller Analogies test to gain entry. After taking the exam he wrote to the university with a critique of the examination and they responded with an offer of a fellowship”. “Life’s Work”, 174n.


See below for more on the evolution of Illinois’ communication programs.
26 See Advertising: Theory and Practice (Chicago: Business Publications, 1936), and the many editions to follow.
38 Self-confident advice—e.g., “For an excellent and extended discussion of the ideas of Locke, see F.S.C. Northrup...”—abounds in the young author’s footnotes. Ibid., 9.
39 Ibid., 16.
41 “Advertising”, 4.
42 Ibid., 15.
43 The references to “social responsibility” derive from the well-known model of the press outlined by Illinois communication scholars a few years earlier, Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956).
44 “Advertising”, 11, 17.
Carey's M.S. in Advertising was formally granted in the fall of 1959. See “Transactions of the Board of Trustees, July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1960”, University of Illinois, July 1960, 1052. Note that many sources, including Carey's curriculum vitae, incorrectly list the Master’s as “Communications” or “Journalism”. Even before the formal M.S. degree, Carey was enrolled in the Communications PhD program as a graduate fellow, beginning in the spring of 1959. “Transactions”, 280.

In a 1961 review of two advertising books for *Journalism Quarterly*, Carey signaled his new identity as a scholar. He sharply criticizes the books, both the work of advertising practitioners, for “glaring weaknesses”. “Like most books written by practitioners”, he writes of one”, it is almost pure ideology when it deals with any matter relating advertising to the rest of society”. Adds Carey: “The editor justifies the volume because there are not enough practitioners teaching advertising. If this is any evidence of what they would bring to the classroom, then the only sensible conclusion is that it is just as well they’re not teaching because they really don’t have much to say and more importantly, they have yet to learn the crucial distinction between valid knowledge and rote, rule and sophistry”. Review of *Tested Advertising Methods* (3rd ed) by John Caples, and *460 Secrets of Advertising Experts*, ed. Willard A. Pleuthner, *Journalism Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (1961): 397–398.


Carl E. Schorske, “The New Rigorism in the Human Sciences, 1940–1960”, *Daedalus* 126, no. 1. Stoddard, an educational psychologist, had become close to Schramm at the University of Iowa, where both worked. Stoddard was also co-author of one of the storied Payne Fund studies on movies and children.

See Chaffee & Rogers, “Wilbur Schramm, the Founder”, 139-141.

In 1949, the Institute was allotted $49,675 in hard money funding, which is nearly $500,000 in 2015 dollars. “Transactions of the Board of Trustees, July 2, 1948 to June 30, 1950”, University of Illinois, July 1950, 536.
“Transactions of the Board of Trustees, July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1948”, University of Illinois, July 1948, 351

See “Transactions of the Board of Trustees, July 2, 1948 to June 30, 1950”, University of Illinois, July 1950, 988. As part of the reorganization, the School of Journalism had “and Communications” appended to its name, with Divisions of Journalism, Radio, and Advertising. Ibid., 992.


In 1954, the Institute was placed in the Graduate College, while the School of Journalism and Communications was restored to independent status. Ibid. In 1957, the units were reorganized again, with the Institute transferred to the School, itself renamed as the College of Journalism and Communications. “Transactions of the Board of Trustees, July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1958”, University of Illinois, July 1958, 435.


For an overview on funding, see Ibid. For a survey of the research, see, Leon A. Jakobovits, “Comparative Psycholinguistics in the Study of Cultures”, International Journal of Psychology 1, no. 1 (1966).


“Transactions of the Board of Trustees, July 2, 1948 to June 30, 1950”, University of Illinois, July 1950, 42.


68 In addition to Albig, sociology appointments to the Institute over this period were Joseph Bachelder (1951), Charles Edmund Swanson (1951) and Bennett Berger (1960).


74 Ibid., 17.

75 See “Communication Systems and Social Systems: Two Economic Postulates Applied to a Theory of Communication Systems” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1963), 68n4, 84n55, 86n59. Osgood, George Gerbner, and Dallas Smythe are also cited, but only in passing.

76 Carey: “It was as much [Jensen’s] philosophical interests and his constant forcing them upon others that cultivated in me an interest in all sorts of scholars. He gave me a very broad philosophical reading list. But he said he thought that I should start with Dewey, for I would find in Dewey a congenial mind…. during my Ph.D. work”. Grossberg, “From New England”, 16-17.


80 Carey, “Life’s Work”, 171
86 “Communication Systems”, 3. In the footnote off this passage, Carey illustrates the broader point with reference to behaviorism: “Behaviorism, as evidenced by the reflex arc concept in psychology and many reinforcement theories, is a striking example of analytical, elementalistic thinking. The fundamental unit of social reality is conceived to be the individualized act, the behavior, and all complex social phenomena are reduced to their fundamental behavioral units”.
87 “It is the contention of this thesis that part of the sterility in the field of communications is that there is, as Whitehead warned, a constraining framework of thought particularly operative in communications though plaguing much of the rest of the social sciences. This constraining mode of thought is the overwhelming predominance of analytic thinking in social science stemming from the hegemony of classical physics as the model for the exact sciences”. Ibid.
88 Ibid., 2.
89 Ibid., 15, 19.
After Parsons, Bertalanffy is cited more than anyone else in the thesis. And it’s the biologist’s concept of “systems” that earns three mentions in the dissertation’s title. It’s no exaggeration, in other words, to say that these first two chapters are an extended paraphrase of Bertalanffy. Carey typically cites “An Outline of General System Theory”, _The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science_ 1, no. 2 (1950) and _Problems of Life: An Evaluation of Modern Biological Thought_ (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952). For a sense of the overlap—as well as Carey’s own, more inclusive sense of “synthetic”—compare Bertalanffy, “An Outline”, 134-136, with this passage: “The modern ‘synthetic movement’ can be identified with many names. Without being exhaustive it would appear that in economics the movement began with Walras, was immeasurably furthered by his successor at Lausanne Pareto and culminated in the 1930s with Keynes; in psychology it was the Gestalt school that wrenched away from the behaviorists by developing a more organic theory of personality and perception; in history, Spengler and Toynbee represent the more extreme manifestations of the organic conception; in sociology, Durkheim successfully welded together the positivist’s penchant for detailed empirical examination with a conception of the fundamental wholeness and solidarity of the social system. In anthropology, the ‘functionalist school’ paced by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown reacted against the ideological organicism engendered by Social Darwinism to produce a scientific conception of the fundamental unity of all culture. Although observable differences can be found in each of these approaches as systems of thought, there is fundamental agreement that principles of dynamic wholeness are basic to the modern scientific world-view”. “Communication Systems”, 21-22.


Even the experimental psychology of Carl Hovland and associates suffers from elementalist thinking”. At the experimental level, the ultimate effects of the mechanistic bias, when pursued to the effective exclusion of other programs, is evidenced by the work of Carl Hovland at Yale”. Ibid., 12n.

See especially footnotes 28 and 29. Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 14.

Ibid., 25.

Ibid., 34. “An organic approach, or what we shall call in this thesis a systems theory approach, starts from the assumption that social life is basically incorporated into systems. It is an assumption that all reality shows the property of ‘immanent organization’”. 30.

Ibid., 29.

Ibid., 31.

Carey: “It could be argued that the view being presented here of systems theory is almost identical to the approach known as functionalism in sociology and most closely identified with the name, Robert Merton. Though the point can be argued, it overlooks a number of crucial points of difference between functionalism and systems theory”. 59. The first difference, he says, is that the term “function” has been “historically used in a variety of ways in the social sciences”, including mechanistically. As a result, there is a “strong tendency to ... never to get beyond the concept of function as the mathematical dependence of two variable”. The second difference is that many functionalists’ have a “strong ahistorical bias”—citing Charles Wright, from Columbia’s Bureau of Applied Social Research. The third problem goes deeper: “If the philosophical assumption of this thesis is correct, namely that the nature of social life is typified by immanent organization, then functionalism is inadequate. For functionalism looks, to extend the redundancy, for functions and not for the organization of functions and processes within system”. 60. Those “crucial points”, though, are arguably red herrings, that Carey—in his subsequent elaboration of Parsons’ full-throtled structural-functionalism—himself refutes. My own interpretation is that Carey is distancing himself from the low-octane functionalism associated with Columbia’s Bureau—which, after all, represented at the time one of the main streams of American communication research (committed, no less, to the “Lasswellian model” Carey has already dismissed). How can Carey’s theory count as a genuine alternative if its functionalist core already undergirds a major strand of existing research? Hence the mention of Columbia’s Merton, which I take to be a slight feint given that it was Parsons who was “certainly most closely identified” with functionalism—with his former student Merton an important revisionist.

“Communication Systems”, 34.

Ibid., 55.

Carey is explicit about this universalizing assumption. See, for example, his dismissal of a more particularist take on the theory he’s advancing: “More important, if each society must be explained in terms of its own unique myth system, social science is reduced to a kind of historicism—devoid of any general laws (except at a level where they have no meaning)—interpreting and describing unique historical events”. Ibid., 95.

“Instead of a causal model, value systems, social systems, and technological systems must be seen as constituting three interdependent but not mutually reducible systems. What can be explained is the pattern or syndrome that constitutes this interdependence and not any one way causality”. Ibid., 95-96.

This bracketing of technology is especially curious given that he had apparently written (and set aside) a draft dissertation on Innis and McLuhan. Still, references to the technological system are rare, and he elaborates technological system just once, as “providing the means of adaptation. Social systems thus represent organized efforts to use technology in the solution of problems of survival, consistent with prevailing value patterns”. Ibid., 97.
The discussion of the value system includes a fascinating, if also jarring given the context, discussion of a “cultural world”. Carey draws the concept from an essay summarizing the major currents of European philosophy and social thought associated with hermeneutics and phenomenology. Grace de Laguna, “The Lebenswelt and the Cultural World”, The Journal of Philosophy 57, no. 25 (1960). Though these European currents will indeed become important reference points for Carey, via Geertz, in the 1970s, here their subjectivist and interpretive cast cut against the dissertation’s otherwise-nomothetic grain. He refers to culture as a “sensitized net, a way of viewing and organizing reality which can be learned, taught and transmitted”. “Communication Systems”, 66. The accent on subjective filtering—on the “human life world”—is soon dismissed, however. “The ‘subjectivist’ tilt of this discussion”, writes Carey, “should not obscure the fundamental ‘objectivity’ of values”. Ibid., 80. This claim is rooted in an idiosyncratic definition of “value” as a “thing in relation to other things”, a relationship independent of human perception. (He observes that the definition was “originally suggested” by Jay Jensen.) Ibid., 68. Yes, values are “subject, within limits, to idiosyncratic coloring”: “Yet even along the subjective dimension values have an ontological source for historically all cultures have derived their ultimate or focal values from a basic concept of Being—and have variously termed it God, Nature, the Universe, History”. Ibid., 70–71.

Ibid., 84-85.
Ibid., 108.
Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
Ibid., 109.
Ibid.
“A Cultural Approach to Communication”, Communication 2, no. 1 (1975): 9; Communication as Culture, 22. The full quote: “There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common ... are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding—likemindedness as sociologists say. Such things cannot be passed physically from one to another like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces. . . . Consensus demands communication”.
“Communication Systems”, 110. The footnoted reference off the “good deal of empirical work” passage is to Joseph Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: Free Press, 1960), which is the major summary volume coming out of Columbia’s Bureau of Applied Social Research. The book helped to codify the conclusion that post-war research had established that media have, against expectations, only “limited effects”. Klapper argued that the main “effect” of mass communication was in fact “reinforcement”, and it is this conclusion—articulated in the soft functionalist key common to much Bureau work—that Carey is citing here. Interestingly, references to the Bureau’s work are notably rare in this otherwise citation-rich thesis. For example, the Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld classic Personal Influence (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955) is nowhere cited.
Ibid., 111-112.
Ibid., 120.
Thus, the process of communication must reflect the basic organizational pattern of any system. It follows then that to the degree system, or less formally, the society, is a logically definable unit then it too must have a patterned method of distributing symbols and values just as it possesses the facilities and operating procedures for the distribution of economic goods, power and prestige. Society, then, must be bound together by a system of communicative relations”. Ibid., 122

Ibid., 175, 176.
Ibid., 207-210.
Ibid., vi.

Carey cites here Albert Levi’s 1959 *Philosophy and the Modern Mind*, which attempts to synthesizes social thought against the tide of specialization.


Here Carey cites Daniel Lerner’s 1958 *The Passing of Traditional Society*.


“Ibid., x.
Ibid., x-xi.
Ibid., xi. Italics are mine.


“Communication Systems”, viii-ix. The two passages from Cassirer—“our wealth of facts is not necessarily a wealth of thoughts” and “remains lost in a mass of disconnected and disintegrated data which lack all conceptual unity”—are from *An Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

“Communication Systems”, ix. The “all conceptual unity” is a reference back to Cassirer; see the footnote above.

Later in the preface, Carey again defends the move away from empirical data-gathering. After quoting Albert Einstein on the necessity of generalizations, Carey writes, “Einstein recognized a certain audacity in examining large problems, for large problems necessarily entail a loosening of methodological rigor. Yet there is no escape from this dilemma, either”. Ibid., xiii.

Ibid., xiv. “If, as Andrew Hacker argues, ‘significance and truth are never the easiest of bedfellows,’ then for ‘important issues … to receive discussion … standards of logic and even of veracity must be relaxed’”. The citations are to Hacker, *Political Theory* (New York: Macmillan, 1961) and Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1929).

“Communication Systems”, xvi.

Ibid., xvi, xiv.
Ibid., xv-xvi.
Weber borrowed the term from the philosopher Heinrich Rickert, one of the main disputants in the Methodenstreit. Hans Henrik Bruun, Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber’s Methodology (London: Ashgate, 2007), 95.


Ibid., xvii-xviii.

He declined an offer from the Dutch publisher Mouton. Ibid., 173n.


Ibid., 19.

Carey makes a telling reference to his abandoned career aspiration. “In such sub-systems”, he writes, “the link between the individual and the social order is not unnecessarily one of character formation but may be of functional role requirement”. The footnote to that statement reads, “A classic example, of course, is the advertising copywriter who ‘just has a job to do’”. “Communication Systems”, 100-101.

The discussion of scientific brokers is “Communication Systems”, 151-155. For the broader discussion of “symbolic brokers”, see 134-161, 198-211. Interestingly, the discussion of symbolic brokers was one of the only few of the dissertation that Carey re-purposed for later publication, in “The Communications Revolution and the Professional Communicator”, The Sociological Review Monograph 13 (1969).


2. INNIS IN URBANA

As a new assistant professor, Carey was asked to help organize the Institute’s first-year doctoral proseminar in the fall of 1963. The assignment was more daunting than standalone teaching. The proseminar, after all, was a semi-public display of intellectual identity. Nearly all of the Institute faculty rotated in for a week’s session, with the idea that students would receive a survey-by-example of an expansive field. Given Illinois’ prominence and the still-infant state of communication research, the proseminar served as a surrogate textbook. In that sense the self-understanding of the department—and by extension the field—was at stake. At first Carey’s seat at the seminar table was just a seat. But he wanted more than that; he wanted, in fact, to revise the textbook.

Carey’s strategy was to coin a phrase, “cultural studies”, to designate his new section of the proseminar. The “cultural studies” label, adapted from Max Weber’s “cultural sciences” (Kulturwissenschaft) put a legitimating name to the motley band of thinkers Carey had embraced in the preface of his dissertation. The local context was crucial: in a department dominated by quantitative behavioralists like Charles Osgood and Marxists like Dallas Smythe, Carey sought to carve out a distinctive intellectual space, a third way all his own.

This chapter traces his first attempt to clear a new path. For more than a decade, he devoted his attention to technology: its history, its contemporary
consequences, and above all the celebratory discourse that greeted its new forms. His principal device, throughout this period, was to narrate a contest between Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan—the subjects of his first, abandoned dissertation. In each essay Carey enlisted Innis as his intellectual surrogate. Carey revived the late Canadian economist’s grim take on modern technology to puncture—often savagely—McLuhan’s high-flying mythology of televisual communion.

McLuhan’s rapid celebrity ascent in the mid-1960s provided the opening and the rationale for Carey’s turn to technology. He was also aided by a remarkable collaboration with an Illinois undergraduate, John J. Quirk. Brilliant and unstable, Quirk would soon drop out of college. But Carey and Quirk continued to write together, as Quirk’s mental health permitted, through the early 1970s.1 It was Quirk who introduced Carey to scholarship in American studies, and to the intellectual tradition that both men, following Leo Marx, would call the “rhetoric of the technological sublime”.2

Carey’s early engagement with technology—just a handful of essays composed from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s—established his national reputation. By the conventions of communication research at the time, the work was unconventional, even exotic. For the leaden prose of his dissertation, Carey substituted the lyrical, humane style that quickly became his hallmark. The essays are gracefully written, studded with quoted poetry and allusions to contemporary drama. Their arguments unfold in meditative layers, supported by page-long extracts from old books that—in a field as resolutely ahistorical as communication research—no one had ever encountered. The aperçus, the easy erudition, the historical mode of argument: all of this was foreign to the field. In effect Carey dropped the conventions of social science for those of the literary essay. Most of these works, in fact, were published in “little magazines” like The American Scholar.

Carey also abandoned his dissertation’s universalizing ambition. Instead he insisted on the specificity of the American experience, which he identified with the country’s anomalous history. In that respect the essays are the earliest illustrations of an unapologetic ethnocentrism that Carey maintained for the remainder of his career. The argument, for example, that European thought-styles like Marxism are unsuited for American soil makes its first appearances here.

American exceptionalism, however, is put to different, more critical use than is typical of his later work. The animating trope of these early-career essays is a contrast between myth and powerhouse—a couplet borrowed from the literary critic Philip Rahv, via John Quirk.3 In these articles Carey sets the country’s
pastoral “mythology” against its harsh “powerhouse” reality. The result is demystifying ideology critique, with McLuhan as mythologist and Innis as the spear-carrying myth-buster. Years later, under the influence of Geertz and especially Richard Rorty, Carey would come to view the myth/reality contrast as nonsensical and unappealing. But here Carey—with Quirk’s notable aid—is bent on skewering McLuhan’s “secular prayer to technology” in often scabrous terms.4

As a result there is a radical edge to Carey’s writing in this period, even as he remained dismissive of Marxism and the New Left. The essays, citing Innis, are pervaded by an anti-modern nostalgia for place-bound community life. Common culture, in the dissertation, had been a descriptive reality. Here, in the technology essays, we glimpse a new, normative take on shared culture: There isn’t enough of it, because (drawing on Innis again) modern electronic media favor space over time. This theme of common culture as sacred canopy would remain prominent for the rest of his career—though Innis would come to play an intermittent role as surrogate. Indeed, with Geertz and then Rorty, Carey’s proto-communitarian agenda would largely collapse the descriptive and normative, with the American past deployed as a useful fiction. In this earlier period, Carey was an unflinching opponent of American mythology.

Parsons is rarely cited in this new work. But key patterns of Carey’s intellectual style already evident in the dissertation support these technology essays too. The mode of argument is similar, even as the content has shifted. Instead of Parsons, Carey speaks through Innis. As before, Carey occupies the borderlands of communication research—but this time imports American studies scholarship rather than high sociological theory. Intellectual history remains a principal argumentative tool, but the narrative is new (and largely borrowed from Quirk). In these essays, Carey repeatedly contrasts Innis with a rhetoric of the “electronic sublime”, which he traces through Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford, and on through McLuhan.

By the late 1960s Carey had succeeded in establishing a distinctive voice. His intellectual referents and writing style positioned him, at Illinois and beyond, as a different kind of communication scholar. In 1969 he was named director of the Institute of Communications Research—the academic unit that Wilbur Schramm had founded 20 years before to seed a behavioral-science approach to the field.5

Still, Carey had not yet elaborated the full-fledged “cultural studies” approach that would make him famous in the mid-1970s. Indeed, Carey rarely used the “cultural studies” language in the technology essays that are the subject
of this chapter. Instead, “cultural studies” remained for over a decade a lexical stowaway—a reactive term of convenience with local resonance.

The Naming of Cultural Studies

In the fall of 1963, Charles Osgood, the Institute director, assigned Carey—a new assistant professor—the task of co-organizing the program’s proseminar. Carey, as he later recalled, felt the need to stand out, in part because work that wasn’t quantitative or Marxist was treated condescendingly. At the time, the Illinois proseminar—reflecting the organization of the program—was divided into “micro” and “macro” halves. On the micro side were Osgood and other behavioral scientists. On the macro side were critical scholars like Gerbner and Smythe, along with journalism historian Jay Jensen, and a rotating cast of visitors, many of them non-behavioralist social scientists like Joseph Gusfield and Murray Edelman.  

In Carey’s memory anyway, Smythe and the behavioral scientists maintained a wary respect for each other: both were engaged in a kind of rigorous science. To both camps, everything else—including Jensen’s work and the heterodox social science of the irregulars like Gusfield and Edelman—was mere “history”, treated “like poetry: a lot of fun, fairly engaging, but you can’t make any serious claims for it or from it”.  

Faced with that condescension alongside the pressing need to contribute to the seminar, Carey proposed a new section, distinct from the existing “macro” and “micro” units. He remembers that he said to himself, “I have to find a name for these irregular historians, sociologists and then try to convince the Marxists to join with us”. He had, as the dissertation preface indicates, already encountered some Max Weber’s methodological writings.  “I liked ‘cultural science’ as a name, but I didn’t want to use the word ‘science’, Osgood and the other hard-nosed scientists would castrate me. So I started to think of this assorted group of scholars under the umbrella name of cultural studies”. The name, he admits, was a catch-all, a term of convenience:

Cultural studies was then little more than a term to describe the perceived commonalities in the work of Joe Gusfield, Jay Jensen, Erving Goffman, Thomas Kuhn, symbolic interactionism and the Chicago School of Sociology, Kenneth Burke, Leslie Fiedler and a small group of literary critics, and, of course, Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis, along with those Marxists willing to associate with a group largely affiliated in opposition to positivism and positive science. This was a strange group to patch together, against their will, if they knew about it, but
nonetheless I carved out a section of the proseminar under the label “cultural studies”.9

“Cultural studies” as a label did not emerge fully formed with a coherent definition; instead, it was a defensive category for “everything else”.10 The impetus, moreover, was local and related to the peculiar topography of the Illinois program. As Carey later recounted, “You join a program like Illinois and everyone’s got a seat staked out at the table.... But there was no chair for me. You walk into a room, and everyone sits down, and there’s no chair. Where can I sit? And someone says, you can sit on my lap. But no one was quite the voice”.11 Carey’s aversion to quantitative evangelists like Osgood was plain enough, even then. Carey maintained an equally strong and enduring distaste for Illinois’ Marxist scholars. There were no appealing laps around that table.

With the Marxists the difficulty was personal. Though Carey also cites Sidney Hook’s anti-Communist writings from the postwar period, he admitted in an interview that his relationship to Marxism was “partly shaped” by his encounters with Smythe and Smythe’s replacement Herbert Schiller at Illinois.12 He detected an “authoritarian spirit” in Smythe, Schiller and Guback that he often labeled “Stalinist”. “I may have felt much different about Marxism”, he recalled, “but I encountered it in its Stalinist phase. When Dallas [Smythe] said, ‘I want all the graduate students to lie down on Friday afternoon on the Illinois Central tracks near the power plant to oppose American policy toward Cuba, we all thought: That goddamn engineer may not see us! I mean this was the director of the program”. Smythe—who ironically introduced Carey to Innis, whom Smythe read as a Marxist—“intensely disliked anyone who was not a Marxist”. He was, Carey remembered, an “authoritarian personality—you did things his way, or you didn’t do them at all”.13 Carey believed that Smythe even tried to scuttle his employment prospects, phoning up a department head to warn him against Carey, whom Smythe (so Carey says) labeled a “fascist”.14

Schiller, too, earned Carey’s personal ire, “a very hard-line Marxist of a certain kind, who was always looking for a fight. He stated his views in ways designed to antagonize and alienate everyone but true believers.... I encountered Herb”, he added, “as a bourgeois Marxist; a particularly unattractive example of the breed who speaks of fiery rebellion and lets other people go out and take risks and clean up in the aftermath but doesn’t take any risks himself”.15 Carey found Gerbner more “generous and tolerant”, but admitted that he “always got nervous around” him, because “he too had an Eastern European authoritarian streak to his personality”.16
In its early state, then, “cultural studies” was defined in opposition to Carey’s Illinois colleagues. And the label itself was a coinage of rushed convenience, with no relation to its better-known and near-simultaneous adoption by Richard Hoggart. (Hoggart founded the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in 1964.) Carey had read Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson—and would strike up a correspondence with Hoggart and the Birmingham Centre’s Stuart Hall in the years to come—but these British figures were not among Carey’s cultural studies elect. Instead, he gathered a hodgepodge of unorthodox North American thinkers under the label, all of them outside the organized field of communication: figures like Erving Goffman, Kenneth Burke and Harold Innis. There was, initially, no real logic to membership in his cultural studies pantheon, except an unarticulated intellectual affinity and the fact that these figures weren’t political economists or mainstream effects researchers.

The Phantom Scholar

Carey, in effect, knew what he wasn’t. In these first years as an assistant professor, he jumped from topic to topic—marketing, ethnic politics, and the black TV audience. With a half-appointment in the Journalism department, he dabbled in reporting. He delivered conventional papers at academic conferences, where he continued to position himself as a de facto sociologist—just without the Parsonsian overlay. It was a period of interregnal flux: He had not yet revived his interest in the McLuhan/Innis pairing, nor had he settled into the humanist essay form.

In his first year on the faculty, Carey delivered a paper at the American Marketing Association’s winter conference in Boston. The paper’s title —“Personality Correlates of Persuadability”—is an index of the intellectual distance Carey would travel over the next few years. That paper, however, was in many respects a dissent from the gathering’s confident scientism. The conference was planned around the contributions of “the behavioral sciences and quantitative analysis”, and its proceedings were published as *Toward Scientific Marketing*.18

Carey’s paper took direct aim at Yale University’s high-profile communication and attitude-change program. Since World War II, a team of psychologists led by Carl I. Hovland had published widely on experimental studies of short-term persuasion.19 After a generous and lucid summary of the Yale research, Carey’s paper pivoted to critique, in the form of a sociological cold bath.
“Without attempting to be iconoclastic”, he said, “I must say that the usefulness of [the Yale group’s] principles is doubtful”. Marketing behavior, he observed, takes place in a complex social setting. “It strikes me as odd that, since Durkheim, anyone would seriously assume that psychological factors operate independent of social factors”. An adequate explanation of marketing and consumer behavior, he argued, requires a mix of social and psychological variables.

In the paper’s conclusion Carey took the critique deeper, to challenge the Yale group’s embrace of a stimulus-response model. The “S-R model” works well enough for animal lab studies, he conceded, but the approach distorts the “variety, complexity and perverseness of human behavior”. As a result, the Yale team’s attitude research will be “of little help” for students of marketing behavior. Nor will improvements in study design fix fundamental problems “internal to psychological theory and experimentation”.

The “Personality Correlates” paper was delivered in the language of social science, and its critique was relatively mild. Marketing behavior could be studied successfully, he argued; the missing ingredient is sociology. Still, his gestures toward the diversity of human action, and his assault on the S-R model, anticipate a line of criticism that became a staple of his mid-1970s account of the field’s stunted development. According to a letter he wrote after the conference, he was depressed by its “abnormally ambitious young men... constantly sampling the official winds of doctrine and dogma before deciding what to think”. The paper, he recorded, had generated “argument and controversy”.

Carey’s next academic paper, delivered at the Association for Education in Journalism (AEJ) in 1964, was greeted with similar agitation. As before, his approach was to apply a sociological sensibility to a research area then dominated by psychological assumptions. This time his topic was the television audience, whose preferences, he argued, were divided along racial lines. In a reanalysis of a private firm’s audience data, he concluded that black and white audiences have significantly different tastes in television programming. Carey framed his study as a broader criticism of prevailing research, especially its image of the audience as “an undifferentiated mass”. Group membership—the “structure of group life”—affects the character of viewers’ TV preferences, he argued. Because American life is organized along ethnic, religious, regional, and generational lines, it is reasonable to expect “some congruence between the culture of the group and the specific pattern of preferences that emerge”. Blacks (“Negroes” in Carey’s use of common parlance) favor programs that
speak to their particular experiences. No program is intrinsically entertaining; enjoyment depends, instead, on “those situations and styles of life, those virtues and vices, which have some relation to the tissues of [the viewer’s] own experience”.

Though perhaps self-evident today—in our era of demographic narrowcasting—Carey’s findings were startling to fellow journalism academics. The editorial introduction to the published paper states that it “aroused a great deal of heated discussion” when originally presented—“and should do so again after publication in these pages”.

What startles today’s reader, instead, is that Carey employed quantitative methods, complete with ratings tables and language like “roster recall method” and “rank-order correlation”. At the same time, Carey signaled humanist leanings in other word choice: TV programs speak to viewers in a “comic, tragic, or melodramatic way”, through the “tissues” of experience. He was suspended, in other words, between social science and something else.

It is possible that Carey was auditioning journalism for that something else. His only other publications from this period were both reported pieces written for a general audience. Carey was half-appointed in Illinois’ Journalism Department. At the time, American journalism schools often required that faculty, regardless of the PhD, have reporting experience. Illinois was apparently not so strict, but Carey’s brief flirtation with journalism may have reflected these pressures.

At any rate, both articles were (like his AEJ paper) centered on race. In a 2000-word dispatch for the Catholic magazine Commonweal, Carey reported on the politics of race among white ethnic Catholics. The backdrop was the impending 1964 presidential election, which was thrown in turmoil by Lyndon Johnson’s successful push for the Civil Rights Act that summer. Based on over 200 interviews with “ethnic Catholics in New England industrial cities”, Carey predicted that there would be “little or no white backlash” reflected at the polls. Catholics, he concluded, would remain loyal to the Democratic ticket. Nevertheless, he found the “Negro” to be an “obsessive preoccupation” among his interview subjects: “The prejudice is real, the bitterness intense, the attitudes intractable”. The depth of the “anti-Negro sentiment” does “not speak well for the future”, he wrote. The Democratic Party’s big tent—“Negroes and whites, Catholics and atheists, intellectuals and workers”—is “severely strained”. A new political coalition could emerge, reflecting an “unlikely but politically powerful assortment of bedfellows”.
The *Commonweal* article turned out to be a prescient work of political analysis. Carey’s other foray into journalism had a narrower scope, but was also doggedly reported. In “The Phantom Racist”, published two years later, Carey and his co-author, sociologist Rita James Simon, tried to reconstruct a knotty racial controversy at the University of Illinois. The dispute centered on charges that coaches had discriminated against black athletes. The campus NAACP chapter intervened on behalf of the athletes—some number of whom then proceeded to raise vociferous objections to the NAACP’s public advocacy representative. The facts of the case remained muddled when Carey and Simon picked up the story. The pair interviewed most of the principals involved, “hoping to disentangle fact from fiction”. In the end Carey and Simon admitted defeat in the search for what they came to call the “phantom racist”. They could not prove the charges of discrimination, nor unravel the “snarled communications” around the dispute. Instead—in the dramaturgical language Carey would repeatedly invoke in the decades ahead—they described the case as part of the “great public drama of civil rights”, subject to the “laws of drama rather than the laws of reason”. The protagonists had cast themselves in roles—“as gods and devils, racists, integrationists, or liberal fools”.

This was atypical journalism, to be sure. But “The Phantom Racist”, along with Carey’s other work from this period, showed him groping for an intellectual identity. His distinctive writing style, already evident in his dissertation preface, surfaced in these articles, albeit sporadically. In his *Commonweal* story, for example, Carey referred to John F. Kennedy: “He has been, in a special sense, deified, removed from the scene of politics, made a free-floating Irish atom swimming in a mystical sea of holy water”. This is not the typical prose style of a behavioral scientist.

Carey’s persistent interest in race and ethnicity is also notable, and probably related to his dawning appreciation for his Irish Catholic identity. The *Commonweal* piece is filled with canny observations about the Irish and other white ethnics. In his AEJ television audience paper, he reported (in a footnote) on a “small study by the author” that found distinctive Irish and Italian TV preferences, rooted in “differences in Irish and Italian culture”. In a 1964 letter from Rhode Island, he wrote that “the people of Providence are, for good or ill, my people – I understand them, they understand me; we can communicate ... with a naked directness and in a sparkling, enjoyable if not an altogether [...] vernacular”. The visit home, he continued, revived
all my latent chauvinism for the Irish, for they are, when untouched by middle class culture, a beautiful people … [I]t is from the Irish Catholics of New England, from the heritage of their own hates, loves and fears that I draw my own individual identity.42

Carey’s Catholicism, and his Irish patrimony, would occupy a growing—if sometimes submerged—space within his intellectual self-concept in the decade to come.

In all this work Carey expresses a new sensitivity to the thickness of group life. In the pair of academic papers, this attention is telescoped through sociology’s critique of psychological atomism. Given sociology’s waning influence in the rapidly expanding, would-be discipline of “communication”, Carey might have widened this corrective with new empirical research predicated on the importance of supra-individual social groupings.43 This was not the route that Carey selected. The fast fame of Marshall McLuhan, and a chance encounter with an undergraduate, intervened.

The Secular Messiah

At the end of Carey’s first year on the Illinois faculty, Marshall McLuhan published *Understanding Media*.44 The Cambridge-trained literary scholar wasn’t well-known outside the academy at the time. But the book sold well, and the following year a pair of Californian advertising executives mounted a publicity campaign on McLuhan’s behalf, culminating in a “McLuhan Festival” attended by Tom Wolfe. Wolfe, the doyen of new journalism, soon published a feverish profile in *New York* magazine: “Suppose he is what he sounds like, the most important thinker since Newton, Darwin, Freud, Einstein, and Pavlov?”45 By late 1965 McLuhan was a high-flying celebrity—“Canada’s Intellectual Comet” in the words of *Harper’s* magazine.46 A *Newsweek* cover, *New Yorker* cartoons, and a *Playboy* interview soon followed.47

Carey had known McLuhan before he became a klieg-lit media sage. Harry Skornia, an Illinois professor of radio and television, had introduced Carey to McLuhan in 1960, when Carey was still a graduate student.48 Skornia, president of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB), had commissioned McLuhan to develop a report on high school media education.49 McLuhan spent the summer of 1960 at Illinois as Skornia’s guest, revising his highly unconventional guest report for the NAEB—a document that formed the nucleus of *Understanding Media*.50
That summer, Skornia began to invite Carey to his house for evening drinks and conversation with McLuhan. These encounters with McLuhan gave Carey the idea for his first, abandoned dissertation on McLuhan and Harold Innis. Carey, in a later interview, recalled that this thesis “was not very good”, so he opted to set it aside in favor of the Parsonsian project. For years the early dissertation remained untouched—until McLuhan reappeared as a celebrity intellectual.

In the wake of McLuhan’s fame, Carey resurrected his original thesis, which he refashioned into a pair of articles including the justly celebrated 1967 *Antioch Review* essay “Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan”. Carey was the rare academic who knew McLuhan’s work well, and he quickly became the most incisive voice among a loud chorus of McLuhan critics.

From the mid-1960s onward, McLuhan endured as a career-long preoccupation. Nearly all of Carey’s published work through the early 1970s addressed the Panglossian media prophet, almost always by way of an unflattering contrast with Innis. Carey later described Canadian communication theory as an arc running from Innis to McLuhan, quoting Oscar Wilde’s reaction to the Niagara Falls: “It would be more impressive if it ran the other way”. The first published iteration of Carey’s McLuhan criticism appeared in 1966, in a local journal of leftist opinion. Without naming Innis, the short article outlined the core contrast that would animate Carey’s other technology writings from the period. McLuhan, Carey wrote, is a “secular messiah” whose “roaring success” is “impressive testimony to the power of the media to create heroes, to confer status, to turn ordinary academicians into symbolic leaders”. An “ideologist”, McLuhan draws his support from the electronics industry, “not from the academy”. He is, Carey suggested, a media-anointed charlatan.

Despite the harsh dismissal, the article synopsizes McLuhan’s work with some care, and lays out a series of specific criticisms. Among these is the charge that McLuhan underplays the agency of media audiences, while exaggerating the rigidity of technology. It is true, Carey conceded, that language and technology limit human expression, but the “history of man is also the history of attempts to... make the media bend to his thought and imagination rather than merely be imprisoned by them”. With an apparent reference to Kenneth Burke, the essay cites “metaphor and simile, incongruity and hyperbole, personification and irony” as technology-evading imaginative devices. In an unmistakeable echo of his “Personality Correlates” paper, he faults McLuhan’s “pernicious view of the
person” for occluding the “bewildering variety, complexity and perversity of behavior”.  

Though Innis goes unmentioned, Carey enlisted McLuhan’s Canadian precursor to argue that McLuhan had neglected the social impact of media technology. McLuhan’s theory centered on the claim that each medium has always favored one or another sense. Print, according to McLuhan, privileged the eye over the ear—an imbalance that television’s synesthetic character promised to correct. To Carey, this talk of altered sense-ratios was thinly supported at best. More to the point, McLuhan had buried Innis’ core insight—that media technologies scramble patterns of social organization. Plainly invoking Innis, Carey pointed to a “good deal of evidence” that technologies of communication “rearrange the structure of social groups, permitting new associations to form, encouraging old associations to atrophy.”

In the much longer Antioch Review essay the next year, Carey’s debts to Innis were openly declared. Indeed Innis is asked to serve as McLuhan’s explicit foil: He is the wiser, unflamboyant, fretful alternative to McLuhan’s industry-lifting gasbaggery. In this essay Carey’s voice is enunciated through Innis in a direct, uncomplicated fashion. The great themes of Carey’s career—the allergy to science and scientism, the plea for orality and shared culture, the hoped-for identity of communication and communion—are here delivered by and through Innis. Even the critique of McLuhan, the essay insists, is not intended as absolute or universal, “but only in relation to the work of Innis”.

In that respect the essay was a tribute and recovery effort, a claim that the wrong guy was getting celebrated. But it was also a declaration of Carey’s own nonconformist posture to the field of communication research. The Antioch Review essay, which effectively launched his career, served as a camouflaged manifesto for a different kind of media study. In large part this statement was elaborated in formal terms. The learned eloquence that occasionally surfaced in earlier writings was pressed into sustained service in this piece. The essay brims with literary and religious allusions, carried along by a writerly cadence utterly foreign to the research mores of the established field. He acknowledged this heterodoxy in the article’s first paragraph, admitting that he is “treading forbidden waters in this paper”. With veiled reference to divine authority, he wrote that he was “content to let history or something else be the judge of what is the proper or only method of scholarship”. The settled norms of his academic peers were demoted in favor of God and history.
To some degree those peers were not even the essay’s intended audience. Carey chose to publish the piece in a small-circulation “little” magazine, one that excluded the citation and bibliography apparatus of conventional scholarship. Its readership was the intellectual public and not Carey’s fellow mass communication academics. His decision to adopt the essay form was itself a salvo of sorts, launched against the linear style of the standard journal article. The *Antioch Review* piece is instead governed by the rhythms of the essay tradition. Carey’s argument is modulated through a series of movements: first the Innis exegesis, then a gentle critique of McLuhan’s claims, followed by an Innis-voiced riposte, and concluding, crescendo-like, in a stirring rebuke to a culture that could anoint McLuhan. This was not the way that social scientists wrote, certainly not in their role as scholars. Our retrospective knowledge of Carey, as well as subsequent changes to the field, obscure the audacity of the essay.

Carey devoted its first nine pages to an admiring, though sparingly quoted, portrait of Innis and his thought. The essay acknowledges the difficulties of Innis’ scattershot argument style, likened to the “proprietor of a psychedelic delicatessen”. Carey positions Innis’ early work on Canadian economic history as a prelude to his sweeping, millennia-spanning theory of media-conditioned history. The essay proceeds to outline that theory, in particular Innis’ division of media according to their bias toward time or space. Heavier, durable media like clay and parchment favor small-scale societies oriented to history and tradition. Lighter and less durable media like paper and papyrus, by contrast, encourage the spread of secular authority across great distances. These media biases, according to Innis, also leave their imprint on culture and thought. “Monopolies of knowledge” form around space or time which, however, get challenged at the margins by new media with the contrasting bias. Media technologies are, in Innis’ view, the switchmen of history. In Carey’s summary, “the dynamic of social change resided in the search for alternative forms of communication alternately supporting the kingdom of God or man”.

Carey conceded that Innis was a technological determinist, though “unlike McLuhan a rather soft determinist”. The essay recorded—but did not yet endorse—Innis’ view that the history of the modern West is the lamentable story of the increasing hegemony of space-biased media like print. He let Innis’ declinist narrative lie dormant, moving instead to McLuhan’s more cognitive theory of sensory effects. After another nine pages of synopsis, this time of McLuhan’s theory, the essay tacks to a critique. What’s interesting is that the
critique—much of which is borrowed word-for-word from his short 1966 piece—is mild-mannered and even protective of McLuhan. The structure of McLuhan’s argument, as well as his “current popularity”, stand as an “incautious invitation to criticism and thus most critical fire that I might muster would inevitably be aimed at McLuhan”.66 Regardless, wrote Carey, it is “rather beside the point” to “quarrel” with McLuhan’s whimsical style and half-serious “probes”.67 Instead Carey proposed to place the two Canadian media theorists side by side, to test their competing approaches in light of recent history.

There is, Carey argued, scant proof of McLuhan’s claims about sensory organization. The “most visible” effects of technology are on social organization and culture, as Innis proposed. “Much of McLuhan’s evidence can be more plausibly, directly and productively used”, he wrote, “in support of the form of argument offered by Innis”.68 Recent developments in electronic media have only “intensified” the spatial bias that Innis pinned on modern Western history. Nothing like the rapturous re-tribalization that McLuhan purports to read in television has in fact occurred.69

To extend the point, Carey embarked on a lengthy analysis of the generational divide—a charged topic that McLuhan, of course, also claimed to address. Time-based cultures experienced a “great continuity of culture and social structure over generations”, maintained by a “shared, collective system of ritual”. But the spatial bias of modern media, “radically extended” by film, radio and television, has flattened out—“ground down”—geographic variations in culture and social structure.70 Instead, the “axis of diversity” in modern Western societies has shifted to discontinuity in time. Electronic media, that is, have “intensified the differences between generations within the same society”—perhaps, Carey added, best captured by the hippie slogan, “Don’t trust anyone over thirty”. As space-constrained identities like ethnicity and religion weaken, generational membership becomes pivotal to youth identity. This conclusion, Carey’s own, seems a “logical extension of Innis’ argument”.71 These “perhaps over-long notes on the sociology of generations” illustrate, Carey continued, Innis’ principal claim, that the influence of media technology is directed primarily at social organization.72

Up to this point, Carey’s critique of McLuhan had been relatively tame, even empirical. But here the tempo picks up. Carey has scarcely prepared the reader for the full force and literary elegance of the essay’s closing pages. He encircles his theme, pouncing from one angle and then another. That theme is McLuhan’s fame.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about McLuhan, Carey declares, is the “degree of success he has enjoyed”. His arguments are less important than his “capacity to be an acceptable prophet of our times”. His work is a “secular prayer to technology, a magical incantation of the gods, designed to quell one’s fears that, after all, the machines may be taking over”. By treating television-induced communion as inevitable and ecstatic, McLuhan soothes his readers into apolitical somnambulence. Ultimately,

McLuhan himself is a medium and that is his message. As a medium, he tells us we need no longer ask the imperishable questions about existence or face the imperishable truths about the human condition. The fundamental problems of existence are to be solved automatically and irreversibly by the subliminal operation of the machines on our psychic life.

He represents the “ultimate triumph of the technical over the moral”, since there is no room—or even need—for politics and values. As a “vessel of social meaning”, he is salvation, but without the suffering.

What are we to make of this electronic utopia? In a remarkable pair of paragraphs that resonate with his later work, Carey casts a dim, contingent silhouette around McLuhan’s prophecies:

The only thing of which we can all be sure is that even in the age of electric circuitry men are born alone and individually attached to nature and to society by an umbilical cord which all too quickly withers away. The fact of the terrible loneliness and isolation of existence is what has motivated much of the great art produced in any period of history. We should not need Eugene O’Neill to remind us in the face of McLuhan’s onslaughts that ‘man is born broken; he lives by mending; the grace of God is glue’.

Though Carey’s writing throughout the essay is fluid, his sentences take on a new character here. The simple word choice (“[t]he only thing”) and bodily metaphor (“umbilical cord”) echo the explicit statements of existential disquiet. With O’Neill he invokes original sin; communication—re-attachment—is by God’s grace alone. We are a long way from the plodding exegesis of the essay’s first twenty pages.

Quoting the Irish-American playwright again, Carey observes that human communication is the

fragile means by which men attempt to overcome the isolation of existence and wed themselves to other men. Under the best of circumstances, communication is
rarely successful, is always halting, is always tentative and tenuous. ‘Stammering is the native eloquence of we fog people’.

Tacking again, and with McLuhan’s inevitabilist “onslaughts” very much in mind, Carey proclaims that the contingent act of communication is the “only source of joy and tragedy humans have”. In support, he points to the etymology of “communication” in terms reminiscent of the dissertation: “One can all too easily forget that the word ‘communication’ shares its root with ‘communion’ and ‘community,’ and it is the attempt to establish this communication that theories of communication, vulgar as they are in present form, attempt to capture”.77 Carey, in the mid-1970s, would undertake to develop a less vulgar theory of communication, and with the verbal shared-roots observation (by then attributed to John Dewey) as a key rhetorical anchor.

As if to signal his new humanist bearings, Carey closed out the essay with a spirited assault on science, which he tied to McLuhan’s “parable on the restorative power of media”. Modern myths like McLuhan’s, he wrote, always depend on science, and enjoy the authority of “not appearing as myths at all but as truths”, verified by the “inscrutable methods” of the scientist. “The Iceman cometh again”, Carey added, “but this time in the cloak of the scientists”. McLuhan’s myth is particularly odious—a scientific footnote to Yeats’ “The Second Coming”. One cannot help, Carey observed, being overwhelmed by its awful vulgarity, by its disconnection from whatever sources of joy, happiness, and tragedy remain in this world. Scott Fitzgerald was right: Modern men would invent gods suitable only to seventeen-year-old Jay Gatsbys and then would be about their Father’s business: “the service of a vast, vulgar and meretricious beauty”.78

Yet again Carey enlists a literary icon, this time borrowing The Great Gatsby’s portrait of consumerist striving and empty, God-displacing grandeur. The allusions, in these last few pages, come swiftly and from different angles.

In the end, however, Carey gives Innis the last word—cast here as a lonely voice for history, morality and stability. McLuhan, Carey insists, is “no more revolutionary than I am”. He represents the “death of values”, the “end point of a positivistic revolution against meaning and metaphysics”. The closing paragraph deserves to be quoted in full:
But let me remind you that it was precisely this revolution that Harold Innis tried to resist; it was precisely this revolution that he saw as ending the possibility of a stable civilization in the West. For Innis, the oral tradition representative of man’s concern with history and metaphysics, morals and meanings had to be preserved if we were not to fall victim to a sacred politics and a sanctified science. It is an irony and an uncomfortable fact that the prophecy is borne out by one who has identified himself as a disciple. But such is the frequent result of discipleship.  

Innis, in this last paragraph, is no longer the better analyst, the better student of media history. He has become, in the binary terms that Carey favored, the myth-slayer to McLuhan’s Edenic utopia. He is asked, moreover, to wear the armor of anti-scientism, in defense of anti-modern values. The fit is not perfect, as Carey would later realize, but in this essay at least Innis was his humanist paladin.

The Antioch Review piece, so unlike anything being published by communication scholars, was greeted with instant praise and wide interest. Ted Peterson, Carey’s senior colleague at Illinois, spread the article through his media contacts. Carey himself sent the essay to George Gerbner, by then dean at University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School. Gerbner wrote back that the article is a “very significant contribution indeed”, and expressed regret that it “has to be published” in the Antioch Review. He requested 15 additional copies for the library and to distribute to colleagues at Penn. One, a sociologist, wrote back to Gerbner, “I feel moved to write this note of praise. Your former student has style, perception, and a superior analytic capacity”.

The essay was soon reprinted in a trade paperback collection of McLuhan criticism, McLuhan Pro and Con. The article even crossed the Atlantic to that other, better established center of “cultural studies”, attracting the notice of Birmingham’s Richard Hoggart. Impressed by the piece, Hoggart wrote to Carey with mimeographed copies of the Birmingham Centre’s working papers.

The paper’s acclaim was almost certainly a factor in Carey’s elevation, two years later, to the Institute directorship. It was also a fulfillment in print of his formerly shapeless announcement, in the proseminar, of a third way between Illinois’ Marxists and behavioral scientists. The Antioch Review essay doubtlessly served that local purpose, but carried the point far beyond campus.

Carey maintained his preoccupation with the Innis-McLuhan polarity in the years ahead. Most of his published work through the early 1970s was a variation on this theme. But these fresh treatments were the product of an improbable
collaboration with a precocious undergraduate. Among other things, John Quirk helped Carey place the McLuhan myth into historical relief.

The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution

Carey met Quirk, then a sophomore political science major at Illinois, in the spring of 1966 at a dinner sponsored by an Irish student group. Their initial connection revolved around a shared fascination with Irish history and culture. Their other common interest was McLuhan: at the time of their meeting, Carey had just finished his *Illinois Political* article, and Quirk too had been reading McLuhan. Over the next few months Carey finished his *Antioch Review* draft, which exposed Quirk to Innis. The pair continued to converse “on a range of matters”, and the next spring Quirk enrolled in Carey’s “Communication Systems” graduate seminar—which in that semester dealt “largely with the 19th century in the United States”. Quirk dropped out of Illinois after taking the course—“but I hope”, Carey wrote in 1971, “not as a result of it”. Thus began the most important collaboration of Carey’s career.

Together Carey and Quirk would go on to author a pair of significant papers over the next few years. But Quirk’s influence on Carey cut deeper than the two co-authorship credits. It was, Carey remembered, a “genuine and richly rewarding collaboration”, albeit an “unfulfilled” one. In a number of subsequent works, long after their collaboration had ended, Carey continued to acknowledge his debts to the college drop-out. In the *Communication as Culture* essay collection—published over twenty years after their meeting—he even singled out Quirk as his “largest obligation... from whom I learned much”.

By all accounts Quirk was a brilliant autodidact, not unlike Carey when he arrived at Illinois some years earlier. Carey recalled him as a “very strange fellow, deeply, profoundly intelligent who at nineteen seemed to have read everything”. But Quirk wrestled with mental illness, and had difficulty completing projects except under severe deadline pressure.

Despite his struggles, Quirk made three major contributions to Carey’s intellectual toolkit in this period. He introduced Carey, first, to American studies scholars like Leo Marx and Alan Trachtenberg. He brought Carey’s attention, second, to McLuhan’s early, much darker take on popular media culture. He furnished, finally, an intellectual storyline—from Peter Kropotkin, to Patrick
Geddes, to Lewis Mumford, and on through McLuhan—that became a staple of Carey’s writing for the rest of his life.

All three of these contributions were foreshadowed in a remarkable essay Quirk published in a New Left journal in the fall of 1967, months after Carey’s *Antioch Review* article appeared. Quirk’s piece, “The Myth of the Powerhouse”, borrowed the myth/powerhouse contrast elaborated by literary critic Philip Rahv in a well-known 1953 essay. The purpose of Quirk’s article was to position McLuhan as the latest installment of a long American obsession with electronic deliverance.

Drawing on the double meaning of “powerhouse”—fount of electricity but also symbol of machine civilization—Quirk outlined a pair of competing responses to the industrial dislocations of late 19th century America. The utopian reaction greeted new electric technologies as a “harbinger of decentralization, re-pastoralization and a new GEMEINSCHAFT”. Quirk called this tradition the “rhetoric of the electronic sublime”—an obvious nod to (the unmentioned) Leo Marx. The counterpoint to this utopian tradition was the “rhetoric of cultural skepticism”, exemplified by Henry Adams, Matthew Arnold and—into the 20th century—F.R. Leavis and Innis himself.

In an astute argumentative twist, Quirk locates McLuhan as heir to both rhetorics. Here he draws out—in a manner as-yet unseen in Carey’s work—McLuhan’s early-career cultural pessimism. In a series of essays leading up to *The Mechanical Bride* (1951), the Leavis-trained McLuhan had written often savage broadsides targeting the “bilge” of popular consumer culture. *Mechanical Bride* itself, as Quirk detailed, is a witty critique of advertising-sated, “supine consumers”. Quirk quotes McLuhan: “Each day brings... shiny gadgets, new pleasures [sic] techniques and new pills for pep and painlessness”. Captivated by business consulting and the “cybernetic sublime”, McLuhan traded in the mechanical bride for the “electric wedding” in his later, far more famous books. “McLuhan”, Quirk wrote, “turned himself upon his head”.

The later, buoyant McLuhan—the “Flying Scotman of the electronic cosmos”—tapped into the longstanding rhetoric of the electrical sublime. Quirk traces the inheritance back to the 19th thought of Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, through Scottish sociologist Patrick Geddes, and on to his then-assistant, Lewis Mumford. In books like *Technics and Civilization* (1934), the polymathic Mumford “brought this gospel back to American shores”. Though Mumford, by the postwar years, had soured on his earlier “eutopian” flight, McLuhan was there to pick up where he left off. He thus stands in a long line of “propagandists for powerhouse interests”.

Quirk’s essay bears the definite mark of Carey’s influence, especially in its capsule summary of Innis’ media theory. And Quirk closed the piece with an allusion to Innis: “The basic issues remain—freedom from myth and control over the powerhouse. Let us make space in the time we have left”.101

Over the next few years Carey and Quirk labored, in effect, to synthesize their overlapping critiques of McLuhan. Quirk brought American studies scholarship and the Geddes-Mumford narrative to the writing table, while Carey supplied the Innis counter-story. It was, for the most part, a successful synthesis, even if Quirk’s strident leftism sometimes clashed with Carey’s New Deal politics and antipathy for Marxism, the New Left, and the counterculture. First in the 1970 “Mythos of the Electronic Revolution”, and again in 1973’s “History of the Future”, the two men extended their critical histories of the American technological sublime.

Carey and Quirk published “Mythos of the Electronic Revolution” in another footnote-less little magazine, The American Scholar. The paper was delivered to the magazine only after a frantic, forty-hour sleepless dash on deadline. Due to the manuscript’s unusual length, the Scholar ran the essay in two parts in successive issues. In nearly every respect the essay faithfully echoes the themes already present in their earlier work.

Fittingly, the article opens with a literary reference, to Thornton Wilder’s The Eighth Day: “In the last third of this century”, Carey and Quirk write, “we are witnessing another prophecy of an ‘eighth day’” in the form of a putative “Electronic Revolution”. Right away they identify McLuhan as the estuary of this “millennial impulse”, but also identify Buckminster Fuller, John Cage, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and “element of the New Left” as fellow “children of the ‘eighth day’”. Together these figures have “cast themselves in the role of secular theologians composing theodicies for electricity and its technological progeny”. As in the Antioch Review piece, these eighth-day adventists come under withering attack for setting aside politics on the naive belief that electricity is the “motive force of desired social change”. In an old pattern, these hymns to technology have been seized by “coteries of advertisers and engineers, corporation and foundation executives, and government personnel” for their own self-serving ends.

The expressions of faith, Carey and Quirk write, contrast “sharply” with reality—with actual developments in electricity and electronics. Here the two authors’ critiques cross paths, Quirk’s anti-corporate leftism whisked together with Carey’s lament for lost community. Electronic technologies, they write, have
been “biased toward the recentralization of power in computer centers and energy grids, the Pentagon and NASA, General Electric and Commonwealth Edison”. The electronic society, moreover, has led to “the erosion of regional cultures by television and radio networks the programming of which focuses upon a single national accent in tone and topical coverage at the expense of local idiom and interest”. Innis has yet to be mentioned, but his presence clearly suffuses both critiques.

Carey and Quirk turn next to history. Most of the essay’s first part is devoted to positioning the children of the “eighth day” against the “background of traditional American attitudes” toward technology. The next few pages are a precis of Leo Marx’s argument in *The Machine in the Garden*—that early 19th-century Americans imagined the new country as providentially perched between the rural and the urban, the natural and industrial. “A vital and relevant tradition in American studies”, Carey and Quirk write, “inspired by Perry Miller and Henry Nash Smith and continued by Leo Marx and Alan Trachtenburg [sic], has traced the recurrent theme of the ‘machine in the garden’”. Though mid-century figures like Ralph Waldo Emerson had lifted the “hyperboles of technological sublimity to a philosophical plane”, in the post-Civil War decades the faith in restorative mechanization was strained by industrial slums, class warfare, and the scarred countryside. What happened next, Carey and Quirk narrate, is a turn from the mechanical to the electrical sublime. “In electricity was suddenly seen the power to redeem all the dreams betrayed by the machine”. It is around this time—just after the turn of the century—that Peter Kropotkin’s claims for the restorative promise of technology impressed Patrick Geddes, the Scottish urbanist. Geddes’ “gospel” was passed down to his American disciple, Lewis Mumford. For all the restraint of his prose, Quirk and Carey write, the early Mumford had argued that “electrical energy and communication would lead to a decentralization of power and the restoration of man to a life in touch with nature”.

As in Quirk’s original essay, McLuhan is cast as heir to the Kropotkin-Geddes-Mumford triptych. Just when the “dream of the electoral pastoral” should “again stand revealed as an empty promise”, McLuhan and a “covey of supporters” have “expropriated the scholarship of Geddes, Mumford and the later Harold Innis” and “converted it into a new mythology”. Though Mumford, since World War II, had turned against his earlier hopes, he had no strategy for dealing with the reversal. “His articulation of the rhetoric of the electrical sublime had, if anything, contributed to the situation he found so abhorrent”.

It was left to the “now obscure Canadian academic”, Innis, to “produce the first systematic criticism of the new technological behemoth”. Carey and Quirk close out part one with an extended reprise of Innis’ media theory and his countervailing politics of balance. Innis “uncovered the most vulnerable point in the rhetoric of the electrical sublime” and “disputed all those claims for electricity McLuhan today celebrates”. Modern technologies of media, Quirk and Carey write in summary of Innis, “reduce space and time to the service of a calculus of commercialism and expansionism”. The spatial bias of modern media, from print onward, has encouraged centralization and the spread of empire. Innis’ only answer, write Carey and Quirk, was the “workmanship of politics and scholarship, the consistent attempt to maintain another counter-culture”. Against the technological culture of mobility he recommended support for an oral tradition and “its embodiment in cultural enclaves”. This countervailing politics requires that “elements of stability be preserved and extended, that communities of association and styles of life be freed from the blinding obsolescence of technical change”.

Carey and Quirk end on a dark note, channeling Innis’ disappointment in intellectuals, the class that might have helped to curtail the influence of technics. Innis’ advice has been ignored. “The myth of the electrical powerhouse has been perfected in our time and wedded once more”, they conclude, “to the utopian tradition by Innis’ former colleague, Marshall McLuhan”.

The essay’s second, separately published section circles around the same themes, and features an extended comparison of Innis and McLuhan in by-now familiar terms—including the latter’s abrupt repudiation of his earlier, critical work in *The Mechanical Bride*. A lengthy excursion on contemporary politics—complete with New Left–style critiques of the Great Society, the Pentagon and U.S. imperialism—gives way, in a sudden tonal shift, to Carey’s voice: “The least dramatic, most serious problem” posed by electronic media is “its erosion of organic cultures and cultural institutions”. Like the essay’s first section, part two closes with a call, issued in Innis’ name, to counter “rather than disguise” the spatial bias of electronics. Still summarizing Innis, Carey and Quirk write that this means “cultural and qualitative checks rather than more quantitative definitions of the quality of life... defusing the humanistic from the technological”. As in the *Antioch Review* piece, Innis was asked to give voice to Carey’s emerging humanist identity.
The History of the Future

The second and final product of the Carey-Quirk collaboration, “The History of the Future”, was written for a 1972 symposium at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School organized by George Gerbner, which both Carey and Quirk attended. They apparently had material left over from The American Scholar article, for they sent along a 109-page draft in advance of the symposium. In the accompanying letter to Gerbner, Carey wrote, “I don’t want you to lapse into cardiac arrest when you see it …” At the time, they seem to have been planning a book based on the long paper (and perhaps the earlier collaborative essay as well). The next year Gerbner published a shortened version in an edited collection based on the Annenberg gathering.

As published, the chapter is even more sweeping than the earlier works, with a sharpened attack on science and scientists. Carey and Quirk trace the history of the “futurean mirage” all the way back to the ancient world, which—then and now—has been used by elites to “ward off dissent”. The paper recycles themes from the previous essays—the evacuation of politics by technology, the Kropotkin-Geddes-Mumford-McLuhan lineage, 19th-century American exceptionalism—though in notably harsh terms updated for the nascent computer age.

The “modern history of the future”, they write, begins with the rise of science. Armed with precise clocks and telescopes, the “secular priesthood” of science “seized hold of the idea of a perfect future, a zone of experience beyond ordinary history and geography”. Like ancient astrologers, modern scientists are “elevated castes who profess special knowledge of the future, indeed establish a claim of eminent domain over the next stages of human history”. Modern scientific elites, like their ancient counterparts, serve a double role as oracles to the people and “servants of the ruling class”.

For the most part Carey and Quirk’s critique of present-day futurism is presented in this same abstract, polemical mode, though they do cite McLuhan, Brzezinski, Alvin Toffler and the RAND Corporation (with its “institutional monopoly of foreknowledge”). The bulk of the paper is devoted, as in earlier renditions, to the American rhetoric of the technological sublime in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The founding of the United States, they argue, was “an attempt to outrun history and to escape European experience”. This time Carey and Quirk illustrate the point with reference to the 1876 Centennial exhibition, where the
“new electrical machines” like the electric lamp and Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone were displayed. The essay follows the cord from Kropotkin through to McLuhan, including Mumford’s “Americanization of Geddes’ gospel”. Quirk and Carey refer to the new computer technologies as a “third communications revolution”, after print and electronic media. These new systems of “broadband” communication are revolutionary in only one sense: their “supposed capacity to transform the commonplace into the extraordinary”—in the recurrent promise that also greeted print and electronics. Certain groups—“industrialists, technocrats and scientists”—are depicted as the new technology’s appointed guardians, not as “an elite usurping the power to make history and define reality”.

Though Innis is not explicitly named, the chapter ends with a lament for the futurist’s embrace of “vast scale and fast pace”, which has “eclipsed the public vision of its immediate and long-term community”. Recalling Quirk’s original essay title, the chapter holds the “mythology of the powerhouse” responsible for enabling “commercial empires and cosmetically treated landscapes engineered for exploitation”. On this bleak note, the chapter’s final paragraph invokes “resources” that await restoration: “elements of cultural permanence and political vitality in the nontechnological parts of our national inheritance”. Sometime after Carey and Quirk presented the paper in Philadelphia, Quirk apparently “disappeared into the underlife of Chicago”. The brief but fruitful collaboration came to an abrupt end. The two men never spoke again.

Conclusion

In the ten years after his dissertation, Carey drifted away from the social science identity he had, for a time, embraced. By the early 1970s he was thinking of himself in humanist terms. Harold Innis had served as his intellectual bridge, and McLuhan his foil. Now that Carey was on the other side, Innis was a less suitable surrogate, and McLuhan the wrong villain.

Carey would continue to write about both figures, and in the same reverse-Niagara direction. In the decades to come, he would periodically return to Innis, often in support of his critique of academic professionalism or in connection to the Chicago School. McLuhan, too, was the subject of a handful of later essays, still critical though not so bilious. Most of Carey’s
attention, however, trained on other figures better matched to his intellectual project.

Put crudely, his focus was moving from technology to culture. It is true that Carey’s preoccupation with the shared canopy of culture was already there in the dissertation. These themes—small-scale community, the indeterminacy of man’s action, communication as communion—surfaced in his technology essays, too. But the history of media technology, even the history of its rhetoric, was a leaky vessel for these questions.

Part of the problem was epistemological. Carey’s work on Innis, McLuhan and the American Eden was a project of de-mystification. The “first task”, Quirk and Carey had written in 1970, “is to demythologize the rhetoric of the electronic sublime”. By 1973 they were even calling the ideology of the future a “form of false consciousness”. The closing plea of that essay is for the conception of the future to be “rejoined to the real past and the realities of the present”. This sort of ideology critique, grounded in a myth-reality contrast, would hold less and less appeal to Carey. Soon enough he would be treating myth as inescapable and even productive. Reality, he came to believe, is constituted through our descriptions of the world. Even the American past, the object of such fierce attack in the technology essays, would furnish the future Carey with eminently usable myths.

In his first decade as a certified academic, Carey re-enacted the intellectual style he had established in the dissertation. He imported thought from beyond the established field: American studies, and even the work of Innis. He employed intellectual history as argument, through the Innis/McLuhan contrast, supplemented by Kropotkin, Geddes, and Mumford. And he was a ventriloquist, pleading his case in the voice of Innis.

By the mid-1970s that voice was strained. The limits of Innis’ flexibility had been reached; in the end he could not stand in as humanist, cultural theorist, and communitarian avant la lettre. As Carey softened the sometimes-choleric language of the technology essays, he also shifted the object of his critique: from the history of electronic boosterism to the mainstream field of communication research.

In 1973 the anthropologist Clifford Geertz published *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Carey, in effect, substituted Geertz for Innis. Ten years after coining the label, Carey finally found something to call “cultural studies”.
NOTES


7 Ibid., 21.


In later accounts, Carey projected an original coherence onto the label. He claimed—in a 1997 essay, for example—that his “cultural studies” program had been founded in opposition to the special prevalence of scientism in the U.S. social sciences of the period. In these accounts he was already using the “American cultural studies” moniker, which he positioned as distinct from the British variant (which was not, in this account, conditioned by the quantitative evangelism prevalent in the U.S.). He does, in these later accounts, concede that “he had no particular program in mind”, and that “cultural studies” was merely an “attractively impartial name” with an “innocent and practical” purpose. That purpose, he claimed, was to oppose the rapid erosion of “[p]olitical economy, historical studies, work that flowed out of pragmatism and the Chicago School, such as symbolic interactionism”, by the surging “formal and behavioral sciences”. The first task, he claimed, was the “creation of a something of a wedge discipline: a body of work that had sufficient weight and reach to clear a space, a legitimate and central space, in the academy for work that was, broadly, historical, critical, interpretive and empirical”. The follow-on aim, he continued, was to engender a political coalition, “a revival of the republican and progressive tradition of American politics through wider, more powerful alliances”. Carey, “Reflections on the Project”, 3–4. It is true that his version of cultural studies came to be defined by anti-scientism and a commitment to American reformist pragmatism—but not until the mid-1970s for anti-scientism, and the early 1980s in the case of pragmatism. Carey’s original “cultural studies” formation was local and happenstance, and would remain so for the next decade.

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12 Grossberg, “From New England”, 24. In a 1977 letter to British political economist Peter Golding, Carey acknowledged the local (and reactive) pressure he felt from Illinois’ Marxist in the early to mid-1960s. “During my many years at Illini”, he wrote, “there was always a strong circle of students and faculty with interests in Marxism, and they were, typically and appropriately, continually asking me to define my work relative to theirs. Now I have the time but I lack the daily pressure of such students”. Quoted in Daniel Carey, “Life’s Work: James W. Carey (1934–2006)”, Cultural Studies 23, no. 2 (2009): 174. John Nerone, a later colleague of Carey’s at Illinois, recalls that Carey told him he was treated with “disrespect” by Smythe and Schiller, when Carey was still a student. “He sort of liked Marx”, according to Nerone. “He didn’t like Marxists”. Nerone (professor emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), interview with the author, July 2014.


14 Personal communication, 2005.

15 Grossberg, “From New England”, 23. In a 1997 essay on the Illinois origins of cultural studies, Carey again gestured at his former colleagues. Referring to his adoption of the “cultural studies” label, Carey explained his program’s standoffish relations with the department’s political economists with reference to “sharp elbows” and the view (which he assigned to the left in general) that “intellectual life is primarily a matter of lining up opposing teams in clearly identifiable jerseys representing smaller and smaller communities and permitting no defection from either side without screams of apostasy and talk about the true political religion”. Carey claimed that his desire for an alliance with the Marxists was thwarted for “political reasons”—reasons, he added, “I would very much like to finesse, for little is to be gained by waking up the dead only to sing them a lullaby”. Without naming names, Carey pointed to the Marxists’ which-side-are-you-on certitude—their “obligatory marxism” and “ingrained discursive habits”. Referring to Marxists’ attacks on John Dewey in the late 1930s, Carey added that—“among certain elements of the left, including some in communications”—that “campaign of vilification never ended and spread out to anyone intellectually associated with Deweyan pragmatism and American progressivism”. In criticizing a “persistent Stalinist or stalinist tendency” in the American left, Carey insisted that his point was “not to rehearse old grievances”, but admitted, “some of that inevitably creeps in”. Among U.S. political economists in particular, these clubbish and caustic habits of interaction “were finely wrought”. Carey, “Reflections on the Project”, 6, 13–14.


17 In essays and interviews, Carey recalled reading Raymond Williams (and Culture and Society and The Long Revolution in particular) soon after his arrival in Illinois, on the recommendation of George Gerbner. “I didn’t realize at the time that others were using the same title [cultural studies] elsewhere to describe their work”, he claimed in an interview. “Though a few years earlier, following some disagreements with George Gerbner on the nature of popular culture, he came to me one day with a copy of Raymond Williams’ Culture and Society and said, ‘You ought to read this, you’ll find this much more to your liking.’ I think he recognized the affinity from the outside”. Grossberg, “From New England”, 21–22. See also Carey, “Reflections on the Project”. 4-5.


Carey, “Personality Correlates of Persuasibility”, in *Toward Scientific Marketing*, 37.

Ibid., 40.

Ibid., 42.

Ibid., 43.


Ibid., 211.

Ibid., 199.

Ibid., 206

Ibid., 199.


Ibid., 91.

Ibid., 93.


Ibid., 108.

Ibid.
E.g., “No one can adequately understand relations between the Negro and ethnic Catholic without appreciating the fact that ethnic groups in the United States have always practiced cultural apartheid. They have attempted to gather themselves into homogenous cultural ghettos in the city, have shown an aversion to cultural pluralism, have resisted and resented the intrusion of any alien group. In part this has been reinforced by the Church because Catholic worship in ethnic neighborhoods is an extension of nationality as much as it is of religion. Similarly, local political institutions, as anyone who has visited an Irish or Italian political club knows, are extensions of the values, the norms, the culture of nationality”. Ibid., 92.


Carey may have worked on papers in this vein which, however, were never published. In a 1965 letter to George Gerbner asking about a talk by Columbia sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Carey referred to an in-progress paper “on ‘personal influence’”, which he described as “increasingly critical”. Carey to Gerbner, November 2, 1965, George Gerbner Archive. In another letter to Gerbner a year and a half later, Carey referred to in-depth interviews with orphans on their television viewing, with the aim “to find out what the content of television means to them, that is, not what is [sic] its effect but what kind of an experience is it”. He also told Gerbner that he had been “trying to drum up enthusiasm for a major study of the accelerating patterns of industrial concentration in mass communication”, with a focus on media companies’ ties to education. He mentioned, finally, an article on “homogeneous product advertising” that, he added, was “in the process of being whittled down by the Journal of Communication”. Carey to Gerbner, March 27, 1967, George Gerbner Archive. On sociology’s declining importance to organized mass communication research in this period, see Pooley and Elihu Katz, “Further Notes on Why American Sociology Abandoned Mass Communication Research”, Journal of Communication 58 (2008).


Ibid.


55 Ibid., 23, 25.

56 Ibid., 25.

57 Ibid., 26.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid., 25.


61 Ibid., 5.

62 Ibid., 7.

63 Ibid., 9.

64 Ibid., 7.

65 Ibid., 14.

66 Ibid., 24.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 26.

69 Ibid., 29.

70 Ibid., 30.

71 Ibid., 31–2.


74 Ibid., 35–36.

75 Ibid., 36.

76 Ibid., 37.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid., 38–39.

79 Ibid., 39.

80 Daniel Carey, “Life’s Work”, 171. As John Nerone, a later Illinois colleague of Peterson and Carey’s, recalled, “About Ted, [Carey] remarked that he’d had him edit (his word) everything that he’d every published”.


82 Marvin E. Wolfgang to Gerbner, May 8, 1967, George Gerbner Archive.


On Quirk’s enrollment in the seminar, see Ibid. On the course, itself, see James W. Carey to George Gerbner, March 27, 1967, George Gerbner Archive, 1–2.


Daniel Carey: “Quirk’s capacity for absorbing information was remarkable. I remember my father saying that John was a great reader of discarded documents and that one of his first tasks on arriving at the university was to read the entire run of the university newspaper to get up to speed”. “Life’s Work”, 168.


John J. Quirk, “The Myth of the Powerhouse”, *The Activist*, Autumn 1967. The author credit refers to a Quirk’s “forthcoming book, COMMUNICATION IN A MODERN WORLD: MYTH OR REALITY?” The book was never published; its manuscript may have been incorporated into his Carey collaborations.

Rahv, “The Myth and the Powerhouse”. Quirk’s use of “powerhouse” is similar to, but nevertheless distinct from, Rahv’s. In his 1953 essay, Rahv defines “powerhouse” as a stand-in for the disruptions of a fast-paced modernity. Referring to the “powerhouse of change”, Rahv writes that “modern life is above all an historical life producing changes with vertiginous speed”. 13–14. Quirk (and by extension, in the essays to come, Carey) mean something more specific than the tumult of modernity: They are invoking the market-driven rise of machines and technical rationality (in addition to the near-perfect electrical metonym that “powerhouse” suggests). The two meanings are close but not identical.


Ibid., 36–37. The echo of Carey’s *Antioch Review* essay is unmistakeable in Quirk’s reference to McLuhan’s “scientization of distinction between myth and powerhouse”. Ibid., 38.
Ibid., 40. This last page also, and somewhat strangely, refers to a “third alternative”, between McLuhan and the paralyzing pessimism of Jacques Ellul and Herbert Marcuse. This alternative is “proffered by such scholars as James Carey, Dallas Smythe, and Richard Hoggart”. All three, Quirk claimed, share a strategy “based upon Innis and the early McLuhan”. Unfortunately, he continued, this position “only provides critical antidotes and suffers from the weakness of essentially privatistic armament”. Ibid., 40. Smythe, Carey and Hoggart would have been surprised to see themselves grouped in this way.

Quirk, Carey later recalled, “first pointed out Leo Marx to me in some work he did in a course of mine, and that is when we started to do some work together”. Grossberg, “From New England”, 21–22.

Just as Carey had four years earlier, Quirk wrote about the election for Commonweal, publishing six short essays in the Catholic magazine over the course of the campaign. E.g., Quirk, “The Victory of the Hubiecrats”, September 1968. One of many statements of Carey’s skeptical reaction to the late 1960s campus unrest: “[T]hose were years in which, to quote the title of a Frank Kermode book of the period, everything was overlaid with the sense of an ending.” Each day brought the news that something else we thought enduring—God, Man, the Family—had been put into permanent receivership”. Carey, “Editor’s Introduction: Taking Culture Seriously”, in Media, Myths, and Narratives: Television and the Press, ed. James W. Carey (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988), 8.

Carey: “So, two days before we had to get our piece into The American Scholar, [Quirk] arrived in town and we worked forty-eight hours without sleeping. I concluded that he could only work at breakneck speed and with the closest of deadlines”. Grossberg, “From New England”, 21–22.


Ibid., 220.

Ibid., 221.

Ibid., 220.

Ibid., 222.

Ibid., 223.

Ibid., 223–225.

Ibid., 226.

Ibid., 230–233.

Ibid., 230–233.

Ibid., 230–233.

Ibid., 230–233.

Ibid., 396–397.

Ibid., 398.

Ibid., 238–240.

Ibid., 241.

Ibid., 238–240.

Ibid., 241.

Ibid., 238–240.

Ibid., 241.

Ibid., 238–240.
Ibid., 406–412. The lead-in to the contemporary politics section, probably written by Quirk, reads, “While the rhetoric of the electrical revolution can be pierced by study of its historical development, it can even more clearly be punctured by the analysis of contemporary events”. Ibid., 406.

Ibid., 422.

In a 1972 essay published by the Institute but not widely circulated, Carey extended the “Mythos” argument but with special attention to McLuhan’s mythopoetic defense of the status quo. Carey, *The Politics of the Electronic Revolution: Further Notes on Marshall McLuhan* (Urbana, IL: Institute of Communications Research, 1972). Carey presents the essay as the second installment of a trilogy “devoted to a common task: an assessment of politics, mythology, and social implications of electrical communication”, preceded by the 1967 *Antioch Review* essay and succeeded by the two-part “Mythos” piece. 1, 2. (Given that the “Mythos” essays were published in 1970, the timing is odd. In a footnote, Carey suggests that *The Politics of the Electronic Revolution* and the “Mythos” papers were written at the same time: “There is considerable overlap between this essay and those published in *The American Scholar*. However, this essay has a more intensive concentration on the work of Marshall McLuhan”. 2n4.) In caustic and allusion-studded prose, *The Politics of Electronic Revolution* builds the case against McLuhan, first analogizing his program to Marx’s stage-driven theory of chiliastic redemption. 3–7. He traces again the 19th and 20th century American “rhetoric of the technological sublime”—reprising too the Kropotkin-Geddes-Mumford account—as “the oldest American dream, the oldest motif of the American imagination”. 10–23. A long exposition of Innis concludes with the lament that his “analysis and advice” have been “unavailing... The myth of the electrical sublime has been perfected in our time and married once more to the utopian tradition by Innis’ former colleague at the University of Toronto, Marshall McLuhan”. 23–29. Carey glosses McLuhan’s abandoned anti-modernism (as expressed in *The Mechanical Bride*), concluding with a spirited (and quite leftist) attack on McLuhan’s support for an unjust social order: “While the new world of technology is being proclaimed, one has only to look around to see that it is business as usual in electronic America. We use the new technology in the same way we used the old. American television industries dominate the globe, programming, for example, 95 per cent of Mexico’s air time; Cape Cod is repeatedly threatened with becoming an atomic dump; the TVA authority is exported to the Mekong Delta; and, finally, we propose to electrify the DMZ... While it proposes a revolutionary technology, the rhetoric of the electrical sublime is merely an accommodation to the old system and the old values which have brought us to where we really are today. In the words of de Tocqueville it ‘does little more than turn a taste for slavery into a virtue’”. 31–41.

On Quirk’s attendance, see his resume, posted to the internet, http://www.iaftd.org/RES/JJQ.html.

In the same letter, Carey wrote that, when he and Quirk began to work on the paper, “we realized that we had collected so much material and had so many things we wanted to say about it that we might as well block out a book”. James W. Carey to George Gerbner, January 14, 1972, quoted in Daniel Carey, “Life’s Work”, 168.


Ibid., 502, 486.
“Modern computer enthusiasts may be willing to share their data with anybody. What they are not willing to relinquish as readily is the entire technocratic world view that determines what it is that qualifies as an acceptable or valuable fact”. Ibid., 501.

Ibid., 485.

Ibid.

Ibid., 501.

Ibid., 486–488.

Ibid., 493–495.

Ibid., 497–498.

Ibid., 498.

Ibid., 502.


According to a 1971 letter, they had plans for a study of behavioral modification technology, to study how these “electrical devices are ... now being rapidly innovated and with rather characteristically utopian hopes”. James W. Carey to Carroll Pursell, April 6, 1971, quoted in Daniel Carey, “Life’s Work”, 168.


Ibid., 502. In the 1972 McLuhan essay, Carey made a similarly stark myth-reality contrast: “By emphasizing the mythical side of [McLuhan’s] work, I mean to focus not only on a quality of his prose but also on a distortion of the nature of historical events, a distortion with deleterious consequences politically and intellectually”. Carey, The Politics of the Electronic Revolution, 3n5.
3. A CULTURAL APPROACH

In 1973, Carey’s scholarly project took a sharp cultural turn. The catalyst was Clifford Geertz’s *The Interpretation of Cultures*, published early that year. No other single work had, or would have, a comparable impact on Carey’s intellectual worldview. And the effect was as sudden as it was profound: In the year following the publication of Geertz’s collection, Carey drafted a handful of essays that, in revised form, would constitute the core of *Communication as Culture*. Carey’s mid-1970s essays formed an elegantly written brief for a “cultural approach” to communication research. That approach was unambiguously the Geertzian program for anthropology, transposed onto communication studies.

In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Geertz presented an extended case for a meaning-centered concept of culture. All humans, he claimed, make sense of experience through symbols and stories that are established, reaffirmed, and altered in daily life. “Believing, with Max Weber”, he wrote in a soon-famous line, “that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs”.¹ For Geertz, two facets of cultural life are key. First, cultures are highly *various*, bound in place and time to particular human groupings. Second, these webs of meaning are *shared*, produced and altered in everyday interaction. The task of the anthropologist is to interpret those specific cultural formations.
Geertz positioned his interpretive approach as an explicit challenge to the definitions of social science then prevailing. For Geertz, the search for timeless laws of behavior not only skims off the very stuff of culture (its particularity), but is condemned to hubristic failure. Social scientists—despite their self-description as uniquely neutral—can never escape the always-partial “webs of significance” that enfold all human action. Cultural analysis, indeed, is fundamentally similar to everyday sense-making. It is, in Geertz’s words, “guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses”.\(^2\) Anthropologists, in short, are interpreters of interpretations.

For Carey \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures} was a revelation, and he soon applied its lessons to communication research. He was, for a couple of years at least, something like the ambassador from Geertz. By the mid-1970s Carey had became the field-specific voice of an interpretivist dissent that—with varying force—was sweeping through every social science discipline. Unlike some of his counterparts in other fields, however, Carey’s intervention made more than a dent in his discipline’s self-conception. The U.S. field, after all, had clung with singular tenacity to the post-World-War-II “behavioral sciences” ideal, and even the Marxist alternative was committed to a more-or-less traditional view of social science. Carey’s essays opened up intellectual space and, just as important, identified the enemies. For graduate students especially, his eloquent war on “positivism” resonated.

Carey’s new Geertzian commitments meant a shift in focus. His attention, most recently trained on recurrent techno-euphoria, turned to culture. In the technology essays, Carey’s audience was the intellectual public assembled by McLuhan’s celebrity. In the new cultural work, Carey instead addressed his colleagues in the organized discipline of communication research. If Carey had spoken before through Innis’ voice, he was now far less likely to invoke the Canadian political economist. Even the intellectual histories that Carey narrated were new, and borrowed from Geertz.

Compared to the muckraking animus of Carey’s Quirk collaborations, his mid-1970s writing is tonally de-fanged. In part his essays’ new, tamer cadences reflect the affable cogency that Geertz favored. But the main factor was epistemological. He had abandoned his faith in the contrast—of obscurantist myth with unmasked reality—that animated the technology essays. With Geertz he came to hold that such a contrast is untenable. The descriptions, practices, and beliefs that make up culture are \textit{real}. In Geertz’s words, they are—like rocks
—“things of this world”. They can be challenged, but not with appeal to some empyrean scientific standpoint beyond culture. On the same grounds Carey began to view scholarship itself as a significant tributary feeding wider cultural currents. Scholars’ descriptions of the world, he came to insist, help enact the realities they purport to merely describe. For Carey this insight furnished a new and special reason to oppose the desiccated language of social science.

Carey’s embrace of homo symbolicus, while a departure in many ways, was at the same time continuous with older preoccupations, all the way back to his Parsonsian dissertation. By 1963 he had already linked communication with shared meaning: “Culture, then, from one point of view, is communication”.

More recently, in the late 1960s, he had turned to Innis to describe the “shared, collective system of ritual” that maintains time-biased cultures. The difference is that, by the mid-1970s, Innis’ voice was submerged, while Talcott Parsons’ structural-functionalism had become Carey’s explicit foil.

Clifford Geertz and the Interpretive Turn

Clifford Geertz was a much better fit. He was, like Carey, a genuinely gifted prose-stylist. As a matter of writerly temperament Geertz viewed social science through a humanistic lens—a sensibility he carried over from his undergraduate studies in philosophy and literature. Lines of quoted poetry and literary allusions fill his writings, and—like Carey—he was fond of punctuating a point with a well-placed paraphrase of another author’s witticism. Carey’s use of an extended example to illustrate an argument—a device that first appears in writings from this period—was probably borrowed from Geertz. In The Interpretation of Culture’s first chapter alone, Geertz lingers on a Moroccan sheep raid, a Beethoven quartet, and three winking boys, in each case to concretize otherwise abstract arguments.

Like Carey, Geertz was an essayist. He regarded the essay as the “natural genre in which to present cultural interpretations”, since “if one looks for systematic treatises in the field, one is so soon disappointed, the more so if one finds any”. The Interpretation of Cultures was itself an essay collection, comprised of Geertz’s scattered writings over the preceding 15 years, ordered thematically without regard to chronology. Only the first, scene-setting chapter was new to the volume, “an attempt, in fine”, he explained, “to say what I have been saying”. In form at least Communication as Culture was identical: 15 years
of essays arranged thematically, threaded by an introduction. The point is that Geertz’s voice—and not just his theory—was appealing to Carey.

The two men followed the same intellectual arc, away from sociological functionalism in the direction of literary criticism. In the 1950s, Geertz had trained at Harvard’s amalgamated Department of Social Relations, under Clyde Kluckhohn and Parsons himself. Though Geertz did not subscribe to Parsons’ full-fledged structural-functionalism, much of his work through the early 1960s was cast in functionalist terms; his critiques were presented as friendly amendments from within the tradition, and he frequently deployed Parsonsian jargon. More than anything, Parsons bequeathed to Geertz his partial picture of Max Weber, the German sociologist at the center of Geertz’s early work on Javanese religion. While at Harvard, Geertz conducted his dissertation fieldwork in Indonesia as part of a research team from MIT’s Center for International Studies, and by the early 1960s he had become an important figure in the world of Cold War modernization theory.

Geertz’s decisive step away from functionalism came in the mid-1960s, around the same time that Carey ended his brief infatuation. In a 1964 essay, Geertz pointed to the post-hoc elasticity of much functional analysis—its penchant for assimilating the most diverse behavior into accounts of social order. “A group of primitives sets out, in all honesty, to pray for rain”, he wrote, “and ends by strengthening its social solidarity”. Geertz, in the same essay, complained that social science has been “virtually untouched” by “one of the most important trends in recent thought: the effort to construct an independent science of what Kenneth Burke has called ‘symbolic action’”. His views, he acknowledged in the preface to The Interpretation of Cultures, had “evolved” over the past 15 years, with some “earlier concerns” like functionalism now “less prominent”, while “later ones” like semiotics “now more so”. For Geertz as for Carey, the standard social scientific toolkit, and functionalism in particular, came to seem less and less felicitous.

If the two men shared an intellectual trajectory, they were far from alone. Beginning in the mid-1950s but picking up pace in the mid-1960s, Parsons came under ferocious assault from all sides. More broadly, the postwar giddiness about the prospects for a unified science of behavior—on the cusp, awaiting elaboration by well-funded interdisciplinary research teams armed with new quantitative methods—had begun to dissipate by the early 1960s. That mix of cocks sure scientism and Cold War liberalism was undercut, in part, by a major shift in the funding landscape. The failure of the era’s many competing projects of
general theory to live up to their own explanatory ambitions also contributed to the sense of an ending. More than anything, the rise of the campus-based New Left and, as the 1960s wore on, a broader anti-war movement generated harsh critiques of social scientists’ entanglements with the military and other government agencies. By the early 1970s every social science discipline had to vie, to varying degrees, with a youthful cohort of radical scholar-insurgents, who in each case charged their fields’ elites with collusion and conservatism shrouded in a sham objectivity.

Geertz and Carey rode the same wave of disillusionment with the reigning nomothetic ideal, which was increasingly identified with the catch-all pejorative “positivism”. But neither joined the radicals. Both men were allergic to Marxism in all its varieties, and shared an aversion to Promethean politics. Geertz (and later Carey) built their critiques of scientism, instead, atop a loose bundle of literary and philosophical traditions that argued for the priority of meaning and symbolism in the study of man. Though many of these approaches had earlier roots, their new prominence in 1960s American intellectual life helped generate what has since been labeled the “interpretive turn”. Among its fountainheads were philosophers of symbolism like Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer, literary critics like Kenneth Burke, the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophers in the hermeneutic tradition like Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the line of phenomenological sociology stretching from Alfred Schütz to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Though these figures are diverse and even incompatible, they bear (in Wittgenstein’s term) “family resemblances”. As a whole, they identify shared meaning-making as a fundamental feature of human life. Analysts—social scientists— are themselves bound up in webs of signification; the implication is that the old unity-of-science dream is chimerical. For the study of man at least, nothing elemental separates the object of study (maps of meaning) and the tools of analysis (interpretation).

Geertz’s interpretive approach, as he repeatedly acknowledged, is nothing more (or less) than a creative synthesis of Langer, Burke, Schütz and the others. In Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz positioned the book as just one more expression of a much wider upsurge:

Insofar as the essays here collected have any importance, it is less in what they say than what they are witness to: an enormous increase in interest, not only in anthropology, but in social studies generally, in the role of symbolic forms in human life. Meaning, that elusive and ill-defined pseudoentity we were once more than content to leave philosophers and literary critics to fumble with, has now
come back into the heart of our discipline. Even Marxists are quoting Cassirer; even positivists, Kenneth Burke.25

In a later essay, Geertz observed that a concern with meaning-making was “in the Zeitgeist” when he was writing the essays that made up _Interpretation of Cultures_. “One thinks one is setting bravely off in an unprecedented direction”, he wrote, “and then looks up to find all sorts of people one has never even heard of headed the same way”. Langer, Burke, Wittgenstein, and many others “all suddenly made a concern with meaning-making an acceptable preoccupation for a scholar to have”. These figures supplied the “ambiance” and “speculative instruments” that made his approach thinkable. “For all my determination to go my own way, and my conviction that I had, I was, all of a sudden, an odd man in”.26 Interest in the symbolic dimension of human life, in short, was in the air.

In that respect Geertz was engaged in a project of intellectual brokerage parallel to Carey’s own. In _Interpretation of Cultures_, Geertz even invoked his role as an importer. In reference, for example, to interpretive theories of meaning, he wrote, “What is necessary is to see to it that the news of it reaches anthropology”.27 Carey, in his extended 1975 review of the book, recognized Geertz’s translation work: “One of the many benefits of Clifford Geertz’s _The Interpretation of Cultures_ is that it is an avenue through which important European scholarship can enter the United States”.28 Carey positioned his own essays in similar terms—as an act of importation:

Major contributions have come from semiotics, cultural anthropology, literary criticism, intellectual history, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and that branch of modern philosophy deriving from Wittgenstein. It is now of some importance that news of these advances reach communications researchers.29

They both delivered the news: Geertz to anthropology and Carey to communication research.

In fact, however, Geertz’s influence spread far beyond anthropology, to every corner of the social sciences. Perhaps no other American social scientist of his generation was more influential than Geertz—the ambassador from anthropology, as Renata Rosaldo called him.30 Carey’s “cultural approach”, important as it became _within_ communication, never breached the discipline’s walls. That discrepancy can be explained by Geertz’s priority: he wrote _Interpretation_ first, before Carey’s otherwise powerful adumbration. More important, however, was the communication discipline’s place at the university’s professional-school
margins, cut off from larger intellectual trends. For one thing, this made a surrogate like Carey necessary. His elaboration of the Geertzian program was, thereafter, effectively trapped within the discipline. The topography of relative field prestige ensured a one-way traffic in ideas.

When Geertz published *Interpretation* in 1973, Carey’s career switched tracks. Nearly all of his writing over the next few years was concerned with explaining Geertz to an audience of communication researchers. In that sense, Carey was an interpreter of an interpretivist who had interpreted the literature of interpretation. The appeal of Geertz is easy to understand: He made an eloquent case for culture as irreducible and significant in its own terms. For Geertz meaning is not trapped in people’s heads, but instead formed in the “public world of common life”—an idea easily assimilable to the concept of communication itself. Geertz celebrated the richness of cultural particularity, up through (by implication) the Irish-Catholic working-class neighborhoods of Providence. All human cultures draft maps of meaning to make the world intelligible, but each with its own idiographic singularity. Geertz’s metaphor of the text—his insistence that cultures could be read in the literary sense—surely appealed to Carey’s humanist affinities.

More than anything, Geertz furnished Carey with the intellectual third way he had been seeking for a decade. Geertz’s program, after all, was explicitly positioned as an alternative not just to postwar behavioral science, but also to Marxism. Ten years had passed since Carey introduced his unformed “cultural studies” label to the Illinois proseminar. With Geertz’s aid, he finally took the term public.

**A Geertzian Approach to Communication**

Long before he read *Interpretation of Cultures*, Carey was at least familiar with many of the streams of thought that comprised Geertz’s interpretive approach. In his first, precocious publication on advertising as an institution—written while still a Master’s student—Carey was already invoking Ernst Cassirer, the German-Jewish philosopher of symbolism. The context is a critique of the rationality assumption in economics: “Man is increasingly defined, using Ernst Cassirer’s terminology, not as *animal rationale*, but as *animal symbolicum*.” Cassirer appeared again in the main body of Carey’s 1963 dissertation, but in a footnoted aside to an extended discussion of symbols in Parsonsian terms. Carey also cited the later Wittgenstein
in passing, but the most intriguing discussion—the one that took him closest to Geertzian phenomenology—appeared in a few anomalous pages midway through the dissertation. There Carey glossed a recent article by the philosopher Grace de Laguna, who had pointed to a convergence of American anthropology and European philosophy on the culture concept. The European notion, *Lebenswelt* (lifeworld), was derived, Carey paraphrased, from “Husserl’s phenomenology to demonstrate the concrete richness and immediacy of subjective experience”. Citing the anthropologist Leslie White, Carey even defined culture as a “sensitized net, a way of viewing and organizing reality which can be learned, taught, and transmitted”. The dissertation’s flirtation with phenomenology, however, soon gave way to a discussion of the objectivity of values within the wider “value systems”.

The dissertation’s preface was less ambiguous. Carey openly endorsed Max Weber’s “cultural science” (*Geistwissenschaft*) and his *verstehen* method of reconstructing human experience. He also quoted Kenneth Burke at length, and included Ernst Cassirer and Erving Goffman in his second list of “[n]ot so obvious” intellectual debts. In 1963 at least, Carey was attuned to what Geertz would later call webs of significance.

But in the intervening decade he rarely touched on these themes. He made a passing reference to Susanne Langer in 1967, and briefly invoked Cassirer in 1970. Burke was an occasional source for quoted insight in these years, but without any substantial treatment of the literary critic’s dramatist approach to symbolic action. Carey, in effect, took a detour through Innis and McLuhan, before his attention was recaptured via Geertz.

It was a sudden pivot. Carey seems to have started work on his cultural theory of communication almost immediately after the 1973 publication of *Interpretation*, when his and Quirk’s “History of the Future” essay was still in press. Carey, who had recently been promoted to full professor, outlined his new project in four essays published around the same time, in 1974 and 1975:

- 1974: “Popular Culture and Uses and Gratifications: Notes Toward an Accommodation” (with Albert L. Kreiling)
- 1974: “The Problem of Journalism History”
- 1975: “Communication and Culture [Review of *The Interpretation of Cultures*]”

The two 1975 essays would appear as the pivotal first two chapters in *Communication as Culture*. 

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It is impossible, based on publication date alone, to determine the order in which the four articles were written.\textsuperscript{48} It is more than likely that Carey worked on them all concurrently. Drafts dated to 1973 exist for both “The Problem of Journalism History” (published first, in spring 1974) and “A Cultural Approach to Communication” (published last, in December 1975). “Popular Culture and Uses and Gratifications”, published in 1974, refers to the 1975 “Cultural Approach” article as “forthcoming”.\textsuperscript{49} The exact or even relative timing isn’t essential in any case, as each of the four essays addresses the same Geertzian themes.

The Anxiety of Power

Carey’s first published reference to Geertz appeared in his contribution to a 1974 edited collection on the “uses and gratifications” approach to audience research. Carey’s essay, co-authored with his Illinois colleague (and former graduate student) Albert Kreiling, attacks the functionalist underpinnings of the approach on a number of grounds, including its unstated conservatism. But the main thrust of the critique is that uses and gratifications studies operate with a flattened and unreflective theory of culture.

Uses and gratifications, as an approach to audience research, has roots in the “gratifications” studies pioneered by Herta Herzog in the late 1930s at Paul Lazarsfeld’s Princeton Radio Research Project.\textsuperscript{50} In the 1960s, the sociologist Elihu Katz, with the help of British political communication scholar Jay Blumler, revived the approach. As a Lazarsfeld graduate student, Katz co-authored the landmark \textit{Personal Influence} study, which had famously concluded that media have only limited effects.\textsuperscript{51} For Katz, the obvious next step was to flip the question—to ask, in effect, what the audience does with media.\textsuperscript{52} By the early 1970s, Blumler and Katz’s approach—to ask audiences to complete questionnaires about why they consumed popular media—was an established stream of mass communication research.

Carey and Kreiling open their critique with a cutting rejoinder to Katz’s call for a merger of popular culture criticism and audience effects research. “The marriage that Katz proposed in heaven”, they wrote, “has not been consummated in the drawing rooms of actual research”. To be of any worth, such a union will need a “considerably higher dowry than has heretofore been offered”.\textsuperscript{53} In its current form, they maintained, uses and gratifications research is a celebration of the existing media system under the cloak of objectivity. By translating audience
self-reports into the “statistical rhetoric of social research”, gratifications researchers give off the appearance of a “‘real’ or objective description”, which in turn takes on the air of a “legitimate and positive pattern of behavior”.

Carey and Kreiling fill out the charge with a many-angled critique of Katz and Blumlér’s functionalism. Gratifications researchers work within a functionalist framework, Carey and Kreiling claim, but one that is half-submerged and under-articulated. Katz and Blumlér’s “silence” concerning these functionalist commitments “disguises the fundamental grounds of the position”, leaving them “even more susceptible to value-laden biases”. Above all, Katz and Blumlér open themselves up to an obvious criticism, that their whole approach “smack[s] of a mere defense of the media operators’ oldest argument: ‘We only give the people what they want’”.  

Carey and Kreiling go so far as to attribute uses and gratifications’ affirmative, upbeat character to a sense of optimism at large in the academy. Citing Raymond Williams’ notion of a “structure of feeling”, they contrast Katz’s implicit cheerfulness to Herta Herzog’s earlier, more downcast take on audience gratifications:

The pessimism of early discussions of mass communication—captured in such terms as “alienation” and “mass society”—was the legacy of nineteenth century and early twentieth century social theorists who were ... marginal men who felt considerable personal alienation from the burgeoning industrial society. But communications research, like the larger sociological milieu from which it draws much of its inspiration, has undergone what [Kenneth] Burke (1957) called a “bureaucratization of the imaginative”, and positive and optimistic terminologies and styles of thought now dominate the center of the field.

Using a trope that Carey would repeatedly invoke in later years, they conclude that communication research has shifted from a “prophetic” to a “priestly” mode.

Up to this point, Carey and Kreiling’s essay is strikingly similar to the leftist critique offered by Philip Elliott in the same volume. Their argument, however, soon shifted to the gratification scholars’ inadequate handling of culture. They promised, in short, to tentatively chart an alternative approach—a “cultural theory of communication” that could “enrich and partially transform current studies”.

Their critique began by noting a “peculiar liability” of Katz and Blumlér’s functionalist language, its “inadequate aesthetic theory”. They fault uses and gratifications for neglecting the “actual experience” of consuming mass media, and resorting instead to the wan language of “incidental learning” and “tension reduction”. The meaning of media programming—its symbolic content—is
explained away as a psychological trigger or system-maintaining influence. “Like so much of the social sciences”, Carey and Kreiling wrote, “uses and gratifications research regards psychological and sociological variables as real and primary, and culture as a derivative agent and manifestation of them”. Whenever a symbolic dimension is present, a “certain theoretical clumsiness overtakes the social sciences”. Confronted by culture, social scientists “retreat to obscurantism” and reduce their subject to psychological needs or social structures. Social scientists “seem incapable of handling culture in itself—as an ordered system of symbols”. That attitude will “have to be replaced” by a “cultural point of view” if Katz’s proposed marriage is to go through.

In the balance of the essay, Carey and Kreiling outline their cultural approach, in unmistakably Geertzian terms. As with Carey’s other mid-1970s work, two of Geertz’s 1960s essays—“Ideology as a Cultural System” (1964) and “Religion as a Cultural System” (1966)—are especially important sources.

In place of sociological or psychological man, Carey and Kreiling call for a conception of “cultural man”. Culture, in this model, is not comprehensible in terms of psychological or sociological conditions, but instead as a “manifestation of a basic cultural disposition to cast up experience in symbolic forms that are at once immediately pleasing and conceptually plausible, thus supplying the basis for felt identities and meaningfully apprehended realities”.

Citing Interpretation of Cultures, Carey and Kreiling describe human activity as “involving the construction of a symbolic container that shapes and expresses whatever human nature, needs, or dispositions exist”. They, like Geertz before them, invoke Max Weber’s large claim that humans are defined by a quest for lucidity—a basic need for an ordered, comprehensible universe. Culture is a process “whereby reality is created, maintained and transformed”, in the service of “producing and maintaining a meaningful cosmos at once both aesthetically gratifying and intellectually plausible”.

The essay also marks Carey’s epistemological shift, again with Geertz as guide. Carey and Kreiling deny that there “exists some hard existential reality beyond culture and symbols”. Rather than “grading experience into zones of epistemological correctness”, they argue, we should presume that people live in “qualitatively distinct zones of experience which cultural forms organize in different ways”. They point to four “modes” in particular: common sense, religious, aesthetic and scientific—the latter of which presumes itself “unequivocally superior” to the others. “The debilitating effect of this conceit is the failure to understand the meaningful realm of discourse in terms of which
people conduct their lives”. Popular culture, Carey and Kreiling conclude, must also be apprehended in “something like its own terms”, but as one of several “cultural modes” in which people live.

Geertz is not the only source for the essay’s culturalist program. Carey and Kreiling prominently quote a trio of sociologists—David Chaney, Philip Ennis, and Tom Burns—with no obvious debts to Geertz. Still, the anthropologist’s influence was far greater than even his five citations suggest. The four “modes” of perception, for example, were delineated by Geertz (leaning on Alfred Schütz). The essay’s core argument—that popular culture should be studied as a “cultural process in which persons create shared expressive and conceptual models that supply common identities and apprehended realities”—is a faithful echo of Geertz’s approach. Even small examples in the Carey and Kreiling text seem borrowed from Interpretation of Cultures.

In some sense Geertz’s most interesting bequest was historical. Like Carey, Geertz was fond of framing his arguments in intellectual historical terms. In a seven-page section of “Ideology as a Cultural System”, he contrasted “two main” approaches to the study of ideology, (1) the interest theory and (2) the strain theory. In the first model, ideology is set against the “background of a universal struggle for advantage”. In the second, the background is a “chronic effort to correct sociopsychological disequilibrium”. He has in mind, in archetypical terms, Marxism and functionalism, respectively. “In the one, men pursue power”, Geertz wrote. “[I]n the other, they flee anxiety”. The weakness in both is their lack of “anything more than the most rudimentary conception of the processes of symbolic formulation”.

Carey and Kreiling transposed the interest/strain dichotomy onto the context of communication research. In the process they modified the referents, and elevated “power” and “anxiety” over “interest” and “strain” as the defining labels. Where Geertz’s “interest” designation was confined to Marxist and cognate approaches to the sociology of knowledge, Carey and Kreiling stretched the label to encompass “causal analysis” in general. Their approach, in essence, was to assign the mainstream effects tradition associated with Lazarsfeld to the “interest/power” camp, and uses and gratifications research to the “strain/anxiety” model.

On the “interest/power” side, Carey and Kreiling described a shift from “causes to consequences” in the study of mass communication. Early communication research—they cited Lazarsfeld and Carl Hovland’s Yale program on persuasion—attempted to explain media effects by “deriving them from some
causally antecedent aspect of the communication process”. This “explanatory apparatus”—“inspired” by both behavioristic psychology and information theory—gave rise to a “power model of communication”. The emphasis was placed on the causal priority of the environment, which acted upon a “relatively passive receiver”.77

When early researchers at Columbia and elsewhere produced disappointing empirical results—the limited effects finding—a switch was made to a functionalist approach. Accompanying the change was a “shift in imagery”: from a model of “communication as a power” to “one of communication as a form of anxiety release”.78 Both approaches neglect the symbolic dimension of communication: “The rich history of cultural symbolism, the complex, meaningful transactions of, for example, religion end up no more than shadowy derivatives of stimuli and structures”.79

The “power and anxiety” narrative, first outlined in 1974, became one of Carey’s standard historical trope, appearing in the two 1975 articles and many publications to follow. It’s a strange mnemonic mold, in part because it sprang from such a different—and more circumscribed—context in Geertz’s rendition. Even as applied to communication research the story is a poor fit: the Columbia media effects tradition—the standard-bearer for the “power” model—was arguably functionalist in its underlying commitments in much the same way as uses and gratifications ("anxiety").80

Carey’s new Geertzian perspective also informed “The Problem of Journalism History”, his manifesto-like call for a cultural history of journalism. The short essay appeared in 1974 as the lead article in the brand-new Journalism History.81 The study of journalism’s past, he wrote in its opening sentence, “remains something of an embarrassment”. Though Carey conceded the important work already produced, he invoked Herbert Butterfield to argue that the main arc of the subfield’s studies had reinforced a “whig interpretation” of journalism history (as the gradual unfolding of press freedom). In its place, he proposed that the field’s scholars look to “the most fruitful research of modern historians” as the “basis of fresh interpretations of our subject matter”.82 He had in mind the growing field of cultural history, and—as applied to the past—Geertz’s interpretive program. “Our studies”, he concluded, “need to be ventilated”.83

The essay’s central idea is that journalism’s basic unit, the “report”, is a cultural form that maps the world for its readers. The report, in other words, is a mode of experience or way of seeing akin to religion or science. Journalism, at
its core, is a “state of consciousness, a way of apprehending, of experiencing the world”. To grasp its significance, historians need to compare the journalistic report to “older forms of consciousness (myth, religion) which it partially displaced” as well as those other forms with which it interacts: the scientific report, the essay and “aesthetic realism”.  

Here Carey is blending, in creative ways, two Geertzian concepts, cultural form and a perspective. By cultural form Geertz typically meant a specific cultural practice like the Balinese cockfight. A perspective is something larger, like a religious lens—a “particular way of looking at life, a particular manner of construing the world”. Carey, in effect, collapsed these two categories by suggesting that media forms like the journalistic “report” furnish a fully ordered perspective with which to see the world. Journalism, he wrote, provides audiences with “models for action and feeling, with ways to size up situations”, qualities it shares “with all literary acts”.

On these grounds Carey argued that the history of journalism is at the same time the history of consciousness, or at least a portion of it. The study of the report is an investigation, then, into a “way in which men in the past have grasped reality”. The press acts as a kind of textual sedimentation of the cultural past, which the historian can and should attempt to recover:

When we do this the presumed dullness and triviality of our subject matter evaporates and we are left with an important corner of the most vital human odyssey: the story of the growth and transformation of the human mind as formed and expressed by one of the most significant forms in which the mind has conceived and expressed itself during the last three hundred years—the journalistic report.

“The Problem of Journalism History” was widely regarded as an important intervention, attracting immediate and sustained critical attention. Though Geertz goes unmentioned, the cultural history that Carey proposed is plainly the Geertzian program projected onto the past—a strategy that a number of disciplinary historians also took up in this period.

Geertz is mentioned, prominently, in a draft version of the journalism history essay, presented the year before at the Association for Education in Journalism. The draft concludes with a lengthy reference to Geertz. “Let me close”, Carey wrote, “with a quote that while taken from an anthropologist, captures the essence and tribulations of the historical enterprise I have been commending to you”.

Carey excerpts the now-famous last two paragraphs of The Interpretation of
Culture, which begins, “The culture of a people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong”. Like the “anthropologist whom he very much resembles”, Carey’s draft continues, the journalism historian reads texts “over the shoulder of those historical actors to whom they properly belong”. The extended reference to Geertz was spliced out of the essay’s published version.

To Europe and Back

The next year Carey published the two essays that, in revised form, would comprise the theoretical core of Communication as Culture. The first, “Communication and Culture”, was an extended review of Interpretation of Cultures. The second, “A Cultural Approach to Communication”, developed an influential contrast between “ritual” and “transmission” views of communication. Both essays lay out a programmatic case for an interpretive alternative to the discipline’s existing models.

For all their overlap, the two articles are distinct in patterned and interesting ways. There is, in effect, a division of Geertzian labor: The review essay takes up Geertz’s epistemological critique, while the “Cultural Approach” essay emphasizes the anthropologist’s more substantive discussion of religion and ritual. Roughly speaking the divide tracks Geertz’s key mid-1960s articles: The first is indebted to “Ideology as a Cultural System”, while the second leans on “Religion as a Cultural System”.

Carey also frames the two essays in distinctive ways. “Communication and Culture”, the review essay, is all about Europe: British cultural studies and Geertz’s translation of European thought. Carey, in fact, introduced the ritual/transmission contrast here first, but assigned the labels to referents altogether different than those made famous in “A Cultural Approach”. In the review essay’s version, American communication research clings to a flattened “transmission” model, while the more fertile “ritual” view is the possession of the Europeans.

By the end of 1975, when “A Cultural Approach” was published, the same contrast was applied instead to currents within American history. The story was also stretched out quite a bit: The focus, in the first essay, was on postwar communication research. In “A Cultural Approach”, by contrast, both “ritual” and “transmission” are traced back centuries as strands in American social thought in the broadest sense.
Carey had bookended the review essay with British cultural studies. In “A Cultural Approach”, by contrast, the American pragmatist John Dewey is the far more prominent figure. There was, from the one essay to the next, a kind of continental drift. To a large degree the Europeans were reclothed in American dress.

One explanation for the shift is that Carey, in “A Cultural Approach”, had begun to articulate what would become the main motif for the rest of his life: a proto-communitarian critique of American public life. His emerging preoccupation was the normative flip-side to his descriptive outlook. With Geertz he held that ordered symbols and shared culture are a fundamental feature of human life. He came to argue, in addition, that contemporary American culture isn’t nearly thick enough.

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In the review essay, Carey finally employed the term “cultural studies”, more than a decade after first circulating it in the Illinois proseminar. Here he used the label repeatedly to designate his culturalist program for communication research.

Carey opened the article with a lament for American scholars’ ignorance of their European counterparts. The “particular tragedy” is that U.S. “ethnocentrism” has intensified at the moment that “European scholarship has recovered from the ravages of World War II”. With the damage repaired, European thought “seems again alive with resurgent pre-war traditions such as Marxism and phenomenology and new bodies of thought such as structuralism produced from European strains of ideas”. American scholars are not “well equipped” to absorb these trends, and the problem is worse within the field: “American students of communication in particular are isolated from what are, I think, among the most exciting and important developments in their field”.

The complaint, of course, is a set up for Geertz. There is, Carey continued, an absence of “mature American scholars capable of introducing such work to American audiences with clarity and distinctive American overtones”. Enter Geertz: A chief virtue of The Interpretation of Cultures is that it is an “avenue through which important European scholarship” can enter the U.S. Because Geertz is a “powerful and graceful writer”, he is able to convey the ideas without the “opaqueness of the original”.

The mission of the essay is clear: Carey will translate Geertz for communication studies in much the same way that Geertz has translated Europeans for Americans. Read chronologically, Geertz’s essays develop a theory
of culture that “progressively becomes a theory of communication as well”. His views on communication—more European than American—connect with “what is called in Germany the ‘cultural sciences’ and, less pretentiously perhaps, in England ‘cultural studies’”.

To press the terminological point, Carey enlisted Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, two literature-trained figures at the center of British cultural studies. As Carey recalled from a 1973 conference in London, both men had issued critiques of the “communications” label standard in the U.S. Williams and Hall were, Carey wrote, “raising a concern that never crosses an American’s mind”. With the benefit of reflection, however, Carey wrote that he had come to accept the British critiques, noting that “communications” isolates the field from an “entire body of critical, interpretive, and comparative methodology” at the heart of anthropology and literary studies. In the rest of the essay Carey used his (and Hall’s and Williams’) “cultural studies” alternative.

It is at this point that Carey introduced the “ritual” and “transmission” contrast that “A Cultural Approach” would make so famous. European and American media research, he wrote, derive from “quite different kinds of intellectual puzzles”, rooted in “two different metaphors for communication”. Admitting the over-simplification, he described American scholarship as “grounded in a transmission or transportation view of communication”. Persuasion, attitude change, conditioning: These are the terms that Americans invoke. For them, communication is a process of “transmitting messages at a distance for the purpose of control”.

In contrast, the “preponderant” image of communication in Europe is a “ritual view”, in which communication is conceived as a “process through which a shared culture is created, modified, and transformed”. Carey continued:

A ritual view of communication is not directed toward the extension of messages in space, but the maintenance of society in time (even if Marxists are less than sanguine about this); not the act of imparting information or influence, but the creation, representation, and celebration of shared beliefs. If a transmission view of communication centers on the extension of messages across geography for purposes of control, a ritual view centers on the sacred ceremony which draws persons together in fellowship and commonality.

U.S. communication research, in Carey’s rendering, has been preoccupied by a narrow problematic: short-term attitude or behavior change brought about by media exposure. The typical researcher holds an attendant image of communication: The word, to him, signifies the conveyance of a message from one
place to another place. The ritual view, which for Carey (in this essay) is the province of Europeans, conceives of communication instead as an integrative process that binds human groupings over time. For the Americans it’s all about persuasion; for the European, the nub is communion.

Positioned in this way, the ritual/transmission binary is an odd rhetorical set-piece. The core contrast—maintenance-in-time versus extension-in-space—is plainly drawn from Innis, but here it is the thought-styles, and not the media technologies, that carry the bias. There is, also, the somewhat arbitrary allotment of ritual to the Europeans. The argument for mediated communion had been asserted by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic since the late 19th century. In Carey’s own intellectual past both Parsons and Innis put forward versions of the claim, arguments that Carey had synopsized. Here, however, it is the Europeans who embrace the ritual view. In Carey’s future writings the relevant adherents would change again, to Americans like Dewey, Charles Horton Cooley, and Robert Park.

In the Geertz review essay even the “European” category is porous. After ascribing the ritual view to Europe as a whole, the balance of the section pivots to British studies in particular. In the process Carey lets a looser formulation—the question of social order—stand in for the “ritual” view. The problematic of British studies, he wrote, is the “relationship between culture and society, or more generally, between expressive forms, particularly art, and social order”. The British, Carey explained, are concerned with the question of how societies hang together, with reference to media, literature and art. For American researchers this is “not even seen as a problem”. 104

The only British figure mentioned by Carey is the sociologist Tom Burns, who in Carey’s telling sounds very much like Geertz: “The task of social science is to make sense out of the senses we make out of life”. The social scientist “stands toward his material”, wrote Carey paraphrasing Burns, as the “literary critic stands toward the novel, play or poem”. 105 Without saying as much, Carey was in effect projecting Geertz onto British cultural studies—despite Williams’ and Hall’s deep engagement with Western Marxism in this period. Hence the sly parenthetical reference to the European embrace of the ritual view: “(even if Marxists are less than sanguine about this)”. 106

In the remainder of the essay the British fall away, only to reappear in the last sentence. In the intervening pages Carey developed his cultural approach against the backcloth of two traditions of American communication research. The first conceives of communication as a “behavioral science whose objective
is the elucidation of laws”. The second pictures communication as a “formal science whose objective is the elucidation of structures”. Carey’s alternative to the other two is a “cultural science whose objective is the elucidation of meaning”. The first tradition—which in this version includes functionalism—is dismissed along the familiar lines of Geertz’s interest (power) and strain (anxiety) narrative. For the second, structuralist tradition, Carey marshaled Geertz’s critique of French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. Geertz’s interpretive program, of course, underpins Carey’s culturalist rival to the other two.

The tripartite comparison is framed in epistemological terms, according to what Geertz, in his “Ideology” essay, called “Mannheim’s paradox”. Geertz was referring to the Hungarian-born sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose sociology of knowledge program traced the social conditions that give rise to social and political thought. The dilemma for Mannheim was that his theory, focused as it was on the social roots of knowledge, seemed to double back on (and thereby discredit) his own analysis. Where “ideology leaves off” and “science begins” has been, Geertz observed, the “Sphinx’s Riddle” of much social science.

Carey positioned the three approaches—behavioral, formal and cultural—as “devices for escaping Mannheim’s Paradox”. In his discussion of the first, “behavioral sciences” tradition, Carey reprised the power and anxiety formulation that had already appeared in 1974. As before, he described a “causal” framework that, when confronted by weak correlations, shifted to a “functional” explanation. “In one model men pursue power; in the other they flee anxiety”. In both cases a strategy to deal with Mannheim’s paradox is the claim that the scientist is exempt because “in the act of comprehending the law he escapes its force”. There is less to hang on the second tradition, Carey admitted, since there have been “no formal theories of communication active in American scholarship”. But modern linguistics, systems theory, cybernetics and aspects of structuralism (“particularly that identified with Levi-Strauss”) make the attempt to build formal, deductivist theories of social life, and these trends have had “at the least an imaginative effect on the study of communications”. The formalist route out of Mannheim’s dilemma is to turn away from behavior altogether, in favor of abstract systems like Noam Chomsky’s formal grammar.

Carey struck a conciliatory note in presenting his cultural alternative. “I wish”, he wrote, “neither to belabor nor to gainsay” the other two traditions. “I
merely suggest that they do not exhaust the tasks of trained intelligence”.

There is, he continued, a “third way” of looking at communications, “[c]ultural studies or cultural science”. Like the others, his cultural approach does not escape Mannheim’s paradox, but unlike the others embraces it directly. Rather than reduce human action to “underlying causes or structures”, cultural studies seeks to “interpret its significance”. To punctuate the point, Carey quoted Geertz’s famous “doctrine in a clause”—the “Believing with Max Weber” passage. The idea, Carey explained, is to “bypass” the “rather abstracted empiricism” of behavioral studies and the “ethereal apparatus” of formal theories, in order to “descend deeper into the empirical world”. Following Geertz, he cast the cultural analyst as a reader of texts whose work is closer to that of a “literary critic or a Scriptural scholar” than to a “behavioral scientist”. The task is not “long-distance mind reading”, but instead an attempt to decipher the “interpretations available out in the public world”.

Carey illustrated the point with a lengthy example, an imagined conversation on the meaning of death between four characters: a doctor, a typical middle-American, an Irish peasant, and an Ik tribesman. In evocative, even poetic, prose, Carey ascribed to each character a different interpretation of death. In Carey’s telling, the doctor identifies death with the cessation of brain waves. For the middle-American, death arrives later, with the cessation of the heartbeat. Since the heart is a “symbol of human emotions”, this measure attends to the “affective side of death, the relation of death to the ongoing life of a community”.

The Irish peasant, the third conversant, argues that death occurs three full days after the heartbeat stops. “In the interim the person, as at the Irish wake, is treated as if he is alive”. The “as if”, Carey wrote, gives away too much; he is alive for those three days. For Irish peasants the relevant cessation is social death, “the final separation of the person from a human community”. The final character, the Ik tribesman, claims that death occurs seven days before the heart stops, when food has run out. Among this “starving people” the person is treated as if he were dead. “Again, ignore the ‘as if’: the definition is as cognitively precise and affectively satisfying as anything put forth by a neurosurgeon”. Neither a law-like statement nor an appeal to the deep structure of the mind, Carey explained, could capture these highly particular meanings.

The analyst’s role is to grasp the “imaginative universe in which the acts of our actors are signs”. The point is not to arrive at some final understanding, but
instead—citing Geertz—to “enlarge the human conversation by comprehending what others are saying”. Geertz and a number of Europeans have already helped to clarify the interpretive project, which now awaits the attention of communication scholars:

The task now for students of communications or mass communications or, as the British prefer, contemporary culture, is to turn these advances in the science of culture toward the characteristic products of contemporary life: news stories, bureaucratic language, love songs, political rhetoric, daytime serials, scientific reports, television drama, talk shows, and the wider world of contemporary leisure, ritual, and information.

Those artifacts of everyday life, Carey wrote in the essay’s final line, were just the things that Raymond Williams “felt had slipped by us when we confidently named our field the study of mass communications”. Carey reprinted the essay in 1977 as a chapter in the British Open University’s important collection, *Mass Communication and Society*. A pair of references to Marxism were removed in the updated version, but the main change was to de-emphasize Geertz. And the essay is no longer presented as a review of *Interpretation of Cultures*.

A Deweyan Approach to Communication

Carey’s “A Cultural Approach to Communication”, published in late 1975, was to become the most celebrated work of his career. Beautifully written and often enigmatic, the essay, in part, is a well-mannered manifesto for his interpretive program. But it is also a *Bildungsroman*, a chronicle of his intellectual coming of age. What’s surprising is that Geertz is almost completely missing from the account. This despite the fact that the essay is at least as indebted to *Interpretation of Cultures* as Carey’s other mid-1970s work. Geertz appears in the body of the article just once, at the end of a long list of named influences. He surfaces again in a late-essay footnote to a concept that, in the text itself, goes unattributed: “This formulation, as with many other aspects of this essay, is heavily dependent on the work of Clifford Geertz”. A reasonably attentive reader would have no inkling that Geertz was the model for Carey’s “cultural approach”.

The essay instead places the American pragmatist John Dewey at its center. Dewey’s reflections on communication, admittedly scattered and incomplete, serve as Carey’s avowed foundation stone. The shift is unexplained, but the effect
is to recast what was, in the review essay, a Geertz-filtered European tradition in
resolutely American terms. In essence Carey put Geertz’s words in Dewey’s voice
—in addition to his own.

“When I decided some years ago seriously to read the literature of
communications”, Carey wrote in the essay’s opening line, “a wise man suggested I
begin with John Dewey”.128 In a 2006 interview Carey identified Jay Jensen, his
Illinois teacher, as the “wise man”, but here the reference hangs in mysterious
anonymity.129 “It was advice”, Carey continued, “I have never regretted accepting”.
There is “depth to his work”, a “natural excess common to seminal minds”, that
offers “permanent complexities, and paradoxes over which to puzzle”.130

Carey went on to argue that Dewey had recognized, without using the terms,
the crucial contrast between transmission and ritual views of communication. The
transmission/ritual pairing had, of course, been framed very differently in the
Geertz review essay—as expressions of European and American communication
research, respectively. But in “A Cultural Approach”, Carey shifted the geography
and the timing: The two views, he wrote, have been “alive in American culture since
this term [communication] entered common discourse in the 19th century”.131

Carey’s starting point is a Dewey quote from Democracy as Education:
“Society exists not only by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said
to exist in transmission, in communication”.132 Carey reads the line as an evocation,
in kernel form, of the ritual and transmission contrast. Dewey, Carey wrote, uses
communication in “two quite different senses”. He “understood that
communication has had two contrasting definitions in the history of Western
thought”, and uses these definitions as a “source of creative tension in his work”.
Carey proposed to “extend his thought” by “seizing upon the same contradiction he
perceived in our use of the term ‘communication’”, as a device for “vivifying our
studies”.

Over the next nine pages the essay traces the history of the “ritual” and
“transmission” conceptions. The far more prevalent transmission view derives,
Carey wrote, from “one of the most ancient of human dreams: the desire to increase
the speed and effect of messages as they travel in space”. For millennia—since the
time “upper and lower Egypt were unified under the First Dynasty”—
communication and transportation have been inseparably linked. The telegraph
“ended the identity” but did not “destroy the metaphor”: “Our basic orientation to
communication remains grounded, at the deepest roots of our thinking, in the idea
of transmission”.134
In a surprising move, Carey insisted that *religion* was the source of the transmission conception, at least for the U.S.—a claim that he proposed to “illustrate... by a devious and, in terms of historical detail, inadequate path”.\textsuperscript{135} He has in mind the religious mission that accompanied the early modern voyages of discovery. New England Puritans, for instance, sought to “carve a New Jerusalem out of the woods of Massachusetts”, on the “profound belief that movement in space could be in itself a redemptive act”.\textsuperscript{136} Plainly drawing on his technological essays with Quirk—though with a different timbre—Carey recounted the religious euphoria that greeted new communication technologies in 19th century America.\textsuperscript{137} The religious dimension of the transmission view was, however, soon eclipsed by the “forces of science and secularization”. Drained of its ties to the sacred, the transmission view has “dominated” American thought ever since.\textsuperscript{138}

The ritual view, Carey wrote, has been comparatively neglected. Though “by far the older” conception, the ritual view is only a “minor thread in our national thought”.\textsuperscript{139} Its links to religion—to prayer, chant and ceremony—are more overt. Communication, in this view, is the “construction and maintenance of an ordered, meaningful cultural world which can serve as a control and container for human action”.\textsuperscript{140}

Though Carey blamed the weakness of the ritual view on the “evanescent” concept of culture in American thought—and though his definition of ritual is plainly indebted to Geertz and Innis—neither scholar is mentioned. Even so, the essay frames the flatness of the country’s culture concept in the same terms as the other mid-1970s essays: Scholars treat American culture as a “residual category useful only when psychological and sociological data are exhausted”. The hubris of science is that it provides “culture-free truth where culture provides ethnocentric error”. As a result, Carey admitted in passing (and again without mention of Geertz) that one must “heavily rely on European sources or upon Americans deeply influenced by European scholarship”.\textsuperscript{141} The thought, however, is dropped, and the balance of the essay suggests that native resources for cultural analysis are plentiful, especially in the person of Dewey. Indeed, the historical excursus on the transmission/ritual contrast wraps up with the American pragmatist. The “power of Dewey’s work”, Carey wrote, derives from his “working over these counterpoised views of communication”. Quoting another long passage from *Democracy as Education*, Carey concluded that Dewey’s “final emphasis” was on a ritual view of communication.\textsuperscript{142}
At this point in the essay Carey recounted the evolution in his own thought. Observing that the transmission view had dominated American thinking since the 1920s, he classified the main strands of organized communication research as falling within that conception:

When I first came into this field I felt that this view of communication, expressed in behavioral and functional terms, was exhausted. It had become academic: a repetition of past achievement, a demonstration of the indubitable. While it led to solid achievement, it could no longer go forward without disastrous intellectual and social consequences. I felt it was necessary to reopen the analysis, to reinvigorate it with the tension found in Dewey’s work and, above all, to go elsewhere into biology, theology, anthropology, and literature for some intellectual material with which we might escape the treadmill we were running.\textsuperscript{143}

This is a wide and unspecific umbrella, of course, and he attempted in the next paragraph to name his influences. “For me at least”, he wrote, “the resources were found by “going back to the work” of Weber, Emile Durkheim, Alexis de Tocqueville and Johan Huizinga. He also pointed to a long list of “contemporaries”: Kenneth Burke, Hugh Duncan, Adolph Portman, Thomas Kuhn, Peter Berger, and Clifford Geertz. Even this list—with Geertz one name among many, and no mention of Parsons nor Innis—was dropped below a third, final group of scholars:

Basically however, the most viable though still inadequate tradition of social thought on communication comes from those colleagues and descendants of Dewey in the Chicago School: from Mead and Cooley through Robert Park and into Erving Goffman.

To a reader familiar with Carey’s later work, this “Chicago School” formulation is utterly unremarkable. Yet the passage is the first mention of the grouping in Carey’s published work. Though Dewey in particular looms larger in this essay, the entire Chicago assemblage would soon take on acute narrative importance to Carey’s writings.\textsuperscript{144}

What’s striking about their enlistment here—and Dewey throughout—is that the remainder of “A Cultural Approach” is another rendition of the Geertzian program for interpretive social science. In the very next paragraph Carey introduced a definition—drawn, he claimed, from the named scholars—of “disarming simplicity” yet of “some intellectual power and scope”: “\textit{Communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained,}
Here is Carey’s analog to Geertz’s “doctrine in a clause”. Yet Geertz never reappears in the body of the text.

To fill out his definition, Carey first established the epistemological stakes. Against the view that humans have access to a pre-linguistic reality, he made the by-now familiar point that reality is “not given, not humanly existent, independent of language and towards which language stands as a pale reflection”. Instead reality is produced by communication, in the shared symbolic constructions that humans cast up. There are, he wrote, “no lines of latitude and longitude in nature but by overlaying the globe with this particular, though not exclusively correct, symbolic organization, order is imposed on spatial organization and certain, limited, human purposes served”. In the process of elaborating this point, Carey calls on Geertz’s sources—Ernst Cassirer, Alfred Schütz, and Gilbert Ryle—but without citing Geertz himself.

Carey, for example, credited his discussion of the public, and therefore accessible, nature of human meaning to Ryle. His extended example of a child finding his way to school by way of a crude map, in similar fashion, closely tracks the treatment of a road map in “Religion as a Cultural System”—yet Geertz is not mentioned. When Carey invoked Geertz’s well-known distinction between representations “of” and “for” reality, he does cite the anthropologist, but without naming him in the text. In the essay’s concluding pages Carey re-introduced the “power” and “anxiety” narrative: “American social science has generally represented communication, within an overarching transmission view, in terms of either a power or an anxiety model”. Here again, Geertz is not cited.

Instead, the essay’s conclusion returns to Dewey. Carey, in a theme that he would elaborate to great significance in the years ahead, argued that the way scholars conceive of communication—in anxiety and power terms, for example—are not just bad or partial descriptions of the way communication works. These conceptions actually double back on the reality they purport to describe, helping to weave those portrayals into the fabric of everyday life. “Our models of communication”, Carey wrote, “create what we disingenuously pretend they merely describe”. His otherwise baffling reference, earlier in the essay, to the “disastrous intellectual and social consequences” of the prevailing transmission view takes on a new meaning in the essay’s conclusion.

Dewey offers a different way to think about communication, wrote Carey, as the “most wonderful” of all things. If “we follow Dewey” it will “occur to us” that problems of communication are “linked to problems of community, to
problems surrounding the kinds of communities we create and in which we live”.

In the essay’s last line, Carey issued a forceful normative link between thinking about communication with the health of public life: “The object, then, of recasting our studies of communication in terms of a ritual model is not only to more firmly grasp the essence of this ‘wonderful’ process, but to give us a way in which to rebuild a model of and for communication of some restorative value in reshaping our common culture”.

**Conclusion**

In Geertz Carey found a kindred scholar. He wrote like Carey, from the same humanist outlook. Geertz expressed, with sophistication and broad learning, what Carey had been struggling to say since his dissertation. With Geertz as his guide, Carey put forward an eloquent appeal for the field to take meaning and symbolism seriously. The plea, in many ways, was heard: His national reputation was made by these mid-1970s essays, “A Cultural Approach” above all.

Carey also genuinely opened up the field. The scope of what was acceptable work was widened because of his interventions in these years. Without a border-dwelling importer like him, the discipline’s interpretive turn might have taken even longer to appear. The same reason that Carey’s translation was necessary—the field’s relative isolation and marginality—also ensured that no one was too concerned, or knowledgeable, about his sources. Nor was it likely that his version of interpretive social science would be read outside communication research.

Geertz, however, did eventually read Carey’s review essay, thanks to a former Carey graduate student who sent Geertz the article. He described the essay as “one of the best things about my work I have seen” and “extremely incisive, particularly in [Carey’s] awareness of my connection to European thought”. Carey’s skills as an intellectual exegete were affirmed again.

The irony is that Carey, by the end of this period, was downplaying both Geertz and his European sources. Because “A Cultural Approach” became the first, scene-setting chapter of *Communication as Culture*, the Deweyan filter of that essay came off instead as its wellspring. Even the book’s second chapter was revised off the second, 1977 version of the review essay, with its origins as a review obscured. The countless students of communication who encountered this work first in its collected form must have had trouble detecting Geertz’s
profound influence. Carey himself obliquely acknowledged the debt in the book’s index, which reads, “Geertz, Clifford, 9, 13-68 passim, 86”. As David Paul Nord has observed, pages 13-68 comprise “all of chapters 1 and 2, the two most important chapters in the book”.155 Geertz was an absent presence.

Parsons and Innis were lurking in the background too. It is true that Carey had abandoned structural-functionalism, and moved on from his technology essays. Nevertheless some of the themes he stressed in the mid-1970s were faithful echoes of his earlier work. Back in 1963 he had described media content as a “social ceremony” that “celebrates the values which the national community holds in common”.156 In his 1967 Antioch Review Innis-McLuhan essay, Carey had written, “Oral traditions and time-binding media led to the growth of a culture oriented toward a sacred tradition, which built consensus on the sharing of mutually affirmed and celebrated attitudes and values”.157 Geertz, and for that matter Dewey, were only the latest voices through which Carey expressed the claim.

Carey had signaled this new, American orientation in a series of fellowship applications submitted in 1973.158 In the applications, Carey proposed to collect his “scattered essays” into a “book length statement”, tentatively titled Communication, Technology, and Culture.159 Though the project—basically an attempt to synthesize his work on Innis, McLuhan, and the history of American technology, against the backdrop of the “third communications revolution”—was never completed, the application’s framing revealed a new preoccupation with American particularity. He presented his proposed book, in fact, as the U.S. counterpart to the uniquely English work of Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart—“hopefully duplicating”, he wrote, “in an American context the achievement Raymond Williams has made in this field against the background of British history”.160 Though the application was unquestionably framed in terms of his late 1960s/early 1970s technology essays, Carey had, by the time he took the NEH fellowship in spring 1975, moved on to Geertz.161 He remained committed to replicating British cultural studies in the American context. In his fellowship report to the NEH, he described his ongoing project as “a book paralleling for American history and experience the work Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart had already published in England”.162 Carey’s “cultural studies” was now American, allied to but distinct from the British variety then gathering renown. Dewey became his vessel.
“A Cultural Approach” was Carey’s first, not-so-tentative step toward a new, self-consciously American intellectual identity. In the years to come his determination to speak with an American voice would only grow, so much so that he came to embrace ethnocentrism as an ideal. In this project Dewey and the Chicago School came to furnish an eminently usable past.

In “A Cultural Approach”, Carey’s praise for Dewey was still tempered by his regret that the philosopher had come to “overvalue scientific information”. Carey’s exposure, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to the revival of American pragmatism helped to assuage those concerns. In particular, Carey came to adopt the partial and redemptive Dewey portrayed by philosopher Richard Rorty, a key figure in the pragmatism revival. The encounter with Rorty was fateful for another reason: His unqualified disavowal of realism in favor of pragmatic hope almost certainly loosened Carey’s already pliable posture toward the field’s past.
NOTES

2 Ibid., 19.
3 Ibid., 10.
6 There is a large critical literature on Geertz’s theory of culture. See, for example, the essays collected in *Interpreting Clifford Geertz: Cultural Investigation in the Social Sciences*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Philip Smith, and Matthew Norton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Mark A. Schneider, “Culture-as-Text in the Work of Clifford Geertz”, *Theory and Society* 16, no. 6 (1987); Karen Lystra, “Clifford Geertz and the Concept of Culture”, *Prospects* 8 (1983); Diane J. Austin, “Symbols and Culture: Some Philosophical Assumptions in the Work of Clifford Geertz”, *Social Analysis* no. 3 (1979); and Fred Inglis, *Clifford Geertz: Culture Custom and Ethics* (New York: Polity, 2000).
8 In dismissing the charge, for example, that his interpretive anthropology slides into relativism, Geertz wrote, “As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying that as a perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer”. *Interpretation of Cultures*, 30.
9 Ibid., 24.
10 Ibid., ix.
12 See, for example, Geertz, “Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example”, *American Anthropologist* 59, no. 1 (1957), reprinted as chapter 6 in *Interpretation of Cultures*. In a 1962 book on Indonesian development, Geertz refers to a credit vehicle as “an institution which acts to change the whole value framework from one emphasizing particularistic, diffuse, affective and ascriptive ties between individuals to one emphasizing—within economic contexts—universalistic, particularistic, affectively neutral and achieved ties between them”. Geertz, *Agricultural Involution* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1963), 260.


16 Ibid., 208.

17 Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 8.


19 As Hunter Heyck has masterfully documented, the broker-driven, interdisciplinary, team-based “behavioral sciences” model of the 1950s was funded by a mix of foundation and military sources. After Sputnik in 1957, a new, more discipline-based funding system emerged, more dependent on civilian agencies like the National Science Foundation. For a number of years the two funding systems overlapped, but by the early 1960s the newer regime had largely displaced the older model. Hunter Crowther-Heyck, “Patrons of the Revolution: Ideals and Institutions in Postwar Behavioral Science”, *Isis* 97 (2006). See also Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 188–203.


See Inglis, *Clifford Geertz*, 145–153. As Geertz notes in *Interpretation*: “my own general ideological (as I would frankly call it) position is largely the same as that of [Raymond] Aron, [Edward] Shils, [Talcott] Parsons, and so forth; that I am in agreement with their plea for a civil, temperate, unheroic politics”. *Interpretation of Cultures*, 200n.


Acknowledging the friction between some of these thinkers, Geertz was a resolute agnostic on ontological first principles. He practiced, instead, a hermeneutics without guarantees: “Both Ricoeur and Gadamer are interested in the general possibility of knowledge, which I have learned a lot from, but it is not what I am doing. I am trying to get some knowledge about some thing. I am trying to have an applied phenomenology, an applied hermeneutics, to really do a hermeneutic job on whatever it is that I am trying to understand…. So I see myself as belonging to the phenomenological tradition, although my work tends to be a little shy of a general philosophy of culture”. Micheelsen, “‘I Don’t Do Systems’”, 4.

Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 29.


Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 12.


The opening vignette in *Interpretation*—an account of the layered meanings of a wink among a small group of boys—is unmistakably a discussion of communication, which was of course not lost on Carey. Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 6–7.

It is striking that a bound bibliography of the Institute of Communications Research’s publications to date (1949 to 1972)—produced under Carey’s supervision—has no header for “Cultural Studies” among its nine topical categories. Most of Carey’s publications are listed under “Mass Media” or “Popular Culture and Political Economy”. Institute of Communications Research, *A Selected Bibliography of Publications, 1949–1972* (Urbana IL: Institute of Communications Research, n.d. (1973?)), 37, 44.

In a footnote that first cites Anatol Rapoport and Leslie White, Carey adds: “Of course, Ernst Cassirer, more than any other modern figure, is the ‘philosopher of symbolic form’.” “Communication Systems and Social Systems”, 92.

The Wittgenstein reference appears as Carey discusses specialized jargon: “One gets the feeling that Wittgenstein was thinking about the highly differentiated meaning and symbol systems when he argued that the meaning of a term is governed by the ‘language games’ in which it functions”. Ibid., 148.


Carey, “Communication Systems”, 64.

“Ibid., 66. “The cultural constitution of the human life world”, Carey continued, “means that man’s responses can never be simply reduced to stimuli derived from the surrounding world, defined in a physical or geographic sense. Through training and experience, simply through living in human society, the concepts, discriminations and classificatory patterns of individuals are established by means of which perceptual experience is personally integrated. In this way assumptions about the nature of social and physical reality become a priori constituents in the perceptual process”. Ibid., 66–67.

Ibid., 68–72.

Ibid., xv–xiii.


Carey, “Communication and Culture [Review of The Interpretation of Cultures by Clifford Geertz]”, Communication Research 2, no. 2 (1975).


Ibid., 230.

Ibid., 227–228, 231.

Ibid., 230.

Ibid., 231


Ibid., 231


Ibid.


Ibid., 243.

Ibid. See Interpretation of Cultures, 98–101.
Carey and Kreiling, “Popular Culture”, 243. Compare Geertz on religion: “sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order. In religious belief and practice a group’s ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life”. Interpretation of Cultures, 89–90.

Carey and Kreiling, “Popular Culture”, 243–244.

Ibid., 244.

Ibid.


Geertz: “But to speak of ‘the religious perspective’ is, by implication, to speak of one perspective among others. A perspective is a mode of seeing, in that extended sense of ‘see’ in which it means ‘discern,’ ‘apprehend,’ ‘understand,’ or ‘grasp.’ It is a particular way of looking at life, a particular manner of construing the world… If we place the religious perspective against the backdrop of three of the other major perspectives in terms of which men construe the world—the common-sensical, the scientific, and the aesthetic—its special character emerges more sharply”. Interpretation of Cultures, 110–111.

E.g., Geertz: “There is still, to paraphrase a remark of Kenneth Burke’s, a difference between building a house and drawing up a plan for building a house, and reading a poem about having children by marriage is not quite the same thing as having children by marriage”. Interpretation of Cultures, 91–92. Carey and Kreiling: “But there is still a useful analytic distinction (to steal from Burke, 1957) between building a house and drawing up a blueprint for building a house, between making love and writing a poem about making love”. “Popular Culture”, 233. The Burke-via-Geertz sourcing was later acknowledged in Communication as Culture, in the section of chapter two that excerpted this 1974 “Popular Culture” essay: “But there is still a useful analytic distinction, to borrow from Geertz, who borrows from Kenneth Burke (1957), between building a house and drawing up a blueprint...” Carey, Communication as Culture, 50.

Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 201–207.

Carey and Kreiling, “Popular Culture”, 234.

Ibid., 235.
Ibid., 234–235. As Carey and Kreiling explain, this two-stage progression mirrors the wider pattern in the social sciences: “The several subfields of the social sciences in which symbols and meanings are of critical importance exhibit a similar history. In the study of ideology, religion, and mythology as well as popular culture, the same attempt is made to reduce symbolic forms to antecedent and causal variables. When this strategy falls, as it inevitably does, a switch in strategy is announced which reduces cultural phenomena to system-maintaining phenomena—that is, to a functional explanation. Behind the switch in research strategy there is a concurrent switch in imagery; from a power model of phenomena to an anxiety model, from an interest theory of action to a strain theory, and from a passive and arational notion of behavior to an active and utilitarian conception”. Ibid., 234. Geertz is not cited.


The essay, in reference to problems with journalism history, refers to a “longer work in progress”. Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History”, 3. According to John Nerone, who remembered talking with Carey about the essay years later, Carey told Nerone that he had sent off to *Journalism History* the first 11 pages of this longer project (stopping there, he said, because 11 pages was the single-stamp limit). Though the claim about the letter seems a stretch—Carey was not, after all, paying for his own postage—the larger point about his casual attitude toward the essay (especially given the enormous interest it has generated) is revealing. John Nerone, personal communication, July 23, 2013.


On Geertz’s influence on the new cultural history, see Ronald G. Walters, “Signs of the Times: Clifford Geertz and Historians”, *Social Research* 47, no. 3 (1980); and Peter Burke, “Geertz Among the Historians”, *Historically Speaking* 8, no. 4 (2007).

Carey, “What’s Wrong with Teaching and Research In Journalism History?” Though this 1973 draft’s opening paragraphs do not appear in the published version, most of the rest of the text (including a notable deletion, discussed below) is identical.
Ibid. Carey includes the full penultimate paragraph and, separated by an ellipsis, the last two sentences of the book’s final paragraph. Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 452–453.

Carey, “What’s Wrong with Teaching and Research In Journalism History?” 8. The text immediately before and after the Geertz treatment (the paragraph beginning “The cultural history of journalism would attempt...” and the last-paragraph sentences beginning with “Our major calling is to look at journalism as a text...”) appear verbatim in the published version, with the Geertz material excised. Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History”, 27.


Ibid., 174.

Ibid.

Ibid., 174–175.

Carey apparently attended the conference: “To the ears of an American auditor two remarks at the conference initially were confusing and then revealing”. Ibid., 175. The November 1973 gathering, the “Conference on Communication Studies”, was sponsored by the British Council for National Academic Awards. An adapted version of Raymond Williams’ keynote address (“The Hardening of an Infant’s Arteries”) was published as “Communications as Cultural Science”, *Journal of Communication* 24, no. 3 (1974). See John Corner, “‘Mass’ in Communication Research”, *Journal of Communication Research* 29, no. 1 (1979): 32n.


Ibid., 177.

Ibid.

Ibid., 177–178.

Ibid., 178.

Ibid., 177.

Ibid., 181.


The three-way division—between a behavioral, formalist, and cultural approach—also structures the Illinois doctoral proseminar from this period. The 1975 proseminar syllabus, for example, includes six weeks devoted to “Mass Communication Effects” and “Behaviorism”, three weeks on “Formal Approaches”, and a pair of concluding weeks on “Cultural Approaches”. “Communications 471 – Fall 1975”, unpublished syllabus, provided to the author by Norman Sims.


Ibid., 194.

Carey, “Communication and Culture”, 181–182. A similar phrase appears in *Interpretation of Cultures*: “In the one, men pursue power; in the other, they flee anxiety”. 201.

Ibid., 183.


“Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after [,] construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical”. Quoted in Ibid., 184. Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 5.


Carey, “Communication and Culture”, 187–188.

Ibid., 184–185.


Ibid., 187–189. Carey quoted Geertz’s statement that the task of cultural analysis is “to make available to us answers that others guarding other sheep in other valleys have given and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said”. Ibid., 189.

Ibid., 191.

Ibid.


On the Marxist references, compare “Communication as Culture”, 176, 177, with “Mass Communication Research”, 411, 412. References to, and passages about, Geertz are eliminated in “Mass Communication Research”, 410, 415, 422, 423, 424. For example, a line in the final paragraph of the 1975 essay (“The remarkable work of Clifford Geertz—remarkable substantively and methodologically, though the latter has not been explored in this review—and of many others, particularly Europeans working in phenomenology, hermeneutics, and literary criticism, has served to clarify the objectives of a cultural science of communications and has defined the dimensions of an interpretive science of society”, 191) was cut in the 1977 version. 424.


Ibid., 22n. In the footnote Carey’s reference is to the standalone version of Geertz’s “Religion as a Cultural System” essay.


Ibid., 2.


Ibid., 3.

Ibid.

Ibid., 3–4.
“This new technology enters American discussions not as a mundane fact but as divinely inspired for the purposes of spreading the Christian message [sic] further and faster, eclipsing time and transcending space, saving the heathen, bringing closer and making more probable the day of salvation”. Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 7.

Dewey: “There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common ... are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding—likemindedness as sociologists say. Such things cannot be passed physically from one to another like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces.... Consensus demands communication”. *Democracy as Education*, 5–6. Quoted in Carey, “A Cultural Approach”, 9. Carey may have derived this analysis of Dewey and communication from a 1921 essay by Robert E. Park, the University of Chicago sociologist. Park advanced a similar reading of the same passages of *Democracy as Education*. Park, “Sociology and the Social Sciences: The Social Organism and the Collective Mind”, *American Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 1 (1921): 14–15.


A striking illustration of this novelty is that Dewey, Park, and Cooley are virtually absent from the Illinois proseminar’s allotted pair of weeks devoted to “Cultural Approaches” in this period. In both the 1974 and 1975 versions of the proseminar, neither Dewey, Park nor Cooley appear in the listed readings for the two weeks devoted to “Cultural Approaches to Communication”. The figures who dominate the readings, instead, are Susanne Langer, Hugh Duncan, Kenneth Burke, Raymond Williams, and Geertz himself. (Herbert Blumer, the second-generation Chicago figure and codifier of symbolic interactionism, also appears in the syllabi for both years.) “Communications 471: Fall, 1974”, unpublished syllabus, provided to the author by Norman Sims. Note that Albert Kreiling taught the two “Cultural Approaches” weeks in 1974, when Carey was on fellowship leave, though as Norman Sims, then a graduate student, observed, “Kreiling’s readings and topics were probably the same as [Carey’s]”. Norman Sims, personal communication, August 1, 2013.

Ibid.

Ibid., 13.


Ibid. 16. On Geertz’s “of” and “for” distinction—including the Burke-derived house blueprint example that Carey also employed—see *Interpretation of Cultures*, 90–94.


Ibid., 19.


Nord, “James Carey and Journalism History”, 121.


The book’s working title was also rendered in the application as *Technology, Communications, and Culture*. Ibid., 1, 4.

Earlier in the application, Carey had referred to three books in particular: “This debate over culture and technology in relationship to the growth in communications has been summarized and extended by Raymond Williams in two remarkable works *Culture and Society 1750-1930* and *The Long Revolution* and by Richard Hoggart in *The Uses of Literacy*”. Ibid., 3. Interestingly, Carey never uses the phrase “cultural studies” in the application, and even renders the Birmingham Centre as the “Center of the Study of Contemporary Culture”. Ibid., 5.

In the application, Carey reprises his McLuhan/Innis contrast, glosses familiar work from American studies scholars, and even recaps the Patrick Geddes/Lewis Mumford genealogy—all staples of the technology essays that he co-authored with John J. Quirk. He presents four orienting questions (e.g., “What specifically, has been the effect of changes in communications technology on mind and culture and what intelligent guesses can we hazard on the probable impact of new communications technology on culture and social organization?”) that are a long way from the Geertzian papers he would publish over the next two years. Ibid., 3–4.


4. A PLEA FOR PUBLIC LIFE

In the balance of the 1970s Carey turned to John Dewey and the Chicago School of sociology to articulate a sweeping indictment of journalism and communication research. Both fields, he came to argue, were complicit in the decline of public life. Dewey and the Chicago School furnished Carey with a native-born, reformist alternative to what he viewed as the corrosive professionalism of journalism and social science. The eclipse of the public, by the early 1980s, had become Carey’s animating theme.

Of course Dewey and the Chicago sociologists had already appeared in Carey’s previous writings, notably 1975’s “A Cultural Approach”. Still, Carey’s embrace of American pragmatism, especially by the early 1980s, had become much more explicit and all-encompassing. Even the picture of Dewey that he painted in this period was new. The philosopher Richard Rorty was Carey’s main source.

As I described in the last chapter, Carey had argued for an interpretivist alternative to the field’s prevailing scientism. Epistemology and the world-affirming character of culture were, in the mid-1970s, the main focus. In the balance of the decade, however, Carey devoted a number of articles to a different project: a critique of journalistic professionalism, with a renewed emphasis on
Innis and technology. This second project placed the decline of public life, rather than the failures of scientism, in the foreground. Though Carey invoked Dewey and the Chicago School in both projects, the two lines of work advanced on largely separate tracks.

In the early 1980s, under the influence of Rorty, Carey re-narrated the field’s history in epic, binary terms as a pitched battle between Dewey, pragmatism, and the Chicago School—Carey’s side—set against the “effects” tradition, Walter Lippmann, expert knowledge, and correspondence theories of truth. In the process, he succeeded in establishing the Dewey-Lippmann debate as an historical trope and morality set piece with purchase well beyond communication research—even though no real debate ever took place.

If Carey spoke through Parsons in the early 1960s, Innis at the end of the decade, and Geertz some years later, his ventriloquism in this later phase is harder to place. Dewey, up until 1982, shared top billing with—indeed was assimilated into—the Chicago School. Under Rorty’s influence, Dewey reclaimed his central role.

The Eclipse of the Public

Carey’s official title at Illinois had always included “Journalism”. Even after he was named director of the Institute for Communications Research in 1969, he remained—in line with the Institute’s cross-appointment norm—a professor of journalism. Despite the title, most of his writing up through the mid-1970s was centered on technology or culture. With notable exceptions, journalism was not on his research agenda.

This changed in 1976, when Carey accepted the George H. Gallup Chair at the University of Iowa’s journalism school. The same year Carey was elected president of the Association for Education in Journalism (AEJ). With the pair of high-profile journalism-centric roles, he diverted much of his intellectual attention to the press. His focus was the American journalist’s self-appointed status as a professional.

Carey’s main claim was that, like other varieties of professionalism, the journalistic kind is elitist and anti-democratic. For Carey journalists’ self-segregation from their audience had a calamitous consequence: the public was thereby dissolved. By claiming to speak in the public’s name, reporters in effect colonized the nation’s space for debate and conversation. A more democratic press would instead catalyze public talk.
Versions of this argument appeared in Carey’s publications as early as 1969, though its full articulation would await his 1977 presidential address to the AEJ. In formulating his professionalism critique, Carey drew upon his work on the history and rhetoric of American technology. The account, as it evolved up through the presidential talk, mixed technological and cultural factors to explain the rise of news professionalism alongside the public’s collapse.

In capsule form, the argument was that new 19th-century technologies—the telegraph above all—gave rise to parallel forms of thinking about communication. The media themselves were, in Innis’ sense, profoundly biased toward space: telegraphic wire formed a lattice overlay of the continent, enveloping the landscape. For Carey the spatial bias sank deeper still: communication policy and even a transmission-oriented “structure of thought” among elites fortified a spread-out uniformity.

The key period was the post-Civil War era through the First World War, when rapid industrialization herded immigrants and rural migrants alike into polyglot cities. To this standard story of American modernization Carey was keen to stress the indispensable enabling role of new transportation modes—railroads and canals—and communication innovations like the telegraph and telephone. The new trans-continental grid was not, Carey insisted, geography-agnostic. Instead—and here Carey drew on Innis’ early “staples” work on Canadian economic history—the national communication system was laid out along patterned metropole-hinterland lines, with New York City in the hub position. Telephone lines tracked telegraphic wire, which followed canals and railroads, which in turn shadowed pre-industrial trade routes. To Carey this center-periphery “geographic bias” penetrated Americans’ habits of thought and life-style. The baleful result was a thin, standardized culture that emanated, along established arterial lines, from New York City. More recent communication technologies, including radio, television and up through the satellite and computer, had if anything intensified the homogenizing assault on regional, ethnic and religious diversity.

In most versions of the account, a narrative of public decline parallels the standardization storyline. In 18th and early 19th century America, Carey argued, limited-circulation partisan newspapers had encouraged an oral culture of public talk. Beginning with the penny press in the 1830s, technical improvements in printing lowered prices and increased circulation, spurring a shift from public, out-loud reading to private, in-home consumption. At the same time newspapers came to rely on advertising support, which compelled editors to appeal to a politically heterogeneous audience with language stripped of affect and
partisanship. Soon the Associated Press and other wire services, motivated by the economics of telegraphic concision and a diverse, spread-out clientele, were opting for a spare, neutral prose-style that Carey identified with a nascent commitment to news “objectivity”.

By the end of the 19th century, newspaper reporters had become, in effect, transmission technicians—relay agents who pass on thinned-out information to distant locales, often in the service of economic extraction or political control. Like many other elites, journalists began to assemble themselves into a professional caste. Newspapers, supported by new cadres of journalism educators, doubled down on exfoliated prose and objective reportage. Journalists claimed to speak for—to represent—a public that they had, however, long since helped to snuff out. Carey’s solution was to de-professionalize journalism in favor of an altogether different reportorial role, as committed instigators of public conversation.

In many ways this argument, which remained a staple of Carey’s writings for the rest of his life, was an obvious extension of his 1975 ritual/transmission contrast. But in these publications, up through and including his celebrated 1983 essay on the telegraph, Carey moved technology (in place of culture or communication thought-patterns) into the foreground. The work is more directly continuous with his Quirk collaborations of the early 1970s, as indexed by Innis’ return to prominence. Certainly these later technology essays affirmed the same over-arching, Innisian claim that modern technologies have intensified, rather than reversed, the spatialization of Western culture. Still, the newer writings focus more directly on technology, in place of the rhetoric of technology that dominated the Quirk writings. And while those essays had assailed sublime rhetoric, Carey by the late 1970s was eager to celebrate the conversational democracy he traced to early American history. There was, too, a new emphasis on journalism and public life, even though the decline of place-based oral cultures had been threaded into some of Carey’s previous writing.

Strands of this late 1970s technology/professionalism account were already appearing as early as 1969. That year Carey published an almost schizophrenic essay which, despite plain roots in his functionalist dissertation, first linked journalistic professionalism with the eclipse of the public. Much of the essay’s text was drawn word-for-word from his doctoral thesis, with the same basic argument structure. In the dissertation, Carey had outlined two parallel communication trends in modern societies: the growth of nation-spanning media alongside “minority” media focused on lateral population segments like women or
Catholics. In the thesis his argument was that a new social role, that of the “professional communicator”, mediated between these two communication tendencies, thereby maintaining solidarity in the face of modern differentiation.\(^5\)

In 1969 he outlined the same trends with the same functionalist language,\(^6\) but then pivoted to call out the failures of the professional communicator. His illustrative example, delivered in much more vivid prose, was American journalism—which had not been treated in the dissertation. The early American journalist, Carey wrote, was an “independent interpreter of events” offering “advocacy and criticism”. Traditional journalism, moreover, had been conceived as a “literary genre”.\(^7\) In the second half of the 19th century—in part owing to the non-partisan example of the wire services—the journalist went through a “conversion downwards”.\(^8\)

No longer a “critic, interpreter and contemporary historian”, the reporter’s role was “de-intellectualized and technicalized”.\(^9\) Enthralled by the “fetish” of objectivity, the Gilded Age journalist had become a “professional communicator”—a term with new, negative connotations. The journalist was, in effect, a “relatively passive link in a communication chain that records the passing scene for audiences”.\(^10\) The rise of journalism coursework in the 1890s university institutionalized these conventions of objective reporting as part of an “ideology of professional responsibility”.\(^11\) An aversion to “emotionally charged symbols of national community” was thus stitched into reporters’ professional self-image.\(^12\)

In contrast to Carey’s later work, technology played only a minor role in the decline, which is tied here more directly to industrialization, the modern division of labor, and an “an essentially utilitarian–capitalist–scientific” worldview.\(^13\) But the result is the same: the public has ceased to exist. In a memorable line that would reappear in other essays, Carey pointed to a “silent conspiracy” between “government, the reporter, and the audience to keep the house locked up tight even though all the windows have blown out”.\(^14\)

Carey reprised the declinist theme in a 1974 essay notable for its strenuous call for sustained critical scrutiny of the press.\(^15\) Carey’s conception of “democratic criticism”, credited to Dewey, is cast in the image of science. Such criticism requires:

- some clear description of how we observe what we observe, a language relatively neutral in terms of effect or emotional coloring, a forum of response to observation and language, a desire to take account of contrary findings, a willingness to discard untenable hypotheses, to correct errors and to revise postulates—these are the manners of science, indeed ideally conceived of democratic life generally.\(^16\)
Though faithful to Dewey’s scientific vision of democracy, this 1974 plea for unemotional press criticism strikes a dissonant note within Carey’s published corpus. He had, after all, been decrying the antidemocratic implications of science in American culture since the late 1960s, and never so vigorously as in the years ahead. However aberrant—he never again raised the plea for criticism—and otherwise contradictory, the essay echoes the 1969 dismissal of journalistic professionalism. Wearing the “cloak of professional authority”, American journalists are “increasingly remote and unresponsive to the public they presumed to represent”. That public has become “remarkably dissolved, is in eclipse”.  

Carey’s argument about public life, if not yet the full critique of news professionalism, was joined to technological developments in a 1975 essay on Innis, published at the height of Carey’s Geertzian period. Admitting that he was taking some liberties with Innis’ thought, Carey endorsed the view that communication technologies affect not just institutions but also, “and perhaps most importantly”, the “structures of thought”. In “propositional form”, Carey wrote, “structures of consciousness parallel structures of communications”. In cultures with a strong oral tradition—and here Carey included the early history of the American republic—knowledge is a resource held in common:

The strength of the oral tradition, in Innis’ view, derived from the fact that it could not be easily monopolized. Speech is a natural capacity, and when knowledge grows out of the resources of speech and dialogue, it is not so much possessed as active in community life, a view Innis shared with John Dewey.  

But 19th century communication technologies have effaced that oral tradition, Carey insisted. The telegraph and cognate media flattened language, empowered distant administrative control, and undercut place-bound community. The locus of knowledge moved from the “everyday context of banquet table and public square, and courtyard” to “special institutions and classes”. The great majority are, as a result, “precluded from vigorous and vital discussion”—the oxygen of healthy public life.  

Without singling out journalists, Carey—still channeling Innis—insisted that media professionals “appropriate the right to provide official versions of human thought, to pronounce on the meanings present in the heads and lives of anonymous peoples”. The civic landscape, as a result, is divided between “knowledgable elites” and “ignorant masses”. The media, in short, monopolize civic knowledge.
A Plea for De-professionalization

It is unlikely that more than a handful of the audience members gathered for Carey’s 1977 AEJ presidential address in Madison, Wisconsin had encountered any early version of the broadside against news professionalism that he was set to deliver. Knowing this, Carey warned the assembled journalism scholars and educators that he would state views about reporting practice and education that “many of you may find distasteful.”

Carey expected a skeptical, even hostile audience. The AEJ, after all, was split along the very same academic and professional fault line that he would address in his talk. Wilbur Schramm and his allies had, back in the mid-1950s, launched their guerrilla campaign for social scientific communication studies from within the AEJ. Their beachhead, the Division on Communication Theory and Methodology, had by the mid-1960s grown to represent nearly 40 percent of the association’s membership, setting off a debate between so-called “green-eyes” and “chisquares” that was still roiling the group when Carey delivered his talk. Carey had recently assumed the George H. Gallup Chair at Iowa, the site where Schramm had proposed the first doctoral program in communication in 1943. Even the act of giving an AEJ presidential address was freighted with academic symbolism: No president had delivered remarks since 1972, leading Carey to admit that it is “therefore with some temerity that I reestablish this interrupted tradition.”

Carey borrowed the title of his talk, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, from a commencement address that Innis delivered at the University of New Brunswick in 1944. Innis had warned against the corruption of scholarship by business and, especially, the wartime state. Carey framed his own address as a restatement of the Canadian’s warning: “Innis made a plea to his colleagues”, said Carey. “Protect the university tradition, defend it against interests and specialisms that would overwhelm it, maintain the general intellectual and moral point of view, preserve a sense of history and the future. I want to make that same plea”. He claimed that his talk was merely an extension of Innis’ 1944 remarks: “[M]y title and argument are not particularly original . . . I lifted them, as I have lifted much else, from the scholar in this field who has had the most singular influence upon me”.

In fact the remarks did not track Innis’ 1944 address, nor were they centered on the defense of scholarship from the incursions of practice. Instead, in a witty and allusion-filled speech, he extended his earlier critique of professionalism as fundamentally anti-democratic. In this version, informed by the historian Burton Bledstein’s recent account, the rise of the professions represents nothing so much
as the class privilege of status-anxious, middle-class strivers. Professionals’ ethical codes and their claims to autonomy and meritocratic principle are really in the service of an individualist and amoral system of control. Drawing on Christopher Lasch’s *Haven in a Heartless World*, Carey asserted that professionals of all kinds have deployed expert knowledge to exert control over workers’ private lives.

Journalism, Carey told the AEJ members, was no different. “The history of journalism education”, he continued, “is part of the story of the creation of a new social class invested with enormous power and authority”. Joseph Pulitzer’s long, successful struggle to establish a journalism school at Columbia University was an attempt, Carey wrote, to “professionalize journalism and upgrade the status of journalists”. Reporters had been “an unlikely assortment of upwardly mobile uneducated ethnics, prodigal sons of wealthy parents, failed novelists, itinerant teachers and marginal men”. Before Pulitzer and Columbia, reporters were “like factory workers”; to Carey, the spread of journalism education is the story of how journalists joined the middle class. The conditions were slightly different in the Midwest, where journalism education took deepest root. But the result was the same: self-segregated elitism, secrecy, and a paternalistic attitude toward the broader public.

As he had in his 1975 Innis article, Carey linked spatial technologies like the telegraph with the news professional’s emerging claims to exclusive knowledge. In fact he included three slightly revised paragraphs from the 1975 paper in the AEJ address. The “great danger” of modern journalism, he added, was the belief, usually implicit, that “the audience is there to be informed, to be educated, to be filled with the vital information and knowledge whose nature, production and control rests with a professional class”.

The oral tradition upon which public discourse depends was destroyed, in large part, by professional journalism, itself enabled by media technologies that segregate the speaking few from the listening many. “The professional imagination”, Carey said, “stills the voice of the moral community, the primary community of citizenship”. Civil society depends on a “widespread, decentralized body of human impulses, skills and knowledge”, which the professional “expropriates” for himself. The “simple fact”, Carey concluded, “is that the public has disappeared. There is no public out there”.

As a partial corrective Carey called for the “deprofessionalism of journalistic life”, on the theory that reporters might “encourage the conditions of public discourse”. The address, like so much of Carey’s scholarship over the decades to come, was really a plea for the revival of public life. The “greatest single task” of
scholarship, he concluded, is to “conceptually restore the idea of the public and public life”.

In a handful of papers published over the next few years, Carey restated the public decline argument, typically against the backdrop of the technological story he had first outlined in the 1975 Innis essay. Most of these works were delivered as speeches or symposium presentations, though the single exception—Carey’s 1983 article on the telegraph—is by far the best remembered.

In these works Carey distinguished the talk-oriented news culture of the late 18th and early 19th century from the private, interiorized consumption that soon characterized American media. The “American system of communications”, in the earlier period, was organized around “established habits of speech and discourse”. Daily life was speech-oriented, of course, but Americans were well-practiced in the art of public talk: “habits, talents and opportunities for speaking in public and for speaking to strangers were widespread.”

Even newspapers, in this early period, were read aloud, in part because of limited circulation but also because habits of private reading had not yet formed. And newspapers’ content was itself “primarily talk”, inclusive of speeches, sermons, and debate. “The early American newspaper”, Carey concluded, “amplified and extended speech: public opinion or, better, the opinions then being expressed in public”. Public spaces where strangers gathered to discuss the news played a “critical role” in the “ground conditions” of what Carey was calling the “American system of communications”.

Due to technological improvements beginning in the 1830s, newspapers became cheaper and therefore more accessible. One consequence was the “displacement of public reading” into the private space of the home. What had been an oral experience, grounded in habits of talk, to some large degree was interiorized and privatized. The public, in Carey’s terms, was transformed into an audience. Over time, as he claimed in another 1980 speech, “[m]odern forms of communication” act as “vehicles by which private styles are imposed on public space”. The private identity cultivated by advanced media forms “destroys the very possibility of the ground condition of American politics: the creation and amplification of public discourse”.

In telling the story of those advanced media technologies, Carey repeatedly invoked the theme of geographic bias that he had briefly glossed in the 1975 Innis paper. In that essay, Carey had devoted a few pages to Innis’ early work on the economic history of Canadian staples like fur and timber. Innis had identified persistent geographic pathways by which fur and wood pulp traveled from the
colonial periphery to the European capitals and, in due time, to New York. Railroads, canals and telegraphic wire were laid out along the same pathways; the result was that staples like pulp were literally returned to Canadians as newspapers. Innis, Carey wrote, had identified the “relationship between the routes of trade and routes of culture”. Carey’s application of this geographic insight to the internal development of the United States first appeared in 1978, as credited to the geographer Allan Pred’s reading of Innis. American communication, Carey wrote, “always had a strong geographic bias”. After American independence, New York replaced London as the “center of American communications, a position it has never relinquished”. The Erie Canal and major railroad routes drew the “hinterland cities” within New York’s “information field”. Carey conceded that the telegraph, magazines and broadcast media have altered the original trade routes. “But the centrality of New York in the flow of communication and culture, the importance of the New York-to-Washington corridor, and the metropole-hinterland connections that flow East and West are still there to be observed in hundreds of important ways”. To the extent that the culture was nationalized—lancing regional and local pockets in the process—its trans-continental character was in fact the world seen from a “couple of distinctively local, even provincial places”. Carey repeated the point about the lopsided geography of media in a number of papers, including his 1983 telegraph essay. He also applied the argument’s logic to the specific conditions of Irish TV broadcasting in an article unusual for its empirical detail.

Carey attached great significance to the establishment, in the early 1880s, of standardized time, a consequence of the spread of railroad track and telegraphic wire. With space effectively conquered by the cross-cutting transport and communication grid, time—in Carey’s highly original argument—became the final frontier. In the same decade that time was standardized, Carey observed, the Sabbath itself was “progressively invaded” by the Sunday newspaper.

Carey, who for many years refused to wear a watch, deepened the argument in the conclusion to his 1981 essay on Innis. Once the “spatial frontier” was filled, time became the “new frontier”. As an example, Carey noted that stock market arbitrage had shifted from space—price gaps from one city to the next—to time: the exploitation of fleeting information asymmetries. The end of space, he concluded, led to the invasion of time by commerce and politics. He made the same point, alongside a lengthy meditation on the establishment of standard time, in the haunting conclusion to his 1983 telegraph essay (in which the telegraph is deemed the “crucial instrument” of the changeover).
Time was, in effect, one especially important reflection of a broader uniformity brought about by new technologies, themselves propelled along by capitalist dynamism. But it was, to Carey, an unusually thin and under-nourished homogenization, exemplified by the flattened, sterilized speech, reporting and writing styles that he famously attributed to the telegraph in 1983. As he had back in 1969, Carey tracked the population’s simultaneous break-up into lateral audience segments, though ten years later he explicitly exempted those “historic groups which antedated industrialization—regional groups—or were formed during its early migratory phases—ethnic and linguistic groups”. Both tendencies—the aggregative and the segregative—could be traced to “late 19th century technology”.

As in the AEJ speech, Carey tied these various developments to the rise of journalistic neutrality and professionalism. Objectivity, as he had already suggested back in 1969, was a by-product of telegraphy. The telegraph and wire services, as Carey phrased the argument in 1983, “snapped the tradition of partisan journalism”. The wires, that is, demanded a language of “strict denotation”: “If the same story were to be understood in the same way from Maine to California”, he wrote, language had to be “flattened out and standardized”. Gone were journalistic styles like “the tall story, the hoax, much humor, irony and satire”, all of which depended on a “more traditional use of the symbolic” that the economics of telegraphy and the wire news business could not accommodate.

In parallel, the technology-driven constitution of a private audience created the core rationale for a “new professional guild: the journalist as reporter”. As journalists came to see themselves as high-status professionals, they reproduced the uniformity of thought that the communication technologies enabled in principle. Newspapers across the continent, regardless of ownership, produce content remarkably similar in “tone, coverage, ideology and conclusions”, because the papers’ writers are “linked into a national fraternity that shares, unevenly of course, a common point of view toward the world”. Journalists’ loyalties, in short, were transferred from their communities to their craft.

The whole bundle of changes, as Carey underlined in nearly every technology-oriented piece from this period, was disastrous for public life. The “public sphere”, the “realm of discourse among strangers”, was left asphyxiated. Today, Carey wrote in 1977, there is little left of democratic life but “footnotes to Greek thought” and “memories of early American experience”. The newest technologies—the computer, the satellite, and cable
television—merely amplified the public-undercutting effects of older spatial technologies.

A Cultural Approach, Continued

At the same time that Carey was publishing on the intersection of technology, journalism, and public life, he continued to promote the interpretivist alternative to mainstream communication research that he had announced in the mid-1970s. In this follow-up work, Carey’s concern remained the sense-making webs of significance spun by humans. As before, he was also determined to draw out the epistemological implications of his Geertzian view that the scholar, like everyone else, lives in a culture-bound world.

Carey’s ongoing culturalist work was largely segregated from, and in some tension with, his technology-oriented writing of these same years. His emphasis, after all, was on the variety and relative autonomy of culture from political and economic conditioning. To the extent that he was keen to highlight the prevalence of a transmission-oriented view of communication, he presented that conception as an intellectual, cultural, and indeed religious inheritance. He positioned the scholar’s task, moreover, as a hermeneutic project of meaning-recovery.

In the technology essays, by contrast, his attention was trained on the hard stuff of commerce, politics and communication forms. In many instances, most memorably in the 1983 technology essay, he wrote in language that was unmistakably deterministic, including liberal use of the “effects” noun that he increasingly singled out for attack elsewhere. He rarely if ever treated communication technologies as sui generis, but nevertheless turned to politics and economics—and not culture—to explain their emergence. As shaped by money and power, moreover, technologies like the telegraph possessed formal properties—like spatial bias—that in turn helped to generate thought patterns.

The tension between the two Careys—the one culturalist, the other fixated on technology—should not be exaggerated. Carey referred to Geertz’s neglect of technology in his 1975 review essay, for example. He also called out positivism in his 1977 AEJ address as a significant fountainhead for turn-of-the-century professionalism, and was careful to anticipate the determinism charge in the telegraph essay. There is a plain affinity, moreover, between Carey’s lament for the transmission-oriented thinness of contemporary culture, on the one hand, and his lament for the eclipsed public, on the other.
Even so, the strain is real, as a number of sympathetic commentators have asserted. To state the issue flippantly, it is hard to be an interpretivist with an economist as your principal source. Where do the “pulverizing consequences of communications technology” leave off, and the “role of the prayer, the chant, and the ceremony” take over? It was as if, internal to Carey’s own thought, a revived Innis was locked in silent battle with Geertz.

In a number of essays and shorter commentaries published in this interregnum between the mid-1970s and his synthesizing 1982 statement, Carey restated the case for an interpretive science of communication. In a brilliant 1979 essay on the field’s institutional history, for example, Carey distinguished between two “essentially positivistic models of science”—behavioral and formal studies—and his own cultural studies, based “more or less on an interpretative model of science”. In a 1978 critique of Elihu Katz’s report for the British Broadcasting Corporation, Carey called for a model of communication research in which “the history and intentions of the observer are part of the history and meaning of the observed”. Humans, Carey wrote in a 1981 qualitative methods chapter co-authored with Illinois colleague (and former student) Clifford Christians, “are born into an intelligible, an interpreted world, and we struggle to use these interpretations creatively for making sense of our lives and the lives of those around us”. The task of social science, they continued, is to “study these interpretations, that is, to interpret these interpretations so that we may better understand the meanings that people use to guide their activities”. In all this work Carey placed special emphasis, in particular, on human agency in cultural world-making.

The villain, in these accounts, is not space-biased technology nor professional journalism. Instead, Carey called out the field’s scientistic mainstream—what he called, variously, the “positivistic tradition”, a “natural science of communication”, the “effects tradition”, or the “positivist program for social science”.

There is, in a subset of Carey’s published work from this period, a palpable friction between his dueling orientations, the one culturalist and the other technology-oriented. In a 1978 review of 12 books by prominent social theorists, for example, Carey simply divides his essay in half. The review’s first eight pages are given over to a synopsis of the authors’ collective critique of the post-World War II “behavioral sciences”. Beginning in the late 1960s, “Polite conversation started to fill up with references not only to Marxism and existentialism but to hermeneutics, phenomenology, structuralism, semiotics,
critical theory, symbolic interactionism, ethno-methodology, and there seemed to be no end to the variety of ways these positions could be combined”. The impact of these new voices, exemplified by the dozen books under review, might “in the long run be decisive”. 85 When these figures spoke, “even in translation, in foreign accents”, they have been “slowly assimilated into American thought”. 86 Carey positioned his review essay as an act of translation: “The reason for presenting this work here is that these concerns have largely been unnoticed by American studies of communication”. 87

Halfway through the review, in a rare awkward transition, Carey abruptly jumped tracks: “Which brings us to the mass media and the public sphere”. 88 With reference to books by Richard Sennett and Alvin Gouldner in particular, he drew out the shared concern for public life among figures like Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Robert Park. These thinkers recognized that the “entire idea and reality of the public and the public sphere went into eclipse”. The cause? The “pounding of [both] modern technology and the force of positivism”. 89 Neither Gouldner nor Sennett, however, emphasize strongly enough the “major impact of modern communications technology”, which has been to turn “communication from a public activity to a private one”. 90

The tension between culture and technology was also registered in Carey’s frequent but bifurcated appeals to John Dewey and the Chicago School of sociology. Carey would often invoke Dewey or Chicago sociologists like Robert Park in the context of the decline of public life. But Dewey, and especially the Chicago School, also surfaced in Carey’s late 1970s writings as champions of interpretive humanism. It would take the unwitting intervention of Richard Rorty to square the intellectual-historical circle. With Rorty’s help, Carey was able to downplay, if not silence, the foreign accents.

Dewey and the Chicago School, 1969-1981

In a brief but revealing sentence in his 1975 “A Cultural Approach”, Carey grouped the hero of the essay, John Dewey, with “colleagues and descendants” of what he called the “Chicago School”. After listing influences like Max Weber, Clifford Geertz, and Kenneth Burke, Carey reserved his highest praise for the School’s major figures. “Basically however, the most viable though still inadequate tradition of social thought on communication”, Carey wrote, comes from the Chicago School. In addition to Dewey, Carey lists George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, Robert Park and Erving Goffman. 91
Carey had tapped into an emerging campaign to recover the University of Chicago’s interwar department of sociology. As Andrew Abbott has documented in his masterful survey of the historiography, the idea of a distinctive “Chicago School” was a retroactive creation of the early 1950s by the then-embattled Chicago department. Talcott Parsons’ re-casting of sociology’s theoretical heritage in European terms, alongside the postwar vogue for general theory and quantitative methods, had left the Chicago department marginalized. Only then, in the early 1950s, did its members identify Chicago’s distinctive character, during a brief moment when the department really did embody the traits that it projected onto its interwar past: “Meadean, dogmatically qualitative, and perhaps even dogmatically ethnographic.” Their characterization smoothed over the considerable diversity, methodological and otherwise, that characterized the interwar Chicago department.

Interest grew in the Chicago School within the discipline through the 1950s and into the next decade. In the 1960s just four article were published on the Chicago School, but a surge of new interest emerged in the late sixties—in tandem with the gathering dissatisfaction with the “behavioral sciences”.

Over the course of the 1970s, especially its second half, the publishing pace picked up, with a growing number of biographies, historical accounts, and current-practitioner appeals to the School’s legacy. “[B]y 1980”, writes Abbott, “the time, the place, the people and the ideas were framed and sketched in”.

Since then, the published literature on the Chicago School has enlarged still further, into a cacophony of competing and sometimes clashing interpretations. The “Chicago School” claimed by symbolic interactionists, for example, hardly resembles the department invoked by urbanists or race scholars. Leftist critics have decried the School’s apologies for capitalism, while historians have sparred, for example, over Mead’s relative importance. The “many and diverse claims of Chicago descent” constitute, in Abbott’s terms, a “vast ‘manufacturing Chicago’ industry.” Sociologists have, in other words, spent decades claiming the School’s heritage for their own varied and diverse ends. The Chicago School, as Lyn Lofland has remarked, is a “kind of projective device; descriptions of it seem to reveal as much about those doing the describing as about the phenomenon itself”.

Carey joined the Chicago School revival at a markedly early point—no later than 1973, when the mimeographed draft of “A Cultural Approach” was already circulating. Carey’s formulation was notable, too, for its disciplinary scope and peculiar geographic reach. In this first reference, Carey included Dewey
and Charles Horton Cooley in the ranks of the Chicago School. Dewey, of course, was no sociologist, and his Chicago tenure ended in 1904. Cooley, though a sociologist, was never affiliated with Chicago, and his relevant writings appeared in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Chicago School is commonly assigned to the interwar years, though earlier figures in the department, like the founder Albion Small and especially W. I. Thomas—who left Chicago in 1918—are frequently named as significant forerunners. In most accounts, the core members were the sociologists prominent in the interwar department: Park, Ernest Burgess, and Ellsworth Faris, as well as former students-turned-faculty like Herbert Blumer, Louis Wirth, and Everett Hughes. Though Dewey, and pragmatism more broadly, are frequently invoked as important to the School’s intellectual background, the philosopher is almost never counted among the School’s actual ranks. With the notable exception of media researchers plainly influenced by Carey, claims for Cooley’s membership are rarer still. The Dewey-Cooley-Park trio that Carey soon settled on was unique, even within the swelling body of Chicago School historiography. Put differently, Park was the only figure common to Carey and all the other treatments.

It is difficult to identify the sources for Carey’s anomalous Chicago School definition. What is clear is that Carey developed his unconventional account in collaboration with an Illinois graduate student, Sheldon Lary Belman. Carey supervised Belman’s 1975 dissertation, “The Idea of Communication in the Social Thought of the Chicago School”. The precise nature of Carey’s mentorship is unclear, though Belman acknowledges his debts to his advisor in effusive terms. Belman’s dissertation is framed as a recovery of the communication thinking of what he names throughout the “Chicago School of Social Thought”. In his opening line, Belman used a generic, passive construction to introduce the label: “The Chicago School of Social Thought is a name that has been given to a particular group of men and to the ideas they gave professional, public expression to”. Carey, in the 1973 draft of “A Cultural Approach”, used the same moniker, though the “of Social Thought” was cut from the published version. Belman named Dewey, Mead, Cooley, W. I. Thomas, Park, Thorstein Veblen, Ernest Burgess and Louis Wirth as the “seminal figures” in the School. Their enduring value, Belman wrote, was that these figures “offer an alternative to the contemporary primacy of behaviorism and its rather restricted perspective on communication as persuasion”.
Belman, perhaps under Carey’s guidance, opted to focus the dissertation on four representative figures in two pairings: Dewey and Cooley ("the first generation of Chicago Scholars"), and Park and Burgess ("the second"). 110 The two main substantive chapters are devoted to close readings of the four figures’ communication-related writings from the 1890s to 1939. Belman conceded Cooley’s lack of Chicago ties, and got around Dewey’s philosophy background by including Chicago’s department of philosophy in his Chicago School formulation. 111 As Carey would also stress in the years to come, Belman highlighted the “Chicago” scholars’ claim that new media technologies would supplement and, to some extent, substitute for the face-to-face communication that had bonded pre-modern societies. 112

Carey’s intellectual stamp—the critique of “behaviorism” in communication research, for example—is unmistakeable in Belman’s dissertation. More to the point, Belman identified, using the same big-tent logic that Carey invoked in 1973, the key figures who would come to constitute Carey’s Chicago School: Dewey, Cooley, and Park (in addition to Burgess). 113 Belman’s positioning of these figures, moreover, as a neglected alternative to the discipline’s desiccated mainstream is identical to the framing Carey would repeatedly invoke. 114

The apparent novelty of the Carey-Belman formulation begs the question of its source. Of the two main secondary works that Belman referenced, Robert Faris’ 1967 Chicago Sociology 1920–1932 is by far the most detailed. 115 In Faris, both Cooley and Dewey are presented as influential precursors to Chicago sociology, but they are nowhere positioned as constitutive members. 116 The other secondary work is a possible, though by no means definite, source: the sociologist Hugh Duncan’s 1965 Culture and Democracy. 117 Though Duncan’s book was a detailed history of the Chicago School of architecture, he did place architects like Louis Sullivan in the context of what he labeled the “Chicago School of Thought”. 118 Among its key members were Dewey and Cooley (along with Mead and Veblen). 119 More significantly, Duncan brought Park and Burgess under his “Chicago School” umbrella in a telling passage:

But, as [Louis] Sullivan, Veblen, Mead, Cooley and later Dewey himself were careful to stress, the pragmatism of the Chicago school was based not only in science but also in art. Sullivan’s ‘functionalism,’ Veblen’s ‘instinct of workmanship,’ Dewey’s ‘instrumentalism,’ like Mead’s ‘consummatory phase of the act,’ Cooley’s ‘sympathetic understanding,’ and finally, the ‘social process’ as a ‘communicative interaction’ of Park and Burgess, had little to do with science as the study of nature (as science was really defined by [William] James). For the
Chicago school, conduct was not only a way of *thinking* about the physical world, as in science, but of *acting* in it, as in art.\textsuperscript{120}

The passage is significant on a number of levels. Leaving out Sullivan, Duncan names all but two (Louis Wirth and W.I. Thomas) of Belman’s initial eight “Chicago School” members.\textsuperscript{121} Park and Burgess, moreover, are brought together with Cooley and Dewey as members—by implication, in the last-sentence mention—of the “Chicago school”. The focus on communication, as allied with art, is perhaps most revealing, as Belman and Carey’s own Chicago School was framed in strikingly similar terms. In a footnote off the passage, Duncan described Park and Burgess’ 1921 *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* as an “influential work, done by members of the department which founded American sociology, [which] advocated the study of communication as necessary to the study of society”.\textsuperscript{122} Duncan’s book is frequently cited in Belman’s thesis, though mainly to set up the context of turn-of-the-century University of Chicago.\textsuperscript{123} The fact, moreover, that Carey acknowledged Duncan—arguably the field’s major scholar of communication, symbolism and social order—as a key influence is another piece of suggestive evidence.\textsuperscript{124} There is, finally, the small but potentially relevant point that Duncan, in the same book, twice used the “Chicago School of Social Thought” phrase—though only in the book’s index.\textsuperscript{125} Duncan’s was the first and only such reference that could be located, prior to Belman and Carey’s 1973 usages.\textsuperscript{126}

The most likely explanation remains that Carey himself, reading voraciously in the primary and secondary literatures, introduced the more capacious “of Social Thought” terminology, with the aim to billet Dewey and Cooley under a label that otherwise excluded them. At any rate, Carey was invoking the “Chicago School of Social Thought” formulation in his teaching from the period. According to 1975 class notes from a Carey graduate student at the time, Norman Sims, Carey positioned the “Chicago School of Social Thought” as the first American attempt to systematically study communications. Naming Cooley, Mead, and Dewey—“first” at the University of Michigan and “later” the University of Chicago—Carey argued that they viewed communication as “central to the study of social order”. In an argument he would repeatedly attribute to the Chicago School, Carey outlined their core insight as the claim that communication substituted for the common inheritance of tradition that maintained European cultures over time. “There was not a shared body of traditions”, Sims’ notes read. “[I]t had to be created. Communication brought these communities into existence”. Most of the Chicago figures, Carey told his students, were reared in small-town America before encountering the
bewildering dynamism of Chicago: “How could the small-town sense of community be realized in a national, urban future became [their] main theme”. This encapsulated intellectual history—that the Chicago School proposed communication as an American substitute for European tradition—would remain a staple of Carey’s Chicago School references for decades to come.

The same graduate student, Norman Sims, co-authored an essay with Carey on “The Telegraph and the News Report”, which they presented at the 1976 Association for Education in Journalism (AEJ) meeting. Carey later cited the paper as a precursor text in his celebrated 1983 telegraph article. The co-authored essay is fascinating, not so much for its anticipation of the 1983 telegraph arguments as for its framing of the Chicago School. Carey and Sims do issue the claim (made famous in 1983) that the telegraph produced, for the first time in human history, the separation of communication from transportation. But otherwise the telegraph, as a technology, remains in the paper’s background; the well-known 1983 argument that the telegraph led to a pared-down journalistic prose style, for example, nowhere appears. If anything, this Sims-Carey collaboration is a reprise of other journalism-centric Carey writings from the period, in which one 19th-century reporting ideal—literary and vernacular—is locked in a losing battle with another, this one scientific and professionalized. The paper’s distinctive claim is that the Chicago School, represented by Dewey and Park, attempted to reconcile the two models. In most earlier and contemporaneous Chicago invocations, and certainly those to come, Chicago, and Dewey in particular, are unambiguous stand-ins for the vanquished literary ideal. The Chicago emplotment here is a striking outlier from the role that Carey typically cast.

The paper, never published, was sparked by Carey’s passing mention in class of Franklin Ford, the eccentric journalist who—together with Dewey and Park at Michigan in the early 1890s—proposed a new national newspaper (Thought News) intended to knit Americans together in “organized intelligence”. Though the (failed) Thought News experiment has since received a great deal of scholarly attention, the Michigan episode had barely appeared in secondary accounts when Carey and Sims mounted their investigation. Sims took the lead in tracking down Ford’s proposals, and in stitching together a biographical profile from newspaper clippings and the rare mention in secondary literature. The essay itself is written in Carey’s unmistakeable style, with familiar allusions and argumentative tropes.
Carey would later use the Thought News initiative to make the case for his distinctive Chicago School formulation; after all, here was a location in time—Michigan in the late 1880s and early 1890s—where Cooley, Mead, Park, and Dewey really were assembled. But in this 1976 Sims AEJ paper, the newspaper experiment, and Ford in particular, are set up instead as explicit exemplars of “the scientific report”. Ford’s proposals for a new national newspaper—what would become the stillborn Thought News effort—are quoted at length to support the (convincing) claim that Ford’s vision was animated by faith in technology-enabled truth dissemination—a “journalistic epistemology”, in Carey and Sims’ words, “based on the sanctity of the fact”. In Ford’s ambitious scheme, a single national news operation, centered in New York, was to digest and distribute knowledge over the continent’s telegraph-and-railroad grid, serving (in Carey and Sims’ summary) as “an objective fact service detailing the state of the social organism”. University experts were to supply material for journalists’ “scientific” reports; in Ford’s feverish phrase, universities would become a “ganglion in the nervous system of the state”. Carey and Sims set off Ford’s professionalized model against the “literary” reporter, characterized by ties to a “local public rather than to national elites”. The “literary” model “envisioned the newspaper as a democratic organ”, filled with locally grounded opinion and personal observation. “The reporter as ‘vernacular man,’ tied to the culture, the language and the people of a particular region”, the authors wrote, “presents certain contrasts to the conception of the ‘diurnal man’ suggested by Franklin Ford and later developed by John Dewey”. The essay closes by positioning Dewey and Park, “scholars of the Chicago School of Social Thought”, as sympathetic to the Ford vision but also to its literary rival. Both men tried (and failed) to reconcile the two ideals in writings from the 1920s and 1930s, Carey and Sims recount. Citing Dewey’s own statements, the authors observe that Ford influenced Dewey despite the failure of the Thought News experiment. In a surprising passage—given how Carey positions Dewey’s book in subsequent writings—Carey and Sims characterize The Public and its Problems as an extension of Ford’s vision: “Nearly forty years after their initial encounter, Dewey restated Ford’s main thesis in The Public and its Problems (1927)”. But Dewey, unlike Ford, also appreciated the small-town community “more characteristic of the literary perspective”, and was “being pulled in two directions”. Likewise, Park tried to “reconcile this tension between the scientific and literary report” with his research on the human interest story. But he too “did not succeed” in integrating the “old community and the literary style”
with the “concept of news as science”. The divide, the authors conclude, remains a live concern in 1970s America, with “precision” reporting squaring off against the literary “new journalism” of the period.

The Sims collaboration is revealing for a pair of reasons. It is, first, another early example of Carey’s use of the “Chicago School of Social Thought” formulation, along with his idiosyncratic membership roster (though without Cooley in this instance). The unpublished paper also suggests that Dewey and the Chicago School remained, even in 1976, itinerants in Carey’s thought. The Dewey and Park of the Sims essay are besotted by both the literary and the scientific. They are divided men, notably committed to (if also torn about) the promise of scientific journalism and science itself. In the years ahead, and decisively in 1982, Dewey and the Chicago School would lose those commitments; they would, in Carey’s portrait, stand firmly for the literary and the humanistic. The Michigan Thought News episode, depicted here as extreme reportorial scientism, would be invoked instead to make a geographic case for the Cooley-Park-Dewey “Chicago School” rendering. Perhaps most striking of all, Carey would go on to paint Walter Lippmann’s vision for journalism in strokes reminiscent of Ford’s portrait here—with Dewey as set-piece rival.

The apparent division of labor on display in the Carey-Belman and Carey-Sims interactions—Carey as intellectual guide, with Belman and Sims supplying the actual detail—echoed to some degree Carey’s earlier collaboration with John Quirk. Indeed, other graduate students seemed to have played a part in filling out Carey’s Chicago School picture. Albert Kreiling, co-author of Carey’s significant, Geertz-influenced 1974 article “Popular Culture and Uses and Gratifications”, also completed his dissertation under Carey’s supervision. It is perhaps unsurprising that Kreiling’s 1973 thesis on Chicago’s black press—a sophisticated and meticulously documented work—casts news consumption in ritual terms. The dissertation includes a remarkable chapter, “The Analysis of Culture”, that supplies a sweeping overview of interpretive social science currents, complete with frequent reference to Clifford Geertz, Susanne Langer, Hugh Duncan and Ernst Cassirer. The chapter closely hews to the interpretive approach that Carey, in this period, was developing. At the same time Kreiling placed notable and repeated emphasis on Park and Dewey, in explicitly interpretivist terms. In an especially revealing two-page section, Kreiling draws on Dewey and Park as humanist analysts of “expressive or dramatic symbolism”. Kreiling continued to intermittently publish on the Chicago School, in one case with Sims.
Though it is impossible to reconstruct Carey’s relationship with his graduate students of the period, there is a patterned outcome: the students, in effect, furnished the detailed Chicago School readings, presumably with their supervisor’s encouragement. Carey, in turn, wove those readings into brief, scene-setting passages to suit his more expansive, footnoteless style. Carey was, in other words, a kind of popularizer who brought his students’ work into programmatic focus. In part owing to the Matthew effect—Carey’s higher profile begat more attention, which heightened his profile—but also because of his unsurpassed mastery of elegant emplotment, Carey became the Chicago School’s public face. He did not publish a chapter-length treatment of Park, Dewey and Cooley until the late date of 1996—and yet nearly all of the School’s field-specific references credit Carey.

As defined, the Chicago School appeared increasingly often in Carey’s publications in the late 1970s. His appeals typically stressed one of two major themes: in some instances Park, Cooley and Dewey were portrayed as humanist forebears—as allies-from-the-grave in the *methodenstreit*. At other points, often in the same essay, Carey positioned the School, and especially Dewey, as a champion of the abandoned talk-based democracy that Carey longed to revive. In either case, Carey downplayed the three figures’ diverse but incontestable commitments to science. Carey’s, like so many other versions of the “Chicago School”, was what Abbott has called a “current-purposes interpretation”. Park, Dewey and Cooley, in short, were drafted to serve as a usable past. As portrayed by Carey, they furnished a long-neglected, unquestionably American alternative to the field’s spent mainstream: “buried treasure”, in Kurt Danziger’s apt phrase.

Robert Park first appeared in two of Carey’s early critiques of journalistic professionalism. In both the 1969 and 1974 papers, a short passage from Park is granted the last word: “The function of news is to orient man and society in an actual world. In so far as it succeeds it tends to preserve the sanity of the individual and the permanence of society”. The passage plainly evokes Carey’s developing interest in the world-affirming character of news, though the point remained undeveloped until his 1974 “The Problem of Journalism History”, which does not cite Park. If anything, the second, 1974 article on news professionalism is notable for its off-key, science-drenched endorsement of Deweyan criticism. Dewey, Carey wrote, “insisted upon communication and public debate as the instrument of realizing society as a process of association, as a community”. This debate, or “criticism”, Carey continued, “must be based upon precise observation, clear procedure, unemotional language, subject to the cooperative correction of others, and occurring in the public forum where all affected by the institution can at least
observe and comment on the critical process”.

Plainly—and indeed faithfully—summarizing Dewey, Carey earlier in the essay analogized this “democratic criticism” to the procedures of science.

This Dewey—the advocate of science in society—would not appear again in Carey’s published writing, though Carey did, in “A Cultural Approach”, admit that Dewey “came to overvalue scientific information”. In that essay, as outlined in the last chapter, Dewey was portrayed as both an interpretivist and as a philosopher of democracy uniquely sensitive to the society-binding potential of communication.

In his article on Innis the same year, Carey had noted that Dewey shared the Canadian’s fondness for the oral tradition and face-to-face speech. Carey also argued that Innis “inherited” a concern for community, history and stability from the “Chicago community in which he studies, the community of John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Robert Park”. Innis, Carey was careful to qualify, did not share their faith that modern communications could support a “Great Community”.

Carey’s references to Dewey and the Chicago School—with the significant exception of a subplot involving Dewey and Walter Lippmann, which I address below—fell away until the late 1970s, when they returned in full force. One relevant development in the interim was a mushrooming of historical interest in the Chicago School from self-identified “symbolic interactionists”, who positioned themselves as humanist opponents of the sociological mainstream. The approach had been codified by Chicago sociologist Herbert Blumer, who traced his interactionist perspective to George Herbert Mead’s social psychology. Though Blumer had articulated versions of the perspective as early as 1939, he did not position “symbolic interactionism” as an explicit, named tradition within sociology until 1969. By the late 1970s a veritable cottage industry of historical works—Abbott terms it the “interactionist-pragmatist lineage”—had as their subject interactionism’s Chicago School roots.

Carey registered this upsurge in symbolic-interactionist interest in the Chicago School. The School, he wrote in a 1979 essay, contributed to “the development of what is known today as symbolic interactionism”. Education in mass communication, Carey added, “begins where research on mass communication began: the University of Chicago”. The School, which found itself in “tension with Marxism”, was a movement “we would describe as broadly humanistic”. Its members were proposing “something close to what we would now call a phenomenology of human experience: the study of the process whereby
humans transform themselves and the world about them by meaning-endowing acts”.  

Citing his own “A Cultural Approach”, Carey claimed that the School viewed communication in the “more benign envelope of communal creation: how the manifold acts of men brought into existence a shared world of value and meaning”. The School’s “basic and animating question”, Carey insisted—in a word-for-word reprise of what he had, in the 1975 Geertz review essay, attributed to the British—was, “What is the relationship between expressive culture and social order?” In the next sentence he rephrased the “central question” in terms of the “place of mass media in a democratic politics”. The Chicago School, as positioned here, spanned the full breadth of Carey’s intellectual worldview. The School, Carey conceded finally, has “not been the most powerful tradition of research”, nor its “principal object of training”. The field, he implied, would greatly profit from its revival.

In a 1980 commentary, Carey reinforced the point in dichotomous terms. “The early work on mass communication”, he wrote, “assumed two quite different intellectual and ideological postures, postures that are with us to this day”. One tradition emerged in the “Middle West late in the century”—Carey names Dewey, Mead, Cooley, Park and Thomas. Methodologically, he added, this scholarship was “critical and interpretive”, but also oriented toward a normative end: “the restoration of democracy, above all of small town democracy”. The tradition’s central question, Carey wrote, became “one of assessing the possibility that the new media, including the mass press, could restore or preserve democratic life”. At around the same time, Carey continued, the second approach emerged: “this one was more scientistic and positivistic”. Rather than view the media in terms of an “explicitly democratic ethos”, this tradition was preoccupied with media effects on human behavior. Without naming any scholar in particular, Carey insisted that the approach could be traced to the 1890s and after, and was initially focused on the “baleful influences” emanating from the institutions of the “immigrant class: pool halls, gambling parlors, taverns, street corners, the stage and movie theatres”. In place of these influences, the second tradition sought to substitute “places where middle class values and habits could be taught”. The aim of this “concern with communication effects”, Carey concluded, was to “open people up to alternative forms of social control, particularly to the new professional elites in commerce, politics and the helping professions”. This commentary piece is short and forgotten, but his extension—here for the first time
—of the effects tradition back to the late 19th century foreshadowed the grand historiographical claims he would make in 1982.

Carey invoked the Chicago School again in a 1981 qualitative methods chapter co-authored with his colleague Clifford Christians. “In American sociology”, they wrote, “the ‘Chicago School’ introduced qualitative research early in the century”. A sentence that could have been lifted from Geertz is instead cited to Cooley: “Observers, from this perspective, must pitch their tents among the natives, must enter the situation so deeply that they can recreate in imagination and experience the thoughts and sentiments of the observed”. Getting an insider’s view, the authors added, the social scientist must study the “human spirit as expressed through symbolic imagery. ‘The Chicago School’ taught us that social feelings (attitudes and sentiments) and life-styles are most fully expressed in actual situations, and must be recovered unobtrusively through participant observation, from personal documents, and by open-ended interviewing”. Here the Chicago scholars were presented as unqualified humanists in the *verstehen* vein.

In another 1981 essay, this one on Innis, Carey invoked the common Michigan roots of Dewey, Mead, Park and Cooley. Carey referenced Park’s undergraduate education at the University of Michigan, where he encountered Dewey—and apparently Cooley as well, who was a Michigan student and, soon, a faculty member. “American research and scholarship on communication began as a cumulative tradition”, Carey wrote, “in the late 1880s when five people came together in Ann Arbor, Michigan”. Carey referred to the journalist-cum-activist Franklin Ford as the final member of the “pentad”, though in this essay he does not reference the collaboration between Ford, Dewey, and Park on *Thought News*. The Michigan connection, including *Thought News*, had been featured in a 1979 dissertation chapter on the trio by a Wisconsin graduate student in history, Daniel Czitrom. The thesis, published in 1982 as *Media and the American Mind*, was a fast classic in media history. Its Park-Dewey-Cooley chapter, as Czitrom acknowledged in the book’s preface, is indebted to Carey and bears his narrative imprint.

In the 1981 Innis essay, Carey also rehearsed a trope that he would repeat in subsequent work, most extensively in his 1996 chapter on the School. “In the absence of an inherited tradition”, Carey wrote in summary of the School’s view, “the active process of communication would have to serve as the source of social order and cohesion”. The Chicago figures were arguing, according to Carey, for a kind of over-the-wire *Gemeinschaft*. They conceived of communication as more than the “imparting of information”. Instead—and Carey was here plainly invoking
his own ritual/transmission contrast—the School characterized communication as the “entire process whereby a culture is brought into existence, maintained in time, and sedimented into institutions”. 186

Another theme of the School, Carey wrote, was its “intense concern with the nature of public life”. 187 In the 1920s these concerns “crested” and “yielded a continuous stream of literature on communications”—a “central feature” of which was a “concern with the ‘vanishing public’ or the ‘eclipse of the public’”. 188 Despite their youthful optimism, “many” of the Chicago School, “as they were known”, came to recognize the mass media’s threat to public life. 189

From the mid-1970s through to the early 1980s, then, Carey identified in the Chicago School a dormant, neglected tradition of communication thought. His major project of these years was to make the case for revival. Though the School was, in Carey’s formulation, hard to distinguish from the European currents of thought he had earlier embraced, Chicago profited from a decisive advantage: it was unassailably American. Carey spent these years completing a transition he had initiated back in 1975, to render foreign currents of thought in language suited to the American experience. The result, over time and after additional renditions, was a storyline firmly lodged in the field’s consciousness. Though everyone may have their “own private Chicago”, as Howard Becker quipped, Carey’s Chicago remains ours. 190

Rorty, Dewey and Carey

Carey first referenced the philosopher Richard Rorty in a 1982 article, “The Mass Media and Critical Theory: An American View”. The encounter was a fateful one, largely because the essay came to have overriding importance. With the partial exception of the AEJ address and the pair of Innis articles, the work Carey produced between “A Cultural Approach” (1975) and the 1982 essay has been largely forgotten. 191 Not so for “The Mass Media and Critical Theory”. The article has escaped mnemonic oblivion thanks to its prominent placement as Communication as Culture’s third chapter.

Rorty exercised two main influences on Carey. The first was Rorty’s distinctive portrait of Dewey, which Carey used to revise his own depiction. Basically, Rorty relieved Dewey of his scientistic baggage. The other influence, related to the first, was Rorty’s pragmatist view of truth, which loosened Carey’s already relaxed attitude toward intellectual history.
Rorty, once an ambitious participant in philosophy’s analytic mainstream, had over the 1970s distanced himself from his colleagues, culminating in the high-profile 1979 book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Though his assault on philosophy’s preoccupation with epistemology drew on Wittgenstein and Heidegger as much as Dewey, Rorty in essays from the period increasingly (and self-consciously) identified with Dewey as a fellow American reformist. The Dewey that Rorty celebrated, however, was notoriously partial—asked to speak for Rorty’s own anti-foundational humanism. That Dewey—Rorty’s Dewey—was the explicit model for Carey’s own revised version.

The significance of Rorty was his portrait of Dewey as an anti-essentialist prophet of hope. Dewey was positioned as a home-grown opponent of correspondence theories of knowledge and a champion of small “d” democratic politics. Recast in these terms, Dewey could serve as the argumentative surrogate for the two projects that, in Carey’s late 1970s work, were fraught with tension: the decline of public life, on one hand, and the brief for interpretive humanism, on the other. Rorty, in effect, helped Carey achieve a merger. Rorty’s interpretation of Dewey and the pragmatist tradition offered to Carey, in other words, the rhetorical means to merge two otherwise disparate lines of work.

In the key 1982 essay, Carey integrated the field’s intellectual history with a declinist account of journalism and public life. His device was to set up one big binary: Dewey stood for democracy, ritual and humanism, while a new villain, Walter Lippmann, was cast as the defender of objectivity, professionalism and elitist politics. The 1982 essay gave birth, as Sue Curry Jansen has meticulously documented, to a powerful though inaccurate historical trope: the Dewey-Lippmann debate.

In a sense, Carey’s encounter with Rorty was less decisive than, say, his engagement with Geertz. Carey, after all, was quoting Dewey years before Rorty crossed into his intellectual life. And Carey had rejected the quest to mirror nature long before Rorty published his 1979 book. Carey’s commitment to his American identity and reformist politics—his aversion to the radical European left—was already in place when Rorty gave articulate voice to the same values. Carey certainly did not need Rorty to endorse a conversational model of scholarly life. In many ways, then, Carey already resembled Rorty when the philosopher caught his attention in the early 1980s.

The resemblance, however, is what made Rorty so influential to Carey in the first place. Rorty supplied a high-status language to say the things Carey was already struggling to say. Rorty gave him the license, in other words, to go all in with Dewey.
With Rorty’s help, he could blend his various intellectual commitments into a single American voice. Carey used Rorty, in short, to bring his pre-existing commitments into focus.

Neil Gross has convincingly argued that Rorty in effect selected Dewey over other relevant figures, like Wittgenstein and Heidegger, because Dewey resonated with his intellectual self-concept. Rorty’s biography—including his family’s roots in the reformist left—predisposed him to think of himself, in Gross’ terms, as a “leftist American patriot”. Having eschewed a conventional philosophical career, he located in Dewey and American pragmatism a tradition that matched his own self-image.

Like Rorty, Carey identified with the United States and its history, and also shared Rorty’s New Deal-style reformist politics. The two men’s broadly similar outlook were rooted, of course, in distinct life experiences. Carey’s Irish-Catholic working-class background did not resemble the middle-class intellectual milieu of Rorty’s prominent parents. Even so, Carey’s attraction to Dewey, already evident in the mid-1970s, is analogous to Rorty’s. The philosopher’s particular take on Dewey—with the accent placed on American social hope—plainly resonated with Carey’s own intellectual self-concept.

But there is more to the Rorty-Carey relationship than that. Rorty is often lumped in with interpretivists like Geertz and the philosopher Charles Taylor, but in fact he parted ways with the hermeneutics project that was, in the mid-1970s, Carey’s own. Rorty dismissed the attempt to reconstruct shared meaning as a species of representational truth-seeking. He also rejected the very distinction between the human and natural sciences that was an interpretivist mainstay. Instead he advanced the pragmatist view that truth is what works, or what it is good to believe. But unlike many classical pragmatists—Dewey included—Rorty did not tether truth to a critical community of inquirers on the model of science. His theory of knowledge, instead, was loose and noncommittal, cheerfully unsecured by intersubjective consensus. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he even rejected the entire philosophical enterprise—and conventional academic inquiry more generally—in favor of what he termed “public edification”.

In the early 1980s Carey adopted Rorty’s version of pragmatism and its attendant theory of truth. Among the important consequences was a shift away from the Geertzian project of meaning reconstruction. In its place Carey positioned his scholarly role in terms of public edification. He came to see his scholarship, in other words, as a contribution to the wider public conversation. Also in line with Rorty, he embraced ethnocentrism as not only unavoidable but
also—to some degree at least—salutary. In this period, for example, he began to use the “American” qualifier to designate his alternative to British cultural studies. More than anything, Carey’s Rortyan view of truth freed him to deploy historical figures and traditions as rhetorical set-pieces in the service of argument. Carey, already prone to narrate intellectual history in binary terms, was furnished with additional mnemonic leeway. One result was the Dewey-Lippmann debate.

The Ragged Ambulating Ridge

Though Dewey had received top billing in “A Cultural Approach”, he was in the late 1970s effectively assimilated into Carey’s broader Chicago School. As one-third of the School, he remained prominent and frequently invoked. Still, in these years Carey positioned the School as greater than the sum of its members. Walter Lippmann rarely surfaced in Carey’s late 1970s work, but when he did appear he was portrayed as engaged with Dewey in a common project. Lippmann, that is, was positioned as Dewey’s ally. Carey’s 1982 framing of a Dewey-Lippmann debate was, then, a reversal of this earlier—and accurate—depiction.

In two works from the late 1970s, Carey described Dewey and Lippmann as fretting over the same threats to public life. In his 1977 AEJ address, Carey pointed to the “melancholy exercise to re-read three great books of the 1920s, three books that laid the foundation for modern media studies”: Lippmann’s Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom Public (1925), and Dewey’s The Public and its Problems. In these books, Carey continued, the central intellectual problem was to “analyze the conditions under which public life could flourish”. The great fear expressed in all three was that the public had become “merely a fiction.” Both men were calling attention to the grave challenges facing democratic politics in an age of mass communication and modern complexity.

Carey struck the same note in his 1978 review essay. In the 1920s, he began, Lippmann and Dewey had “staked out the problem of the ‘vanishing public’ or the ‘phantom public’” as the overriding problem of mass communication. The two thinkers’ concerns had, Carey wrote, been shunted aside in favor of effects studies: “As American communication research drifted away from its originating concerns, as the public was reduced in fact and theory
to a statistical artifact, as the public sphere evaporated into private life, a second vacant space was created in which an alternative literature could flourish”. In Carey’s telling, Dewey and Lippmann were allies who had identified an overlapping set of threats to public life.

In 1982 Carey reversed course and recast Lippmann as an anti-democratic villain locked in battle with Dewey. The essay—an edited transcript of a conference talk—framed the conflict in epic terms, taking in the whole sweep of Western intellectual history.

Carey registered his new, Rortyan commitments in the essay’s opening paragraph:

The task of hermeneutics is to charm hermetically sealed-off thinkers out of their self-enclosed practices and to see the relations among scholars as strands of a conversation, a conversation without presuppositions that unites the speakers, but “where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation lasts” (Rorty, 1979, p. 318). In other words, on this view scholars are not in combat over some universal truth, but united in society: “persons whose paths through life have fallen together, united by civility rather than by a common goal, much less a common ground”.

Here the essay opens with Rorty’s anti-foundational model of scholarship, in which the quest for truth is replaced by conversation with no fixed destination. Carey proposed to apply the model to the “perpetually unsatisfying discussion” on mass media. Perhaps to inoculate himself from the charge of airy scholasticism, Carey proceeded to offer a one-paragraph synopsis of his telegraph article. “The point of repeating conclusions arrived at elsewhere”, he explained, “is that here I am attempting to elucidate a theoretical structure that will support and give generality to detailed historical-empirical investigation”. But the path to that structure, Carey concluded, “must proceed by way of a number of detours”.

The detour turned out to be a grand epistemological bisection of the whole of Western intellectual life, introduced with a vivid geographical metaphor: “The ragged ambulating ridge dividing the Enlightenment from the Counter-Enlightenment—Descartes from Vico, if we need names—has surfaced in contemporary media studies as an opposition between critical and administrative research”. Carey identified three “peaks” in the ridge, all epistemological claims: (1) that knowing is a bounded act (“The noncontingency of starting points”); (2) that universal methods for knowing exist (“Indubitability”); and (3) that a mind-independent reality is knowable (“Identity”). Taken together, the three peaks “described and secured the way to positive knowledge” and yielded an
“epistemologically centered philosophy”. Needless to say, this is not the stuff of a typical communication conference paper.

Though Rorty is not cited, he is almost certainly Carey’s source: the list closely tracks the Locke-Descartes-Kant representationalist adversary that Rorty sets up in his 1979 book’s introduction and first two parts. The “epistemologically centered philosophy” is another giveaway—a phrase coined by Rorty to label the broad philosophical worldview that he was attacking.

“The reaction from the Italian side of the Alps”, Carey continued, “settled all those divides that are with us to this day: Science versus the humanities, objective versus subjective, Rationalism versus Romanticism”. Carey proceeded to list three features of “Vico’s reaction”: (1) that the knowable world is human created; (2) that science has no privileged access to knowledge; and (3) that knowledge is specific to a particular time and place.

The first and third points, and the appeal to Vico itself, are plainly drawn from the philosopher Isaiah Berlin—though here again Carey supplied no citation. The source was almost certainly Berlin’s 1976 Vico and Herder. The book’s introduction presents, in list form, Vico’s “major advances in thought” in sweeping language that—as Berlin’s critics have complained—positions Vico as direct forerunner to 19th century Romanticism and indeed interpretive social science itself. One clue to the Berlin sourcing is that Carey, in a 1981 paper, invoked Vico in similar terms—and cited the philosopher.

Carey conceded that he had “painted a misleading and exceedingly two-dimensional portrait”, but wanted to sharpen a distinction, between “expressivism” and “objectivism”. The contrast, as Carey observed, was elaborated by the philosopher Charles Taylor in his 1975 book on Hegel. Objectivism, Carey explained, views the world as mind-independent and manipulable; expressivism, in Carey’s reading, refers to a view of reality as animated by human intentions—everything but “neutral, contingent, concatenated”.

It is this distinction between objectivism and expressivism, “not between administrative and critical research”, that “constitutes the fundamental divide among scholars”. Reality, or the relevant bits anyway, is human-made. “But if all that is true, it has a philosophical consequence”, Carey claimed in Rortyan terms. “There are no given starting points, no Archimedean points or indubitable concepts, or privileged methods”.

Carey closed the essay’s epistemological ridge walk with characteristic rhetorical flourish:
I want now to leave the savannah of continental philosophy for the rather more secure village of American studies. I shall not refer in what follows to these preliminary matters but, to steal Stuart Hall’s lovely phrase, “their absent presence will lay across the route like the sky-trail of a vanished aircraft” (Hall, 1977, p. 18).

The essay moves on, over the next seven pages, to Dewey and Lippmann. Carey first apologized for the arbitrariness of the selection, by quoting Rorty on the contingency of all starting points. Once “we have grasped” their conversation, “we can use” the exchange as an “entrance to other conversations—foreign, strange, and elliptical”.

Carey proceeded, in effect, to assign to Lippmann the representationalist composite that Rorty developed in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. In *Public Opinion*, Carey wrote, “Lippmann redefined the problem of the press from one of morals and politics to one of epistemology”. His basic assumption, Carey continued, was that “we can know the world if we can represent accurately what is outside our mind”:

The philosophical side of Lippmann is arguing for a general theory of representation that divides culture up into the areas that represent reality well (such as science), those that represent it less well (such as art), and those that do not represent it at all (such as journalism), despite their pretense of doing so (Rorty, 1979, p. 3). Lippmann’s view is that reality is picturable, and truth can be achieved by matching an independent, objective, picturable reality against a language that corresponds to it.

What Carey has done, in this passage, is transpose Rorty’s critique of philosophy onto Lippmann. Indeed, Carey’s language is nearly identical to Rorty’s: “Philosophy’s central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so)”.

Rorty, however, makes no mention of Lippmann—not here nor anywhere else in the book.

Next, Carey linked Lippmann’s putative epistemology to anti-democratic elitism. Lippmann, wrote Carey, “endorsed the notion that it was possible to have a science of society such that scientists might constitute a new priesthood: the possessors of truth as a result of having an agreed upon method for its determination”. Since truth can only be accessed by elites—scientists and experts—Lippmann, in Carey’s rendering, had abandoned democracy on principle. The press inevitably fails to represent the world accurately, and the public has “only
limited time”, a “compressed vocabulary”, and “certain human fears at facing facts”.\textsuperscript{227} Lippmann’s conclusion, according to Carey, was that the “formation of a correct public opinions” requires “independent cadres of social scientists working in quasi-public bureaucracies”. Only then would an accurate, statistically informed picture of the world be “transmitted to the waiting individuals who make up the public”.\textsuperscript{228} Lippmann, in short, views the public as “a second-order spectator: a spectator of the spectator”.\textsuperscript{229}

Carey fashioned this indictment of Lippmann without a single quotation or citation to the journalist’s work.\textsuperscript{230} He does include a lengthy quote from Dewey’s \textit{The Public and Its Problems}, though—because the book is “maddeningly difficult”—he reported that he has “mercifully shortened and improved [it] without impairing its meaning”.\textsuperscript{231}

Dewey, in Carey’s account, provides a kind of democratic antidote to Lippmann’s cynical elitism. As with Lippmann, Carey sketches Dewey in epistemological terms. He is positioned as an avowed enemy of the view that nature might be mirrored. He is, in other words, Rorty’s Dewey. In \textit{Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature}, Rorty had conceded that Dewey had “neither Wittgenstein’s dialectical acuity nor Heidegger’s historical learning”.\textsuperscript{232} But Dewey, unlike the others, wrote his “polemics against traditional mirror-imagery out of a vision of a new kind of society”. In his ideal society, Rorty wrote, culture is “no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement”. Rorty hoped that his book “will help pierce through that crust of philosophical convention which Dewey vainly hoped to shatter”.\textsuperscript{233}

Carey’s condensed Dewey quote stressed the importance of dialogue to public life, rendered in sensory language: “Vision is a spectator: hearing is a participator”. Carey read the passage as “attacking the doctrine of representation in both its political and epistemological forms”.\textsuperscript{234} The spectator is not merely striving to see the world correctly—the epistemological mistake—but is also a passive bystander—an inactive citizen. Carey continued his summary of Dewey:

\begin{quote}
As an instrument of action, language cannot service a representative function. Truth is, in William James’s happy phrase, what ‘it is better for us to believe’ and the test of the truth of propositions is their adequacy to our purposes (Rorty, 1979, p. 10).\textsuperscript{235}
\end{quote}

Dewey, again with Rorty as unmistakable backdrop, is portrayed as hostile to scientific claims to privileged knowledge. Science, Carey wrote of Dewey’s belief, “is merely part of the conversation of our culture.... Science is one, but only one,
strand of that conversation”. Reality, after all, is “what we will to believe in support of our shared purposes”, as constituted by human action. As a corollary, public opinion does not consist of correct representations, but instead is the product of “discussion, when it is made active in community life”.

Dewey’s “most acute conflict” with Lippmann, Carey wrote, is over this problem of representation, “in both its epistemological and political-journalistic sense”. Dewey “sees in Lippmann”, claimed Carey, “a manifestation of what he most argued against: the spectator theory of knowledge”.

“The Mass Media and Critical Theory”, which began life as a conference paper, was reprinted seven years later, with almost no revision, in Communication as Culture. Seemingly emboldened by Rorty’s insouciant stance toward truth, Carey made a giant historiographical leap. His portrait of Lippmann was caricatural, as his own late 1970s writings betray.

“Let me draw out just enough”, Carey wrote in 1982 and again, to a much larger audience, in 1989, “to focus Dewey’s conflict with Lippmann and to set the stage for the argument I wish to advance”. That instrumental attitude toward the field’s history had, in this instance, profound consequences. One reason the Dewey-Lippmann “debate” had such wide uptake in the field was Carey’s story-telling facility. The fact that much of the essay’s content was imported from the empyrean heights of philosophy was decisive too. The essay convinced communication scholars for the same reason that they were unable to police its claims: the low-status discipline was notably bereft of, and therefore impressed by, imported erudition. It is ironic that Carey’s raconteurial license, in this case if in few others, spread beyond the field’s borders—back to some of the high-prestige fields from which its constituent parts originated.

NOTES

1 Joseph Goedert, “Carey Assumes Gallup Chair at University of Iowa”, Journalism Educator 31, no. 3 (1976).
2 Ibid.
3 Published as Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, Journalism Quarterly 55 (1978).


Carey wrote, for example, “Following Parsons, I would suggest that social change involves a process of differentiation, the solution of integrative problems stemming from differentiation, and the creation of value patterns which legitimize new social arrangements and give coherence to the general orientations of the total society”. Carey, “The Communications Revolution”, 30.

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22 Ibid., 36.
23 Ibid., 40.
24 Ibid., 30–32. On language, for example, Carey wrote: “[T]he extension of language over space drains it of its capacity to serve as an instrument for emotive meaning and emotional closeness and therefore reduces the capacity of language to be time-binding. The cost of translating language into semaphore signals or telegraphic dots is to strip away from language the expressive capacity it possesses in close traditional contexts of face to face usage”. Ibid., 31–32.
25 Carey: “We keep waiting to be informed, to be educated, but lose the capacity to produce knowledge for ourselves in decentralized communities of understanding. All this apparatus generates continuous change and obsolescence: time is destroyed, the right to tradition is lost. The more complicated the tools of communication the easier for it to be anonymously owned and controlled and for knowledge to be centrally stored”. Ibid., 43.
26 Ibid., 42–43.
27 The address was published as Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”. Carey, in the published version, referred in a footnote to the address as a “truncated version of a much longer paper on the problem of professionalism”. Ibid., 846. No such longer version seems to have been published. On the previous obscurity of his arguments, consider that the 1969 and 1974 papers were published in a sociology and political science journal, respectively. The 1975 Innis chapter appeared in a typeset, limited-run book published by the fledgling communication program still housed in McGill University’s English department.
30 Rogers, A History of Communication Study; 1.
31 Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, 846. Carey himself, according to his later colleague John Nerone, was pleased to finally publish a full article in Journalism Quarterly, AEJ’s official flagship. “He said he’d been submitting things for years and years, as a grad student, asst prof, full prof, institute director and everything had been turned down, and snidely too”. John Nerone, personal communication, July 23, 2013.
33 Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, 847.
34 Ibid., 846.
35 Carey, in the address’ early lines: “Well, I have worried a good deal about all these matters and about our spinal erectness, and today I’m going to follow the advice of George Bernard Shaw: ‘If you can’t get the skeleton out of the closet, you might as well make it dance’”. In subsequent paragraphs he quotes Benjamin Disraeli, Harold Rosenberg, and an “old Irish adage”. Ibid., 847–848.

Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, 848.

Ibid., 848–849.


Ibid., 853.

Ibid., 853–854.

Carey, here and elsewhere, was plainly drawing on, without naming, the Germany social theorist Jürgen Habermas, whose concept of the “public sphere” was not yet widely known in the English-speaking scholarly world: “This is part of a wider task in which there is plenty of work for everyone: the re-creation of the res publica, a set of institutions that are not only participatory in a formal sense but critical and rational as forms of discourse. The highest reaches of rationality where fact and value merge into judgment is not a region certifiable by profession, or by degree or by experience; strictly speaking, it is not certifiable at all but merely testable in a rational process of discourse”. It is possible that Carey encountered the short 1974 translation of Habermas’ 1962 public sphere book, but more likely that he relied upon treatments by Alvin Gouldner and/or Richard Bernstein—whose books (among others) he reviewed around this time. Carey, “Social Theory and Communication Theory”, *Communication Research* 5, no. 3 (1978); Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)”, *New German Critique* 3 (1974).

Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, 854. Carey reprised the address every year from 1985 to 1995 at the Gannett Center for Media Studies. “No one ever tired of hearing it, even those of us who heard it at least 11 times”, the Center’s director, Everette Dennis, said. Quoted in Sharon Murphy, “Jim Carey: Man for All Seasons”, *Journalism Studies* 7, no. 6 (2006): 825.

Carey, “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph”, *Prospects* 8 (1983). Despite its later, 1983 publication date, the telegraph essay is included in this analysis for three overlapping reasons: (1) many of its themes, and some of its language, were articulated in this late 1970s, early 1980s period; (2) in the key hinge essay, Carey’s 1982 “The Mass Media and Critical Theory”, he refers to the technology essay in the past tense: “In a recent paper on the history of the telegraph...” Ibid., 19; and (3) because, as Carey acknowledged, he had “written about some of these matters elsewhere”—citing an unpublished 1976 essay he had co-authored with Norman Sims, then a graduate student. Carey, “Technology and Ideology”, 305. The essay, discussed below, is Carey and Sims, “The Telegraph and the News Report”, unpublished paper, University of Illinois, 1976.


Ibid., 102.
Ibid., 103. Though Habermas goes unmentioned, Carey’s stress on bracketing status differences seems to echo the German scholar’s depiction of the bourgeois public sphere: “The relationship between the newspaper and talk also depended on a group of social habits: the ability to express oneself in public, particularly around strangers, the ability to welcome strangers easily, a reticence to mark those status distinctions which inhibit public talk and discussion”. Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 104.

51 Carey, “Changing Communications Technology and the Nature of the Audience”, Journal of Advertising 9, no. 2 (1980): 43. The article was a reprint of a speech Carey delivered earlier that year to the American Academy of Advertising.


53 Ibid., 50.


55 Carey, “Concentration and Diversity”, 37.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 37–38.

58 Ibid., 38.


60 Carey, “The Politics of Popular Culture: A Case Study”, Journal of Communication Inquiry 4, no. 2 (1979). The paper, vividly written and tightly observed, was in part an argument with unnamed interlocutors on the left, like Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller, who were advancing the “cultural imperialism” thesis at the time. Carey did not deny the imperialism charge so much as point to the complicated specificities of the Irish case, among them geographic. The paper appears to have been based in large part on Carey’s semester at University College Dublin, in the spring semester 1975. He refers in the 1979 paper to “[r]eading this [newspaper] debate as an outsider” in the spring and summer of 1975. Ibid., 22.


62 Carey, “Culture, Geography and Communications”, 87–89.
63 Carey, “Technology and Ideology”, 319–323. The paper’s final paragraph: “E. P. Thompson finds it ominous that the young Henry Ford should have created a watch with two dials: one for local time, one for railroad time. ‘Attention to time in labour depends in large degree upon the need for the synchronization of labour.’ Modern conceptions of time have rooted into our consciousness so deeply that the scene of the worker receiving a watch at his retirement is grotesque and comic. He receives a watch when the need to tell time is ended. He receives a watch as a tribute to his learning the hardest lesson of the working man—to tell time. The watch coordinated the industrial factory; the grid of time co-ordinated, via the telegraph, the industrial nation”. Ibid., 323.

64 Carey, “Concentration and Diversity”, 32; Carey, “Culture, Geography and Communications”, 88.


67 Ibid., 105.


69 Carey “International Communications”, 104.

70 Carey, “Concentration and Diversity”, 35.


73 Carey explicitly invoked the “effect(s)” of the telegraph 15 times, and the essay is otherwise filled with causal claims. E.g.: “[T]he telegraph brought about changes in the nature of language, of ordinary knowledge, of the very structures of awareness”; or “In the balance of this paper I wish to concentrate on the effect of the telegraph on ordinary ideas: the coordinates of thought, the natural attitude, practical consciousness, or, less grandly, common sense”. Carey, “Technology and Ideology”, 303, 310.

74 Carey: “For the student of communications other matters press in: how do changes in forms of communications technology affect the constructions placed on experience? how does such technology change the forms of community in which experience is apprehended and expressed? what, under the force of history, technology, and society, is thought about, thought with, and to whom is it expressed?” Carey, “Communication and Culture”, Communication Research 2, no. 2 (1975): 190.

75 Carey: “[T]he authority of the professions was finally derived from their presumed capacity to speak with the voice of positive science: to ground both their methods of selection and their understanding of human problems in the special methods and insights of science”. Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, 852–853.

Carey, “Review of Mass Communication and Society, Open University Course, DE 353”, *Media, Culture & Society* 1, no. 3 (1979): 318; Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication”, *Communication* 2, no. 1 (1975): 6. In the former publication, Carey concluded his review of a British course with a telling call for more attention to technology—via an invocation of phenomenology: “What seems therefore most absent in the course is a treatment of communications technology in relationship to the evolution of human consciousness and culture. Despite disavowals, there is a tendency to treat culture as epiphenomenal and technology as given. This is not an argument for a phenomenology of the mass media but something of a phenomenological inflection will be necessary in order to grasp the profoundest consequences of the mass media: the ways in which these technologies constitute and re-constitute the basic data of experience, including, one might add, the experience of being educated through an open university”. Carey, “Review of Mass Communication”, 318.


Carey, “Graduate Education”, 288.


Christians and Carey, “The Logic of Qualitative”, 347.

E.g., Carey: “Qualitative studies start from the assumption that in studying humans we are examining a creative process whereby people produce and maintain forms of life and society and systems of meaning and value. This creative activity is grounded in the ability to build cultural forms from symbols that express this will to live and assert meaning. To study this creative process is our first obligation, and our methodology must not reduce and dehumanize it in the very act of studying it. Such creativity is unique to the human species, and to this distinctive aspect we must pay circumspect attention. In [Peter] Berger’s useful phrase, our research must not treat a person as a puppet on a string or a prisoner, rather than as a live actor on a stage who constantly improvises”. Ibid., 346.


Carey, “Social Theory and Communication Theory”. The review was Carey’s contribution to a special journal issue that he co-edited with the sociologist Paul Hirsch on “Communication and Culture: Humanistic Models in Research”, *Communication Research* 5, no. 3 (1978).
95 Ibid.; and especially the rich treatment in Lee Harvey, *Myths of the Chicago School of Sociology* (Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1987).
98 See Ibid., 11–33, for a superb overview of the almost impossibly complex historiographical terrain. It is ironic but unsurprising given the topography of relative field prestige that Abbott does not, however, touch on the Carey-influenced Chicago School stream in his otherwise comprehensive survey.
99 Ibid., 31.
102 Carey also named George Herbert Mead and Erving Goffman, in addition to Robert Park. Though both Mead and Goffman are controversial inclusions in the extant Chicago School historiography, they are nevertheless often listed as members.
103 Abbott, *Department & Discipline*, 5.
106 Ibid., 1.
Carey apparently dropped Burgess, who is often treated as Park’s junior partner in other Chicago School histories, noted mainly for his teaching and supervisory influence. The fact that Burgess could not be jointly tied to the University of Michigan—unlike Park, Cooley and Dewey—may have also played a role in Carey’s decision.

Belman, along with Clifford Christians, co-edited a special issue of *Qualitative Sociology* in 1982 on “American Communication Theory: The Qualitative Tradition” that is filled with references to the “Chicago School of Social Thought” in articles authored by current and former Carey graduate students. Lary Belman and Clifford Christians, eds., “American Communication Theory: The Qualitative Tradition” (special issue), *Qualitative Sociology* 5, no. 3 (1982).


Ibid., ch. 19 & 20. Duncan, in turn, borrowed the “Chicago School of Thought” moniker from a William James letter. Ibid., 223.

Ibid., 184, 218, 265–266n, 282n, 284, 300, 306.

Ibid., 589–590. In a subsequent passage, Duncan referred to the “spirit of Veblen, Dewey, Mead, Cooley and Park”. Ibid., 593

Wirth does appear in a footnote. His 1928 *The Ghetto*, Duncan wrote, “describes the urban drama of assimilation in Chicago”. Ibid., 185n.

Ibid., 594. Though without mentioning Park or Burgess, Duncan had, in an earlier footnote, anticipated some of Carey’s “cultural approach” language: “This dramatistic conception of sociology”, Duncan wrote, “was shared by Charles Horton Cooley, Lester Ward, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and in our time, Kenneth Burke. Basic to this view is the assumption that society arises in, and exists through, the communication of expressive symbols which men use in—that is, playing their roles—in society”. Ibid., 265–266n.

Carey, “A Cultural Approach”, 10; and Carey, in 1979: “But the default of the Chicago tradition occurred also as symbolic interactionism generally lost its geographic center at the university. Despite that fact, symbolic interactionism and subsequent movements, which it has spawned or to which it was otherwise related (such as ethnmethodology and phenomenological sociology), remain major alternatives within sociology and communication theory. Within the study of mass communication theory proper, Hugh Duncan was perhaps the last major figure”. Carey, “Graduate Education”, 290. Duncan’s 1960s work, itself heavily indebted to Kenneth Burke, anticipates many of the themes of Carey’s 1970s writings. See, for example, Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962); and Duncan, Symbols in Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). Duncan, however, does not appear often in Carey’s writing, and is a surprisingly neglected figure in the field’s memory. 

125 Duncan, Culture and Democracy, 596, 605.

126 Three other potential sources for Belman and Carey’s Dewey-Park-Cooley formulation should be mentioned. It is possible that Jay Jensen, Carey’s Illinois teacher—who Carey identified as the “wise man” said to have suggested that he read Dewey—discussed these figures as an “oral publication”. Jensen, who rarely published, served on both Belman and Kreiling’s dissertation committees. Belman, "The Idea of Communication in the Social Thought", ii; Kreiling, “The Making of Racial Identities”, ii. Another, especially remote, possibility is that Carey picked up the portrait from his name-doppelgänger, James T. Carey, an Illinois sociologist who in 1975 published a history of the Chicago School. James T. Carey, Sociology and Public Affairs: The Chicago School (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1975). James T. Carey, however, stressed the Chicago sociologists’ scientific self-image, and his three-page treatment of Dewey (and Mead) positions the two philosophers as the School’s “wider context”. Ibid., 163–165. Cooley is nowhere mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that James W. interacted much with James T., since he was based at Illinois’ Chicago campus. The third possibility is Jean Quandt’s sweeping 1970 intellectual history of nine Progressive-era American scholars and reformers, which includes Dewey, Cooley and Park (among six others figures), From the Small Town to the Great Community. Quandt argues that her subjects, all raised in small towns, were “loosely linked” by personal and intellectual ties, and notes that Chicago was the main site that their paths crossed. The other major link that Quandt cites in her framing introduction is the Michigan confluence of Dewey, Cooley, and Park (along with Franklin Ford). The book’s fourth (on Cooley) and fifth (on Park) chapters, though without invoking the language of the “Chicago School”, present Cooley and Park’s thinking on communication and technology as a conversation with each other and with Dewey. The argument ascribed to the three, moreover, is in keeping with the Belman/Carey portrayal: “In the social thought of the communitarians, the new means of communication were powerful instruments for solving the problems that obstructed the emergence of the Great Community”. Jean Quandt, From the Small Town to the Great Community (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 67. See also 3-4, 54-55, 65-66, 70-74. Tellingly, those are the two Quandt chapters that Carey assigned in his ICR proseminar from the period. “Communications 471: Fall, 1974”, unpublished syllabus, provided to the author by Norman Sims.
Norman Sims, “Approaches to Communications Research II”, unpublished course notes for “Pro-Sem” [proseminar], November 24, 1975, provided to the author by Sims. The argument closely tracks the main thrust of Quandt, *From the Small Town to the Great Community*, which, however, applied the claim to a larger roster of figures and without the “Chicago School” language. See note 126.


Carey, “Technology and Ideology”, 305. With this essay and a Quirk collaboration cited, Carey wrote, “I have written about some of these matters elsewhere”.


The other anomalous treatment, of Dewey at least, is Carey, “Journalism and Criticism: The Case of an Undeveloped Profession”, published two years earlier.

Norman Sims, personal communication, July 31, 2013.


The newspaper experiment did appear in Jean Quandt’s 1970 *From the Small Town to the Great Community*, 4, 31–34.

Sims, personal communication, July 31, 2013.


Ibid., 14

Ibid., 21.

Ibid., 4

Ibid., 4, 23.

Ibid., 29.

Ibid., 29–30.

Ibid., 32, 34.


Ibid. References to Geertz (71, 95), Langer (83, 89, 93), Duncan (89, 90, 94), and Cassirer (86).
E.g., Kreiling: “The hypothesis that cultural symbolism is a response to social-structural position can be quickly dismissed. Cultural symbolism arises in men’s attempts to define situations; it is a response to the social milieu as it enters men’s experience”. Ibid., 54. Kreiling, drawing on Weber, places significantly more stress on status conflict than does Carey’s cultural approach. Ibid., esp. 65–71.

Kreiling, citing two Dewey books: “Among symbolic theorists, the American pragmatists such as John Dewey show most forcefully how symbols grow out of and typify shared patterns of action and experience”. Ibid., 41. Park is cited in seven separate instances in this chapter alone, by far the most frequently cited figure. Ibid., 78, 79, 80, 87, 89, 99.

Ibid., 78–79.


John Nerone, his colleague in later years, agreed that Carey would suggest graduate student work, and then draw upon in his more expansive essay writing: “Carey would scout the territory, then one of his advisees would parachute in and do the fieldwork, and then Jim would integrate this work into his own. All[bert] Kreiling seems to have been almost as important as Quirk, and Jim used to cite his dissertation regularly in our conversations”. John Nerone, personal communication, July 23, 2013.


Carey, “Journalism and Criticism”, 235–236.
Carey: “the extension of the method of democratic criticism always requires the following: some clear description of how we observe what we observe, a language relatively neutral in terms of effect or emotional coloring, a forum of response to observation and language, a desire to take account of contrary findings, a willingness to discard untenable hypotheses, to correct errors and to revise postulates—these are the manners of science, indeed ideally conceived of democratic life generally”. Ibid., 230.


Carey, “Canadian Communication Theory”, 40.

Ibid., 51. Carey had floated the claim that Innis was exposed to his roster of Chicago School figures as early as 1972, in an essay on McLuhan: “When Harold Innis returned to Canada following his graduate work at the University of Chicago...[his] principal influence at Chicago were Veblen (who had left the university before Innis arrived but whose influence lingered on), Robert Park, G. H. Mead, and John Dewey”. Carey, The Politics of the Electronic Revolution: Further Notes on Marshall McLuhan (Urbana, IL: Institute of Communications Research, 1972), 23. (Dewey, not just Veblen, had moved on by the time Innis arrived.) By 1981, Carey had scaled back the Innis-Chicago claim: Innis studied at Chicago, he wrote, “when Park and Mead were on the faculty and the tradition was in full flower”. Park had “no direct influence on Innis” and, besides, “Innis was too singular a thinker to be described as a member of any school”. “My only claim”, Carey added, was that Innis “took the concerns of the Chicago School and, with the unvarnished eye of one peering across the Forty-ninth Parallel, corrected and completed these concerns, marvelously widened their range and precision and created a conception and historically grounded theory of communications that was purged of the inherited romanticism of the Chicago School and that led to a far more adequate view of the role of communications and communications technology in American life”. Carey, “Culture, Geography, and Communications”, 75-76. Carey devoted a much later (1999) essay on Innis’ Chicago connections, with a similarly ambiguous take. His argument, he wrote, is “not that Innis was a member or descendant of the Chicago School but that Park and John Dewey and their cohort and students provide the most illuminating and useful framework for an exegesis of Innis’ work, at least for those of us working in the United States”. Carey, “Innis ‘in’ Chicago: Hope as the Sire of Discovery”, in Harold Innis in the New Century: Reflections and Refractions, ed. Charles Acland and William Buxton (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 82.


Abbott, Department & Discipline, 17.

Ibid., 288. Carey, in addition to Dewey, lists Mead, Park, Thomas, Blumer—and, in an apparently errant inclusion—Franklin Giddings, the Columbia University champion of a quantitative science of sociology.

Ibid.

Ibid., 290

Ibid., 289. Continued Carey: “They recognized, however, that in modern times the mass media were crucial instruments through which the social world was typified and shared, producing new patterns of association through the expressive forms of journalism and popular art”. Ibid.


Carey, “Graduate Education”, 292.

Ibid., 290.


Ibid.

Ibid. Added Carey: “Not surprisingly, this tradition also examined the potential of the new media for destroying the basic conditions of democracy”. Ibid.


Ibid., 154. Carey apparently had in mind the early 1930s Payne Fund studies on children and the movies, as his only citation is to Garth Jowett’s *Film: The Democratic Art* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976). The Payne Fund studies are the only body of social scientific research that Jowett addresses in the book. Ironically, two of the Payne Fund books was authored or co-authored by Herbert Blumer, *Movies and Conduct* (New York: Macmillan, 1933); and, with Philip M. Hauser, *Movies, Delinquency, and Crime* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

Christians and Carey, “The Logic of Qualitative Research”, 343–344. Perhaps owing to editorial requirements or else first-author Christians’ insistence, this chapter is unusual for its plentiful and detailed footnotes.

Ibid., 347.

Ibid., 348–349.

Ibid., 348–349.


Carey, “Culture, Geography, and Communications”, 75.

Ibid.

Ibid. Carey cited Alvin Gouldner, here and elsewhere in this period, as a source for the Chicago School’s engagement with the idea of the public. Ibid. In 1978 Carey had reviewed Gouldner’s *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), which devotes two chapters to Park, journalism, and the public. Carey, “Social Theory and Communication Theory”.
Carey, “Culture, Geography, and Communications”, 75.

Ibid.


The 1975 and 1981 Innis articles were combined and revised as the sixth chapter in Communication as Culture. See Communication as Culture, xii.


As John Nerone has noted, “He was a lifelong Roosevelt Democrat, as he told everyone he encountered”. Nerone, “To Rescue Journalism From the Media”, Cultural Studies 23, no. 2 (2009): 243.


Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror, Part Three.


Carey, “A Plea for the University Tradition”, 853.


Ibid.

Ibid., 19. Carey referred to the technology essay as a “recent paper”, though the article would not be published until 1983. Carey, “Technology and Ideology”.
Carey, “The Mass Media and Critical Theory”, 18

Ibid. The claim for a distinction between critical and administrative research, first articulated by Paul Lazarsfeld in 1941, was by the early 1980s a common and widely understood frame. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, “Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research”, Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9, no. 1 (1941).


One hint is Carey’s use of “indubitability” to refer to universal-methods claims—a term of art that Rorty develops in just this sense in his critique of Descartes. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror, 53–62.

See, e.g., Ibid., 329, 357, 387.


Ibid.

Ibid. The second point—that science is “one more voice in the conversation of mankind, one more device of self-expression ... [that] must be understood, as we would say today, hermeneutically, as part of an extended conversation”—is much closer to Rorty’s view. Carey admitted that he was “twisting [Vico’s thought] somewhat to the purpose here”. Ibid.


Carey, “The Mass Media and Critical Theory”, 21. It is ironic that Taylor’s notion of expressivism, by which he means something like Romantic self-realization, was borrowed from his Oxford teacher Isaiah Berlin’s reading of Herder. “Expression’ here is necessarily a term of art, but I am following here Isaiah Berlin in his ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’... where he identifies one of Herder’s innovative ideas by the term ‘expressionism’. I think I am making the same point in somewhat different form, though to avoid confusion with the twentieth-century movement, I shall rather use the term ‘expressivism’–a term also suggested by Berlin (Private Communication)”. Taylor, Hegel, 13n.


Ibid., 22.

Ibid., 22–23.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 24.

Ibid., 25.

Ibid., 27.

Ibid.

Ibid., 28.

Ibid., 25. Carey’s elisions and minor alterations, though they represent an unconventional practice in scholarly writing, do leave the meaning of Dewey’s passage intact. As an example of a Carey alteration, Dewey’s sentence, “But the winged words of conversation in immediate intercourse have a vital import lacking in the fixed and frozen words of written speech”, is shortened by Carey to, “But conversation has a vital import lacking in the fixed and frozen words of written speech”. In Carey’s revised version of this essay, published as chapter three of *Communication as Culture*, he changed the lead-in to read, “….a quotation I have mercifully shortened (omitting the many ellipses) without impairing its meaning”. *Communication as Culture*, 78.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 27.

Ibid.


See Sue Curry Jansen’s meticulous account of how the Dewey-Lippmann debate trope was picked up by prominent historians like Christopher Lasch. Jansen, “Phantom Conflict”.

Carey’s main villain in the 1982 essay was the field’s mainstream “effects” tradition, sifted through Rorty’s critique of nature-mirroring epistemology and the figure of Lippmann. Almost immediately, however, he was forced to contend with a resurgent left. In the early 1980s communication scholars finally registered the uptake of cultural Marxism that had been underway in the U.S. and Britain since the early 1970s. The main conduit, for American media researchers, was the British cultural studies out of Birmingham—an awkward fact due to the shared name and Carey’s regular praise for Richard Hoggart and the early Raymond Williams.1 Carey, at the height of his writing powers, worked through this awkwardness in a series of talks and essays over the next few years, culminating in the 1985 “Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies”.2 That essay—a delicate critique of Hall—would stand as the fourth and final core chapter in *Communication as Culture*. Carey’s old quarrel with Marxism had resumed—but this time he was arguing with his cultural studies allies.

The new interest in cultural Marxism was announced in 1983 by a thick special issue of the *Journal of Communication*, titled “Ferment in the Field”.3 Indeed the issue, and the “ferment” noun, became metonyms for the U.S. field’s
new and newly visible pluralism. The journal’s official editor was George Gerbner, Carey’s former dissertation reader and then-dean of the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication. Gerbner was a radical himself—though diplomatic about these politics—and, together with associate editor Marsha Siefert, had already opened the journal to heterodox voices since the late 1970s. Their “Ferment in the Field” call-for-papers attracted dozens of contributions, 35 of which were published. Figures associated with the mainstream U.S. field, like Wilbur Schramm and Elihu Katz, were well-represented, but the symposium featured many more critics of one stripe or another—including sociologists Gaye Tuchman and Sue Curry Jansen, continental scholars like Armand Mattelart and Cees Hamelink, and major figures from the British and American traditions of political economy. It was a polyglot roster of essays, even among the critics, but references to the Birmingham Centre and to European Marxists like Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser were among the most common. Carey’s own contribution, discussed below, was no exception.

The summer before the “Ferment” issue appeared, the University of Illinois hosted a now-legendary NEH-funded teaching institute and conference on “Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture”. Carey watched, though hardly participated, as Perry Anderson, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson and Gayatri Spivak, among others, descended on Urbana for Illinois’ “Summer of Marxism”. The month-long teaching institute and the conference that followed attracted hundreds of students and faculty, and are frequently credited with launching British cultural studies in the United States.

Though the summer’s events were co-organized by Carey’s former student and colleague Larry Grossberg, Carey remained on the periphery. He was, Grossberg remembered, supportive and open-minded, but skipped most of the scheduled talks and classes. He labored through Marx’s Grundrisse—“my bedtime reading for the summer”, he told a colleague, who sensed that Carey wasn’t enjoying the tome. There was, in any event, an inescapable irony: Carey had come up with the “cultural studies” label back in 1963 in order to distinguish his work from Illinois’ Marxists. Here was Marxism—albeit of a different sort—getting feted under the selfsame banner, and just across campus.

Illinois’ “Summer of Marxism” was more than Stuart Hall and British cultural studies. Indeed, the event (and the book it spawned) was a high-profile cresting of an encounter with “Western” Marxism well underway in Britain and the U.S. since the 1970s. Western Marxism, a loose and contested term, refers to a set of 20th century continental Marxists who, in a variety of ways, had dissented from 2nd
International–style economism as well as Lenin’s vanguardist revision. In the wake of failed revolutions after World War I (and the aberrant success in backward Russia), György Lukács, Karl Korsch and Antonio Gramsci had grappled with the apparent consent of the working classes to their own exploitation. A series of (mostly) Western European intellectuals to follow—including Lucien Goldmann, Henri Lefebvre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Frankfurt School scholars like Theodor Adorno—had remained preoccupied with the seeming quiescence of the exploited many. Put differently, Western Marxists recast the classical question of American sociology, defined by Talcott Parsons as the problem of order—how is it that complex societies hang together?—as the problem of consent: how do unjust societies reproduce themselves? Their otherwise diverse projects shared a concern with culture and ideology as an explanation for this social stability. The French structuralist Louis Althusser, at the height of his influence in the 1970s, was only the latest Western Marxist figure to highlight the decisive role of culture.

Though most of this theorizing had been published decades earlier, it was only in the wake of the British and American New Lefts that English-language scholars began reading in earnest. The early 1970s mood was, in a sense, a fitting echo of the disappointed radicalism of figures like Gramsci: the New Left, especially in the American case, had self-immolated, and key activists retreated to the academy to grapple with the defeat. A remarkable series of translations, published in journals like the New Left Review, Telos, and the New German Critique, brought Gramsci, Lukács, and Goldmann to the Anglophone academy. In the U.S. case, this encounter centered on theory-inclined sociologists, philosophers, and intellectual historians. American communication scholars of the 1970s, even the Marxists, weren’t reading Gramsci. By contrast, Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Birmingham Centre were marinating their analyses of subcultures, media audience and the like in the thinking of newly translated continental Marxist—Gramsci especially and, as the decade wore on, Althusser too.

The 1983 “Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture” events at Illinois, with Stuart Hall as a central figure, helped spread the work of British cultural studies to American scholars. The rapid uptake in these years, however, was far more complex, and only incidentally centered on the organized discipline of communication. Scholars from the mainline humanities were especially enthusiastic, and key British and Australian transplants helped to synonymize the Birmingham tradition with the “cultural studies” label. By the mid-1980s,
within and beyond communication research, cultural studies meant Hall and the British.  

Carey’s writing in this period, beginning with his “Ferment” contribution, wrestled with the new prominence of cultural Marxism. It wasn’t just the British import; Dallas Smythe, Herbert Schiller, and other North American political economists were more visible, and openly critical, than ever before. Carey, so recently haunted by the specter of objectivity, was by 1984 referring, almost offhandedly, to the “central theme of contemporary scholarship, namely the acquisition and exercise of power”. Recalling his own late 1960s complaint that Marshall McLuhan neglected power, ideology and class, he wrote, in what quickly became a standard refrain, “That deficiency has certainly been overcome, though I feel rather like a proof of Goethe’s maxim: Be careful what you wish for when you are young for you will get it when you are old”.  

Carey’s response to the field’s new left was to concede that domination and ideology deserve more attention. At the same time, he sharpened his claim that power does not exhaust culture—that cultural Marxism does little justice to the manifold of human experience. More openly than ever—and with Richard Rorty in mind—he defended a distinctively American cultural studies, built on words like “hope” and “solidarity” rather than “control” and “critique”.

Ferment in the Field

Carey’s salvo in the Journal of Communication was an attempt to redirect the field’s ferment to an American alternative. Carey conceded, first, that Dewey and the Chicago School were too cheerful, and insufficiently attentive to power. But this inadequacy, he insisted, need not deliver the field to Europe and Western Marxism. Carey nominated an alternative tradition, one that could speak to questions of domination but in an American register: a “radical” strain he identified in the 1950s debate over mass culture. He named four figures—David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Harold Innis, and Kenneth Burke—whose mass-culture writings were sensitive to power and inequality.

Carey’s short piece was a concession and a proposal. The pragmatist tradition was too optimistic; Mills and the others, however, could supply the necessary sobriety. With this move Carey answered the leftist upsurge while keeping the accent on the American in his version of cultural studies. Though respectfully indirect, the essay positioned the four thinkers as a better fit, at
least in the American context, than Stuart Hall’s Althusser-laced cultural studies.

Carey drew out the four figures’ significance by way of a familiar narrative contrast: they present a “third option” to the same pair of mainstream traditions in communication research—one behavioralist, the other functionalist—that he had used to demarcate, since the early 1970s, his cultural approach. Wilbur Schramm’s psychology-inflected behavioral science and the “structural functionalism” of Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld were the two going concerns in the young, 1950s field: “one could be either a certain kind of psychologist of communications or a certain kind of sociologist of communications”. In either case the preoccupation was with the effects of mass communication.

Carey locates his third, preferred option outside the field, within that decade’s public intellectual quarrel over U.S. mass culture. The “mass culture debate” was a contest among conservatives and radicals, both pessimistic on different grounds, and a liberal center whose sunnier conclusion was, Carey writes, “decisive”. (As he also observes, though only obliquely here, key mass communication researchers, including Lazarsfeld, Katz, and Raymond Bauer, injected the field’s “limited effects” findings directly (hypodermically?) into the debate, shoring up the liberal case.) The main positions in the argument over mass culture, however, held little appeal for Carey. Instead he isolates Mills, Riesman, Innis and Burke as “radically individual voices” at the “margins” of the debate. The four figures, in Carey’s telling, held key sensibilities in common: they were less optimistic about American culture than the liberals, “not at all benign” in their assessment of media, and committed to unconventional scholarly methods.

More important, to Carey, was their native radicalism. They were all “formed or touched by” American pragmatism, but also “open to or influenced by” Marxism. Carey’s language here is studiously qualified, but his conclusion is plain: here, in composite form, is (as the title states) a “radical discourse” that can speak to the sharp edge of power, but without the French accent. Taken together, and in spite of their differences, the four offered the “possibility of a distinctive discourse about communications: critical, radical, nonpositivistic, but in touch with the pulse, pace, and textures of American life.”

Carey makes a subtle, but unmistakeable, contrast to the British variant of cultural studies. Pointing to Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, and Richard Hoggart, he briefly recounts the rise, at the “same historical moment”, of a “similar though quite different response” to mass culture, fitted to “specifically
British conditions”. Without explicit judgment, Carey refers to the subsequent developments at the Birmingham Centre, “articulated within a Marxist theoretic and, in recent years, decisively influenced by French Marxist structuralism”. The reference here to Althusser, and to the general influence of Marxist cultural theory for the British, is left dangling. But Carey’s North Americans are plainly meant to supply a homegrown alternative.

Cultural studies in the United States is “undercut”, Carey concedes in the closing paragraph, by the “cheery optimism of pragmatism”. Power, however, was a central concern of Mills and Innis, “among others”. (Burke and Riesman go unmentioned here.) The challenge for “American cultural studies” is to balance “enough of the origins, insights and tone of pragmatism” while squarely facing the “fact” that societies are “structured not only in and by communications”, but also by “relations of power and dominance”. The essay, published among the two dozen other programmatic “ferment” pieces, was an answer to the field’s leftist upsurge. Carey’s brand of “American” cultural studies—though clearly marked off from the British kind—could welcome “power” into its vocabulary too.

His mode of argument, here as in so many other cases, was intellectual historical. “Radical discourse” has been part of the American tradition from the beginning. In place of the British trinity of Williams, Thompson and Hoggart, Carey has recruited Mills, Riesman, Burke and Innis—a parallel band of forerunners. Carey had drawn on the 1950s mass culture debate in earlier writings, but never as a surrogate for the responsible left. The four figures, in this respect, were a strange and internally clashing group, unlikely stand-ins for native radicalism. But the quartet’s relative fitness, in the messy terms of intellectual history, was not especially relevant. Mills, Riesman, and the other were characters in a new story, intended to speak to the present “ferment”.

The same year, Carey devoted a short introduction, written for a collection edited by a former student, to gentle fault-finding. He detects the field’s ferment in the book’s chapters—“the sense running through them that the earth is moving under our feet”. Confident theorizing, much of it Marxist, animates the book, built on the assumption—“dangerous and easily made”—that the “struggle with positivism” is over. Not so, writes Carey, who confesses discomfort with all the high theorizing. He invokes Goethe again: “Be careful what you hope for when you are young for you will get it, when you are old”. The reference is to Carey’s own, often strident 1970s briefs against the mainstream “effects” tradition. The
collection’s essays—synecdochical for the wider ferment—are not the alternative he had in mind. He is, he admits, “something of a skeptic at this particular feast”.27

His main complaint is the chapters’ shared “desire for theoreticism”, which he contrasts to scholarship in the mold of conversation. All “the talk about theory, method, and other such things” just gets in the way of “meaningful conversation”.28 In place of the book’s professionalized model of academic life, Carey proposes hope—Rorty’s “ungrounded hope”, without guarantees or foundations. Are we destined to “roam forever upon the sea of hope”?

The only honest and hopeful answer is yes, if we are not to live what Nietzsche called mankind’s longest lie (though my quotation is from Richard Rorty [1982, p. 208]): ‘that outside of the haphazard and perilous experiments we perform there lies something (God, Science, Knowledge, Rationality or Truth [should we add History?]) which will, if only we perform the correct rituals, step in to save us’.29

There is “no final destination for our studies”—just unending conversation.30 (“Blessedly”, Carey adds.) Here he invokes, for the first time, the Kenneth Burke paraphrase he would go on to make famous: “As [Burke] has reminded us, [life] is a conversation underway when we enter. We try to catch the drift of it; we exit before it’s over”. In a tactful reproach, Carey dismisses the chapters’ self-stated aim to furnish theories and resolve disputes. “That is simply the wrong way to think about scholarship”, he writes, in another echo of Rorty.31

The House of Power

The next year Carey published a spirited defense of cultural studies that, once again, made the case for a distinctively American approach.32 “Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies”, soon revised as the fourth and final core chapter of Communication as Culture, criticized not just the mainstream U.S. “effects” tradition but also the Birmingham-derived rival for the “cultural studies” mantle. The former was an undisguised target, while the latter—Stuart Hall and company—were got at with knotted indirection. Carey phrased his alternative to both in the language of Richard Rorty.

The philosopher is frequently cited. A pair of Rorty talks at a 1984 University of Iowa symposium, attended by Carey, make up a third of the essay’s references.33 More significantly, those talks—and Rorty’s wider project—inform the essay’s style and philosophical outlook, and even its colorful aphorisms.34 Carey adopts Rorty’s plain-speaking, insouciant refusal to specify epistemological
grounds, calling for (in Rorty’s quoted words) “criterionless muddling through”. Dewey is enlisted as an anti-foundationalist ally, and Carey endorses a strong version of the pragmatist theory of truth as what works—“that which will get us to where we want to go”. The essay calls on the field to unload “bad and crippling ideas” and adopt instead an “alternative conceptual vocabulary” that draws “more on the vocabulary of poetry and politics and less on the vocabulary of metaphysics”. Endorsing ethnocentrism, Carey urges communication researchers to cultivate “solidarity” with society—to abandon, in other words, scholars’ priestly isolation in favor of public engagement.

These themes, some of them anyway, were part of Carey’s intellectual worldview before he came across Rorty. But the essay’s cadences, its argumentative motifs, its conceded debts, its attitude toward academic life—all are embossed with Rorty’s stamp. The philosopher turned humanist-at-large plainly resonated with Carey’s own evolving big-picture take on the purpose of cultural studies. Without sending up a flare, Carey reaffirmed here the shift already evident in his 1982 Dewey-Lippmann essay: cultural studies is a public-facing, solidarity-enhancing practice of re-description, not the interpretivist project of Clifford Geertz.

The essay is framed around a pair of “resistances” to cultural studies which, Carey argues, have their source in misunderstandings. One resistance is issued by the “effects” positivists. The other, more surprising band of resisters are said to be the “phenomenologists”. Carey has in mind, for this second group, scholars committed to the reconstruction of lived experience and meaning. There is an obvious oddness here: Carey’s own cultural studies, at least in its 1970s Geertzian formulation, fits this description.

Perhaps the move to label “phenomenologists” as a bastion of cultural studies resistance is a reflection of Carey’s Rortyan drift—a sly admission that he is no longer in the business of meaning recovery. But the essay otherwise presents his intellectual development as continuous and consistent—a sustained 15-year campaign on behalf of “cultural studies”. So the phenomenology-as-resistance claim is not about signaling new allegiances. The purpose, instead, seems rhetorical. Carey articulates his critique of Stuart Hall and cultural Marxism through the figure of the resistant phenomenologist—whose misgivings about the reduction of culture to ideology Carey proceeds to endorse. In other words, he speaks through a third party (phenomenology)—set up as obstructionist to the cultural-studies project—to convey discomfort with the Althusserian turn of his erstwhile cultural-studies allies. The essay purports to be about overcoming
resistance to cultural studies, in other words, but is really more of an internal critique. The resisters, Carey suggests, are basically right—there’s something worth resisting in the Marxist framework that Hall and so many others had come to embrace.

A number of familiar historical tropes make brief appearances in the essay, though none is decisive for Carey’s argument. He had, by the early 1980s, built up a repertoire of self-contained intellectual narratives, neatly labeled and easy to drop into talks and essays. In “Overcoming Resistance”, the most prominent trope is the “effects tradition”—the catch-all tag for quantitative communication research with aspirations for value-freedom in the mold of natural science. As he had since the 1970s, though only passingly here, Carey identifies two approaches, one searching for laws of behavior and the other for functions. The behavioral and functional are, however, two sides of a common project, a “positive science of communications”—a phrase he uses interchangeably with “effects tradition” and, in one prominent reference, the “power and anxiety model of communications”. It’s this “traditional framework” that harbors the “bad and crippling ideas” that Carey hopes to “unload”. The problem with the “positive science” mainstream is not the research itself, though he refers to “results of such studied vagueness and predictability that we threaten to bore one another to death”. The deeper problem is that effects researchers’ claims for objectivity paper over a profoundly anti-democratic substrate which Carey identifies with utilitarianism. While he had occasionally invoked the field’s utilitarian assumptions in earlier writings, the argument here is far more elaborate, though relegated to a handful of exceptionally long footnotes. Carey provides a sweeping account of utilitarianism’s signal importance to Western intellectual history, though with no reference to other scholars’ works.

His argument, in brief, is that “utilitarianism” has overspilled the classical doctrine of (individual) utility maximization. Yes, Carey writes, the view that humans hunger to satisfy their individual, pre-given preferences really does animate the discipline of economics and much lay thinking about society. But the other social sciences have, he argues, desubjectivized utility—driven it “outside of the head and into the objective world”. Utility is re-assigned to genes (as with sociobiology), or to the environment (behaviorism), or to society (functionalism). For Carey, the second and third moves provide the crucial underpinnings for communication research: a utilitarian picture is the “implicit subtext of communication research”, but “twisted out of its originally subjective framework and resituated in the objective world of environment and social structure”.
Empirical mass communication research does not merely feed off of this repurposed utilitarianism; the discipline’s findings double back as cited support for “wider theories”. “Concepts such as attitude, effect, uses, and gratifications are borrowed from utility theory”, he writes, even as “evidence from effects studies are used to support one or another theory of mass society”.  

Carey’s account of utilitarianism’s veiled centrality is adapted from anthropologist Marshall Sahlins and his 1976 *Cultural and Practical Reason*. Though Sahlins is not cited, the idiosyncratic claim that classical, “subjective” utility theory begat an “objective” counterpart in functionalism and sociobiology is a major current in the anthropologist’s book, which Carey reviewed in 1978. The telling point is that Sahlins’ intellectual-historical narrative is what appealed to Carey, not especially Sahlin’s positive argument for the primacy of the cultural. The Sahlins storyline permitted Carey to place mainstream communication research in wide-canvas historical relief.

In *Communication as Culture*, the long utilitarian footnotes were folded into the main text, and framed in the essay’s first-paragraph with a new line: “To show how and why [the ‘effects tradition’ should be abandoned], let me first develop the particular form of utilitarianism that undergirds media studies”. In this version, Carey also added a parenthetical aside: “[a]spects of this formulation are taken from Sahlins, 1976”.

Unlike Sahlins, however, Carey (here and in the 1989 version) faults the “objective utility theorists’” determinism—their claim that it’s all about genes or norms—for emptying out the agency of citizens that democracy requires. The theorists have, Carey writes, surrendered “any notion of a self-activating, autonomous, self-governing subject”. This constrained subject, “not fit for democracy”, is assumed too by “the entire tradition of mass communication research”, including the field’s “founding book”, Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion*, and the Columbia voting studies. *The People’s Choice* turns out not to be the people’s choice”, Carey argues, “but the choice of an index of socioeconomic status”. There is, in short, a disguised but pernicious anti-democratic core to the effects tradition. Later in the essay, Carey invokes the Lippmann-Dewey debate to reinforce the point.

“Overcoming” does not provide a well-articulated alternative—“[f]illing that gap is a major task of the future”—but instead gestures toward figures and traditions that will help the field reimagine itself. “The best I can do at the moment”, he writes, “is to encourage people to circle within an alternative conceptual vocabulary and an alternative body of literature that will assist in
marking out this unclaimed territory”. Among others Max Weber is given prominent place, and the Weber here, significantly, is not the *verstehen* proponent of Geertz’s “doctrine in a clause” (“Believing with Max Weber...”). Instead, and more accurately, Carey presents Weber (credited, here again, with inspiring the “cultural studies” label) as invested not just in lived experience, but also in the macro-analysis of power and conflict. The German sociologist, in other words, has become a confederate in Carey’s effort to bring a non-Marxist sensitivity to domination into his cultural studies program. No one, Carey writes, has “doped out an adequate analysis of power, conflict, contradiction and authority”—a problem, he adds, that was “absolutely central to the rich, diverse, and melancholy work of Max Weber”.

Dewey and the Chicago School get highlighted too, but with a major qualification. Dewey and the “tradition of symbolic interactionism”—which “developed out of American pragmatism generally”—have provided cultural studies “on an American terrain” with its “most powerful expression”. Robert Park, “Dewey’s student”, supplied the “most powerful analysis” of mass culture “adapted to the circumstances of the country”. Dewey, Park and the other Chicago figures had transplanted, though “without attempting to do so”, Weberian sociology to the American context. They had, however, “lost” Weber’s “sharper edges”, particularly around power and domination. These themes, the essay argues, “will have to be restored to the tradition”. As in his 1983 “ferment in the field” piece, Carey is eager to concede—and correct for—the sanguine character of Dewey and Park’s thought.

Weber, as we have seen, was drafted to do some of this work, but Carey also turned to the 1950s “mass culture debate” and—in another echo of the “ferment” essay—the Riesman, Mills, Burke and Innis quartet. “To make things familiar, if not exactly precise”, the search for an alternative literature should take in the 1950s debate—“a modest but important moment in the general argument over the effects of the mass media”. Riesman, Mills, Innis and Burke filled out a “minor but enduring theme” in media research: sensitivity not just to experience and interaction, but also to conflict and power. “Cultural studies, in an American context, is an attempt to reclaim and reconstruct this tradition”.

Weber and the four mid-century thinkers provided, for Carey, a set of named answers to the field’s resurgent left. The fact that a major (and fast-growing) strand of that left also claimed the “cultural studies” mantle put Carey in an awkward place. He had long positioned his own cultural studies as a sympathetic, cross-Atlantic partner to the Birmingham project of Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall. But over
the 1970s, and under Hall’s leadership, the Birmingham Centre had grappled with, and in some cases absorbed, the newly translated cultural theory of Western Marxist figures like Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. As British cultural studies gained traction and serious study in the United States—including at Illinois, even among his own faculty and students—Carey faced a dilemma: how to defend the “cultural studies” project, while also distinguishing his approach from the Althusser-drenched writings out of Birmingham. The prose-acrobatics of “Overcoming”—especially its closing pages—represent Carey’s effort to limber out this apology-cum-critique.

Carey admits, first, that his cultural studies is ethnocentric. But this is merely to foreground, he writes, what is otherwise obscured by the rhetoric of objectivity. To attempt to “import wholesale” an analysis that does not “develop on native grounds” is “simply a pose, another way of being an observer”. Thought from abroad has indeed enriched American cultural studies. But foreign voices must be “embedded in, deeply connected with, the lines of discourse and the canons of evidence and argument that are only decipherable within the social, political, and intellectual traditions of given national, social formations”. A cultural studies sensitive to American conditions, in short, will have native thought at its core.

With this ethnographic flag now raised, Carey turns to British cultural studies—and the essay’s tone takes on a pained, verbose ambivalence. The “issues surrounding cultural studies”, he writes, have been “very much complicated, as well as enormously enriched, by the increasing prominence in the United States” of Stuart Hall’s Birmingham Centre. Carey singles out Hall for praise: his work “very much deserves the influence it has acquired”. But the Centre is “distinctively English” in orientation and, Carey adds, “therefore in its limitations”. Pointing to its engagement with Marxism and structuralism, he suggests that British cultural studies could be described, “perhaps more accurately”, as ideological studies. Hall and his colleagues, Carey repeats, assimilate culture to ideology—make culture “synecdochal of culture as a whole”.

Carey refrains from criticizing this reduction, and instead notes that the Birmingham approach has had a “rejuvenating effect on a variety of Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses of capitalist societies by North American scholars”. He also points to the Centre’s “long detour through French structuralism”—an oblique reference to Louis Althusser, the Marxist theoretician who, in other works and elsewhere in this essay, triggers for Carey an allergic reaction. Still, he offers more qualified praise for Hall, who has held the Centre’s “wide-ranging and often contradictory” influences in “remarkable equipoise”.

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Carey finally pivots to critique, but with delicate indirection. Hall’s neo-Marxist analysis, despite its “power and elegance”, is likely to “increase rather than reduce resistance” to cultural studies in the U.S. Here Carey is the sympathetic ally, alerting his side to third-party objections. The role is an awkward one, since he holds those objections too. Hence the tortured follow-up: “That resistance, however understandable, is, I believe, shortsighted”. 66

The remainder of the essay is devoted to a pair of particular “resistances”. These are answered but—especially in the second case—at the same time endorsed. The first issues from the mainstream “positivists”, who, in the essay’s summary, are especially fretful about cultural studies’ open moral and political commitments. Carey’s initial response is impatient and dismissive: all intellectual traditions work on behalf of values, even when—as in the case of positive science—those commitments are concealed. The field would be far better off if effects scholars dropped the “pose of the observer” and instead made their underlying beliefs explicit. Among other things, the anti-democratic implications of mainstream communication research could then be confronted head on. After all, he repeats, “notions of laws of behavior and functions of society pretty much obliterate the entire legacy of democracy”. 67

Carey is more receptive, however, to a related anxiety he ascribes to the positivists: that cultural studies implies a commitment “in advance” to a “wholly negative and condemnatory” take on Western liberal democracy. The political alternative, Carey concedes, seems to be revolution or at least a “major project of social reconstruction”. The positivists’ fear, in this respect, is “real” but also a “little silly”—“if only for the reason”, he writes, “that there aren’t any revolutionaries anywhere these days”. In any event, if effects researchers judge cultural studies “corrupt” or anti-democratic, they should unearth and defend their own moral worldview. Carey, here, gestures at his own reformist politics, and at the same time de-links cultural studies from the hard-left connotations that the label had taken on. “In short”, he concludes, “the answer is to move toward, not away from, a cultural studies viewpoint”. 68

The second resistance—the “phenomenological” one—is more revealing, in part because the ascribed position is identical to Carey’s own 1970s “cultural studies” project. Though positioned as a third-party critique, the phenomenological complaint is really more like a vehicle for Carey to ventriloquize his own misgivings about cultural Marxism and British cultural studies. It is, in other words, a rhetorical device of indirect criticism.
Carey admits that the phenomenological resistance is “more difficult to characterize”, because it “otherwise shares so much in common with cultural studies”. He has in mind, he explains, the interpretivist project of making sense of lived experience—describing, that is, “the subjective life”. Now characterizing a putative third party, he moves to openly criticize Birmingham’s Althusser infatuation, while also praising the early, pre-Marxist work of Raymond Williams. The phenomenological project, he writes, “means only going as far as the early work of Williams and [Richard] Hoggart and particularly not into the intellectual, moral and political quicksand one encounters when one starts romancing French structuralism”. There is, in the Althusser barb and the elevation of Williams circa 1960, a thinly disguised declinist history of British cultural studies.

The key point that Carey extracts from the resistant phenomenologists is their refusal to reduce culture to ideology. The sense of tonal whiplash comes through again, as Carey admits that he is “not at all unsympathetic to this resistance”, but adds that he “think[s] it is misplaced”. Yet he immediately carries on with an endorsement of the phenomenological “criticism”: “When ‘ideology’ becomes a term to describe an entire way of life or just another name for what is going on, then the rich phenomenological diversity of modern societies is reduced to a flattened analysis of conflict between classes and factions”. Using the same lexical stand-in he had suggested for British cultural studies earlier in the essay, but this time with plain disapproval, Carey writes, “Cultural—or ideological—studies replaces economics as the dismal science”. In a long, punchy footnote, he takes aim, in particular, at fellow cultural studies scholars’ fixation with power. And here he openly reclaims the phenomenological project:

I support the phenomenological enterprise because I believe any healthy society will possess that part of its spirit that admits to the inevitable and desirable pluralizing of the varieties of experience. Just because you admit power to the household of consciousness and conduct, you do not have to let it occupy every room, although I admit that, like many an unwelcome guest, you will have to struggle to prevent it from taking over the entire domicile.

Ostensibly still characterizing a resistance—and a “misplaced” one at that—Carey is slipping into, and out of, his own voice. Passionate diction, unmarked allusions to Geertz, the urgency of an italicized word, taken together, betray Carey’s stated aim to “overcome” resistance: “Phenomenologists of all stripes
are committed to the varieties of human experience as providing the deepest pleasure, the wasting resource, and the most complex explanatory problems in modern society”. To strip away that diversity, he continues, is to “steamroller subjective consciousness just as effectively as the behaviorists and functionalists did”. The result is an unhappy exchange of the “well-known evils of the Skinner box” for the “less well-known, but just as real, evils of the Althusserian box”.

Carey is worried that Hall and his U.S. followers will indeed take over the whole domicile, and throw out the field’s “most compelling problem”: the manifold of lived experience. This is, of course, the Geertzian program he had so eloquently promoted in “A Cultural Approach” ten years earlier.

In the essay’s conclusion, he nevertheless restates his disagreement with both resistances—the positivist and phenomenological—despite their “genuine importance”. The field does not need the objectivist grounding of positive science: “We can get along quite nicely by looking at intellectual work, including science, as a muddling through of the dilemmas that history, tradition, and contemporary life have placed before us”. And the phenomenologists, he suggests by implication, are insufficiently attentive to the “forms of power, authority, and domination characteristic of the modern world”. Here as in his other writings from the period, Carey is eager to concede the left’s point that culture can serve as disguised coercion.

He is quick to shift back, however, to the main thrust of the phenomenological “resistance”, calling for a cultural studies that does not reduce “culture to ideology, social conflict to class conflict, consent to compliance, action to reproduction, or communication to coercion”. And in the essay’s closing paragraph, he casts the field’s animating question in familiar terms: how is it that society hangs together? How is the “miracle of social life”, he asks, “pulled off”? This question—sociologists’ problem of order—had preoccupied Carey since the early 1960s. Though he hints at a different answer here—it’s not just shared culture but instead the “intergraded relations of symbol and social structure”—he is still posing the same question, with the same implicit valence: the endurance of society through time is a miraculous accomplishment. For British cultural studies, as for the tradition of Western Marxist cultural theory on which it leaned, the question was always inverted: how do exploitative societies produce consent among the exploited? Carey, since the early 1980s, had incorporated power and domination into his vocabulary, but his statements (here and elsewhere) read as rearguard gestures.
In the end it was Carey who resisted cultural studies, as the British-derived version gained quick U.S. traction in this period of (leftist) ferment.

The God Term

In the remaining years before *Communication as Culture*’s 1989 publication, Carey kept up his skirmish with the left, and also—in a flurry of high-profile essays—resumed his engagement with journalism and public life. In both conversations, he made the case for (to borrow Rorty’s formulation) solidarity over objectivity.

In a short 1987 essay, he traced the fraternal friction—between his and the British variants of cultural studies—back to an interwar quarrel between Marxism and pragmatism. The “internal bifurcation of the left wing of media theory”, he wrote, originated in a 1920s rift that widened through the 1940s, with the “bitterness peculiar to an internecine dispute”. One consequence of the breach was to open the space for the “thoroughgoing conquest of American intellectual life” by behaviorism and functionalism.

In another brief essay the same year, he positioned the field’s resurgent left in harsher terms. Referring to the mainstream “effects” tradition and its Marxist critics, he characterized the field as a duopoly—a “duologue” between the “party of representation” and the “party of power”. Both parties, moreover, seek a privileged site outside and beyond the wider public. For the positivists, the route goes through “Truth” via method—analogous, Carey writes, to the left’s quest to gain the “Good” via critique. “Both parties seek a guarantee, a metaphysical comfort”, he continues, “a means of escaping the burdens of citizenship”. And between the parties there is nothing like listening, but instead a “deadly repetitive harangue”. He does not, he adds, find either alternative “particularly appetizing”.

In place of this cloistered incivility between left and center, Carey proposes a Rortyan substitute. All scholars, whether chemists or philosophers, engage in a “common human enterprise” that owes little to long-held distinctions among disciplines, or between the academy and the wider public. The lamentable point, for Carey, is that his colleagues fail to recognize, and indeed resist, the reality that they are part of a wider community. Instead, leading communication researchers fret, with cyclical regularity, about the field’s fragmentation. This attempt “to put humpty-dumpty back together again”—the quest, that is, to unite the discipline under a reigning paradigm—is both futile and misguided. Scholarship isn’t about...
finding the right position; “correct” and “complete” are the wrong adjectives. The
field’s fragmentation, in that light, is really a “grand opportunity” for “genuine
conversation”. What the field needs is a lot more talk and much less certainty,
with no particular destination—certainly not Truth—in mind:

All I can suggest is that we get rid of the notion that intellectual work is something
other than conducting a conversation, that there are standards of evidence other
than conversational ones, that there is some way we can guarantee in advance that
we are going to end up on the side of the good, the true, and the beautiful.

The field won’t be held together by a shared method or subject or paradigm. The
only adequate answer to fragmentation is community and ceaseless talk; the hope is
that, “if we just keep the conversation going, keep talking, there may be a chance we
will agree about something”.

Carey’s modest picture of scholarship was, in these years, mirrored in his
renewed call for a public-centered journalism. In a series of essays beginning in
1986, he raised his voice for journalism as a “democratic social practice”, in an
appeal that broadly tracked his mid- to late 1970s writings on the topic. Here in
the late 1980s he again supplied a declinist history of journalism, sometimes with
language borrowed from the earlier work, and arrived at the same conclusion:
reporters have abandoned their role as ventilators of the public. But these essays
remove the explanatory accent from technologies like the telegraph and
standardized time; the rise of journalists’ professional self-understanding is,
likewise, less prominent. Carey still invokes American history, but now more as a
motivating resource—a usable past worth reclaiming. The villain isn’t so much the
entwinement of technology and professionalism as it is wrong epistemology:
journalists are faulted for the pretension that they might mirror nature. There is, in
other words, less Innis and more Rorty.

Carey delivered a version of the argument at a prominent 1987 symposium,
triggering a heated back-and-forth among the invited discussants. In this talk he
designated public the “god term of journalism—the be-all and end-all, the term
without which the entire enterprise fails to make sense”. And yet the public has
been “dissolved”—and journalism is partly to blame. He singles out Lippmann’s
expert-transmission model of reporting as particularly influential and injurious, and
reprises Dewey’s putative rejoinder: “One person got the message of Lippmann’s
deeply pessimistic and antidemocratic books”. We have, he argues, “inherited and
institutionalized Lippmann’s conception of journalism”—a “scientistic journalism
devoted to the sanctity of the fact and objectivity”. The truth-seeking scramble that results is always already a failure, since “no one can tell the truth”. 88

Carey devotes a lengthy section of the paper to the history of the early republic. Though qualified, his main point is that, from the Revolution to the 1840s, Americans and their newspapers constituted a real public. Eight quotes from travelers and figures like John Adams epigraph the section, all evoking Americans’ predilection for public talk about the news. Carey admits that the evidence for a vibrant culture of news-driven discourse is “ambiguous at best”, but proceeds to build up the case, as anchored by a prolonged excerpt from an historian’s account of Philadelphia’s tavern-and-coffee-shop culture of bustling talk. Writes Carey:

Even if this description is overdrawn, the emphasis throughout is on the fact that Philadelphia—at this stage in its history—had a vivid public life, a life of the streets in which segregation and withdrawal were at a minimum. Indeed, it is a description, sufficiently fleshed out, that gives credence to Robert Park’s definition of the public as a group of strangers who gather to discuss the news. The public here is not a fiction, or even a philosophical term, but an entity brought into existence by the conditions of the eighteenth-century city and by the printing press itself.89

Carey admits the risks of “nostalgia and romanticism”, and concedes the exclusions at the heart of what he is calling (though without reference to Habermas) the “public sphere”. Still, there is an unmistakeable before-the-fall curvature to the narrative. Indeed, he proceeds to trace the public’s retreat to the arrival of the penny press and telegraph. These developments of the “second third of the nineteenth century” abandoned “conversation or discussion as the primary goal”, and elevated “objectivity and facticity into cardinal principles”. Their style of journalism is “still roughly the staple” of today’s newspapers.90 Lippmann’s 1920s model, he implies, was merely an intensification of an already baleful reporting culture.

Carey’s proposed solution—an echo of his program for communication research—is to “throw out” the vocabulary of facticity and information, in favor of conversation and poetry. Journalists are “merely part of the conversation”, one partner among the others. The public will begin to “reawaken” when they are addressed as a “conversational partner”; all journalism can do is “preside over and within the conversation”. What would journalism “look like if we grounded it in poetry, if we tried to literalize that metaphor rather than the metaphor of objectivity and science?” The result would be a “new moral vocabulary” that would “dissolve some current dilemmas”.91
Carey would reissue this kind of argument many times over the rest of his life. To some extent these late-1980s journalism essays marked a shift in his published work, away from disciplinary debates intended for fellow scholars. More and more often in the years ahead, he would address himself to journalists, accept service on their awards committees, and take up visiting posts in journalism programs. This turn to journalism culminated, in 1992, with his departure from Illinois for Columbia University’s famed journalism school, where he expected, but failed to secure, the deanship. He remained the CBS Professor of International Journalism at Columbia until his 2006 death. In the interim, he lent prominent support to the once-influential “public journalism” movement, and served, in effect, as the journalism academy’s spokesperson for the bundle of positions that, in the 1990s, came under the “communitarian” label.

There was no clean break. Carey continued to write on the full range of topics that had preoccupied him from his graduate school days. He never really left any conversation, once he had taken up its thread. Still, there was a re-orientation to journalism and journalists underway in these years. Communication as Culture carried with it—to borrow one of Carey’s favorite phrases (itself borrowed from Frank Kermode)—a sense of an ending.
NOTES

1 Williams’ *The Long Revolution* (1961) was, Illinois colleague John Nerone recalled, one of Carey’s “fetish books”. Nerone (professor emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), interview with the author, July 2014. In a pro-seminar session on British cultural studies at Columbia, Carey said, “It is very very hard for me to reproduce the feeling of discovery, indeed excitement, in coming upon” the books of Williams, Hoggart, and historian E. P. Thompson. In the session Carey highlighted the three’s English specificity, working-class backgrounds, and adult-education teaching. Carey identified Williams and Hoggart’s main achievement as to “broaden out the meaning of the word ‘communication’ to engulf the sphere of culture, to make it identical to it, and to look at it not as a narrow disciplinary undertaking”. Undated lecture, 2002, recording in the author’s possession.


4 At the time, its name was “Annenberg School for Communications”, with an “s”.


6 The phrase is John Nerone’s. Nerone (professor emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), interview with the author, July 2014.

7 Lawrence Grossberg (professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), interview with the author, April 2014. Joli Jensen, a graduate student of Carey’s at the time, noted Carey’s reaction to the conference as a “very painful experience for Carey to want to clarify what he wanted cultural studies to be”. Jensen described Carey as “truly vexed” by Grossberg’s attempt to bridge Carey’s style of cultural studies with his status as spokesman for the insurgent British variety. Jensen, personal communication, October 1, 2013. Grossberg has frequently recounted his trans-Atlantic experience with the two cultural studies formations. See, for example, Grossberg, “The formation(s) of cultural studies: An American in Birmingham”, *Strategies* 2 (1989).
8 John Nerone (professor emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), interview with the author, July 2014. Nerone on Carey: “He sort of liked Marx. He didn’t like Marxists”.


11 Indeed, one of the leading North American political economists, Dallas Smythe, famously took British and European Marxists to task for their preoccupation with “ideology” over basic media economics. Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism”, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 1, no. 3 (1977). In the American field, one exception to the early indifference to Western Marxism was the SDS activist-turned-sociologist Todd Gitlin, whose The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980) was heavily indebted to Gramsci.

12 Carey addressed the spread of Marxism to the U.S. humanities in a 1987 book review as a kind of elitist betrayal: “The spectacle of Marxism running loose in literature departments is a common one these days—but why? Up until the 1930s, Marxism was pretty much the doctrine that economics determined everything. In the Depression of that decade, when capitalism failed and the bell of revolution sounded, the workers stayed away from the celebration.... Marxism failed as a predictive science and transformed itself into a literary one.... Marxists are now more likely to be found pouring over ‘Catcher in the Rye’ and the news columns of the Los Angeles Times than examining the falling rate of profit or the surplus value extracted from labor. It is rare to find a Marxist economist anymore; the left has taken residence in the humanities where they agonize more over the cultural dispossession of middle-class youth than the financial dispossession of workers”. Carey, review of Politics of Letters, by Richard Ohmann, Los Angeles Times (June 28, 1987): 8.

13 There is a gigantic literature on the history of cultural studies, some of it touching on the field’s internationalization. See, for example, Jon D. Cruz, “Cultural Studies and Social Movements: A Crucial Nexus in the American Case”, European Journal of Cultural Studies 15, no. 3 (2012).

14 And Carey’s culturalism was noted, and sometimes dismissed, by political economists as insufficiently attentive to the material dimension of the media landscape. Eileen Meehan, for example, referred to Carey (along with Albert Kreiling) as an “idealistic culturalist”. Meehan, “Commodity Audience, Actual Audience: The Commodity Debate”, in Illuminating the Blindspots: Essays Honoring Dallas W. Smythe, ed. Janet Wasko, Vincent Mosco, and Manjunath Pendakur (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993), 389.


17 Ibid., 311.

18 Ibid., 312.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 312–313.
22 Ibid., 313.
23 Carey even implies a kind of priority for the North Americans. Referring to British writing, he wrote, “It too came to be known as cultural studies”. Ibid., 312.
25 The four differed along some of the lines that Carey used to make his case for congruence. Mills and Riesman were friends and both involved in the 1950s mass culture debate, but Mills was far more critical than Riesman, whose own critique was internal to the liberal position. Burke, by the 1950s, was not really engaged in the little-magazine mass-culture arguments. Mills, Riesman and Burke were all influenced by pragmatism (though in distinctive ways), but not Innis—who was not, of course, American, and whose critique of mass culture centered on the cross-border deluge of U.S. books, film, etc. In many ways, the four figures—in their sheer motleyness if also in the overlap of Innis and Burke—resemble the band of thinkers that Carey had, back in the early 1960s, placed under the ”cultural studies” umbrella.
27 Ibid., 4.
28 Ibid., 4–5.
29 This quotation, and Rorty’s extended argument for “ungrounded hope” (via a reading-in-contrast of Foucault and Dewey), appear in Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 208. In the relevant passage, Rorty invokes Nietzsche in an identical way: “This is the attempt to free mankind from Nietzsche’s ‘longest lie,’ the notion that outside the haphazard and perilous experiments we perform there lies something (God, Science, Knowledge, Rationality, or Truth) which will, if only we perform the correct rituals, step in to save us”.
32 Carey, “Overcoming Resistance”. 

Rorty also gave the Tykociner Memorial Lecture at Illinois in April 1986, which John Nerone—Carey’s Illinois colleague—remembers Carey attending and talking with him after. Carey “was very impressed with Rorty’s public performance, remarking on how, at a podium, on a stage, with 1000 people watching, he would take a pencil and make corrections to his text”. Nerone, personal communication, July 23, 2013.

Carey: “To put the matter differently, phenomenologists just cannot take seriously the claim they sense in ideological studies that, in Otto Neurath’s (1935) familiar analogy, we cannot make a sailable boat out of the planks of the ship on which we are currently sailing but rather we must abandon ship altogether and start anew”. “Overcoming Resistance”, 36. Rorty: “To use Neurath’s familiar analogy, we can understand the revolutionary’s suggestion that a sailable boat can’t be made out of the planks which make up ours, and that we must simply abandon ship. But we cannot take his suggestion seriously”. “Solidarity or Objectivity”, 176.

Carey, “Overcoming Resistance”, 33. In noting that “Marxism, existentialism, and a variety of continental philosophies” have successfully attacked positivism, Carey adds, “However, it is not necessary to be either so contentious or so philosophical about the whole business”. Ibid., 27–28.

Ibid., 29.

Ibid., 28.

Ibid., 29–31.

Ibid., 37–39.

Ibid., 37.

Ibid., vii–ix, 102–125. Sahlins: “‘Utility’ likewise may be thought of in subjective and objective dimensions, although many theories rather underspecify which practical logic they take as the basis of cultural order. For some, however, it is clear that culture is precipitated from the rational activity of individuals pursuing their own best interests. This is ‘utilitarianism’ proper; its logic is the maximization of means-ends relations. The objective utility theories are naturalistic or ecological; for them, the determinant material wisdom substantialized in cultural form is the survival of the human population or the given social order. The precise logic is adaptive advantage, or maintenance of the system within natural limits of viability”. Ibid., vii–viii. Carey, in his 1978 review essay of recent social theory books, had devoted an admiring half-paragraph to Sahlin’s Culture and Practical Reason. Carey, “Social Theory and Communication Theory”, Communication Research 5, no. 3 (1978): 363–364.

Sahlins’ manifesto-like argument for the fundamental centrality of culture in all human life (argued against anthropologists’ latent economism) certainly accorded with Carey’s own view. But he already had solid grounds to make that claim (drawing on Geertz and others), and had been, in any event, moving away from a vigorous culturalism in these years. Sahlins is not cited in any of Carey’s works (with the exception of Communication as Culture; see below).


Carey: “The suggestion that positive science be substituted for uncoerced communication was first put forward, within our tradition, by Walter Lippmann in Public Opinion. John Dewey instantly responded to the book, describing it as the greatest indictment of democracy yet. By the time of the Vietnam war, Dewey proved prophetic, for the behavior sciences were central to that intellectual, moral, and political disaster”. Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 29.

Writes Carey: “… Weber attempted to provide both a phenomenology of industrial societies—that is, a description of the subjective life or consciousness of industrial peoples, including the ends or purposes of their characteristic actions—and an analysis of the patterns of dominance and authority typical of such societies”. Ibid., 29–30.

Ibid., 30.

In a silent nod to his Rortyan framework, Carey added the clause, “although happily within the pragmatist attempt to dissolve the natural and cultural sciences”. Ibid. Recall that Carey, in his Geertzian period, was inclined to distinguish a cultural approach from other kinds of academic inquiry, even at the level of epistemology. In the two cited essays and elsewhere, Rorty had repeatedly argued against interpretivists like Charles Taylor, that the distinction between the human and natural sciences was meaningless. Rorty, “Science as Solidarity”, 46; Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 195–203.


Ibid., 29, 30.
In his 1973 National Endowment for the Humanities application, for example, Carey explicitly positioned his project as the American counterpart to Hoggart and Williams. “In my own essays”, Carey wrote, “... I have attempted to introduce the animating ideas of Williams and Hoggart on culture in relationship to the popular arts and information”. He refers to his proposed fellowship work as “by no means a terminal project, I hope to continue working in this field for many years hopefully duplicating in an American context the achievement Raymond Williams has made in this field against the background of British history”. Carey, Application for Younger Humanities Fellowship 1974-1975, National Endowment for the Humanities, October 14, 1973, George Gerbner Archive (GBA), Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, http://www.asc.upenn.edu/gerbner/Asset.aspx?assetID=1904.

Carey’s endorsement of avowed ethnocentrism echoes Rorty: “To say that we must be ethnocentric may sound suspicious, but this will only happen if we identify ethnocentrism with pig-headed refusal to talk to representatives of other communities. In my sense of ethnocentrism, to be ethnocentric is simply to work by our own lights. The defense of ethnocentrism is simply that there are no other lights to work by. Beliefs suggested by another individual or another culture must be tested by trying to weave them together with beliefs which we already have. We can so test them, because everything which we can identify as a human being or as a culture will be something which shares an enormous number of beliefs with us”. Rorty, “Science as Solidarity”, 43.

Ibid., 31.

Carey: “Weber has been mentioned; Marx cannot for long be avoided; and I have paid homage to Williams and Hoggart. On the contemporary scene one thinks of four foreign voices that have something of the right spirit to them: Habermas, Foucault, Giddens, and Bourdieu”. Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 30–31.

Ibid., 31–32.

Ibid.

Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 33, 35.

Ibid., 35. Carey: “Phenomenologists, in the restricted sense I am using the term, are willing to commit themselves to a reconstruction of consciousness through methods as simple as *verstehen* or as complex as hermeneutics”. Ibid.

Ibid.

Carey: “While recognizing that modern consciousness is riddled by antinomy and contradictions formed in relation to and exacerbated by the mass media, and while standing in firm opposition to many forms of life in modern capitalist societies, phenomenologists resist moving power, conflict, domination, or any given set of sociostructural elements to the center of analysis”. Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 39.
Ibid., 35. The “wasting resource” phrase, which Carey also used in his 1982 Dewey-Lippmann essay, recalls Geertz’s similar use in The Interpretation of Cultures: “The great natural variation of cultural forms is, of course, not only anthropology’s great (and wasting) resource, but the ground of its deepest theoretical dilemma: how is such variation to be squared with the logical unity of the human species?”


Carey maintained a number of close friendships with journalists. “He was a storyteller”, his former student Joli Jensen recalled, “and enjoyed journalists who could tell good stories, and those relationships helped shape his sense of what a ‘report’ can and should be”. Jensen, personal communication, October 1, 2013. John Nerone, an Illinois colleague, noted that Carey “loved reading and hanging out with journalists—the more professional the better—though he was a famous critic of journalistic professionalism”. Nerone, personal communication, July 23, 2013. Carey was a frequent presence at the journalism-centric Poynter Institute and a juror for the Peabody news awards. As Nerone observed, “Although he found much to criticize in journalism education and journalism ideology and wanted in serious ways to revolutionize the practice of journalism, he loved rubbing elbows with reporters and editors; it was a great pleasure for him to leave the professors behind and exchange wisdom with the working press at the Poynter Institute in St. Petersburg, Florida, where he was a frequent and popular presence”. Nerone, “To Rescue Journalism”, 252.

Carey attributed his failure to win the deanship to opposition from New York journalism elites, including The New York Times. As James Boylan notes of the deanship contest, “Curiously, Carey’s standing as a scholar worked against him in segments of the Columbia constituency; he became aware of the opposition when the search committee heard from graduates urging the appointment of a practitioner”. According to Boylan (who cites a Carey interview), Columbia’s dean search committee forwarded Carey’s name along with Tom Goldstein’s, a former journalist, to Columbia’s president—who chose Goldstein. “Carey was not pleased”, Boylan wrote, “viewing the choice as a major reversal and an error on the part of the university, but he decided to stay on”. James Boylan, Pulitzer’s School: Columbia University’s School of Journalism, 1903-2003 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 233–234. Goldstein later contested the claim that elite journalists intervened in his favor, but offered no evidence for his counter-narrative. “After I was named”, Goldstein writes, “Jim [Carey] was not pleased with Columbia or with me, but he stayed on as a professor. Our relationship soured”. Goldstein, Journalism and Truth: Strange Bedfellows (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 121–124.

See Carey, “In Defense of Public Journalism”. As Carey told new Columbia Journalism School students at the School’s “Opening Day”, “For journalism and for us that purpose is the development and enhancement of public life, a common life which we can all share as citizens. The role journalism has played in constituting such a life is one of the noblest chapters in our history and one of our most fervent hopes for our future”. Carey, “The Struggle Against Forgetting”, Columbia Journalism Review 34, no. 5 (January/February 1996): 4.
CONCLUSION:
REPUTATION AT THE UNIVERSITY’S MARGINS

From the beginning Carey was a reluctant partner in the making of Communication as Culture, the 1989 essay collection that certified him as a leading media scholar of his generation. He had to be cajoled to sign onto the project, and remained for some time skeptical of its merits. A few of the volume’s eight essays were originally published more than 15 years earlier. His own thought, never systematic anyway, had shifted in material ways. How could the scabrous critic of the electronic sublime be brought into alignment with the pragmatist redeemer of a usable American past? These were time-frozen dispatches that, set side-by-side, would betray their discrete origins.

Despite this fear, Carey was convinced to bring the essays together. In fact the publication of Communication as Culture was an unalloyed triumph. No longer slotted away in often-obscure periodicals, his essays gained a new, wide readership. The pre-publication editing did not eliminate contradiction and inconsistency—the book itself was tellingly divided between the first four “culture” essays and four technology-oriented pieces—but the book’s writerly poise and thematic continuities made it coherent enough. The graceful flow of the four culture essays, in particular, sealed Carey’s reputation as the U.S. field’s philosopher-critic.

David Thorburn, an MIT literature professor already known for his humanist readings of American television, was the collection’s instigator. Carey had invited Thorburn to Illinois to lead the College of Communication’s Seibert Seminars in early 1984.1 It was, Thorburn remembers, an “extended stay”—around six weeks—and during this visit he first raised the idea of an essay collection. “I had the sense”,
he recalled, “that people were much less aware of the richness of [Carey’s] contribution to media studies—that he was less influential than he would have been had he collected the essays earlier”.2 Carey promised to consider the idea, but without conviction.

Thorburn returned to Urbana a year and a half later as a visiting professor invited by Carey.3 Thorburn pressed his case again. This time Carey agreed in principle, but remained reluctant. In Thorburn’s memory, Carey’s reticence derived from his sense of himself as an essayist, whose essays, moreover, were “independent agents that didn’t fit together well”.4

On this second visit Thorburn was able to make a more concrete offer. He had recently been named editor of a media studies book series by the venerable British trade publisher Allen & Unwin.5 It was, ironically, Carey who apparently recommended him for the series.6 Carey had worked with the Allen & Unwin editor, Lisa Freeman, when she was at Sage Publications. When Freeman joined Allen & Unwin as its first American editor, she proposed a series on humanistic currents in communication research—and asked Carey for his advice.7 He recommended Thorburn. Soon the three of them were talking about the idea: “Is there a space in the American academic environment”, they asked, “for a new book series that would focus on cultural approaches to communication, but the American flavor”. As Freeman later recalled, “David [Thorburn] and I very much saw Jim [Carey] as being the father of that—he was the intellectual father”. But they had to convince a still-reluctant Carey to assemble the essays and draft an introduction.8

Thorburn gathered, with the help of Illinois staff, a number of Carey’s essays, selected the “most compelling”, and presented them in proposed order. Carey remained hesitant, but soon after agreed—and with, Thorburn remembers, gathering excitement.9 As Carey worked to edit the essays, he came to see the connections across his writings, particularly within the first four culture essays.10 Thorburn was not much involved in the editing itself, but proposed the book’s title—and continued to press Carey to complete the revisions and an introduction.11 All that gentle prodding succeeded: Communication as Culture was published in Thorburn’s series before the decade was out.12

**Willful Ambiguity**

The book’s short introduction had the difficult task of threading the essays together. With typical dexterity and elegance, Carey really does span the stages of his
intellectual career. His approach, frankly admitted, is to profess his own ambiguous take on the American past. It’s an uneasy balance, but it works: he manages to deliver his critique of feverish techno-rhetoric, reprise his account of 19th century spatial bias, and still affirm the nation-binding quality of ritual and shared narrative. The tensions—between technology and culture, space and time, critique and solidarity—are all there; they are the background to his studiously equivocal portrait of the country’s history.

Against the view that the late-20th century spread of electronic media represents a major rupture, he insists that this is “the latest chapter in an old story”. His basic tack is to describe the American past as shot through with both space-conquering media technology and an enduring—and reparative—oral culture. From the outset, he writes, the country was built up around distance-devouring communication forms. But, he quickly adds, this “technological extension and resettlement could never unload the instincts and necessities of an ancient past outside history”. The country remains “possessed” by that which it “no longer quite possessed”: “rituals and narratives that are in the strict sense anthropological”.13

The introduction continues in this manner, alternating between a mostly downcast read of transmission-oriented extension in space and a restorative tack back to a durable culture of republican talk. The two trends are presented as neither complementary nor antithetical. Instead they are mutually shaping and, at least occasionally, in healthy balance.

The U.S. was, he writes in an echo of his Innisian account of the late 1970s, the “product of literacy, cheap paper, rapid and inexpensive transportation, and the mechanical reproduction of words”. The motivation was to eclipse time and space but—and here he departs from the earlier story—“neither could be eclipsed”. For Americans had imported from Europe older thought patterns rooted in orality. “Grafting ancient European cultures” to those in North America created “strange but identifiable scar tissue”. The scar tissue was a resource; the inherited culture of talk helped Americans “ritualize and stabilize experience in the new world”.14

The country’s formation occurred just as these two tendencies—the distance-covering and time-preserving—were in equilibrium. “A historical void was opened up”, he writes, “a space between the oral and written traditions”. Ancient habits of speech and storytelling, in other words, were “overlaid with newer habits of literacy”. It is true, Carey admits, that the new orientation to writing and print cultivated habits (like long-distance communication) that were “at odds” with the oral tradition. Nevertheless, the two traditions were propitiously symbiotic; one became the form for the substance of the other: “both traditions”, he writes, “were
substantively empty until they were reciprocally filled: until the characteristic tales of
the oral tradition were translated into a printed register; until the characteristic
habits and outlooks of printing filtered through speech and discourse”. It’s a
startling and inventive argument, if also quite convenient. But it is not elaborated.
The next line, instead, concedes that the “entire transmigration” (the formal-
substantive inter-coupling) is a “complicated one”—and announces a turn to the
“political side of the story”.15

Carey proceeds to gloss a “broad consensus” in Western philosophy, from
Plato through to Montesquieu, that democracy was only viable within small,
geographically bounded communities. The founders of the United States proposed
to supersede these limits, with a “republic on a scale never before imagined or
thought possible”. Whether the audacious project could succeed was an open
question. The country’s strategy, in any event, was long-distance media: “in the
word and the wheel, in transportation and transmission, in the power of printing and
civil engineering”. The continent was crosscut with roads and, in time, railroads and
wires, with the aim to “bind a vast distance and a large population into cultural
unity”. In a half-reference to his own more caustic take on the New York-centric
radiation of these networks, he adds, “or, as the less optimistic would have have it,
into cultural hegemony”. This reliance on the “space-binding potential of
communication” placed republican character and virtue under great strain. The
hope was that these habits would be won by the “time-binding power of oral speech
and discourse”. Though he had struck a more optimistic note earlier in the
introduction, here he offers a qualified agnosticism about the long-term success of
the nation-binding enterprise.16

For “much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” the country did, “here
and there”, approximate the Greek ideal. The citizen was “situated in and
preoccupied by, our federal histories notwithstanding, the activity of the local
community”. He continues with similar ambivalence: “distance and terrain led to an
emphasis that reached a somewhat romantic flowering in Jefferson’s ideal of a
democracy of the middle landscape”.17 His hedged language—“here and there”,
“notwithstanding”, and “somewhat”—temper the otherwise hopeful narrative.

The point, he repeats, is that the country has always entertained “different and
contradictory” notions, one deriving from the printing press and the other situated
within the “ancient theory and practice of the voice”. The dominant policy—the
“transmission or transportation solution”—was grounded in the belief that roads,
canals and literacy—the first notion—would be enough to maintain a continent-
spanning public. Carey is less certain. He shares both the “hopes” of boosters and
the “fears” of critics, opting to “live with rather than try to escape the contradictions and ambiguities of the culture”. The book’s essays, he announces, maintain this willful ambiguity: they “do not attempt to exorcise the contradictions”. Instead, the chapters “exploit” the ambiguities of American culture in order “that we might, in a happy phrase of Clifford Geertz, ‘increase the precision with which we vex one another’”. By elevating uncertainty to a virtue, Carey is able to accommodate the whole family of his thought. His career-spanning tensions—notably between culture and technology (as rival forms of explanation and evaluation), but also his conflicted readings of the country’s past—are resolved through irresolution.

The essays’ intermittent and scattered composition, he admits, mean that they are “sometimes in an irritable counterpoint to one another, more a running argument and an extended conversation than a neatly articulated structure”. Ingenuously invoking the introduction’s ambiguous portrait of American history, he adds in closing: “But in that they mirror the pulse and texture of the culture that is their underlying subject”.

A Revised Approach

Carey supplemented the framing work of the introduction with revisions to a few of the essays. In the book’s “Acknowledgments”, he admits that he has made these alterations. For most chapters, he states, the revisions were minor, though he acknowledges merging a “few essays that at one time had an independent existence”. Despite the changes, “the outlook and specifics remain true to the original publication, even when”, he adds, “in hindsight I wanted to alter more than a few judgments”. Carey is right about this; most of his revisions are minor, and all of them understandable. Still, the cumulative effect—especially for the four-chapter “culture” sequence—is to suggest an exaggerated continuity in his thought. In particular, the shift from Geertzian interpretation to Rortyan pragmatism is much harder to detect.

The most important revisions were made to the four “culture” chapters that lead off the collection. These chapters, as published in Communication as Culture, really do cohere; they come off as an elegantly packaged treatise. The first essay’s brief for a “cultural approach”, in other words, seems to lead by design into the next three; each reads as an extension of the last. One obvious reason for this effect is that the essays, even in their original form, stitch
together remarkably well. There is, for sure, stylistic continuity and a set of recurring referents (to Dewey, for example). And key themes—the desiccation of mainstream effects research, the irreducibility of culture—get reiterated in every chapter. Still, the edits that Carey made—in particular, to the second chapter as published—served to smooth out the remaining ruffles. The revisions accentuated, for example, the always-already American character of his thought—downplayed, that is, its European dependencies. The changes also made his commitment to pragmatism seem to stretch across the four essays.

Both of these shifts (toward America and toward pragmatism) were already signaled by the remarkable framing of Carey’s Geertzian program in the original, 1975 “A Cultural Approach to Communication”. Carey’s interpretive manifesto, heavily indebted to Clifford Geertz and his European influences, was cast instead as an extension of the unfinished work of John Dewey. As discussed in Chapter Three, Dewey’s prominence was rhetorical and incidental to the essay’s core argument; the word “pragmatism” never appears. Even so, the essay’s first-chapter placement in Communication as Culture ensured that Dewey—and, by implication, the American pragmatism endorsed in later chapters—was animating the project from the beginning. As if to concede the point, Carey added a new footnote off of his brief, Dewey-quoting opener: “For further elaboration on these matters, see chapter 4”. The collection’s fourth chapter—“Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies”, originally published in Carey’s Rortyan period—really does elaborate a pragmatist program. In any event, the collection’s first chapter hardly needed retroactive edits; it was already framed as American and Deweyan. And indeed few changes were made.

The second chapter, based on Carey’s 1975 review of Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures, presented a thornier case. Recall that this essay had developed the same “ritual” and “transmission” contrast made in “A Cultural Approach”, but with ritual and transmission assigned to European and American thought, respectively. The claim was that Geertz in particular had helpfully synopsized European trends, and more broadly that American communication research would benefit from a European infusion. The essay refers, in its opening paragraphs, to the “particular tragedy” of “American isolation from important currents of European thought”—a state of affairs that Carey blames, in part, on the “ethnocentrism of American scholarship”. Plainly this would not do for Communication as Culture: the book’s introduction
had endorsed “useful ethnocentrism”, and the other three “culture” chapters place American thought-ways at their center.26

Carey’s solution was to cut away the Europeans altogether, and to splice in a substitute American genealogy. He did this by repurposing a discussion of the American “mass culture” debate from a different, 1974 essay. Geertz remains prominent, but he too has been Americanized. The essay’s original appeal to the Europeans is entirely eradicated as a result.

The opening paragraphs from Carey’s 1974 essay, “Popular Culture and Uses and Gratifications: Notes Toward an Accommodation”, replaced the 1975 paper’s introductory lament that American scholars were isolated from European developments—“among the most exciting and important developments in their field”.27 The 1974-derived replacement language is centered, instead, on the “major debate” on popular culture among American intellectuals in the 1950s. The 1974 presentation is, however, amended and supplemented in important if subtle ways, the net effect of which is to re-position the mass culture debate as a still-fertile forerunner to American cultural studies.

The original 1974 paper, for example, had in its second sentence half-dismissed the mass culture debaters: “the antagonists tended to talk past one another”.28 That clause, in the 1989 chapter, was replaced with “the antagonists kept answering questions no one was asking”.29 In the 1974 essay, Carey had complained that the debate had “evaporated”: “rather than resolving a debate, they lost a subject matter.”30 The complaint was re-issued in 1989, but with a pronoun change and a hint of recovery-to-come: “rather than resolving a debate, we lost, temporarily at least, a subject matter”.31 Carey also inserted fresh passages that, among other things, called out the “effects” tradition as well as the leftists he had engaged in the 1980s: “In the 1960s the study of popular culture was absorbed or disappeared into functional sociology and behaviorist psychology—into the ‘effects’ tradition... When the subject of popular culture reemerged in the 1970s, it had been stripped of its general moral, aesthetic, and social concerns and absorbed into one overriding problematic: the question of power and domination”.32

A new, long paragraph made the connection to American cultural studies explicit. “The fashion of recent years”, Carey writes, has been to dismiss the mass culture debate or to “treat it as an aberrational prelude to the more serious and theoretical work that followed”. He resists that fashion, Carey explains, because the debate’s protagonists “were on the hunt of the real goods”. He singles out for praise C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite, “admirably extended and enriched” by William
Kornhauser’s *The Politics of Mass Society*. Those works have “not been superseded by writers working the terrain of critical theory or postmodernism or even ‘effects’ research”. After conceding the European contribution—reduced here to a clause—Carey reaffirms American specificity:

Although the theory of popular culture has been powerfully and instructively elaborated by recent European work, that theory remains unadapted to the more fluid, ambiguous, anarchic conditions of North American life, conditions that are, to put too fine a point on it, ‘Tocquevillian.’ The continuing value of the older popular culture debate and the Mills-Kornhauser version of mass society is that they powerfully caught the structural conditions of life on this continent.33

The original 1975 Geertz review had been successfully reframed to match the American character of the other three “culture” chapters. Even Geertz has his European roots cut back. In the 1975 original, Carey’s lead-in to Geertz had concluded that the anthropologist’s views on communication “are more European than American” and “connect with what is called in Germany the ‘cultural sciences’ and, less pretentiously perhaps, in England ‘cultural studies’”.34 In 1989 the line is gone, and Geertz is instead anchored in the United States (and even Chicago):

The continuing advantage of Geertz’s work is that, while open to important European scholarship, it remains connected, in subtle ways, to Talcott Parsons, under whom Geertz studied, and the milieu of the University of Chicago, where he worked for an early and extended period. Therefore, while absorbing influences from phenomenology, semiotics, British philosophy, and continental literary criticism, Geertz remains in touch with the hard surfaces of American life, even when he is doing ethnography in Bali or Indonesia. Geertz remains open to transatlantic winds of doctrine but still is connected to the instructive lessons that derive from the concrete condition under which he works.35

Carey, in this new language, does not deny Geertz’s European debts. Still, he is at pains to situate his thought in the United States. The effort is overextended—Geertz had, after all, harshly criticized Richard Rorty’s ethnocentrism in a mid-1980s exchange36—but required nevertheless to harmonize *Communication as Culture*’s core “culture” sequence. Geertz’s interpretivist program had also underwritten “A Cultural Approach”, the book’s first chapter, as Carey acknowledged in the index.37 But in that case no renovation was necessary since Geertz had already, back in 1975, been submerged.

The most striking amendment to the book’s second chapter concerned the ritual-transmission contrast which, in the first, had already been outlined in
American terms. The original Geertz review essay had, after all, assigned ritual to Europe and transmission to the United States. “European and American work”, he wrote in 1975, “derives from quite different kinds of intellectual puzzles...grounded in two different metaphors for communication”. American studies are “grounded in a transmission or transportation view”, while the “preponderant view of communication in European studies is a ritual view of communication: communication is viewed as a process through which a shared culture is created, modified, and transformed”. In the 1989 version, the geographic assignments are dropped: it is “intellectual work on culture and communications” in general that is grounded in the two different metaphors. The ritual ideal is glossed in otherwise identical language, but with the reference to the “preponderant view” of the Europeans removed. In 1975 he had written that the “basic question that puzzles American students is quite different from the basic question that puzzles European students”. In 1989 the point was genericized: the “basic questions” of “one tradition” do not connect with the “basic questions of the other”.

Even pragmatism makes a new appearance in the chapter—its first mention in Communication as Culture. In 1975 Carey had summarized Raymond Williams’ criticism of the “mass” in “mass communication”, concluding that his “highlighting of conventions, forms and practices reflects an influence of marxism” and “literary criticism”. In the 1989 rendering, Carey assimilates the point to his preferred antecedents: Williams’ “distinctive emphasis, which derives in part from European Marxism, should not blind us to the fact that it is shared by American pragmatism as well”. Later in the 1989 chapter, Carey inserted a few fresh sentences as introduction to a section devoted to unpacking “Mannheim’s Dilemma” (as sketched by Geertz):

At the center of this book is a problem that equality and social class have created for North American intellectuals. We are officially committed to a belief in human reason as the instrument of political action. Without that commitment there is little left of a common political life beyond individual taste, choice, and rights.

In the original version, the discussion had been generically framed, as a problem of social-science explanation writ large. Here, however, the section is introduced with the communitarian language (“...common political life beyond individual taste, choice, and rights”) of Carey’s 1980s writings. Reason as an epistemological problem, in other words, gets redescribed in political terms. And the context of this political dilemma, in this rendering, is explicitly American.
The aggregate effect of all these revisions was to thoroughly transform the character, if not the Geertzian substrate, of the book’s second chapter. The chapter was, in short, brought into better alignment with the others. The book’s final two “culture” chapters were not overhauled like this. They were, after all, written in the 1980s, when a Rorty-inflected American pragmatism was already animating Carey’s work.

The collection’s third chapter did receive a new title—“Reconceiving ‘Mass’ and ‘Media’” substitutes for the 1982 “The Mass Media and Critical Theory: An American View”—and, in its opening line, a more explicit call-out to Rorty. But the essay is otherwise unchanged.

The fourth and concluding chapter was more substantially revised. The long footnotes on the utilitarian roots of the “effects” tradition, from the 1985 original, are here woven into the main text. Carey also makes his intellectual debts more explicit, to Rorty and to the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins. A new parenthetical, for example, is added after the utility theory discussion: “(Aspects of this formulation are taken from Sahlins, 1976)”.

Carey acknowledges Rorty in a similarly global aside, after presenting the core plea for more “poetry and politics” and less “metaphysics and determinism”: “(This argument is borrowed from Rorty, 1979, 1982, as well as some of his unpublished work.)”

Carey also tweaks the 1985 essay’s treatment of the 1950s mass culture debate—the same debate that had been spliced into chapter two. In the second chapter, recall, the protagonists of the 1950s debate were enlisted as forerunners to Carey’s interpretivist project. But in 1985, the mass culture debate was invoked, instead, to identify a native strand of non-Marxist critics sensitive to power and domination. To square the circle, Communication as Culture’s fourth chapter included a new clause. Referring to David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Harold Innis, and Kenneth Burke as comprising a “minor but enduring theme in media studies during the ferment in the 1940s and 1950s”, Carey in 1989 added, “a tradition that is simultaneously historic and interpretive, and critical”. The problem—that the mass culture debate was invoked in two distinct ways—was resolved by highlighting the four figures, here in the fourth chapter, as “historic and interpretive”, and not just critical.

The collection’s second section, titled “Technology and Culture”, included another four essays. Broadly speaking, two of the chapters—one on Innis and the other the already celebrated 1983 telegraph essay—address the deleterious spread of space-biased media in the second half of the 19th century. These essays, with Innis in mind, track the hard stuff of politics, commerce and economics. The
section’s other two chapters consist of Carey’s early 1970s collaborations with John Quirk on the “rhetoric of the technological sublime”. The four essays—two on technology, two on its discourse—share a critical spirit as well as a downcast take on the country’s technology-driven historical development. Of the four, only the Innis chapter—a blend of Carey’s 1975 and 1981 tributes—was substantially revised.

The tension, in both tone and explanatory focus, between the book’s two sections was allowed to stand. The first four essays, especially as revised, are more optimistic, and refuse to reduce culture and meaning to technology or economics. The second four, by contrast, tell a gloomier story grounded in the baleful impact of technology and its recurring celebrants. It was left to the book’s resolutely ambiguous introduction to do the bridging work.

The point of scrutinizing the book’s revisions is not to condemn Carey’s choices. The four constitutive essays of the culture section, after all, were already propitiously aligned. His edits did in fact achieve their purpose: the derived chapters, in sequence, became something more than their sum. Still, the shift in Carey’s underlying commitments—from Geertz to Rorty, from European hermeneutics to American pragmatism—were obscured to subsequent readers. As the field continues its long engagement with Carey’s thought, the fact of the shift and its intellectual implications deserve to be part of the conversation.

The Field’s Reception

The publication of Communication as Culture was a watershed moment for Carey. He was already prominent, to be sure. The Illinois deanship, together with his charisma as a teacher and lecturer, secured Carey a measure of recognition long before Thorburn persuaded him to collect the essays. And a few publications—the telegraph essay and “A Cultural Approach”, notably—were already in wide circulation. Still, the book gained Carey a new degree of fame, for at least a pair of reasons. His writings, once dispersed and hard to retrieve, were brought together in a single, widely publicized package. Though sales figures are unavailable, the book was widely read—if the early and ever-expanding tally of cited references are taken as a proxy. “I think he didn’t realize how seriously his reputation would alter”, says Thorburn, “how significant an impact it would have on people’s awareness of his work”. Within a year or two, Thorburn remembers, Carey was
marveling over the sharp uptick in invitations and inquiries that the book had generated.54

The other factor, though harder to pin down, was the streamlined, programmatic coherence that the four-chapter culture sequence lent to Carey’s thought. Framed as a two-front argument with the field’s mainstream and its leftist critics, the book came across as a living alternative—a third way with no debts to Marx or survey research. In that respect the collection fulfilled, twenty-five years later, Carey’s local initiative to position “cultural studies” as a rival to Illinois’ Marxists and behavioral scientists.

The analogy to 1963 is worth invoking from another angle. When Carey coined the “cultural studies” term, the label was a big-tent referent to a bundle of figures united only in their dissent from Marxism and behavioral science. The canopy was both enlarged and contracted in the subsequent decades, but the polyglot character of Carey’s intellectual work endured. He was never, even in 1989, a systematic thinker. Certainly by the 1980s, he had come to oppose, on principled intellectual grounds, the very idea of systematicity. And he was, here in Communication as Culture’s introduction, the first to admit that his probing, essayistic thought-style was not conducive to consistency. The precision he had in mind was mutual vexation. The coherence of the collection—leaving aside the tension between the volume’s two sections—was itself, in part, an achievement of revision and style.

Carey’s thought, as even his students and admirers have conceded, was contradictory and enigmatic—which was reflected in, but also indexed by, his preference for the essay form. No wonder that it is difficult to identify a major intellectual project built on Carey’s foundations, with the notable exception of Jay Rosen’s public journalism initiative.55 And yet, to revive the mystery that opened this book, his students and countless others testify to his abiding influence. He remains, even today, a metonym for cultural inquiry in the field’s textbooks, and a syllabus-anchoring totem. His influence is gestured at far more often than it is affirmed in practice.

What accounts for this powerful, yet fugitive, hold? The key is to bracket the positive side of his program, and to attend instead to the sort of intellectual self he projected. Whether his culturalist approach achieved an overarching coherence mattered far less, in the end, than the particular kind of academic life he lived. He represented an urbane yet unpretentious alternative to the careerist anti-intellectualism of the field’s mainstream core, and an alternative, too, to the theoreticist one-upmanship of the discipline’s Marxists and postmodernists. He was,
to put the point differently, a walking symbol of the kind of intellectual that many young scholars and graduate students imagined themselves to be.

In developing this point, I am drawing again on the sociologist Neil Gross, whose notion of intellectual self-concept I invoked to help explain Carey’s preference for the reformist ethnocentrism of Richard Rorty.\textsuperscript{56} By intellectual self-concept Gross means the “more or less stable narrative thinkers use to understand who they are as intellectuals”. That is, we construct the stories of our scholarly lives, he argues, around “categories of intellectual personhood”—categories like “scientist” or “feminist”.\textsuperscript{57} These categories, through a range of biographical experiences, may become “durably anchored in a thinker’s narrative of self”.\textsuperscript{58} His view is that many academics strive to do work, embrace ideas, or endorse other scholars that resonate with their intellectual self-concepts. His point is not to downplay the importance of reputation-seeking, resource competition, and other instrumental explanations for the way academics behave. Instead, the idea of intellectual self-concept is useful, he argues, when those strategic factors don’t provide much explanatory leverage.

With Gross’ ideas in mind, Carey’s influence does not derive from his claims for the telegraph nor his Geertzian hermeneutics—certainly not his avowed ethnocentrism. My suggestion, rather, is that Carey’s public enactment—in writing and in person—of a particular intellectual stance resonated with the self-concepts of many emerging scholars. The negative side of his project was in this respect crucial: in his eloquent and unrelenting criticisms of mainstream scientism in particular, he was marking off the boundaries of a different, more humane orientation to the field’s questions. He was saying, in effect, that this is not the kind of work real intellectuals do.

The manner in which he made this implicit claim—his intellectual style—was perhaps more important still. Throughout this book I have tried to highlight key features of that style. He was, for one, a roving ventriloquist who artfully re-narrated the thought of others to make the case against the quantitative mainstream. The figures he favored were invariably outsiders to communication research—imported eminences whose intellectual sheen derived in part from their foreign status. His preferred mode of argument, moreover, was intellectual history. With sweeping confidence he told stories—a lot of them—about the field’s past. The point, in every case, was to identify dead ends—most often “positivism” or the “effects tradition”—and to suggest by historical proxy a more desirable, if underspecified, alternative. The pastiche-like quality of these narratives only enhanced their appeal as graceful (and graspable) origin stories and morality tales.
There is, finally, the example of Carey’s writing. For sheer beauty his prose remains unequaled, at the sentence-level but also within and across his chosen form, the humanistic essay. His plain-speaking erudition was an implied rebuke to the polysyllabic drudgery of the standard journal article.

These overlapping dimensions of intellectual style amounted to an invitation for a different kind of academic life. My approach in this book has been to focus on Carey’s published work, but his special magnetism was if anything reserved for the seminar room and conference auditorium—and also, more tellingly, the hallway and the bar. An early 1970s, student-authored course guide deemed the standard Carey lecture a close second to William Jennings Bryan’s “cross of gold” speech. Marked by wild gesticulations and runic asides, his lectures were “energetic almost to the point of being frenetic”. Seeming at “times like a leprechaun and at other times like an Irish village priest, donning and doffing his spectacles frequently in the course of his presentation”, remembered one former student, “he both puzzled and charmed his hearers”. Carey, once his fame grew after *Communication as Culture*, was regularly featured at conference sessions convened in his honor. As another former student recalled, conference attendees would clear their schedules: “People would line up in the hallway, door propped open, and strain their ears to be able to hear what [Carey] had to say”. He was, by many accounts, refreshingly allergic to the publish-or-perish scramble, and actively discouraged his students from rushing seminar papers to print. His talent for conversation—with colleagues, friends and students alike—was celebrated in nearly every tribute published after his 2006 death.

There were, indeed, dozens of these memorials, far more than any figure has collected in the history of the organized discipline. Most testified to Carey’s influence with manifest reverence, but almost none could identify a weighty scholarly debt. Instead these tributes are brimming with admiration for Carey’s example as an intellectual. He “taught me how to value university life”, wrote one former student. Another reflected that, for Carey, “the college was a living thing and that all who were a part of it, no matter what part they played, were forever of it”. Still another remembered that, to Carey, “the point of academe was something more than, and different from, the time to read, the mandate to write, or the chance to teach”. Carey modeled, in short, an academic life that spoke to—resonated with—the kind of intellectual these eulogists recognized themselves to be. This resonance helps to explain his enduring renown, but it is also his legacy. He furnished by his
example a critique of the discipline’s scientism, permitting countless others to work in the space he opened up. He ventilated the field.

Reputation at the University’s Margins

A central argument of this book is that the same conditions that enhanced Carey’s stature within the discipline made it likely that he would be little read beyond. And indeed his voice, still prominent in U.S. communication research, is seldom heard outside the discipline. He benefited from, and suffered by, the field’s marginal status. By perching on its borders, he could translate, in his own terms, the invigorating work of the other social sciences. Allusions drawn from the literary humanities, unknown or otherwise neglected by the discipline, furnished his writing with nonconformist vitality. Relevant extra-disciplinary figures—Innis, Geertz and Rorty most especially—could be imported to a field that had, up to then, a constricted reading list. All of this was electrifying to a significant—and after 1989 expanding—portion of the U.S. field. For everyone else, including the mainstream “effects” figures he attacked, Carey’s thought could not be easily dismissed. He came to occupy, in other words, a recognized territory, adjacent to the field’s other legitimate programs.

So the border-perching helped. But the field’s weak status, relative to its neighbors, made exporting back much harder to pull off. Carey was free to scout about the university, but could only report back to his colleagues at the professional-school margins. Communication research giveth, and communication research taketh away.

In the awkward language of the sociology of academic life, the communication discipline qualifies as a “fragmented adhocracy”, characterized by intellectual and institutional heterogeneity. Like other marginal fields, the U.S. discipline suffers from two types of dependence, strategic and functional. In strategic terms, the field’s reputations are dependent on norms derived from more prestigious disciplines. In Carey’s case this meant that his renown was yoked to the fortunes, notably, of the interpretive turn in social science and the revival of American pragmatism. Communication scholars are also functionally dependent; they rely on the research tools and approaches of other, higher-status disciplines. Here again Carey’s project—if “tools” can be loosely defined—was hitched to intellectual stock drawn from philosophy, anthropology and economics. It’s not just Carey: the whole communication discipline is colored by these
dependencies. One consequence is that the field’s center is thereby weakened; there is, in other words, a kind of centrifugal pull. The field’s weak center, for Carey, was a virtue: He could forage elsewhere and make it count back home. But the other, less-dependent disciplines—the source, in other words, for the borrowed thought—were unlikely to pay much heed.

Another way of getting at this is to locate U.S. communication research along a series of disciplinary contrasts. Convergent disciplines are tightly knit and cohesive, while divergent disciplines are loosely structured and disjointed. A related point of contrast concerns disciplinary communication: Disciplines with an urban communication style are characterized by tightly bounded sub-disciplines and research areas with rapid and heavily used information networks; rural communication patterns are slower-paced, with fewer researchers working on a given topic, and poorly defined boundaries between specialisms and the field as a whole.

There are, too, the more familiar axes of distinction: hard disciplines like physics can be distinguished, at least in the academic imaginary, from soft disciplines like literature. Likewise, pure disciplines like anthropology are frequently defined against applied fields like criminology. A final hinge of difference concerns the character of a discipline’s origins. Externally-generated disciplines like nursing owe their existence to government and/or market demands, while internally-generated disciplines emerged—in theory at least—from intellectual problematics.

To circle back to communication research, the field is on the “wrong” side of each contrast, at least in reputational terms: divergent, rural, soft, applied and externally generated. It’s true that these are artificial pole-ends that never apply in fact, and that paired opposites like hard/soft and pure/applied exist to some large extent only in the minds of academics. Nevertheless, as Carey among many others insisted, beliefs have practical (and frequently self-fulfilling) consequences. Communication research, especially as institutionalized in the U.S., sits on the low-prestige margins of the university.

My suggestion is that this relative prestige gap has had intellectual effects. The field, to borrow a commercial metaphor from information science, maintains a knowledge deficit in the balance of academic trade. That is, communication research has tended to import more than it exports. Perhaps the claim can be measured—refuted or otherwise—in large-scale citation analysis. That was not, however, my approach in this book.
Instead, I propose the Carey case as a particular illustration of a wider dynamic. I find myself nodding in agreement, but also sensing a tragic irony, in Carey’s own call for cross-disciplinary foraging. In a 1985 interview he encouraged fellow communication researchers to “go looking at the work of shepherds tending different sheep in different valleys”. Disciplines are an administrative necessity, he said, but nothing more: “In fact, all important work is done at the interdisciplines”.76 This seems right, but in the end Carey’s location in this discipline meant that his important work was confined to one especially remote valley.
NOTES

1 David Thorburn (professor, MIT), interview with the author, July 2013. See also “Professor David Thorburn - Curriculum Vitae”, accessed July 14, 2014, http://www.mit.edu/people/thorburn/cv.html. The subtitle of Thorburn’s talk on American television includes a reference to Geertz: “Toward Thick Description”. Thorburn did not recall the circumstances of their original meeting, but noted that Carey was “sympathetic to sort of my perspective which was like his, an ambivalent left conservatism”. Thorburn, interview.

2 Thorburn, interview. When he raised the idea, Thorburn recalled, Carey “raised his eyebrows—’Oh, something to think about’—but I don’t think he was persuaded”.

3 He served as the George A. Miller Visiting Professor, University of Illinois, 1985-86. “Professor David Thorburn - Curriculum Vitae”; Thorburn, interview.

4 Ibid.

5 Thorburn, interview; Lisa Freeman (former editor, Unwin Hyman), interview with the author, July 2014.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid. Freeman cited a talk by Janice Radway at an International Communication Association conference “that threw everybody into a state of total chaos... The whole field decides, ‘Oh my god, there’s something to this’... You could feel things starting to shift a little bit”. Ibid.

8 Ibid. Referring to Thorburn and herself, Freeman added, “This became our mission, to get Jim to do this”.

9 Thorburn: “By the time we had ... winnowed [the number of essays] down, I think [Carey] had become excited about the project. He had begun to realize that there was something significant happening here and he became very enthusiastic”. Thorburn, interview.

10 Ibid. According to Freeman, Thorburn “really was the one who sort of said, ‘Now these are the essays, Jim, and this is the order they should go in, Jim...’” Freeman, interview.

11 Thorburn, interview; Freeman, interview.

12 By the date of publication, Allen & Unwin had merged with another firm to form Unwin Hyman. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). In his preface, Thorburn gestured at Carey as an alternative to the Marxist approach to cultural studies then prevalent: “His voice is distinctive and important in our current scholarly climate, that is, in part for its very refusal to yield entirely to a vocabulary of power, for its resistance to the privileging of ‘ideological’ as against ‘mythic’ or ‘ritual’ or ‘anthropological’ elements in the description and interpretation of cultural formations”. Thorburn, Series Editor’s Introduction, Communication as Culture, ix.

13 Ibid., 2.

14 Ibid., 2–3.

15 Ibid., 3.

16 Ibid., 3–5.

17 Ibid., 6.

18 Ibid., 6–9.
Ibid., 9. The quotation is uncited, but is probably drawn from Interpretation of Cultures’ discussion of the limits of interpretive knowledge: “Anthropology, or at least interpretive anthropology, is a science whose progress is marked less by a perfection of consensus than by a refinement of debate. What gets better is the precision with which we vex each other”. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 29.

Carey, Communication as Culture, 9.

Ibid., xii.


Carey, Communication as Culture, 35.


Ibid., 173.

Carey, Communication as Culture, 2.


Carey and Kreiling, “ Popular Culture”, 225.

Carey, Communication as Culture, 37.


Carey, Communication as Culture, 38.

Ibid.


Carey, “Communication and Culture”, 175.

Ibid., 39–40.


As noted in Chapter Three, the book’s index reads, “Geertz, Clifford, 9, 13–68 passim, 86”. Pages 13–86 comprise all of Communication as Culture’s first two chapters.

Carey, “Communication and Culture”, 177.

Carey, Communication as Culture, 42.

Carey, “Communication and Culture”, 177.

Carey, Communication as Culture, 43.


Carey, Communication as Culture, 41.

Ibid., 45.


Carey, Communication as Culture, 69.


49 Ibid., 30.


54 Thorburn, interview.

55 See, for example, Jay Rosen, *What Are Journalists For?* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).


See the online Bibliography for the History of Communication Research: http://www.citeulike.org/group/14507/tag/carey.

Pauly, “Remembering a Mentor”, 335.

Jones, “So Far? So Early?” 9


Ibid.

Ibid., 267.

Ibid., 282.


Ibid., ch. 6.

Ibid., 33–40, 171–176.

