In its first few decades, US communication research was shaped by a pair of institutional patrons: the federal government and the big foundations. Beginning with the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s, on through to the Ford Foundation’s 1950s social science spending spree, the philanthropic agenda was, to a large extent, the field’s agenda. And the foundations during this period frequently aligned themselves with the federal government—the other giant patron of communication research. One result was that the study of communication was organized, to a remarkable degree, around the question of effective propaganda design. With World War II and the Cold War as backdrops, the communication researcher became, in effect, a social scientific specialist in “psychological warfare.”

It is not enough, of course, to leave it there; plenty of other factors, including good-faith enthusiasm for new kinds of quantitative social science, helped give the emerging field its distinctive shape. Still, the thumbnail I’ve sketched will do for now, since my aim in this chapter is to highlight a contrast. If early communication research was indeed in the persuasion business, then one enabling factor was foundation largesse from Ford and others; the foundations underwrote the field’s fixation on changing men’s minds, very often in support of military ends. That was then.

Things have changed rather dramatically over the last decade. Ford has self-consciously directed substantial funds to the media democracy movement—over $20 million from 1999 to 2008. Some of that money has supported communication scholarship, with the idea that media scholars, activists, and
policy advocates might mutually inform the movement’s goals. With this recent support in mind—and with a glance back at the 1930s and 1950s—we might say that the field’s foundation patrons have shifted from psychological warfare to social justice.

The claim needs some parsing, of course. But for the moment I want to linger on a strange fact: the Ford Foundation that worked closely with the CIA in the 1950s is the same Ford Foundation that has made dozens of media-democracy grants over the last decade, many of them involving communication scholars. The turnabout is striking on its own terms but comes off as especially startling to those of us reared on a particular story—let’s call it the beholder foundation—about Ford, Rockefeller, and the others. According to this story, the twentieth-century American foundation has served the interests of big capital by smoothing over the market’s rough edges and by managing dissent. Foundations like Carnegie, the account states, supply a veneer of philanthropic legitimacy to policies and initiatives that ultimately benefit the captains of industry whose fortunes they inherited. Ford and the rest, according to the story, have also aided—even spearheaded—sensitive government initiatives, especially in the Cold War years. Social science, all along, has been a favorite tool of the beholder foundation, according to the many scholars who have contributed to the story.

Philanthropy as the robber barons’ soft gloves: the claim is made in a large, cross-disciplinary literature. Foundations (to quote book and chapter titles) are agents of “cultural imperialism” and “collaboration”; they supply an “extension of ideology” and “the mask of pluralism.” Many of these are well-supported and convincing accounts; there really are a number of documented cases, especially during the early Cold War, when Ford and the others acted to contain dissent and help out the national security state. The history of midcentury communication research that I sketched earlier draws substantially on this work.

It’s the strength of the foundation-critique literature that makes the recent Ford work on media democracy so startling. The twentieth-century pattern has not held. In the last decade, Ford has battled, through its funded proxies, the big media companies. And the foundation enlisted communication scholars to aid the effort. One lesson is that another world is possible for foundations too.

**Foundations for Change**

The philanthropic foundation comes off as an unlikely agent of social change. Foundations are, after all, constrained by law and by restrictions put in place by benefactors. Foundations are also—the big ones at least—hierarchical and many-layered. In theory, authority flows from a board of trustees, through
to a board-appointed president, on down to a staff that awards grants and runs programs.

In practice, however, there is often a great deal of officer-level autonomy. Big foundations’ official flow charts disguise the on-the-ground freedom that some program officers maintain. It’s also true that newly installed presidents, depending on the foundation, are expected to launch initiatives and reshape existing programs—within limits. Crucially, those limits aren’t just internal—board oversight, say—but are also set by conditions outside, like the national political climate.4

The philanthropic foundation is, in short, a human institution, made up of real people whose convictions matter. The broader conditions of politics matter too. Foundations might be—have been—servants of the state or handmaidens of capital. But they need not be. My case in point is the Ford Foundation’s media-democracy agenda over the last ten years. Although substantial grant-making in this area didn’t get under way until 1999, the roots of the initiative date back to 1996, when Susan Berresford became the foundation’s first female president. Berresford reorganized the foundation’s program structure, with special attention to Ford’s media-related grant making. Though uninvolved in its day-to-day operations, she was responsible for the original commitment to the media-policy agenda as well as the ongoing financial support. Berresford’s patronage mattered.

Becky Lentz was another key figure in Ford’s media initiatives. Lentz, a veteran information services professional and midcareer doctoral student at the University of Texas at Austin, took a leave from her graduate studies to head up, beginning in 2001, the Ford “portfolio” responsible for most of the relevant grant making.5 Lentz was embedded in a network of scholar-activists committed to media democratization as part of a broader social justice agenda. Over her six-year tenure at Ford, Lentz drew on this community for advice and strategic direction. More than anyone else, it was Lentz who gave shape to the foundation’s on-the-ground interventions in the media and democracy field. Lentz mattered too.

The initiative wouldn’t have happened—at least in the form that it took—without, however, certain enabling conditions. The end of the Cold War in 1989 was especially important. Since the early 1950s, right-wing politicians have assailed (and periodically investigated) the big US foundations, and Ford in particular, for alleged sympathy for socialism and, by extension, the country’s enemies. In a Cold War political culture that exposed left-leaning individuals and institutions to sometimes virulent red-baiting, Ford and the others charted an often cautious course.6 Skittish trustees and predictable flack from the Right led foundations like Ford to tread carefully around initiatives whose social
justice goals might be taken up as evidence of disloyalty. After 1989, some of this pressure was lifted.

The end of the Cold War was important for another reason: the blurring of the Left’s once-sharp divide between reformers and radicals. The collapse of “actually existing socialism” occurred in the midst of an embrace of market-based solutions to public policy problems. Market fundamentalism, especially in Britain and the United States since the early 1980s, had justified policies that benefitted the wealthy at the expense of the social safety net and the poor. The US ideological spectrum, at least in electoral politics, had already shifted rightward by the time the country’s Cold War enemy buckled. In the face of the market juggernaut—and with no real socialist alternative—the traditional enmity between reformers and radicals lost some of its edge. If the word “liberal” was, for the New Left of the 1960s for example, a pejorative, the post-1989 resistance to market fundamentalism served to rally liberals and radicals alike around concepts like strong democracy. The always-fractious Left was to some extent united by a common enemy.

In the years after 1989, the media’s role in a healthy democracy took on special importance for this broader Left. An emerging media democracy movement enlisted the energies of both radicals and reformers—hard leftists alongside defenders of mainstream journalism. The media democracy question, certainly by the late 1990s, was widely perceived to be a major (perhaps the major) front in the battle to halt the market’s momentum. The movement’s growth was fueled not only by both threats and opportunities (the ongoing efforts to rollback public interest protections) but also by the democratic promise of new technologies like the Internet. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, which loosened a number of public-interest limits on media companies, started a wave of industry consolidation. Wall Street demands for high profits led to increasingly underfunded newsrooms dependent on handouts from public relations firms. The creeping commercialization of the Internet, alongside uneven access to its benefits, also galvanized activists, scholars, and policy advocates to join the effort. The movement had attracted enough broad-based public support to stop, in 2004, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from further relaxing ownership limits.

Defensive efforts like these were joined by a number of alternative media experiments, some of which, like the various Indymedia sites, harnessed new digital technologies. Other projects have drawn on “old” technologies like radio: since the late 1990s, a number of groups fought, and ultimately won, FCC approval for low-power FM (LPFM) stations. Since at least 2003, major movement actors have campaigned to establish a “net neutrality” principle of Internet regulation, to prevent big media companies from discriminating among web content providers. Some of the same groups have sought to carve
out more space, especially online, for the public domain in the name of creativity and shared culture. On the international stage, activists who coalesced around the UN-sponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in the late 1990s have articulated a “right to communicate” alongside other human rights claims.

Dozens of US-based groups—some, like the Media Access Project, venerable but resurgent, and many others, like Reclaim the Media, recently founded—make up a loose coalition of public interest nonprofits that work on one or more of these issues. Though US media reform efforts have been under way, with varying intensity, since at least the 1930s, the surge of activity since the mid-1990s is unprecedented. There is, to a significant degree, movement self-consciousness, and growing public awareness of, and involvement in, the movement’s campaigns. There are real fissures, to be sure, reflecting tactical differences, clashes over priorities, competition for scarce funds, and disputes between Washington, DC-based policy advocates and grassroots activists. Indeed, the movement’s name itself is contested terrain, with word choice—media reform versus media justice, for example—fraught with symbolic import. (The broader post-1989 rapprochement of reformers and radicals that I alluded to earlier was partial and tentative, and remains so.) Still, many of the constituent groups engage in a mix of reform-oriented advocacy and alternative media projects. The National Conferences for Media Reform—there have been four since 2003—gather together thousands of actors from all corners of the movement.

The Ford Foundation, as I detail later, has been the single largest funder of the media democracy movement, at least since 1999. Ford dollars have seeded efforts across the movement’s typical divides—from radical media justice work by and for the undervoiced to inside-the-Beltway lobbying. For now, I want to emphasize a different point: the Ford initiatives were only feasible in the context of a preexisting movement for media reform—even if the movement that Ford encountered was atrophied from funding neglect, with no popular constituency. Foundations are pliable, up to a point. Individuals like Lentz exercised autonomy, but it was freedom opened up by a changed social backdrop: new post-1989 political conditions and the reawakening media democracy movement itself. Ford may have enabled media reform, but media reform enabled Ford first.

**Ford and the Media Democracy Movement, 1999–2008**

When Susan V. Berresford assumed the Ford presidency in 1996, the foundation’s media grant making centered on content. Since the late 1970s, the foundation had been funding documentary filmmakers and other programmers,
whose work typically appeared on public television or radio. *The Eyes on the Prize* (1987) civil rights series and the urban public school film *Stand and Deliver* (1988) were emblematic of the effort. All told, the foundation spent over $120 million on media content from the late 1970s up through 1996, the year Berresford became president. At the pre-Berresford Ford, content was king.

Berresford, a 25-year Ford veteran whose officer and management roles had centered on urban and women’s issues, changed this. As part of a foundation-wide reorganization, Berresford folded the cross-program media content initiative, the Media Projects Fund (MPF), into a new Media, Arts, and Culture (MAC) unit. MAC was housed within a new Education, Media, Arts and Culture (EMAC) program—one of three overarching divisions in Berresford’s streamlined Ford. Though it is easy to get lost in the acronyms, the move was crucial for a number of reasons. First, the prominent place of media in the new Ford structure signaled a fresh commitment to communication issues. Second, media grant making was now housed in a dedicated unit, free to articulate its own goals. Under the pre-Berresford system, media funds had been dispersed to support other, nonmedia programs and projects.

Third and most important, the new MAC unit explicitly widened its mandate beyond content for public broadcasting. Here a key role was played by Andrea Taylor, a former journalist and founding director of the Media Projects Fund. Before she left the foundation in 1996, Taylor advised Berresford to take up media policy issues in the aftermath of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Media policy, activism, and scholarship were now on the agenda.

After 1996, the foundation began to make relatively small-scale, exploratory grants outside its traditional content-for-public-media focus. In 1997, for example, MAC launched a News Media and Diversity initiative, which included substantial funding for the study of racial bias in journalism. It was only in 1999, however, that the foundation established a funding “portfolio” devoted to policy and analysis, focused on Media Policy and Technology. The idea was to build an “enabling policy environment” for public interest media in recognition of the “systematic erosion” of legal and regulatory protections since the 1980s. One irony of the new Ford effort was that the foundation had, back in the mid-to-late 1970s, helped nurture the market-oriented reasoning that justified the regulatory rollback of the 1980s and early 1990s—before abandoning media policy altogether in the late 1970s.

To plan the new media policy portfolio, Ford in 1999 recruited Gigi Sohn, then director of the Media Access Project, a Washington public interest law firm that Ford had supported in the 1970s. As a full-time Ford consultant, Sohn also oversaw the new portfolio’s exploratory grant making. By 2000, new language had been added to the mission statement of the MAC unit, indicating
“support [for] the development of media policy.” That year, the foundation handed out 37 policy and advocacy-related grants, totaling $4.7 million—a big uptick from 1999, when the foundation spent $2 million on ten projects. The year before, in 1998, the foundation hadn’t made any policy-related grants.

The 2000 spending did not signal a complete change of course: Ford continued to spend more on public media and journalism review subsidies than on policy—$6.7 million in 2000—but the balance was beginning to shift. Indeed, if the dollars spent on the ongoing news and diversity initiative—$5.4 million—are combined with the policy grants, Ford’s spending in 2000 was over $10 million. Among the policy grants was a highly symbolic $250,000 award to the United Church of Christ’s Office of Communication, the Ford-supported group that, in the mid-1960s, had sparked the modern media reform movement.

Sohn left Ford in early 2001 to cofound and direct Public Knowledge, a Washington nonprofit focused on intellectual property issues. The new director of the MAC unit within EMAC, Margaret Wilkerson, selected Becky Lentz, an outsider to the DC policy community, as the portfolio’s program officer. (Wilkerson was a former professor of African American studies at UC Berkeley who had served as a program officer within another EMAC unit since 1998.) Wilkerson’s choice of an outsider was not accidental; she was seeking someone who would reach out to marginalized constituencies and engage with scholars in the policy arena. As director of MAC—the unit that housed the media policy portfolio—Wilkerson supported Lentz’s efforts to develop a social justice agenda. Lentz also credits the vice president of the overarching EMAC division, Alison Bernstein, with backing her initiatives.

At the time of her hire, Lentz had been working on a midcareer doctorate at the University of Texas at Austin, after many years working on telecommunication issues in industry and government. Lentz’s mentor and main dissertation advisor at Texas was John Downing, a well known communication academic who writes on media justice and alternative media issues. Before joining Ford, Lentz had conducted research for the university’s Telecommunications and Policy Institute, and her dissertation (completed in 2008, soon after her departure from Ford) focused on the history of regulatory debates over new communication technologies.

Lentz directed Ford’s media policy initiative over the next six years, from 2001 to 2007. By all accounts, she was the central figure in the foundation’s involvement in the media democracy movement that flourished over these same years. Ford’s annual reports during this period provide detail on the dozens of direct grants made by Lentz’s Electronic Media Policy portfolio. All told, Lentz dispersed over $20 million dollars during her six-year tenure—making Ford the media democracy movement’s most important bankroller by far.
More significant than the dollar figure, arguably, was the range of grant making under Lentz. When the Ford intervention picked up around 1999 under Sohn, the media reform community was relatively insular and centered on a small number of chronically underfunded, Washington, DC-based policy groups focused on legal and regulatory issues. Many of these groups were formed in the 1970s with Ford’s support but were forced to scramble for scarce dollars in the 1980s and early 1990s after Ford stopped funding media policy work.

Under Sohn, Ford had already begun to fund these Washington nonprofits again. But with Lentz’s appointment in 2001, the Ford grants also began to flow to two other constituencies that had been largely absent from media reform circles before 2000: media justice advocates and academics. The other striking feature of Ford funding over the last decade is that in each arena—policy, grassroots activism, and scholarship—radical groups and individuals were funded alongside reformists and mainstream liberals.

It is helpful to divide Lentz’s tenure at Ford into two periods, the first stretching from her arrival in September 2001 to February 2004, when Ford gave formal approval to the portfolio under the new “Electronic Media Policy” name.38 (Until then, the portfolio had existed in Ford’s version of purgatory, with funding but no official sanction; it was, says Lentz, “never clear whether the foundation would continue to commit funds.”)39 The second period ran from the approval in 2004 until Lentz’s departure in 2007.40 In the first period, Lentz continued to fund media policy groups. But she also awarded a series of grants to support conferences and information-gathering reports, which in turn informed her funding strategy for the field. Over these years her goal became nothing less than the self-conscious seeding of a bona fide social movement.41

Recall that in 2001 she had encountered a reform movement centered on a small, Washington, DC-based policy community without a popular constituency and with very weak ties to university-based researchers. With input from the gatherings and reports that she commissioned, Lentz developed a plan to cultivate both grassroots media activists and committed scholars, with the aim of joining these to the existing policy community within an overarching social movement.42

An early initiative to fund a grassroots, beyond-the-Beltway conference at the Highlander Research and Education Center in Tennessee turned out to be a pivotal moment in the history of media activism. The choice of Highlander, the venerable labor and civil rights organizing school, was deliberate and signaled Lentz’s interest in connecting media policy-making to social justice traditions. Held in August 2002, the Highlander Media and Society Summer Camp—which came to be known as the Highlander Media Justice Gathering—gave birth to the “media justice” terminology that would, over the following years,
become the key self-descriptor for media activists working from a social justice perspective. At Highlander and thereafter, newly christened “media justice” activists would identify with the civil rights movement and with historically marginalized communities more broadly. By design, about half of the 21 Highlander participants were people of color, and issues of race—linked as an advocacy issue to the predominantly white policy-making community—were prominent. According to the widely circulated report authored by the conference organizer, Nan Rubin, a “key strategic decision” was made to shift the terms of media organizing from “‘Media Democracy,’ to ‘Media Justice,’” in part to “put our efforts on the same level as other social justice and human rights organizing, and give us a new vocabulary to work with in terms of defining our various goals.” On the strength of the label, the nascent personal networks formed at Highlander, and Ford funding to come, activists would soon be referring to a full-fledged media justice movement.

Lentz, by helping to spark self-consciousness in the geographically scattered media justice community, had also inadvertently hardened an already existing divide between grassroots activists and the Washington policy community. Her work over the next two years, in collaboration with select grantees, was to try to bridge these two constituencies. The tension between the two camps was (and is) complex, deriving from the policy community’s legal-technical focus, real and perceived ideological differences, racial and generational gaps, competition over scarce resources, a national versus local frame, and center-periphery inequities. At the Highlander gathering, media justice activists were defining themselves against the Washington public interest groups.

The Media Justice Network, founded in 2003 by over a dozen activist groups representing communities of color, soon issued “ADeclaration of Media Independence.” In an unmistakable reference to the Washington reform groups, the declaration stated, “We are interested in more than paternalistic conceptualizations of ‘access,’ more than paper rights, more than taking up space in a crowded boxcar along the corporate information highway.” Aliza Dichter, an activist and researcher supported by Ford, observed soon after that the Media Justice Network “has established itself in contrast and opposition to the existing field of media reformers and advocates, calling for a movement that is grounded in a power analysis of race, class and gender.”

A November 2003 article in The Nation by Makani Themba-Nixon, one of the Media Justice Network founders, and Rubin, the main organizer of the Highlander gathering, became an often cited founding document for the media justice community. The article, titled “Speaking for Ourselves,” carried a charged subtitle: “A movement led by people of color seeks media justice—not just media reform.” Themba-Nixon and Rubin, reflecting the emerging media justice frame, stressed the injuries inflicted by media coverage of marginalized
communities and point to a “growing group of activists” who are “develop-
ing race-, class- and gender-conscious visions for changing media content and structure.” The article referenced not only the Highlander gathering but also the Youth Media Council’s successful 2002 campaign against a San Francisco–based Clear Channel station, which soon became a mnemonic touchstone for the movement. Cyril Malkia, the Youth Media Council’s young, queer African American director, emerged as a major figure in the media justice community.

Media justice advocates, including Themba-Nixon and Rubin, also sought to claim the legacy of the United Church of Christ’s landmark civil rights activism of the mid-1960s. The claim was especially significant since the culminating court case in the UCC campaign established public interest groups’ legal standing before the FCC and hence is typically cited as the founding moment in the modern media reform movement. “Nearly forty years ago,” Themba-Nixon and Rubin open their article, “a few determined civil rights activists at the United Church of Christ and the NAACP in Jackson, Mississippi, decided to take on the treatment of blacks by the television. They drew a straight line from the racism they faced on the streets to the racism they faced in their living rooms when they turned on the TV.” The “lobbyists and scholars leading the current efforts at media reform,” they continue, are focused on campaigns “which are a far cry from the issues of racism and unfair treatment that launched the earlier movement,” referring to the UCC. Media justice activists, they conclude, are “going back to the movement’s roots.”

Some of the tension between policy advocates and media justice activists came out in reference to Free Press, the successful media policy nonprofit founded in 2002 by media scholar Robert McChesney and Josh Silver. Free Press, which played a prominent role in organizing resistance to the FCC’s proposed relaxation of media ownership rules in 2003, had burst on the scene and quickly occupied the movement’s “media reform” mindspace. Even though the fight against the FCC mobilized a broad coalition across the media democracy movement—and ended in a successful 2004 court challenge—Free Press’s self-appointed centrality attracted sustained criticism from media justice advocates. The Free Press–organized National Conferences for Media Reform became “flashpoints for questions of voice and representation within the movement.” It is no accident that the Themba-Nixon and Rubin Nation article ran alongside a cover story on the FCC fight coauthored by McChesney.

Soon after her arrival at Ford in 2001, Lentz had sponsored a pair of interview-based stock-taking and information-gathering studies, which helped lay the groundwork for her own 2004 internal Ford proposal for an “Electronic Media Policy” portfolio. The aim of these studies was to identify strategies to inform her plan to catalyze and support a full-fledged, media-oriented social movement. Among other things, the studies needed to address the divisions
between the media justice and policy communities and identify strategies to incorporate university-based scholars into an umbrella movement. In 2002, Lentz awarded a grant to the OMG Center for Collaborative Learning to direct a “Listening Project,” an expansive study of the existing field. The report, published in 2004 as *The Making of a Social Movement?* was explicitly oriented around finding common ground among the movement’s fractured constituencies: policy advocates, scholars, grassroots organizers, and funders. OMG, which based the report on interviews with 71 stakeholders from 59 organizations spanning the movement’s spectrum, employed carefully chosen language to signal inclusiveness. The report not only refers to “existing tensions . . . particularly apparent between those organizations doing local organizing (primarily the media justice and activist crowd) and those working in Washington, DC,” but also frames the division as surmountable in the service of the larger movement’s goals. In order to “fully maximize the movement’s potential,” the report calls for “constructive conversations and forums,” capacity-building for activist groups, the cultivation of a popular constituency for media issues, and more diversity in the movement’s leadership—in order to “strengthen and catalyze a movement.” The “Listening Project” report, in its effort to build “bridges across real and imaginary boundaries that exist in the field,” also called for new intermediary organizations. In 2003, Lentz provided the seed money for one such intermediary, the Center for International Media Action (CIMA). The New York–based CIMA, while clearly rooted in the media justice community, had as its explicit mission to connect and support “diverse voices and actors in media reform, media production and media accountability.” Lentz commissioned CIMA’s Aliza Dichter to interview participants in, and review documents from, the promising but ultimately ineffective media reform efforts of the 1990s. In her 2005 report Dichter drew many of the same lessons as the “Listening Project,” with particular attention to the movement’s past missteps.

These two Ford-funded reports were joined by a third study coauthored by media justice advocate Nan Rubin, published in 2003 and sponsored by National Network of Grantmakers. The report, directed at the foundation community, was devoted to building a “persuasive and compelling argument for increasing donor and foundation funding for a wide range of media activities.” Especially in this early stretch of her tenure, Lentz says she devoted about a third of her time to educating the philanthropic community, since the bulk of funding had been devoted to content. As founder of the Working Group on Electronic Media Policy at a funders’ consortium, the Grantmakers in Film and Electronic Media (GFEM), Lentz organized three Ford-hosted sessions bringing together funders and movement actors in early 2005. She served, too, as the first chair of the Technology Funders Collaborative, an international
grant-making group on IT issues, and commissioned a 2003 report on grant-making strategies.67

All of this frenetic fact-finding and strategy development in Lentz’s initial years at Ford culminated in a Program Officer Memo (POM)—an internal Ford proposal to formalize her portfolio. Though the POM was not formally approved until early 2004, Lentz had already been disbursing media reform grants in accordance with the strategy outlined in the memo, drawing on an annual budget of three to four million dollars—a funding level that would remain more-or-less constant throughout her six-year tenure.68 The POM is, in effect, a persuasive document—a pitch to Lentz’s superiors at Ford, especially Wilkerson and Bernstein.69 The memo opens with a muscular account of the “systematic erosion of policies that protect the public interest,” in the federal communication policy-making arena. The deregulatory Telecommunications Act of 1996—the legislation that led to the portfolio’s creation in 1999—makes an appearance in the first paragraph, and the already-iconic 2003 FCC ownership rule changes are invoked as a “recent example” of waning public interest protections.70 Lentz highlights the disparity between industry lobbyists and the “small ecology of under-funded institutions” devoted to the public interest.71 She observes that most media-related philanthropy underwrites content creation and neglects “more systemic issues”: “policies that shape and govern the production, distribution, exhibition and exchange of information and ideas in society using electronic media resources.”72 To support her case, Lentz briefly summarizes the other major foundations’ initiatives and concludes that Ford is “unique” in its policy-related grant making.73

Throughout the memo, Lentz carefully navigates internal Ford politics. She pays homage to Ford’s legacy of public media support and invokes the foundation’s mid-1960s grants to the United Church of Christ.74 She also acknowledges Ford’s two other New York–based media portfolios, directed by fellow program officers, and argues that her portfolio “complements” these others “by building an enabling policy environment for media in the public interest which include but are not limited to public interest media such as PBS and NPR.”75 Her new name for the portfolio—“Electronic Media Policy”—was chosen in part to claim turf distinct from the two others.76 Lentz’s decision to stress social justice not only reflected her own commitments but also dovetailed nicely with Ford’s longstanding attention to social justice initiatives.77 Lentz maneuvered adroitly within the opportunity structure that she inherited at Ford.

The memo observes that there is no widespread popular constituency for media policy reform and invokes the nascent media justice community that Lentz had helped cultivate. She refers to the Highlander gathering, citing The Nation article, as the “‘coming out party’ for media justice work in the U.S.” The memo mentions the issues raised at Highlander and after, including the
lack of racial and age diversity among movement leaders, and calls attention to
the media justice community’s relative marginalization:

Until very recently, the dominant voices in the emerging field of electronic media
policy reform have been highly specialized public interest lawyers and high pro-
file academics or journalists who interact mostly with Washington and university
elites as well as national press. Non-experts, ordinary citizens, and grassroots
groups have had little voice in this field because public interest advocacy has been
monopolized by these legal and technical professionals. Also until very recently,
few social justice organizers, labor organizations, arts and culture institutions,
civil rights coalitions, and environmental justice groups have taken up issues in
this field because the “harm” of deregulatory media policies have not been ade-
quately explained or publicized.78

In keeping with the “Listening Project” report, the memo’s essential thread
is a call to “support the evolution of a consensual definition of the public inter-
test to unite disparate efforts.” Until advocates find a “common language and a
shared cause,” writes Lentz, the movement’s efforts will “continue to be discon-
ected, fragmented, and under-funded.”79

With these arguments as the backdrop, the memo proposes three goals for the
portfolio: (1) to strengthen public interest advocacy institutions; (2) to activate
and unite diverse constituencies; and (3) to build strategic knowledge.80 The
first goal is targeted at supporting advocacy organizations, including capacity-
building for outside-the-Beltway organizations. The second goal focuses on the
field uniting—“more engagement between social justice advocates and media
reform groups.” The last goal is centered on research, with the explicit aim to
support university-based scholarship that builds “a sustainable case for public
interest values such as diversity, freedom of expression, and universal access to
electronic media.”81 The memo, in short, is a blueprint for Lentz’s more expan-
sive vision for a broad-based social movement—a vision that self-consciously
stretches the funding agenda in place during the brief, Washington-centric
Sohn period.

The approval of the POM memo marked the beginning of what I am call-
ing Lentz’s second phase, which lasted until her departure from Ford in 2007.
Though many of the second-phase initiatives, and the thinking behind them,
were already in place before the POM approval, the bulk of the funding and
activity occurred after the memo was officially endorsed.82 Since the fact-finding
reports and Lentz’s memo placed a special emphasis on intermediary grantees, I
highlight three major grant recipients, each of which passed along Ford dollars
to specific groups and projects: the Media Justice Fund, the Media Democracy
Fund, and the Social Science Research Council.83
Lentz had seeded the Media Justice Fund (MJF) with $500,000 back in 2003—in concert with the founding of the Media Justice Network in the aftermath of Highlander—and supplied another $2.4 million to the entity through 2007. The MJF, which closed its doors at the end of 2009, was operated by the Funding Exchange, a coalition of 16 progressive community foundations that support a range of progressive activism. Relative to other Ford efforts, the MJF prioritized smaller grants to grassroots social justice groups, many devoted to empowering voiceless communities in specific regions. The Fund's explicit commitment to social and media justice signaled its radical, small "d" democratic orientation; in keeping with the media justice framework, the MJF claimed to work in the "spirit" of the landmark 1966 United Church of Christ case. According to an evaluative report, the MJF "broadened the social justice movement infrastructure, and has been especially successful at involving marginalized communities and populations in work that has been the historical domain of a fairly insular circle of Beltway-focused actors." The Fund's typical grants ranged from $15,000 to $25,000, awarded to progressive groups like the low-power FM radio advocate Prometheus Radio Project and the People's Production House.

Lentz has also supported the Media Democracy Fund (MDF), a collaborative effort involving many other liberal and progressive foundations. The fund was started by Helen Brunner of the Albert A. List Foundation, who convinced List—then spending out its endowment—to seed a “Media Action Fund” in 2003. The fund was relaunched in 2006 as the Media Democracy Fund, with Ford supplying over half of its $1.2 million budget. Under Brunner’s widely praised leadership, the fund has supported some of the same grassroots advocacy groups that received MJF funding, in addition to established, Washington, DC-based policy groups like Free Press and the Future of Music Coalition.

The third and final grant recipient I touch on here is the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), which has since 2005 received $2.4 million to fund its Necessary Knowledge for a Democratic Public Sphere program, directed by Joe Karaganis in cooperation with the Ford-funded Center for International Media Action. As we have seen, the idea of drawing scholars into the media reform movement’s orbit was an early Lentz goal, reflected in commissioned studies and a pair of scholarly convenings (in 2003 and 2006). The purpose of the SSRC grants was to stimulate cooperation between legal and media scholars and the broader media democracy movement, inclusive of media justice activists. Academics’ slow research pace, notoriously dense writing style, and perceived indifference to on-the-ground developments were obstacles that the SSRC program was designed to challenge. The Ford grants have supported an online Media Research Hub, dozens of collaborative academic-activist grants, student internships with activist groups, papers and reports on media policy...
and activism, and scholars’ participation in the broader National Conferences for Media Reform.97 One 2008 collaborative grant, for example, brought University of Louisville researchers together with Kentucky Jobs for Justice to study Internet access in minority Louisville neighborhoods.98

These three intermediary grant recipients (MJF, MDF, and the SSRC) represent a fraction of the overall Ford spending on media democracy issues since 2000. Dozens of direct grants were awarded over this period, to grassroots activist groups, Washington policy nonprofits, and university-based academics alike.99 The Ford funding was strikingly ecumenical, by ideological, tactical, and topical measures.

The media democracy movement flourished in no small part thanks to Ford intervention. The funding mattered most, of course, but so did the alliance-building incentives written into the grants. Lentz’s success depended, in turn, on the growing movement; it is impossible, of course, to tease out causality. Still, there’s something remarkable about this turn of events. In the 1950s, recall, Ford underwrote Cold War propaganda research. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the foundation supported a few liberal media reform organizations but funded market-oriented research too. With a changed political climate, an emergent social movement, and the efforts of a few individuals—Lentz and Berresford among them—Ford recast itself as an agent of media justice.

Susan Berresford stepped down as president in 2007, and soon after Lentz left the foundation to finish her dissertation and, in early 2009, to take up a post at McGill University.100 It is too early to tell whether the new president, Luis Ubiñas, or Lentz’s successor as program officer, Jenny Toomey, will maintain Ford’s media democracy commitments. As part of a sweeping 2008 reorganization, Ubiñas established nine “core issues,” one of which (“Freedom of Expression”) is dedicated to media-related issues.101 Total funding for media, arts, and culture declined from $93.3 million in 2007 to $60.7 million in 2008—a 35 percent drop-off.102 Still, many media reform groups continued to receive funding in 2008 under Toomey, a former indie rock musician and former director of the Future of Music Coalition.103 The departures of Berresford and Lentz may augur badly for the media democracy movement—an irony, if true, given the relatively progressive media policy orientation of the Obama administration.

**The Ford Record**

In the preceding seven decades, media reform had occasionally appeared on the major foundations’ agendas, very often linked to communication research initiatives. Consider the role of the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s. During the so-called Radio Wars—the years of policy debate between the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communication Act of 1934—educational broadcasters and
other civic groups battled the commercial networks over the shape of public interest regulation. The commercial broadcasters prevailed, of course. In the aftermath of the 1934 Act, the Rockefeller Foundation organized meetings and funded efforts to reconcile embittered education advocates and the victorious networks. The Rockefeller-supported Princeton Radio Research Project, as William Buxton has shown, was created to convince ratings-conscious commercial broadcasters that arts and educational programming would in fact draw in large audiences. Rockefeller’s cautious, market-driven approach—invoking as it did Frank Stanton, then rising through the CBS ranks—failed to change broadcasters’ programming choices. But Rockefeller’s radio initiatives, at Princeton and elsewhere, soon took on an altogether different function. After Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Rockefeller repurposed its radio research projects into a private propaganda and intelligence network, before it was politically acceptable for the Roosevelt administration. Rockefeller’s tepid 1930s reform effort had, in short, issued in war-related propaganda research—and formed the nucleus of the government’s sprawling, social science–driven persuasion bureaucracy after Pearl Harbor.

Propaganda was also the major postwar theme of foundation-sponsored communication research. After the war, the Ford Foundation replaced Rockefeller as the principal patron of communication research. A newly flush Ford, relaunched in 1949 as a leading national foundation, established a Behavioral Sciences Program (BSP) in 1951, headed by communication scholar Bernard Berelson. The BSP dispensed millions of dollars to communication-related research, including funds for MIT’s CIA-linked Center for International Communications. Most of the Ford spending on communication scholarship in the 1950s, before the BSP was shuttered in 1957, supported often secret, Cold War–related “psychological warfare” research—the unblushing label applied to the many persuasion studies of the period.

Ford would not invest significant sums in university-based communication research again until the recent wave of media democracy funding. Instead, Ford dollars supported the emerging public broadcasting community. Beginning with its 1951 grant to create the Radio-Television Workshop, Ford would go on to play the major role in financing public television and radio—with grants for stations, programming, and infrastructure. By 1977, when Ford scaled back its support, the foundation had spent $289 million.

Public broadcasting and propaganda isn’t the whole story of Ford and the media in the postwar era. The foundation also backed key organizations in the nascent broadcast reform movement, which had emerged after the landmark 1966 United Church of Christ decision that established “standing” for citizens’ groups in the FCC policy-making process. Ford awarded the UCC $160,000 in 1968 and followed up with over $800,000 more through 1977. The
UCC decision spawned a number of media policy groups, many of which—the Citizens Communications Center and Action for Children’s Television, for example—received substantial Ford funding in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{111}

The 1970s broadcast reform groups gained a seat at the communication policy-making table and won some limited concessions from broadcasters and the FCC.\textsuperscript{112} Still, the movement’s goals were modest, diluted by the industry and reticent regulators. In part because the Washington, DC-based groups lacked a popular constituency, their reform efforts were effectively contained.\textsuperscript{113} One index of their relative impotence was that the FCC’s policy orientation shifted markedly, beginning in the late 1970s, toward deregulation and market-based analysis.\textsuperscript{114}

Despite Ford’s financial support for the 1970s reform movement, the foundation arguably shares the blame for the regulatory setbacks of the 1980s and after. For one thing, Ford dramatically scaled back its media-related grant making in the late 1970s, in keeping with its decision to phase out funding for public broadcasting. As a result, many broadcast reform groups folded, and the few survivors were chronically underfunded.\textsuperscript{115} Ford’s departure from the media policy field also elevated the influence of the more market-oriented Markle Foundation, which remained an active player throughout the 1980s.\textsuperscript{116} Even before its departure, Ford’s cautious funding choices had the effect of narrowing the incipient media reform movement. Albert H. Kramer, founder of the Ford-funded Citizens Communications Center, detailed Ford and other foundations’ timidity in the broadcast policy realm in a well-supported 1977 report. Kramer criticized Ford’s unwillingness to challenge industry interests, as well as its preference for moderate groups with establishment credentials.\textsuperscript{117}

Ford, moreover, partially offset its own broadcast reform funding by underwriting, in the early to mid-1970s, much of the research that would, a few years later, inform the FCC’s embrace of the marketplace. As Katharina Kopp has documented, the Markle Foundation seeded many of the economist-led, market-oriented research efforts at the RAND Corporation, the Aspen Institute, and the Brookings Institution in the early 1970s. Kopp shows that Ford, though more ecumenical in its grant making, nevertheless joined Markle in funding the RAND, Aspen, and Brookings research.\textsuperscript{118} The Brookings-sponsored Economic Aspects of Television Regulation—the highly influential 1973 deregulatory treatise—was funded by Ford, for example.\textsuperscript{119} The foundation, perhaps unwittingly, had undermined its own media reform grant making—before abandoning the field just as the marketplace paradigm was in ascendance.
Ford’s late 1990s turn to media policy issues was, in a sense, a revival of its decades-long commitment to mass media themes. But the recent wave of media democracy funding was, above all, a break with its past—an implicit repudiation of the Cold War propaganda research and the mixed record in broadcast reform. From a media justice perspective, the foundation’s twentieth-century interventions in media policy and communication research had been accommodationist at best, and very often much worse. With past performance as our guide, we would expect more of the same.

The lesson of Ford’s recent history is that past performance should not be our guide. Lentz—with the notable help of Ford figures like Alison Bernstein, Andrea Taylor, and Margaret Wilkerson; other funders including Charles Benton and David Haas; and key movement allies like Gene Kimmelman and Nan Rubin—managed to commit the foundation to media justice principles. Yet there is a small but growing literature that attacks foundation support for media democracy on just these grounds. Michael Barker, for example, points to foundations’ “historical hegemonic role” in his high-octane denunciation of media reform philanthropy. Observes Bob Feldman, another critic, “Since [foundations’] creation, an important goal has been to channel all protest and dissent into activities that do not threaten the wealth and power of the large corporations, or their access to the resources and markets of the world.” Why, asks Feldman, “would the liberal foundations want to fund the left?”

Barker and Feldman catalog foundations’ misdeeds, citing scholarship from the beholden foundation tradition I invoked earlier. Barker, noting that foundation endowments derive from “the world’s most rapacious [sic] capitalists,” asserts that there is an “inherent contradiction of progressive activists receiving significant support from liberal elites.” Both critics concede that Ford and others have recently funded radical media justice groups but argue that foundations are acting on “ulterior motives” (Barker) to co-opt “formerly radical” (Feldman) organizations. Writes Barker, “although liberal foundations effectively exist to maintain the capitalist status quo, this does not prevent them from supporting a limited number of activists who are seeking radical social change. In fact, sponsoring radicals is integral to their overall mission, as arguably it allows them to keep a close eye on the ideas of radicals, while simultaneously enabling them to improve their progressive PR credentials (thereby helping deter critical investigations of their work).”

Having established liberal foundations’ “antidemocratic credentials,” Barker concludes that Ford and the others must be behaving badly again.

The Ford case shows, to the contrary, that there is nothing like an iron law of foundation conservatism. It is true that foundations are risk-averse, but
windows of progressive intervention are possible, given the right confluence of people and enabling conditions. The claims of Barker and Feldman—and by extension the beholden foundation tradition as whole—depend on an argumentative bait and switch in which a reading of the past substitutes for current analysis and future prognosis. Ford’s Cold War history should not blind us to the foundation’s media justice present.

Notes


5. At Ford, portfolios are specified budget lines administered by individual program officers.


7. Most of the Ford presidents up through the 1970s—including H. Rowan Gaither and McGeorge Bundy—were themselves avowed Cold War liberals and committed anti-Communists.


10. See Christina Dunbar-Hester, this volume.

11. See John L. Sullivan, this volume.


13. Gene Kimmelman, the longtime consumer advocate currently serving in the Obama administration, points out that the recent wave of the media reform movement has important roots in the consumer movement—organizations like Public Citizen and Consumers Union—that mobilized on issues like the AT&T divestiture in the early 1980s. These groups remain important players in the current media reform movement. Gene Kimmelman, interview with the author, April 19, 2010; and Milton Mueller, Brenden Kuerbis, and Christiane Page, Re-inventing Media Activism: Public Interest Advocacy in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy, 1960–2002 (Syracuse, NY: Convergence Center, Syracuse University, 2004), 32–33.

14. There is an ongoing debate about whether the media reform coalition qualifies as a bona fide social movement; see Napoli, “Public Interest Media Activism,” 23–25.

15. Ibid., 9–19. See also the superb discussion of movement frames in Hackett and Carroll, Remaking Media, 78–82.

16. The account that follows draws on two Ford-related sources of information: the foundation’s annual reports from 1996 through 2008 and various Ford-commissioned or -funded reports that reflect on the foundation’s media grant making. My data include only US grants.

17. From 1977 to 1988, media production funds were disbursed from an independent program within Ford. A Media Projects Fund (MPF) was created in 1988 to better integrate media-making with the foundation’s other programs. The MPF used one-to-one internal matching grants with other Ford programs and spent $88.5 million over its eight-year existence. See Joe Karaganis and Waad El-Hadidy, Freedom of Expression at the Ford Foundation (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007), 5–6; and Laura Forlano and Becky Lentz, Conversations on Media, Technology, Society & Culture: Convening Report: Media and Communications at a Crossroads (New York: Ford Foundation, 2007), 14–16.


20. Forlano and Lentz, summarizing the 2006 remarks of Alison Bernstein, the vice president in charge of EMAC: “Something very important happened in 1996. Susan Beresford [sic] became the first woman President of the Ford Foundation and committed herself to revisiting and reinventing Ford’s resources and energies around media.” Conversations on Media, 15.

21. According to Ford’s 1996 annual report, MAC “will continue to support media productions” but under the rubric of a broader goal: “analyses of the media’s contribution to the well-being of a diverse citizenry.” 1996 Ford Foundation Annual Report (New York: Ford Foundation, 1997), 75. Based on a one-year listening tour, Berresford’s inaugural “President’s Message” claimed that leaders and average citizens around the world expressed worry that a “growing technological culture . . . will not adequately serve the common good or the disadvantaged” (vii).


23. In 1997, Ford gave $2.2 million to at least eight different analysis and monitoring projects on minority news coverage at the Aspen Institute, the University of Missouri, and the Poynter Institute among others. Ford spent another $1.2 million on grants to groups like the National Association of Black Journalists to promote diversity in the newsroom. 1997 Ford Foundation Annual Report (New York: Ford Foundation, 1998), 127, 137. These grants were funded out of Jon Funabiki’s News and Journalism portfolio. Lentz, interview with author.

24. Forlano and Lentz, Conversations on Media, 10–11. The new Media Policy and Technology portfolio (later renamed Electronic Media Policy) joined two preexisting portfolios in News and Journalism (responsible for the diversity initiative, among other grants) and in Public Interest Media Production and Infrastructure (which directed public broadcasting and content grant making). According to Lentz, it was Taylor who suggested the “Media Policy and Technology” name. Lentz, interview with author.

25. See the discussion that follows.


27. As a “project specialist” rather than a full program officer, Sohn did not have formal authority to recommend grants, but in practice she administered the nascent portfolio. Lentz, interview with author.


32. It is not “accidental that they hired an outsider,” states Lentz. “Their goal was not to do business as usual . . . I had support for doing things differently.” Lentz, interview with author.

33. Because of her Ford role, Lentz did not complete her dissertation until 2008, the year she left Ford. Though Downing had by then moved from UT Austin to Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, he remained cosupervisor (with UT’s Karin Wilkins) of Lentz’s dissertation, and is singled out in Lentz’s acknowledgments as a key figure in her doctoral training. Roberta G. Lentz, “‘Linguistic Engineering’ and the FCC Computer Inquiries, 1966–1989” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2008), v.

34. E.g., Becky Lentz, Internet Service Providers in Rural Texas: Rebels With a Cause (Austin, TX: Telecommunications and Policy Institute, 1998). In her dissertation (“‘Linguistic Engineering’ and the FCC Computer Inquiries, 1966–1989”), Lentz analyzed the so-called Computer Inquiries, the debate at the FCC, spanning three decades, on how to reconcile regulated telephony with unregulated computer technologies.

35. Lentz’s official tenure as program officer spanned September 2001 to September 2007, though she remained at Ford through mid-March 2008 as a Senior Ford Fellow, while also serving as a Visiting Scholar at New York University.

36. See, for example, Forlano and Lentz, Conversations on Media, 10–13; and Feld, “Tribute to Becky Lentz.”

37. See note 1.


39. Lentz, interview with author.

40. According to Lentz, it was Ford practice at the time to restrict program officers to two three-year terms in order to draw expertise from the field in the service of more-informed grant making. One effect of the de facto six-year tenure is that
program officers cannot accrue undue (or at least lasting) power over their funding
fiefdoms. Lentz, interview with author.
41. Says Lentz, “I wanted to build a field; that was the goal—so that there would be
institutions and leaders there for the longer term to keep advocating for public
interest policy.” Lentz, interview with author.
42. Lentz, “Program Officer Memo.”
43. Nan Rubin, Highlander Media Justice Gathering (New York: Ford Foundation,
2002).
44. The plan was that the “gathering would NOT be only the ‘usual suspects’ (heavily
weighted to white males over 50) associated with progressive media, but would
include some of the younger, energetic thinkers . . . The issues of race and class,
always underground, were also brought to the surface as major elements that had
to be considered, difficult as they might be. The noticeable lack of people of color
within media advocacy organizations points to some serious shortcomings in our
political perspectives, and in our ability to build popular support within communi-
cies of color.” Ibid., 3, 6.
45. Ibid., 9.
46. Indeed, the Highlander report already refers to a future “Media Justice Move-
ment,” 8. Lentz credits the report for helping convince the foundation that funding
for media justice projects was warranted. Lentz, interview with author. A well-
informed, interview-based overview of the media justice movement is Dharma
Dailey, A Field Report: Media Justice through the Eyes of Local Organizers (New York:
Funding Exchange, 2009).
47. The best short summary of the tensions involved is Joe Karaganis, Cultures of Co-
laboration in Media Research (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009),
3–5. Karaganis distinguishes between two “geographies” of activism, one in a
“consumer-rights-based model of policy advocacy; the other emerging from pre-
dominantly civil-rights-informed concerns with accountability, representation, and
voice in the media. Media Reform and Media Justice became the shorthand for
these two orientations. Among adherents of the latter, the distinctions sometimes
carried a critique of the technocratic, policy-focused approaches to social change
characteristic of DC-based advocacy” (4).
49. “A Declaration of Media Independence,” November 11, 2003, quoted in Fischer
50. Aliza Dichter, “Where Are the People in the ‘Public Interest’? U.S. Media Activism
and the Search for a Constituency,” Media Development 4 (2004), accessed November
the-people-in-the-public-interest-US-media-activism-and-the-search-for-constitu-
cy.html. In a 2005 Ford-supported stock-taking of the false starts in 1990s
media activism, Dichter cites similar complaints about the policy groups. Aliza
Dichter, Together, We Know More: Networks and Coalitions to Advance Media
Democracy, Communication Rights and the Public Sphere, 1990–2005 (New York:
Social Science Research Council, 2005), 12.
51. Makani Themba-Nixon and Nan Rubin, “Speaking for Ourselves,” The Nation,

53. Cyril’s Youth Media Council (renamed the Center for Media Justice in 2008) hosts, for example, the Media Action Grassroots Network (MAG-net), which is, in effect, the successor coalition to the moribund Media Justice Network. Cyril, a participant at the Highlander gathering, was a featured speaker (“Media Justice 101”) at an important 2007 media justice conference in Knoxville, Tennessee. See *Media Justice or Media Control? A Conference Organized by the Appalachian Community Fund in Collaboration with the Fund for Southern Communities* (Knoxville, TN: Appalachian Community Fund, 2007), 3–6; and Nina Gregg, this volume. See also Malkia Cyril, “A Framework for Media Justice,” in *Alternatives on Media Content, Journalism, and Regulation*, ed. Seeta Pen-a Gangadharan, et al. (Tartu University Press: Tartu, Estonia, 2007), 55–56.


55. See Karaganis, *Cultures of Collaboration*, 5; Aliza Dichter, “Where Are the People in the ‘Public Interest?’”; and Lentz, interview with author. Dichter, codirector of the media justice–oriented Center for International Media Action, included a thinly veiled attack on Free Press in her remarks at a Ford-sponsored symposium in 2005: “Even an email list of 200,000 activists ready to sign petitions needs to be backed up by sustained grassroots and community organizing so people will continue to fight for media rights after that action alert has passed.” Quoted in Carlson, *The Role of Grassroots Organizers*, 18.

56. Karaganis, *Cultures of Collaboration*, 5; and Dunbar-Hester, this volume. Ironically, it was Lentz who first suggested to McChesney that he convene such gatherings. Lentz, interview with author.

57. As Lentz recalled, the report “revealed a lot of splits about how people were seeing their work.” Lentz, interview with author. One of the Listening Project’s three goals was to “Provide a space to talk across the apparent boundaries in the field that have been created by ideology, practice and perspective and articulate a clear vision for the field.” *The Makings of a Social Movement?,* 4. On Ford funding and the role of Lentz, see ibid., i, 4.

58. Take, for example, the goal to “work across areas to strategically advance the broader public interest and social justice agendas.” “Public interest” and “social justice” are code words for policy and media justice, respectively. Ibid., ii, 5. The interviewees are listed on 32–35.

59. Ibid., v, 2. The report, for example, notes that those who “identify with the media justice framework are led by people of color, who embrace a grassroots-directed
approach to change and are critical of the ‘top-down’ approach they associate with media reform,” but quickly adds, “In truth, current media advocacy and communications policy work at the national level has not focused on these issues, but it has clearly targeted some of the structural concerns that underlies some of the media issues that a number of local communities, including communities of color and low-income people, face” (v). In an effort to encourage mutual understanding, the report describes four “theories of change,” all of which seek common goals, 6–7.

60. Ibid., v–vi, 14–15, 19.
61. Ibid., 14, 16.
63. Dichter, Together, We Know More. The report was part of a Ford-funded Social Science Research Council initiative, discussed later.
64. Nan Rubin and Sharon Maeda, Funding Media for Social Change (New York: National Network of Grantmakers, 2003), 1. The study was part of a MediaWorks Initiative, “which grew out of the Working Group on Funding Media of the National Network of Grantmakers” (1). See ibid., 41, for a list of the steering committee. The report makes reference to a “new national network focused on Media Justice . . . comprised of activists of color, many of them young people” (24).
65. Lentz, interview with author.
66. On the GFEM sessions, see Securing Our Rights to Public Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom of Expression: Funders Briefing Hosted At the Ford Foundation, January 7, 2005—Complete Transcript (New York: Ford Foundation, 2005); and Neil F. Carlson, The Role of Grassroots Organizers. In her efforts to mobilize the foundation community, Lentz worked closely with David Haas of the William Penn Foundation and chair of GFEM’s steering committee. Haas had awarded GFEM a grant that enabled the group to hire a staff person who, among other things, helped with the Ford-hosted sessions. Lentz, interview with author.
68. Lentz, interview with author; and The Makings of a Social Movement?, 2.
69. Lentz, “Program Officer Memo”; and Lentz, interview with author.
70. Lentz, “Program Officer Memo,” 1–4, 7. The POM also notes that “Ford-funded public education and advocacy efforts” (9) helped win the 2004 appeals court decision to throw out the rule changes.
71. Ibid., 8.
72. Ibid., 2.
73. Ibid., 5. At the time, the Markle Foundation—the longtime communication policy funder—was being criticized for neglecting its media-policy roots, among other things. See Jim Rutenberg, “A Foundation Travels Far From Sesame Street,” The New York Times, September 6, 2002.
74. Ibid., 6.
75. Ibid., 1, 6. The other two portfolios are News and Journalism and Public Interest Media Production and Infrastructure (which funds public radio and television).
76. Lentz, interview with author. In the POM, Lentz observed that, inside Ford, she has “been working closely with David Winters in the Human Rights unit to build a global working group on intellectual property” and recorded her participation in the foundation’s “Freedom of Expression” working group. Lentz, “Program Officer Memo,” 18. Lentz was also careful to deploy the phrase “freedom of expression” internally at Ford. In 2003, Bernstein’s EMAC division had been renamed as Knowledge, Creativity, and Freedom (KC&F). At one of the early 2005 Ford-hosted GFEM sessions linking potential grantees and funders, Alison Bernstein, head of KC&F, acknowledged Lentz’s strategic language choice: “I want to pay particular tribute to Becky Lentz . . . I see Becky’s hand and head all over this organizational meeting, including the title, which is a complete plagiarism from our program called Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom.” (The session’s title was “Securing Our Rights to Public Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom of Expression.”) Securing Our Rights to Public Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom of Expression.)

77. Lentz says that she referred to “media justice” internally, in part “so I could get people interested,” given the preexisting Ford interest in social justice. She also set out to collaborate with other units in order to “link [her portfolio] to other departments, so it doesn’t look so different.” Lentz, interview with author.


79. Ibid., 13, 8.

80. Ibid., 10. Technically, the memo proposes an “initiative”—the bulk of funding, with these three goals—as well as a much smaller “exploration” devoted to “Advancing Public Interest Values in Global Electronic Media Policy Making,” 1, 10.

81. Ibid., 14.

82. One reason that many of the large, three-year grants came after the POM was approved is that the portfolio’s previously unofficial status had made multiyear awards difficult to justify. Lentz, interview with author.

83. One rationale for using intermediaries was that Ford’s grant-making practices made it difficult to award a large number of small grants. Lentz, interview with author. The use of intermediary funders is a time-honored Ford practice. In the early years of the modern, postwar Ford Foundation, a number of self-governing “Funds” were created, most famously the civil liberties–oriented Fund for the Republic.

84. See Ford Foundation annual reports, 2003 through 2007; and Lentz, “Program Officer Memo,” 14. Lentz had hired Nan Rubin, the Highlander organizer, to serve as a consultant and link to the media justice groups. Lentz needed a funding intermediary because Ford’s grant-making structure doesn’t allow the many small grants the initiative required. Another program officer mentioned the Funding Exchange, and Rubin proceeded to negotiate the relationship between Ford and the new fund. Lentz, interview with author. For most of its existence, the Media Justice Fund was directed by Hye-Jung Park. See Catherine Borgman-Arboleda, The Media Justice Fund of the Funding Exchange: Final Evaluation Report (New York: Funding Exchange, 2008), which includes detailed case studies, funding figures, and lessons informed by a number of interviews. See also Dailey, A Field Report; Rubin and

85. It is unclear why the MJF closed, though Lentz referred to a funding impropriety. Lentz, interview with author.

86. For a case study of an MJF–supported initiative, see Nina Gregg, this volume.


89. Ibid., 4, 12.


92. For a complete list of the fund’s grantees, see “Our Grantees,” Media Democracy Fund, accessed February 8, http://www.mediamonopolyfund.org/our-grantees. Gene Kimmelman and Lentz are both effusive in their praise of Brunner; Lentz notes that Brunner “was there before everybody.” Lentz, interview with author; and Kimmelman, interview with author.


94. Ford-commissioned studies of media-reform scholarship include Mueller, Kuerbis, and Page, *Re-inventing Media Activism*; and Napoli, “Public Interest Media Activism.” On the scholarly convenings, see Forlano and Lentz, *Conversations on Media*, 3. Gigi Sohn had, in 2001, granted $270,000 to Leslie Harris and Associates to operate the Digital Media Forum, whose mission was to invite collaboration among media reform groups and scholars. The effort faltered, in part due to advocates’ complaints about the grantee’s work for industry. *2001 Ford Foundation Annual Report*, 165; and Lentz, interview with author.

95. As Karaganis observes, the SSRC’s mandate involved a difficult but deliberate balancing act that often involved turning down well-articulated requests from the highly organized policy community. Karaganis, *Cultures of Collaboration in Media Research*, 8–9.

96. Ibid., 8, 17–18. Karaganis said, “Nearly everyone—including the academics—viewed academia as isolated from and, most of the time, irrelevant to civil society activity. The near unanimity on this point profoundly shaped our sense of the program’s mission and potential contribution” (3).

98. SSRC Collaborative Grants, 37–38.

99. For a comprehensive (though broader) listing, see Karaganis and El-Hadidy, Freedom of Expression At the Ford Foundation, 42–57. University-based and other research grantees received over $5 million during this period; see the list in Forlano and Lentz, Conversations on Media, 60–89.


101. The articulation of “freedom of expression” was, arguably, a direct outgrowth of the discursive maneuvers Lentz made while at Ford.


115. Lenert, Mapping Social Entrepreneurship, 49–51, quoting Jeff Chester; Mueller, Kuerbis, and Page, Re-inventing Media Activism, 51–64; and Napoli, “Public Interest Media Activism,” 31–32.

116. As Katharina Kopp observes, by 1980 Ford had “completely abandoned the field and left it to the more conservative influence of the Markle Foundation.” Kopp, “The Role of Private Philanthropic Foundations,” 309.

117. Albert H. Kramer stated, “In general, the pattern that emerges confirms the view that organizations dealing in highly controversial attempts to redistribute control of the decision-making processes affecting the media or to challenge the basis of the commercial media, that is advertiser support, have been underfunded, gone without funding, or had to undergo incredible tests of stamina before receiving


