Strictly speaking, there is no history of mass communication research.
—James W. Carey

Most of the published histories of mass communication studies are airbrushed and Whiggish. Accounts of the field’s origins and development typically appear in textbook capsules and annual review essays, and tend to emphasize the progressive unfolding of a new science. Even the stirrings in the 1970s to challenge this progressivist narrative remained thoroughly presentist in other ways. Relative to the disciplinary history produced by the other social sciences, moreover, the historiography of mass communication research is anemic and notably unreflective. It is in this sense that James Carey’s claim, quoted earlier, is true. Strictly speaking, there is very little history of mass communication research—at least the sort that takes the field’s past as a serious object of study.

This volume is a response to Carey’s lament about the field’s neglect of its own past. The authors represented here, in the book’s first section, “The State of the Historiography,” address that neglect head-on. The volume’s second and third sections (“Institutional Histories,” “People and Places in the History of the Field”) take up Carey’s implicit challenge: these chapters exemplify a rigorous (if also catholic) approach to the history of the field. Taken together, the chapters collected here are meant to model, in a tentative way, the high standards that would characterize an emergent subdiscipline devoted to such study.

In this introduction, we briefly compare the history of communication research to the historical self-scrutiny of the other social sciences. We offer, in passing, some suggestions to help explain the field’s relatively meager body of...
history. In the balance of the introduction, we propose a set of traits that a richer, more scholarly historiography might embody.

* * *

Complaints about the historiography of the social sciences form their own history. In 1965, George Stocking issued his well-known charter for a history less prone to “anachronism, distortion, misinterpretation, misleading analogy, neglect of context, oversimplification of process.” A year later, Robert Young published his fifty-page assault on the historiography of American psychology. Robert K. Merton, a year after Young, reaffirmed his “history” versus “systematics” distinction in a classic essay that, among other things, urged historians of sociology to “extend beyond a chronologically ordered set of critical synopses of doctrine.” From the late 1960s on, a stream of critiques, of one or another discipline’s published remembrances, has filled journals and edited volumes—in the form of origin-myth slayings, survey-cum-critiques, and, most systematically, a 1983 collection on The Functions and Uses of Disciplinary History.

What’s striking about this criticism is that it has, in a sense, been heeded. Stocking, Young, and Merton pointed to the sorry state of their respective disciplinary historiographies forty years ago. It is not surprising that the rigor, scope, and sophistication of historical work in each field—especially psychology, economics, and anthropology—has improved steadily in the decades since. In the past twenty-five years or so, all of the established social sciences have developed self-conscious subfields devoted to their histories. However marginal to their disciplines’ centers, these subfields have nurtured, in every case, impressive work. In some disciplines, notably psychology and anthropology, researchers have erected a supporting infrastructure of associations, journals, archives, and specialized PhD programs. The ideal of a community of critical peers engaged in a collaborative project—frequently invoked as a hollow bit of rhetoric—seems more or less realized in these other history of social science subfields. Professional historians, meanwhile, have helped to fill in some of the gaps between and across these established disciplines.

Nothing like this exists for the history of communication research, despite the appearance, intermittently and in isolation, of fine scholarship. The extant history of the field—most of it, anyway—is distinguished by unabashed engrossment with present concerns. Typically this means using history to establish scientific bona fides or the field’s legitimate place in the university. For decades one staple of the field’s self-narration, the claim that researchers at Columbia University during and after World War II replaced a mistaken faith in media omnipotence with measured findings of “limited effects,” has for decades formed the core textbook contrast between naïve pre-history and the field’s scientific coming-of-age.
Deborah Lubken’s contribution to this volume (“Remembering the Strawman”) traces the active life of one of the stock epithets attached to that putative pre-history, the “hypodermic needle” theory of media influence. With a Mertonian eye for semantic nuance, Lubken shows how the label has been used—even by would-be revisionists—as a way to distinguish media researchers from the lay observer.

Wilbur Schramm, the mass communication field’s major institution builder in the decades after the war, supplied another lasting narrative for a young, legitimacy-starved field. Schramm’s story was straightforward origin myth, complete with four eminent (and unwitting) “founders” said to have converged on a science of communication. Schramm’s “four founders” myth is a near-perfect example of what Charles Camic has called strategic “predecessor selection,” and this story, too, has enjoyed a long published afterlife. Lana Rakow’s chapter (“Feminist Historiography and the Field”) notes one of the consequences: these founders—by-ascription, all men, dominate the field’s remembered past and blot out much else—including, notably, the history of feminist work and women researchers.

The history of mass communication research has been used, moreover, to grease the gears of paradigmatic succession—as a means, that is, to caricature, then batter, “old paradigm” whipping boys. More often, the discipline’s history is mined for usable genealogies, invoked by emergent approaches that present themselves as “recoveries.” Here the work of James W. Carey in fashioning a “cultural approach” to communication on the shoulders, in part, of John Dewey, Charles Horton Cooley, and the Chicago School of sociology is an eloquent case in point. Sue Curry Jansen’s chapter “Walter Lippmann” establishes that we profoundly misremember Lippmann, and that this warped picture originates in a misleading historical trope, narrated by Carey and others, that pits an elitist Lippmann against Dewey the democrat.

The point is that, for the field, the past has been an expedient—and a highly elastic one at that. The typical approach to writing history follows from this: a fast digest of a key idea or two, matched to thin and folksy biography. Core storylines are repeated, over and over, through uncited mnemonic hand-me-downs. A bundle of canonic texts is often cited, but in a gestural, even totemic way, and archives, for the most part, remain undisturbed. Most of the existing history is so resolutely internalist that it ignores external intellectual influences, let alone social, political, and economic ones. In particular, the extremely interesting and revealing institutional history of the field has been neglected. The great bulk of the history, finally, has been written by active participants in the field, often central figures with their own legacies at stake.

Our complaint isn’t that communication studies, alone, embellishes its past with helpful and heroic narratives in the service of teaching and legitimacy. All disciplines generate usable stories such as these. It is all too easy, moreover, to
admire the green grass of other social science subfields and to forget that these fields, in turn, may be coveting the verdant pastures of the history of science proper. No, our complaint is that communication studies have the thin hagiography and very little else, whereas in the other social science fields the panegyrics are at least supplemented by bodies of good-faith historical research. In communication research, there is little alternative to, in Jennifer Platt’s phrase, “the amateur history of unresearched introductory comments, taken-for-granted textbook versions and orally transmitted understandings.”

* * *

Why, then, has the historiography of communication research lagged behind its counterparts? One obvious factor is the field’s relative youth as a self-conscious discipline—a status claimed (and attained in the most tentative way) only in the mid-1950s. The other social science disciplines are not much older, but they benefit from their emergence in tandem with the modern American university itself in the late nineteenth century. There is, because of these longer life-spans, simply more history to document, within disciplines that have had the chance, over the decades, to develop more refined divisions of scholarly labor. That fifty-year head start has also won these fields at least a partial exemption from the legitimacy crises that regularly beset communication research—so much so that the late nineteenth century seems shrouded, by comparison, in the misty recesses of time. These other disciplines, moreover, produced the same blend of origin myth and self-congratulation, in their own sometimes precarious early decades. The quality gap in disciplinary history may simply reflect a much broader pattern of delayed inheritance, whereby concepts and methods developed in established fields make their way, years later, to communication departments, with little reciprocity.

There are additional, field-specific reasons for the robust historiographies in the other social sciences. Sociology, for example, has a distinct pedagogy of the classics, in which graduate training involves a one- or two-course encounter with the “holy trinity” (Marx, Durkheim, and Weber). This ongoing engagement, in which sociologists continue to wrestle with the likes of Weber, has supported genuinely historical attempts to contextualize these classics and their reception in the field. Psychology, though not nearly so substantively engaged with past luminaries, likewise requires a “history and systematics” course that has long supported a textbook and monographic market for history. For anthropology, a perpetual methodological crisis has generated a huge body of disciplinary self-reflection that has, predictably, involved historical self-scrutiny. Once formed, each discipline’s history subfield then developed its own internal standards and organizational momentum.

Relative youth, and these field-specific factors, cannot do all the explanatory heavy lifting, however. Another, complementary explanation is suggested
by John Durham Peters in his classic 1986 essay “The Institutional Sources of Intellectual Poverty in Communication Research.” He argues by analogy to the nation-state and compares communication research to an “academic Taiwan”—claiming all of China from its own, much smaller island. The field’s sweeping and often hollow claims to a topic, “communication,” are driven by the “urge to survive” and are built on institutional quicksand. The paradox for Peters is that the field’s desperate need for legitimacy precludes an honest coming-to-terms with its baleful organization. The result is self-perpetuating intellectual incoherence.

In that gloomy paper, Peters laments the “victory of institution over intellect in the formation of the field” and observes pointedly that communication research has omitted, in its disciplinary histories, the story of the field’s tangled institutional emergence. This history remains, at the time of writing, largely untold. If communication research has told one kind of story—the Whiggish—and left out most everything else, perhaps it is because the field has little otherwise, aside from the nebulous term itself, to hold it together. Scattered across the university—and issued from a motley band of ancestors, of which speech and journalism are only the most prominent—communication has arguably needed what Edmund Burke called “pleasing illusions” more than the most other disciplines. Tainted by vocational missions that, however, fill its lecture halls, programs in communication are both well off and in existential doubt. A single large university may have five or six distinct programs that carry the label, and a similar number of scholarly associations claim to represent the whole field. A discipline assembled from (in Peters’s words) “leftovers from earlier communication research married to dispossessed fields such as academic journalism, drama, or speech” needs memory more than it wants history.

* * *

Is it fair to ask what a more serious and sensitive historiography would look like? In a list that is neither exhaustive nor additive, we propose a bundle of traits that good histories tend to express. Of course, no single work could, in check-list fashion, realize each of these properties. Many of the chapters collected in this volume do, however, exemplify one or more traits, as we suggest in the following text.

*Qualified historicism.* The best disciplinary histories attempt to reconstitute the ideas, figures, struggles over resources, and any other object of study, within the full context of their original location in space and time. This kind of good-faith effort is made, however, in the full knowledge that all such attempts will fall far short of the ideal, given the socially grounded limits of perspective, language, and narrative selection. All historical inquiry is motivated, at some level, by present concerns, and this is no cause for despair. As long as these motivations are
tempered and, to the extent possible, explicitly acknowledged, they can be served without undue violence to the past.\textsuperscript{29}

Wendy Worrall Redal’s careful reconstruction ("Making Sense of Social Change") of British media research in the 1960s, within the context of the New Left’s engagement with the postwar consumer culture, is an exemplar of this “qualified historicism” ideal. Redal acknowledges the limits of her study but draws on interviews, archival sources, and neglected secondary work to paint a far richer picture of post-war British media study than is provided by the Williams/Hoggart/Thompson great-books-exposition genre that stands in for the historiography of early British cultural studies.

\textit{Explanatory eclecticism}. A narrowly conceived intellectual history approach is not, on its own, capable of explaining the trajectory of any given academic field. Nor, however, is the full complexity of a discipline exhausted with reference to strategic factors such as boundary work and credit seeking. Nonacademic audiences, government funders or commercial clients, the demands of students—all of these and many other factors besides give shape to disciplines and their intellectual products. However, these are empirical questions, more or less salient depending on the case. Good histories approach their topics as simultaneously social \textit{and} cognitive in character and weigh one set of factors against another on the basis of evidence.

The chapters by Peter Simonson ("Writing Figures into the Field") and David Morrison ("Opportunity Structures and the Creation of Knowledge") provide a telling contrast. Simonson’s chapter turns to the individual and his rhetoric as a device—one among many—to reconstruct aspects of the field’s history. Simonson makes an eloquent and convincing historiographical case for this kind of approach and then illustrates its fecundity in a close reading of a neglected figure, Bill McPhee.

Morrison’s chapter, in contrast, is cast in more sociological terms. “Why didn’t Paul Lazarsfeld and the circle around him,” Morrison asks, “conduct any real television research when the medium came on the scene in the 1950s?” He acknowledges that Lazarsfeld’s intellectual disinterest played a role but tells a story of withdrawn funding in the climate of McCarthyism that, in this case at least, turned off a would-be research spigot.

Despite their rival approaches, Morrison’s and Simonson’s chapters share an openness to different kinds of evidence and explanation. This is crucial, if only because there is simply too much complexity and diversity within the modern academic arena, across fields and over time, for any unitary scheme to bear much explanatory burden.

\textit{Dirty fingernails}. There is a great deal of untapped archival material, and as-yet unconducted oral history work, that should better inform histories of
communication research. This means treating the existing narratives with skepticism—and as objects of study in and of themselves. Even attentive reading of well-known articles, scrutinized at the footnote level and with broader context in mind, can contribute to a rich and unconventional body of historical work.

J. Michael Sproule’s contribution (“Communication: From Concept to Field to Discipline”) is a vivid case in point. Sproule’s chapter refuses the customary trade-off between archival evidence and close reading, on the one hand, and substantive sweep and argumentative ambition, on the other. Similar to Sproule’s well-known work on propaganda analysis, this chapter weaves documentary detail and nuance in with a larger narrative—in this case, a novel account of progressive disciplinary cohesion.

New, search-based methods. The published record of academic inquiry is fast becoming searchable in database form, and disciplinary historians are only just beginning to exploit this vast new trove of evidence. One obvious use is to trace key terms as they emerge and diffuse within and across fields; Deborah Lubken’s qualitative history of the “hypodermic” metaphor, referenced earlier, clearly benefited from these new tools.

Long-established quantitative methods, such as citation analysis, are ripe for adaptation. James Anderson and Janet Colvin (“Media Research 1900–1945”) build their chapter around a computer-assisted coding analysis of a large sample of the published media research of the early twentieth century. The study’s ambitious scope is, in a sense, their reward: where traditional methods tend toward, at the limit, idiographic irrelevance, Anderson and Colvin are able to make qualified claims about decades-long trends.

Openness to institutional histories. Academic fields have a published face, but the daily life of department meetings, syllabus construction, appeals to the dean, and the like are often vital components of historical explanation. The focus need not be at the microlevel: broader patterns, such as field-specific reward systems, graduate program rivalries, or the role of vocational programs in land-grant universities, are crucial here too.

Veikko Pietilä, in his chapter (“How Does a Discipline Become Institutionalized?”), traces the distinct but related rise of research on mass communication in Germany and Finland. Central to Pietilä’s densely sociological account is Richard Whitley’s distinction between “cognitive” and “social” institutionalization. Normally, Pietilä observes, a field forms around a bundle of topics and principles first, before assuming the trappings of an organized discipline. In the case of German newspaper science, however, the social institutionalization came first—so that the field had to cohere cognitively, after the fact. Pietilä’s analysis here of the German and Finnish cases is, of course, richly suggestive for the American case.
More international and comparative histories. The published work in the history of media research is overwhelmingly concerned with the United States, Canada, and the rest of the Anglophone world. There is also a smaller literature on the Scandinavian, Dutch, German, and French cases. With an exception here and there, however, none of the extant histories attends to the field as it has developed in various non-Western countries. Nor is there any serious comparative work that places national traditions and institutional histories side by side.

Work that takes up these now-invisible national and regional histories will be valuable in itself. But the real rewards will come from the insights-by-contrast that comparative research generates. It would be fascinating, for example, to examine the influence of field organization on intellectual life (and vice versa)—to compare, for example, national traditions that have, as in the U.S. case, tethered their fields to professional schools, with those, such as the U.K. case, that have developed as standalone academic programs. Consider, too, the complex and uneven uptake of (and resistance to) Western research models and disciplinary histories in the post-colonial Third World university. Many other stories of international scope remain largely untold, including the involvement of communication researchers in various United Nations’ forays into cultural policymaking. Kaarle Nordenstreng, in his contribution to the volume (“Institutional Networking”), brushes up against many of these research topics in his thorough history of the U.N.-linked scholarly association, the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR).

Dialogue with the historiography of the other social sciences. Communication research, wherever it has emerged in any stable, self-conscious form, has evolved first within the more established social sciences. In the twentieth-century U.S. case, psychology, sociology, and political science have housed in different ways and over sometimes distinct periods, housed major figures and approaches to media research. They have, moreover, supplied many of the personnel, research methods, and even strands of disciplinary memory that “communication,” as a standalone field, adopted.

The silo-like isolation of historical work in each field has led the more established disciplines, in their chronicles, to neglect or distort media research. In a related way, research in the history of communication research tends to obscure the relevant disciplinary contexts and to project, instead, disciplinary self-consciousness onto periods—the 1930s, for example—when there was none. It is, to be sure, a tall order to tame the historical literature of a number of adjacent (and interpenetrating) fields, but the peculiar conditions of the field’s evolution require it. For example, it would be impossible to reconstruct the context around Wilbur Schramm’s frenetic institution building in the 1940s and 1950s without studying social scientists’ wartime service, postwar confidence
and scientism, and the interdisciplinary and foundation-linked network of elite scholars that gelled around cold war government service. In this context the story of communication research is, in some respects, the story of the social sciences more broadly.

One striking manifestation of the sealed-off historiographies is the Chicago School of sociology. The Chicago School’s reflection and research on communication is largely missing from the otherwise methodical treatment by historians of sociology. Browse the communication literature, however, and you get the impression that Chicago personalities such as Robert E. Park thought about nothing else. Here William Buxton’s chapter (“From Park to Cressey”) helps to bridge the gap between the two bodies of history. Buxton, who has published extensively in the history and sociology of both fields, situates the school’s communication thought in the context of interwar sociology. He concludes that the communication-related work of the Chicago “school” is far more diverse than the label suggests.

* * *

In putting this volume together, we invited John Durham Peters to reflect on his 1986 essay, and the result is a thoughtful, quasi-autobiographical chapter (“Institutional Opportunities for Intellectual History in Communication Studies”). Peters closes his chapter with a counterintuitive claim, that communication’s status as a marginal latecomer may, in fact, open up intellectual space occluded by the confident myopia of more established disciplines. “Hegemony is epistemologically hazardous,” he observes.

It is on this hopeful note that we introduce the volume. We reject the commonplace idea that the current progress of a field and its history are mutually destructive. A more serious historiography of communication research would, it is true, be valuable for its own sake. The field’s complex history is also, no doubt, a rich site for any historian curious about the twentieth-century American university or, say, the intersections of social science and cold war liberalism. Communication research—emerging as it did in response to a sequence of external pressures, from public concern, to government funding, to the industry’s need for a workforce, to journalism schools’ need for legitimacy, and so on—is also a kind of a sociology of knowledge exemplar and should interest those concerned with how the winners and losers in the scholarly knowledge game are chosen.

But it is the field itself, we contend, that has the most to gain from carefully conducted historical work. Neglected or long-buried veins of thought, for instance, might be tapped anew because of historical digging. Lines of thought that have been transmitted in partial and misleading ways, likewise, might benefit
from a more conscientious treatment. Above all, honest scrutiny of our peculiar institutional roots will force a conversation about the intellectual consequences. The alternative, as Peters observed back in 1986, is head-in-the-sand irrelevance. This book is an attempt to start that long-overdue conversation.

NOTES

3. “Scholarship and the History of the Behavioural Sciences.”
7. Loren Graham et al.
8. Take the case of psychology: two journals (History of Psychology and Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences), a dedicated archival center at the University of Akron, two PhD programs (at the University of New Hampshire and York University), a History of Psychology division of the American Psychological Association, and a standalone scholarly association, Cheiron.
9. See, for example, Robert C. Bannister, Sociology and Scientism; Mark C. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible; Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science; Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science; Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, The Modern Social Sciences.
10. There are a number of impressive works in the historiography of mass communication research, including the research of William Buxton, J. Michael Sproule, Timothy Glander, Brett Gary, and Rohan Samarajiva, discussed in Pooley’s contribution to this volume (“The New History of Mass Communication Research”). Of the book-length and synoptic histories of the field, see Daniel Czitrom’s Media and the American Mind; Willard Rowland’s The Politics of TV Violence; Jesse Delia’s Communication Research: A History; David Morrison’s The Search for a Method; and Hanno Hardt’s Social Theories of the Press. In the related area of public opinion research, Jean Converse’s Survey Research in the United States remains indispensable, as is Sarah Igo’s recent The Averaged American. Among other notable contributions are Kurt and Gladys Lang’s work on European antecedents (e.g., “The European Roots”); John Durham Peters’s sweeping intellectual history of the idea of communication (Speaking into the Air); Garth Jowett’s work on the Payne Fund studies (e.g., “Social Science as a Weapon”); Peter Simonson’s excavation of Robert K. Merton’s communication thought (e.g., “The Serendipity of Merton’s Communication Research”) and his recently published Annals volume on Personal Influence (“Politics, Social Networks”); Karin Wahl-Jorgensen’s work on communication study at the University of Chicago (e.g., “How Not to Found a Field”); and a number of under-appreciated dissertations (including Larry Jene King, “A History of the Department”; Barry Alan Marks, “The Idea of Propaganda”; David Morrison “Paul Lazarsfeld”; and Wendy Worrall Redal, “Imaginative Resistance”). A comprehensive online
bibliography of works in the history of communication research can be accessed at http://www.historyofcommunicationresearch.org.

11. On this narrative, see Veikko Pietilä, “Perspectives on Our Past”; and Pooley, “Fifteen Pages that Shook the Field.”

12. Schramm first identified the “four founders” in a 1963 essay (“Communication Research in the United States”), and he elaborated the account in many subsequent publications. Bernard Berelson had named the four in his famous 1959 eulogy for the field (“The State of Communication Research”).


15. Carey lays out this narrative in a number of the essays collected as Communication as Culture, and in some later work, including “The Chicago School.”


17. Everett Rogers’s A History of Communication Research, for example, relies on “the general consensus of informed observers about who laid dominant roles in the history of communication study.” This is, as William Buxton has observed, “in effect, writing history backwards” (“Reaching Human Minds,” 177).

18. Robert Alun Jones: “Sociology, like all emergent scientific disciplines, has generated a largely mythological past which performs the important functions of legitimating present practice and reinforcing the solidarity of its practitioners” (“On Merton’s ‘History’ and ‘Systematics,’” 121); and Ulfried Geuter: “the implicit and common approach to the history of psychology is to commemorate its progenitors and to institute a tradition of ‘great men’ and their ‘great ideas,’ an important factor of the disciplinary ego” (“The Uses of History,” 193–94).

19. Here is Alan Sica, commenting on the historiography of sociology: “There are no definitive, comprehensive histories of sociology as practiced in the United States (or elsewhere) which can be compared favorably with the leading extant accounts of biology, chemistry, economics, philosophy, or psychology” (“Defining Disciplinary Identity,” 713).


21. Willard Rowland observed such a lag many years ago: “In many instances developments in communication research have lagged a decade or so behind the ‘parent’ sciences, but even in those cases in which the association has been closer in time, the trend has been one of imitation and following” (The Politics of TV Violence, 21–22).

22. 543.

23. Ibid., 538.

24. Ibid.

25. This argument is elaborated in Pooley’s chapter (“The New History of Mass Communication Research”) in this volume.


27. One consequence of this is that the labels meant to designate our ostensible object of study—“communication,” “communication research,” “communication studies,” “mass communication research,” and so on—are slippery and in important respects partial. Each refers to many things and, arguably, nothing at all. It is true that this nomenclatural disarray begs for historical work on the terms’ evolutions. For this volume, we are resigned to cycle through labels—a “communication
research” here, a “mass communication study” there—in full knowledge that the labels’ referents are shifting and often murky.

28. “Institutional Sources,” 543. James Anderson has made a complementary point: “The disarray of our history would seem to be quite representative of our present state. In fact, I would argue that it is our present state that forces the disorganization of our history” (“The Caravan of Communication,” 282).

29. The stance evoked here resonates with George Stocking’s notion of “enlightened presentism” and is compatible, too, with a view of history writing grounded in the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in which a scholar forms a “fusion of horizons” with his object of study (see Truth and Method, Charles Taylor, “Gadamer on the Human Sciences”; and Martin Jay, “Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?”).

30. “Cognitive and Social Institutionalization.”

31. See, for example, Martin Bulmer’s The Chicago School of Sociology, as well as Andrew Abbott’s brilliant history of the Chicago School, in Department and Discipline, 4–33.

32. Including an important treatment of Talcott Parsons, Talcott Parsons and the Capitalist Nation–State.

33. Recall Robert Merton’s epigraph for Social Theory and Social Structure: “A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost,” Alfred N. Whitehead” (1).

34. As Wolf Lepenies and Peter Weingart observe, “One form of reaction and, sometimes, consolation consists in the re-historization of a field. In retrospect, hitherto neglected and hidden alternatives to the mainstream of scientific development become visible and attempts are made to re-interpret the cognitive identity of a discipline or even to re-invent it as a whole as has been the case with anthropology” (Introduction, xiii).

35. Stocking, in 1965, made this point: “By suspending judgment as to present utility, we make the judgment ultimately possible” (“On the Limits,” 217).

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INTRODUCTION


